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Abstract of Thesis 
Temporary labour migration, social movements and neoliberal transformation  
in South Korea 
This project began with three questions that arose in the course of my field research in 2012, 
South Korea: ‘what had brought the migrant workers to South Korea?’; ‘why does the South 
Korean government restrict the migrant worker’s free choice of job?’ and ‘why do the migrant 
workers and pro-migrant local activists protest against the South Korean labour migration 
policy?’ A review of political economy, policy studies and social movement studies literature 
informs us that these questions involves three research areas: international migration in the 
context of global and national labour systems; the temporary labour migration scheme as a part 
of employer-oriented state policy; and social movements including both migrant’s self-organised 
and non-migrant’s pro-immigrant movements. The primary purpose of this thesis is to answer 
the three grounded questions in theoretical terms and analyse the inter-relations among the 
three areas in the context of neoliberal transformations of South Korean society. 
Like many other contemporary critical social scientists, I make use of Karl Polanyi’s (2001 [1944]) 
three critical concepts: fictitious commodification that entails disembeddedness; market society as 
a political project; and the protective counter-movement as a theoretical framework to analyse 
contemporary social transformations involved in international migration, temporary labour 
migration policy and migrant’s social movements. Contemporary reinterpretations of the 
Polanyian concepts suggests three theoretical principles. First, the political economic background 
of international labour migration to South Korea has to be analysed in the context of the 
transformation of the mode of production management on a global scale, which derives from the 
fictitious commodification of labour and entails disembededness of labour migration. Second, the 
rationales of the South Korean government’s introduction of temporary labour migration scheme 
have to be understood as a part of an employer-oriented political project and also in the context 
of a neoliberal social transformation into market society. Third, the motivations of migrant 
workers and their supporters to protest against South Korean government’s labour migration 
xi 
policy has to be understood as the expression of a countermovement to protect society from the 
perils of neoliberal social transformation on a global scale. 
Immigration data and labour market indexes idicate that an influx of migrant workers in the 
1990s coincided with the restructuring process of the South Korean labour market. The 1997 
Asian financial crisis accelerated the restructuring of financial, industrial and labour systems in 
South Korea. An hierarchical subcontract system between transnational corporations and small 
and medium enterprises intensified the pressures on wage and working conditions of non-
unionised workers. The South Korean government institutionalised the neoliberal ‘flexibilisation’ 
of the labour market which accompanied precarisation of jobs and deterioration of worker’s 
living conditions.  
The South Korean government’s introduction of temporary labour migration policy through first 
the Industrial Trainee System (ITS) and then the Employment Permit System (EPS) was an 
essential element of the neoliberal labour market restructuring project. These schemes were 
driven by employers’ demand for non-regular and low-waged workforces. The newer policy was 
enforced on the basis of such governing mechanisms as restricted choice of job, deportations, 
limited entitlement to social security, a paternalistic ‘assistance’ discourse, and exclusionary 
nationalist politics. Their consequences were extremely poor working and living conditions of 
migrant workers. 
The countermovement of migrant workers and pro-migrant activists grew from individual 
expressions of grievance to collective protests against the governing mechanisms of temporary 
labour migration policy including deportation. The social movements of migrants, however, saw 
a downturn after the temporary labour migration policy was institutionalised in 2004. The 
protests of migrants in 2012 suggest a potential resurrection of migrants’ resistances against 
temporary labour migration policy and the neoliberal commodification of labour and migration. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Migrant workers and pro-migrant activists in protests, Seoul 2012 
On 19 August 2012, almost a thousand people gathered at Boshingak1 Square in central Seoul 
(PO_31)2 . They were Southeast-Asian-looking men and women in their 20s or 30s, wearing 
probably their most colourful and fashionable clothes. They looked pleased and excited with this 
rare chance of an outing to the city centre. Some were giggling nervously; others were busy with 
taking ‘selfies’. Soon after, their faces suddenly grew serious, furious and anxious. They fiercely 
yelled out ‘Stop EPS!’ all together. Some participants put up signs printed ‘Abolish the EPS!’, 
‘Guarantee the Right to change workplaces freely!’ and ‘Win Fundamental Labor Rights!’ in 
English on one side and in Korean on the other. Others held hand-made signs in unevenly hand-
written Korean or in Cambodian, Nepalese, Myanmar or Vietnamese. A few scores of Korean-
looking people also had the flags of various organisations, from an internationally known human 
rights NGO like Amnesty International to an underground revolutionary-socialist group like 
Worker’s Solidarity. On the movable stage in front of the rally, the representatives of trade unions, 
migrant communities, migrant service centres, student organisations, and other social movement 
organisations spoke about the perils of South Korea’s temporary labour migration scheme, 
Employment Permit System (EPS). 
In a few moments, one of the organisers (RP_11), who had been busy preparing a march following 
the rally, saw me and excitedly acclaimed: ‘Chulhyo, did you see this great gathering? This is the 
biggest one that I have ever seen at migrant workers’ rallies for the last ten years! About a 
thousand people gathered!’ 
Two months before the rally, on 4 June 2012, the South Korean Ministry of Employment and 
Labor announced it would introduce a new rule that imposes restrictions on migrant workers’ 
                                                             
1 This thesis follows the Revised Romanisation of Korean system of The National Institute of Korean Language for 
Korean words, unless any word is broadly used in another way. 
2 Throughout this thesis, PO_XX represents Participatory Observation case number XX and RP_XX represents 
Research Participant case number XX. For details of the case, see Appendix I. 
2 
free choice of a job. This rule prohibits migrant workers from searching a new job before they 
quit the current one. It also prohibits them from contacting potential employers for a new job, 
even after leaving their current one. Job searches are permitted only through local labour offices, 
which have the exclusive authority to withhold job advertisement information and to arrange 
recruitment. The labour offices may arrange a maximum of five job interviews within three month 
time for a migrant worker. The worker has to be employed by one of the five employers; 
otherwise, he or she will find his or her visa cancelled and will soon face deportation. 
As a background of introducing this new rule, the Ministry claimed ‘the increasing tendency of 
migrant workers’ excessively frequent changes of job exacerbated the low productivity and 
workforce shortage for small companies’ and even ‘lowered the work morale of colleague 
workers’, according to a news report (Woo, 2012). The Ministry also alleged the ‘unnecessarily 
frequent turnover’ was induced by illegal brokers who manipulate the recruitment process. 
However, no evidence was provided for any of these claims. 
This new rule triggered serious discontent among migrant workers throughout the country. 
Migrant workers claimed the new rule would block their efforts to escape from poor working 
conditions According to a quote in the flyer distributed by the rally organisers: 
There are reasons why we want to change the companies. Dangerous work, violence at 
work, or overdue wages. If we cannot change the companies, what can we do? Should we 
just endure all? Why don’t you think about anything good for migrant workers? If you 
raise our wages and ensure safe and un-dangerous working conditions, no worker 
would want to change his company (A Myanmar worker in Yangsan).3 
They also expressed their claims, using the language of rights: 
I don’t think this is right. I have the freedom to choose a company, depending on 
whether it treats migrant workers well or poorly. I am not a slave. I have rights as a 
worker and a human being. […] If you don’t want us to change the company, you should 
give us a better job, fair treatment as labour law says, and better wages. And, they have 
to respect us as human beings! (A Filipino worker) 
                                                             
3 All translations from Korean materials in this thesis are mine, unless otherwise noted. 
3 
As soon as the migrant workers’ discontent was perceived, both migrants and pro-migrant 
organisations launched a series of actions against the South Korean government. About two 
weeks after the Ministry of Employment and Labor announced the introduction of the new rule, 
the major associations of the migrant and pro-migrant organisations publicised an open letter on 
19 June to the Ministry that expressed their opposition to the new rule. They include the Alliance 
for Migrants’ Equality and Human Rights (Alliance for Migrants), Joint Committee with Migrants 
in Korea (JCMK), and Migrant Rights Network. On 12 July, representatives of Korea Confederation 
of Trade Unions (KCTU) and the Migrant Rights Network had a meeting with the officials of the 
Ministry and complained about the new rule. On 17 July, Gyeonggi Province Alliance for Migrant 
Rights held a press conference to condemn the Ministry’s new rule. A protest rally in front of the 
Ministry’s building followed it on the next day, with the participation of the KCTU and migrant 
and pro-migrant organisations from all over the country (PO_25). On the same day, a nationwide 
temporary consultative network of the organisations was organised under a long name, 
Emergency Countermeasure Committee for the Withdrawal of the Ministry of Employment and 
Labour Rule Imposing Slave Labour of Migrant Workers (PO_24). On 12 August, these 
organisations held the conference of migrant communities to decide what follow-up actions 
should be taken (PO_27). The rally of 19 August (PO_31) was an outcome of the series of efforts 
made by the migrant and pro-migrant organisations, and trade unions. 
After the participation in and observation of above-illustrated series of protests and meetings, 
three questions came to me: ‘what had brought the migrant workers to South Korea?’; ‘why does 
the South Korean government restrict the migrant workers’ free choice of jobs?’ and ‘why do the 
migrant workers and pro-migrant local activists protest against the South Korean labour 
migration policy?’ Answering these three questions is the primary purpose of this thesis. 
Complex and intertwined research areas: labour migration, migration policy 
and social movements 
The above-raised three questions are grounded in fieldwork, rather than driven by theoretical 
reasoning. They still lack analytical salience to become research problems for academic inquiry. 
A social-scientific study needs to develop the questions further to locate them in the context of 
literature. Thus, this thesis begins with shaping and crafting the research problems both 
grounded in the fieldwork and contextualised in the literature review. 
4 
As a process of formulating the research questions, first, I clarify three research areas, the 
theoretical and empirical implications of which I explore throughout this thesis. I also consider 
the complex and ambivalent nature of the problems that emerged in realities of my field research. 
Then, in the next section, I will review the literature in each area in an attempt to locate my 
research problems in the context of earlier studies. 
The series of events as illustrated in the previous section help identifying the research areas of 
this thesis. I identify three areas: labour migration, migration policy and migrant movements. 
These three issues cannot be studied separately from broader political, economic and social 
contexts because they are all embedded in the society (Castles, 2004b, 2010). Thus, labour 
migration should be studied in the context of global and national labour systems; temporary 
labour migration policy as a part of the employer-driven state policy; and the self-organised or 
pro-migrant movements in the context of social movements in the society. 
The first research area is international labour migration in the context of global and national 
labour systems. Both the government’s rules and the migrants’ protests, as illustrated earlier, 
occurred in relation to the global trends of labour migration, particularly of temporary labour 
migration to industrialised countries including East Asian countries. As a form of workforce 
supply, labour migration is highly interrelated with the labour market conditions both in origin 
and destination countries. The transformations of labour system in a country often have 
significant influences in labour migration. Thus, as many migration scholars suggested (e.g. 
Schierup et al., 2006), labour migration has to be understood in the context of the labour market. 
It is particularly relevant for understanding the recent increase of temporary labour migration, 
which may not be explained separately from the changes of the South Korean labour system. 
Accordingly, the question that emerged from the field: ‘why did the workers migrate to South 
Korea?’ needs to be extended to include the aspects of both temporary labour migration and the 
labour system. 
The second area is temporary labour migration schemes as a part of employer-driven state policy. 
As described above, the South Korean government consistently sought to control the work and 
residence of migrant workers. The state’s attempt to control the movement and work of migrants 
is a global phenomenon. In the name of ‘managing labour mobility’ (International Organization 
for Migration, 2008), governments and inter-governmental organisations introduced and 
promoted a model of temporary labour migration. The newly added rule on migrant workers’ job-
choices, as illustrated above, reveals the foundation of the South Korean government’s policies on 
labour migration: the prevention of settlement. A policy-making process is, as political scientists 
5 
often suggest (e.g. Hay et al., 2006), significantly related with the nature of the state, in spite of 
the controversy over whether and how the nature of state has changed in the era of globalisation 
(Held et al., 1999, O'Hara, 2006, Weiss, 2012). The question of ‘why does the South Korean 
government restrict the migrant workers’ free choice of job?’, therefore, need to be explored in 
the realm of public policy. 
The third research area is the social movements of migrant workers and their supporters. As 
illustrated earlier, the South Korean government’s attempts to control migrant workers’ free job 
choice eventually triggered the resistance of both migrant workers and pro-migrant activists. 
Migrant workers’ protests against exploitative working conditions, poor living conditions and low 
wages are growing all over the world (Castles et al., 2014). Their movements often expand to 
challenging the policies of destination or origin governments that tacitly or explicitly condone or 
even induce the poor conditions. Social movements have played crucial roles not only in 
European and American history (Tilly and Wood, 2009) but also in the contemporary history of 
South Korea (Katsiaficas, 2012). Considering the interrelations between the social movements 
and the state policy, the earlier question of ‘why do the migrant workers and pro-migrant local 
activists protest against the South Korean government’s labour migration policy?’ will need to be 
expanded to include the impacts of the state policy on the social movement and vice versa. 
The series of events illustrated above also suggest that the three research areas are not separable 
from each other, but intertwined and interrelated. Migrant workers developed strategies of their 
own to cope with adverse working conditions under South Korea’s temporary labour migration 
scheme. The workers’ strategies triggered the government to change its policy to a more 
restrictive one. The policy change, in turn, provoked the discontent and resistance of migrant 
workers; and it, eventually, generated a momentum for migrant workers to rebuild solidarities 
with different groups of social movements.  
The intertwined and interactive character of the research areas is related to the complex and 
ambivalent nature of the problems in the real world. In South Korea, proactive social movements 
have made crucial contributions to the democratisation of the political community and the human 
rights of individuals. For most South Korean people, a rally of workers in central Seoul would not 
be an unusual scene; they would easily bypass it. However, if they have a closer look at the rally 
of migrant workers, they would most probably find it unusual due to the different languages and 
skin colours of the participants. Despite the vibrant civil society, the contention and participation 
of non-citizens are not visible in South Korea. 
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The claims of the protesting migrant workers might also sound contradictory to the public and 
even to legal or labour experts. The ‘right to freely change workplaces’ had never been an issue 
in South Korea’s labour-related discourse. The ‘fundamental labour rights’ might sound old-
fashioned to the public, because the claim had been mostly made by the early South Korean labour 
movements in the 1970s and 1980s under the authoritarian developmental regimes. The claims 
of South Korean workers in the past has become those of migrant workers in the present. This 
situation may be considered as a part of ‘the simultaneity of the non-simultaneous’ of South 
Korean society, as a South Korean political scientist Im (2014, pp. 629-645) noted by adopting 
the concept of ‘non-simultaneity’ suggested by Ernst Bloch (1977 [1932]). 
The South Korean government claims, in principle, its immigration policy is driven by economic 
rationality or, in other words, ‘the demand of nation and businesses’ (Immigration Policy 
Commission, 2012, pp. 35-39). At a glance, the labour migration policy seems to conflict with the 
government’s overall goals of the neoliberal economic project. The South Korean version of a 
temporary labour migration scheme intends to accommodate the labour demand of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in manufacturing sectors. However, these businesses are 
considered to be uncompetitive in the global market, thus, are expected to fade out rather than to 
be subsidised. 
The statement of a labour-law-specialised lawyer, CES, whom I interviewed, explicitly exemplifies 
the complex and ambivalent nature of the problems; and as a consequence, the difficulties in the 
advocacy of migrant workers’ rights in reality: 
The problems that the migrant workers face are indeed puzzling even to labour lawyers 
or trade unionists. In the past, the government allowed employers to hire migrant 
workers […] for a period of one year or less but renewable a maximum of two times. It 
recently changed the rule to permit the period of the employment contract to be as long 
as three years. Well, this sounds favourable for migrant workers in theory; but it is not 
in reality. Employers welcome the new rule, but migrant workers oppose it. How come 
workers prefer shorter-period labour contract in the time of precarisation? In fact, the 
real purpose of this rule is to prevent the migrant workers from seeking a better-paid 
job. When the workers are tied up by the longer-term contract, they have fewer chances 
to change their jobs. In effect, the long-term contracts only deteriorates the wages and 
working conditions of migrant workers. This is a real irony! The labour migration issue 
is this complicated. So many issues cannot be understood with common knowledge 
(RP_36). 
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The state of affairs of labour migration, migration policy and social movements in contemporary 
South Korea exemplifies the complex and ambivalent nature of the issues. However, as will be 
discussed in the next section, the existing studies on labour migration, migration policy and social 
movements in South Korea tend to oversimplify the problems. Taking into consideration the 
complex and ambivalent nature of the research areas and the oversimplification of the problems 
in research, this study seeks to understand the nexus of labour migration, migration policy and 
migrant movement in South Korea by contextualising the realities in the broader political 
economic contexts and social relations. 
Gaps in the literature: sedentary bias, fragmentation, political agenda-
oriented, receiving country bias, and theoretical isolation 
Reviewing how scholars have studied the three research areas (i.e. labour migration, migration 
policy and migrant movement) is the second process of formulating my research problems. 
Literature review in this section focuses on identifying gaps between the literature and the reality 
in South Korean context. The international literature, although still rather limited to Western 
literature, is reviewed in Chapter 2, where I will seek to build a theoretical framework of this 
research. 
For the last two decades, there have been significant expansions of studies in these research areas, 
particularly in the South Korean context. However, it is questionable whether those studies have 
successfully accommodated the complex and ambivalent nature of problems in the real world. In 
this regard, Castles’ (2010, pp. 1567-1572) critical observations on the global trends of migration 
studies provide useful guidance. First, citing Bakewell (2007), he pointed out ‘sedentary bias’, 
prevalent in migration studies. He criticised that migration is predominantly considered as a 
problem, which needs to be fixed, and of which the root cause must be addressed. His second 
critical observation is ‘the fragmentation on the basis of functional criteria’ that divides research 
areas depending on the types of migration or for the policy purpose. The third is ‘the closeness to 
political and bureaucratic agendas’ that occurs because migration studies are often confined to 
contributing to governments’ formulations of migration policies or evaluating the policies. Fourth, 
many migration studies tend to have ‘the receiving country bias’ and often to be oriented to the 
interest of receiving country. As a result, they tend to ignore the context of the origin country. 
Finally, many studies tend to share the problem of the ‘isolation of migration studies from broader 
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trends in contemporary social theory’. These critiques are used as reference points for evaluating 
the studies on labour migration, migration policy and social movements in South Korea 
throughout this section. 
The first area of the literature review is the process, cause and effect of international migration, 
particularly of labour migration. Understanding why and how the migratory process happens is 
a key research area of migration studies in an international context (e.g. Castles et al., 2014, 
Massey et al., 1998). However, there have been only handful of studies that seek to explain the 
cause of labour migration to South Korea. Some of them directly apply migration theories that are 
based on the experiences of the Western countries, although some others seek to set up a 
modified version of the theories reflecting the South Korean context.  
Describing a shift of migratory patterns from outward to inward migration in Northeast Asian 
countries, Fields (1994) claimed a ‘migration transition’ was witnessed in these newly 
industrialised economies. Corresponding to this view, Park (1994b) suggested that the increased 
inflows of migrant workers and the decreasing outflows of South Korean workers indicated a 
‘turning point’ of South Korean economic development. This argument was broadly accepted and 
repeatedly referred to by academics, policy-makers and the media (e.g. Choi, 2001, DeWind et al., 
2012). However, a close examination of recent out-migration data, contrary to the claim of a 
‘turning point’, leads to questioning the validity of this argument, because the existing outgoing 
migration fails to capture the increasing trends of various forms of temporary migration like 
working holidays. The trend of outgoing migration seems to be related to the transformation of 
the South Korean labour market system (i.e. precarisation of jobs) rather than to economic 
growth only. 
Labour market segmentation theory was often applied to explain the increased arrivals of labour 
migrants in South Korea. Lee (1997, pp. 356-357) argued labour migration was generated by the 
segmented labour market between SMEs and large firms, referring to the classic analysis of the 
relationship between labour migration and labour market (Doeringer and Piore, 1971, cited in 
Lee, 1997). Since the late 1980s, the South Korean labour market has been rapidly divided into 
two segments: the market of higher-waged jobs at large companies and that of lower-waged jobs 
at small companies. The lower wages were often accompanied by poor working conditions, which 
eventually deterred South Korean local workers from seeking such jobs. International labour 
migration was introduced to supply low-cost labour forces to the SMEs. Also, as Seol (1999) 
argued, discrepancy in the level of unionisation between large companies and the SMEs 
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intensified the wage gap; thus, the latter experienced labour shortage that was filled only by the 
migrant workforce. 
After these early initiatives to understand the cause of migration, studies on this topic are hardly 
found. The causality of migration has not been a popular topic for migration studies in South 
Korea. Instead, the migration researchers have tended to be oriented in policy-formulation or 
exposition of migrant’s experiences, as will be discussed later in this section. They have also been 
more concerned about the outcomes of the migration and the perspective of destination society 
than about the whole migratory process including the experiences in origin societies. This trend 
exemplifies ‘the receiving country bias’, policy-oriented confinement, and divorce from broad 
social theories. 
The labour market segmentation approach in the South Korean context may be advanced by 
incorporating the aspects of neoliberal restructuring into the discussion. Many scholars have 
discussed the political-economic process of neoliberal transformation (Ji, 2011, Lim and Jang, 
2006a), neoliberal transformation of economic foundations (Chung, 2007, Lee, 2011c, Saesayon, 
2009), neoliberalism’s impacts on the labour market and employment system (Jung, 2008, Lee, 
2002b) and labour relations (Lee, 2012a, Park, 2002a), and their social perils (Kim, 2004a, Lim 
and Jang, 2006b). However, only a few of them seriously discussed labour migration in the context 
of neoliberal transformations. This thesis seeks to set a bridge between the theories of labour 
migration and those of neoliberal transformations (see Chapter 5). 
The second topic for the literature review is migration policy. The studies on international 
migration to South Korea first appeared in the early 1990s when the issues of increased labour 
shortages in the SMEs and increased undocumented migrants became known to the academics. 
These early studies were mostly policy-oriented. They discussed such topics as the speculation of 
the economic benefit of labour migration (e.g. Kim, 1990, Lee, 1991b) and the control of ‘illegal’ 
migrant workers (e.g. Lee, 1991a). The papers of labour unionist approaches discussed the 
strategies to prevent the ‘illegal practice’ of employing unauthorised migrant workers (e.g. Choi, 
1992b, Kim, 1992b). Later, researchers began to analyse the impacts of labour migration on the 
South Korean labour market by empirical data (e.g. Park, 1993, Seol, 1992). The academic debates 
during this period tended to focus on a rising policy question: whether the government should 
officialise the temporary labour migration scheme. While the business-affiliated researchers 
urged the introduction of labour migration, social scientists and labour movement-related 
researchers showed a restrictionist approach from the view of protecting local workers (Lee, 
2011a). 
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Later, South Korean scholars have more directly engaged with the government’s migration policy 
process by offering theoretical or empirical grounds to support or oppose temporary labour 
migration. Many researchers criticised the failure of the then private-run quasi-temporary labour 
migration scheme, the Industrial Trainee System (ITS). They claimed the ITS had to be replaced 
by a government-managed scheme (Choi, 1996, 2002, Kang, 1996, Seol, 2000a). Other scholars 
introduced the experiences of temporary labour migration in other countries like Germany, 
Taiwan and Singapore to provide references to policy-makers (Yoo et al., 2004). The policy report 
of Lim and Seol (2000) was the stepping stone for the formation of South Korea’s temporary 
labour migration scheme, the EPS. After the employer-driven and government-operated 
temporary labour migration scheme had been introduced in 2004, many studies were involved 
in the evaluation or critique of the policy. Lawyers examined the legality of the temporary labour 
migration scheme from the labour-rights aspect, particularly of the right to free choice of the 
workplace (Ko, 2006) and the right to equal wage (Jun, 2010). They also discussed the 
constitutionality of the laws on the EPS (Choi, 2011b, Pyo, 2011). Social scientists, in cooperation 
with civil society groups, also analysed the negative effects of the migration policy by examining 
the experiences of migrants, as will be introduced later. 
Since the mid-2000s, South Korean migration studies have rapidly shifted their attention away 
from labour migration to ‘the multicultural’ and ‘integration’. As a response to rapid increase of 
foreign spouses, often referred to as ‘marriage migration’, the South Korean government took 
initiatives in proposing policies for the settlement and welfare of marriage migrants. The policy 
proposals were accompanied by empirical research like surveys on demand or delivery of welfare 
services. Seol et al. (2005b) and Seol et al. (2006) surveyed migrant women’s experiences and 
Goh et al. (2005) investigated the process of international marriage brokerage, both of which 
made significant contributions to policy-formulation. 
Soon after, there was a proliferation of policy studies with a narrow focus on service provision to 
marriage migrants. Some other studies critically engaged with debates on the legitimacy of 
service provision-oriented policies. They argued such policies patronised migrants and, 
consequently yield negative influences on their political participation and citizenship (Kim, 
2011d, Kim, 2011e). A critical discourse analysis of Shim (2007, pp. 75–76) demonstrated the 
‘paternalistic’ nature of the South Korea government’s migrant policy. He argued the policies 
emphasised the ‘service provision’ only; but they refused recognise the ‘politics of recognition’ of 
migrants, based on their collective identity as a minority group and represented by their 
collective claims of social rights. 
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A few studies analysed the policy process in theoretical terms. Analysing the process of South 
Korean government’s introduction of the temporary labour migration scheme, Lee (2008b) 
employed both political economic theory of ‘client politics’ (Freeman, 1995, Green, 2005, cited in 
Lee, 2008) and neo-institutional theories on the dynamics within a government (Boswell, 2007, 
Hollifield, 2004, Rosenhek, 2000, cited in Lee, 2008): the former explains why the introduction of 
the EPS was delayed and the latter explains how the EPS has developed. Chapter 2 of this thesis 
explores the theoretical aspects of labour migration policy in detail. Then, I will seek to extend 
the existing analysis of South Korean labour migration policy by employing a policy-process 
analysis and a critical policy analysis approach (see Chapter 6 and 7). 
The third area is migrant’s experiences and resistance. The rapid increase of undocumented 
migrants in the early 1990s was an unprecedented phenomenon in South Korean society. The 
media was the first to pay attention to their extremely exploitive working and living conditions 
(e.g. Kim, 1992a, Lee, 1992). Researchers also participated in the efforts to expose the experiences 
of migrant workers mostly by the survey (e.g. Lee, 1994, Park, 1993, Seol, 1997). From the 
beginning, migrant workers’ experiences have often been addressed with the language of ‘human 
rights’ (e.g. Cho, 1995, Park, 1995). This trend coincides with the expansion of human rights 
discourses in the South Korean civil society, which was often described as ‘the growth period of 
human rights movement’ (Lee, 2001). 
Later, studies on the human rights conditions of migrants specified their research subjects: 
undocumented migrants (Seol et al., 2005a), migrant women (Seol et al., 2005b), migrant children 
(Seol et al., 2003), old-comer Chinese migrants (Huaqiao) (Park and Jang, 2003), refugees (Kim et 
al., 2008) and North Korean migrants (Park et al., 2005). In a unique initiative, Kim et al. (2007) 
explored the nexus of labour and marriage migrations as well as the trajectory of migration from 
origin to destination countries.  
Reports of civil society groups offered particularly useful information that had not been seriously 
examined by scholars. A pro-migrant group published a series of reports on the exploitations that 
migrants had experienced throughout the migratory process under temporary labour migration 
scheme (Migrant Rights Network, 2006, 2008, 2010). This group also extended the scope of its 
investigations toward migrant workers in particularly isolated conditions, such as the fishery (Oh 
et al., 2012) and agricultural sectors (Kim et al., 2013b).  
Many studies on migrants’ experiences are oriented towards rights of migrants rather than the 
national interest of either destination or origin country. They formed the basis for critical 
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engagement with debates on migration policies. It is significant that their research scope 
transcended territorial boundaries and, eventually, they sought to overcome ‘methodological 
nationalism’ (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2003) that was still prevalent in migration studies. They 
attempted to overcome the ‘reductionist approaches that focus on limited aspects of migratory 
processes’ (Castles, 2010, p. 1569). It is also meaningful that these studies sought 
interdisciplinary approaches, encompassing the perspectives and methods of sociology, 
anthropology, legal and policy studies. These studies were often the outcomes of collaboration 
among the academics, civil society group members, lawyers and, sometimes, international 
organisations. Despite the critical, independent, transcendent and comprehensive characters of 
these studies, however, they were not interested in locating the research findings in the context 
of social theories. 
While the studies on migrants’ experiences often tend to describe migrants as passive victims of 
human rights violations under malfunctioning migration policy, the studies on migrants’ 
resistance emphasised active agency of migrants and their supporters. The seminal work of Seol 
(2003) presented a comprehensive map of migrant workers’ resistance and their supporters’ 
activities against the exploitative pseudo-temporary labour migration scheme (ITS). After the 
introduction of a formal temporary labour migration scheme (EPS), Park (2005b) analysed 
divisions of the movement into the race-perceptive group and class-perceptive one. The former 
again divided into the movement-oriented group and the service-oriented group, while the latter 
developed into a trade union. Nevertheless, there is a broad consensus that the South Korean civil 
society in collaboration with migrant workers played a key role in promoting migrant rights, in 
particular between the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. 
Ensuing studies recognised the role of particular organisations of migrants and their supporters 
in shaping an ideological ground of migrants’ movement. The scholars of industrial relations 
noticed growing class awareness among migrant workers and paid particular attention to 
Migrants’ Trade Union (MTU) in relation to its potential of organising migrant workers (Gray, 
2007, Lee and Yoo, 2013). A sociologist of religion analysed church’s contributions to advocacy 
of migrants from the view of ‘the transnational characteristics of the church and the historical 
experience of church-based activism for democratisation’ (Kim, 2011a, p. 1664). Other scholars 
debated the contribution of international human rights norms to promoting the migrant rights 
movement in South Korea. Kim (2009) claimed the international norms served as a framing 
strategy for local activists to mobilise migrant rights, while Kim (2011b) was rather sceptical 
about it. Both recognised the framing strategy failed in cultivating ‘inclusive nationhood’ and 
13 
overcoming cultural barriers. Also, the neglect of migrant workers’ subjectivity among pro-
migrant organisations was often questioned by both the academics and activists. Based on an 
analysis of the relationship between migrant workers and the local clergy, Kim (2011a) criticised 
that the clergy often objectified and patronised the migrants, rather than facilitated their 
independence, despite church’s contribution as the ‘catalysers’ of the movement. The service-
oriented organisations’ collaboration with the ‘paternalist’ state policy was also questioned. Shim 
(2007, p. 76) critically observed ‘the close partnership’ between the government and pro-migrant 
organisations. It employed a ‘tolerance’ paradigm as a policy guideline and prioritised service 
provision, which only resulted in the exclusion of migrants from the mainstream society. These 
perspectives are reconfirmed by my interview data, as will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
However, the literature on migrants’ resistances shows two general limitations. First, the studies 
focused on the struggles for the abolishment of the ITS between 1993 and 2004; only a few cover 
changes in migrant advocacy after the introduction of the EPS. My research pays attention to the 
latter period through an ethnographic observation (see Chapter 8 and 9). Second, they fail to 
analyse migrant resistance in the context of social transformations of both the South Korean 
society and the globe. Efforts were made by scholars to understand the migrant advocacy 
movement in the context of democratisation movement in South Korea (e.g. Kim, 2011a). Koo 
(2001), being inspired by Thompson’s (1965) seminal work, presented a ground-breaking study 
on the formation of the working class and the development of labour movement in the context of 
economic and social transformations in South Korea. Although his work does not cover migrant 
workers, it still provides useful guidance for studying migrant workers’ movements. 
The literature review informs us of three major research gaps. First, with regard to labour 
migration, only a few studies examined its causes, processes and effects more than a decade ago. 
Almost no specific attention was paid to the characteristics of temporary labour migration, 
particularly in the context of neoliberal transformation. Second, although many South Korean 
studies have contributed to the government’s formulations and evaluations of migration policies, 
only a few of them seriously engaged with a theoretical discussion on the policy process. These 
studies are often isolated from general social theories such as state theories or debates on 
neoliberal globalisation. Third, the studies on the experience and resistance of migrants 
presented comprehensive information about migrants’ human rights conditions and their 
struggles. However, they failed to situate their analysis in the context of neoliberal globalisation 
and social transformation or to engage with such theories.  
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While many studies tended to limit their research scope to a fragmented perspective or political 
agenda-oriented approaches, a few researchers sought to overcome the narrow research scope 
(e.g. Lee et al., 1998, Seok et al., 2003). Particularly, the ground-breaking study of Seol (1999) was 
a unique example that held a holistic approach in analysing labour migration, migration policy, 
migrant workers’ experiences, and the South Korean civil society’s engagement. It attempted to 
explain the migratory trend by adopting the migration theories of the American and European 
contexts. It also presented a survey outcome on migrants’ experiences at work and of living 
standards. The author criticised the then operating pseudo-temporary labour migration. After 
almost two decades after this book was published, it is still hard to find a study that holds the 
holistic approach and covers the broad range of issues on migration. For the last two decades, 
however, there has been a dramatic expansion and diversification of international migration and 
also significant changes in migration policy and migrant activism.  
I seek to contribute to the literature by presenting a holistic and contextual approach to the nexus 
of international migration, migration policy and social movements through this research and by 
engaging with the theories of social transformation overarching the three areas. 
Research problems: temporary labour migration, state policy and migrants’ 
resistance in the context of neoliberal social transformation 
As described above, three questions arose from my field research: ‘what had brought the migrant 
workers to South Korea?’, ‘why does the South Korean government restrict the migrant workers’ 
free choice of job?’ and ‘why do the migrant workers and pro-migrant local activists protest 
against the policy?’ Based on observations in the field, I identified three research areas: 
international migration in the context of global and national labour systems, a temporary labour 
migration scheme as a part of employer-driven state policy, and social movements including both 
migrants’ self-organised and non-migrants’ pro-migrant movements. Then, the literature review 
indicated the three major research gaps: lack of attention to temporary labour migration in the 
South Korean migration studies, lack of global and social transformational perspectives in both 
the studies of migration policy and migrants’ experiences and resistances, and lack of theoretical 
engagement in all three areas. 
Taking into account of above-identified research areas and research gaps, I specified the three 
questions from the field research as below: 
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 ‘What is the political economic background of international labour migration to South 
Korea?’, 
 ‘What was the policy process of the South Korean temporary labour migration scheme 
and what are the rationales and governing mechanisms of its operation?’, 
 ‘What are migrant workers’ experiences and in what way have they engaged with the 
policy process, especially in connection with South Korean social movements?’ 
Exploring the answers to these questions is the primary aim of this research. However, it does 
not intend to confine its analysis to addressing each topic separately. This research rather seeks 
to understand how the three issues interplay between each other and why they are significant in 
the historical, political and economic context of South Korean society. Thus, an overall question 
overarching these three problems can be elaborated as below: 
‘In what way does the mode of international migration, the logic of state’s migration 
control, and the actions of the migrants and their supporters interplay in the context of 
neoliberal social transformation?’ 
An outline of theory, methodology and thesis structure 
These research problems reflect the complex and ambivalent nature of reality and the 
intertwined and interplaying character of the research areas. As the literature suggests, a 
fragmented and isolated research approach hardly helps to understand the problems. On the 
contrary, promising for a comprehensive understanding of social structure, agency and their 
interrelation seems to embrace a social transformation approach as a theoretical framework and 
a holistic approach as a methodological principle. There have been constant efforts of social 
scientists to establish theories and methodologies to analyse the social transformation of their 
time and space. The tradition is traced back to the classic social scientists, De Tocqueville (2008 
[1838]), Marx and Engels (2012 [1867]), Weber (2012 [1905]) and Polanyi (2001 [1944]); then, 
it was continued by Thompson (1965), Skocpol (1979) and Tilly (2009). Other examples are 
Castles and Kosack (1985 [1973]), who highlighted migration and migrants in Western Europe, 
and Koo (2001), who focused on South Korean working class. Following this tradition, this thesis 
also stands its ground on the social transformation approach that embraces historical, structural, 
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political economic and also agency-oriented aspects of international labour migration, migration 
policy, and migrant’s resistances. 
My theoretical account of the research problems begins with a review of literature in the three 
areas of this research: international labour migration in the context of global and national labour 
systems, temporary labour migration scheme as a part of employer-driven state policy, and social 
movements of migrant workers and their supporters. Then, I explore the theories of social 
transformations in an effort to develop my theoretical framework. As a starting point, I revisit 
Karl Polanyi’s (2001 [1944]) The Great Transformation, with reference to the theoretical 
principles of the research project that I participated in, The Social Transformation and 
International Migration in the 21st Century (see Castles et al., 2015). As a way of analysing my 
research problems, I particularly attend to Polanyi’s three critical concepts that were proposed 
to analyse the social transformations in his time and space: fictitious commodification that entails 
disembeddedness, market society as a political project and protective counter-movement. These 
concepts were developed in the course of analysing the industrialisation in Western European 
society from the late 18th to the early 20th centuries. However, they still resonate with many 
contemporary studies on neoliberal transformations in the global, national and local contexts. 
Then, I seek to expand the Polanyian concepts to incorporate my three research areas. The 
theoretical exploration is mainly presented in Chapter 2, although it is constantly revisited 
throughout this thesis. 
As a way of operating the holistic approach in methodological terms, this research employed a 
mixed method approach. Despite the debates over ontological, epistemological and 
methodological questions (see Biesta, 2010), the practitioners of mixed methods research 
maintain a ‘pragmatic stance’ (Green and Hall, 2010, p. 130) to overcome the dichotomy between 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Following this position, I used both quantitative and 
qualitative data that can explain each study area in the best way. I also discuss my reflection on 
methodological problems with particular focus on the relationship between researcher and 
research participants. The methods and data used in this research are discussed in Chapter 3. The 
diagram of Figure 1-1 illustrates the process of crafting my research questions and also the key 
concepts and methods. 
Chapter 4 and 5 examine the political economy of international labour migration to South Korea 
before and after the rise of neoliberalism. This is the first area of this research that asks the 
question: ‘what is the political economic background of international labour migration to South 
Korea?’ Chapter 4 examines a historical account of migration, labour, policy, and social 
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movements during the pre-neoliberal period. It mainly discusses the period of ‘authoritarian 
developmental regime’ (Cho, 2012b) between 1960 and 1987, although it also touches on a few 
significant aspects of the period before. This review of historical background serves as the 
groundwork for a comparative analysis between the periods before and after the rise of 
neoliberalism, by which the social transformations of South Korea are distinctively identified. 
Then, Chapter 5 argues that the increase of temporary labour migration is related to the 
neoliberal transformation of the South Korean society, particularly the neoliberalisation of the 
labour system that accompanies the precarisation of work. This argument is primarily based on 
the examination of statistical data including immigration data and economic indices. 
Chapter 6 and 7 examine the second research area, temporary labour migration policy. Chapter 6 
begins with an examination of policy process of the South Korean temporary labour migration 
scheme, the Employment Permit System. Then, Chapter 7 analyses the rationales behind the 
policy and the governing mechanism employed to operate it. Examining the second research 
question: ‘what was the policy process of the South Korean temporary labour migration scheme 
and what are the rationales and governing mechanisms of its operation?’, these chapters argue 
that the introduction of the temporary labour migration scheme is an integral part of neoliberal 
social transformation projects. The South Korean government mobilised the exclusionary 
nationalist ideology and violent immigration control in order to implement the policy. However, 
the recent trend shows the sustainability of this scheme is doubtful. An analysis of policy process 
and policy outcome is employed to underpin this argument. 
Chapter 8 and 9 discuss the third research area on social movements. Chapter 8 begins with an 
examination of migrant workers’ experience and resistance under the South Korean temporary 
labour migration policy in the course of neoliberal transformations. Then, Chapter 9 discusses the 
engagement of South Korean civil society with the migrants’ resistance and their development 
toward anti-neoliberal globalisation movement. Answering the third research question: ‘what are 
migrant workers’ experiences of the scheme and in what way have they engaged with the policy 
process, especially in connection with South Korean social movements?’, these chapters argue the 
social movements have developed in two directions: charity-oriented approach and social 
movement-oriented approach. By taking up service delivery as its role, the former has 
contributed to reinforcing the temporary labour migration scheme and eventually neoliberal 
transformation of work. The latter has maintained the opposition to neoliberal globalisation and 
played leading roles in organising migrant workers’ resistances against the temporary labour 
migration scheme. However, it has been gradually isolated from migrant labouring masses. 
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Qualitative data were extensively collected through my ethnographic study undertaken in 2012, 
and they were analysed for the argument of these chapters. 
Chapter 10 discusses the theoretical and empirical implications of the research findings as a 
conclusion. It also presents limitations of this study and suggests the issues be considered for 
further research.  
 
19 
 
Neoliberal 
transformation 
of labour 
market, state, 
and civil society 
 
Figure 1-1 Process of shaping research questions and identifying key concepts 
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Chapter 2 Labour migration, temporary migration policy, 
and social movements in neoliberal 
transformation: a theoretical account 
This chapter establishes a conceptual framework to analyse labour migration, temporary 
migration policy, and social movements in the context of neoliberal social transformation. The 
theoretical exploration begins with examining Karl Polanyi’s (2001 [1944]) three foundational 
concepts: fictitious commodification that entails disembeddedness, market society as a political 
project and protective countermovement. These concepts were presented to explain the political 
and economic origin of the social transformations in the 19th and the early 20th century Europe. 
Many social scientists have drawn on Polanyian concepts in analysing the contemporary process 
of neoliberal global transformation. This chapter discusses how the Polanyian concepts may be 
expanded to address the temporal and spatial contexts of this research, i.e. in 21st century South 
Korea. It also explores the theoretical salience of these concepts in analysing three aspects of this 
research: labour migration, temporary migration policy, and social movements.  
It is a theoretical initiative of this thesis to overcome a widespread tendency in migration studies. 
As Castles (2010, 2015) consistently criticised, they isolate themselves from mainstream social 
scientific theories and to confine themselves to a descriptive and administrative field. He 
proposes that migration research should be re-embedded ‘in a more general understanding of 
contemporary society’ and also to be linked ‘to broader theories of social change across a range 
of social scientific disciplines’ (Castles, 2010, p. 1565). Drawing on the theoretical insights of 
Polanyi and also on the proposals of Castles, in this chapter I also explore the possibility to build 
a conceptual framework that overarches the three dimensions of this research and the context of 
neoliberal social transformation in contemporary South Korea.  
The first section revisits Polanyi’s theory of social transformation and discusses the temporal 
expansibility of his key concepts to analyse the contemporary transformation driven by 
neoliberal globalisation. The following three sections review the existing literature on the three 
areas of this research and critically evaluate it from a Polanyian perspective. Then, after I examine 
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the relevance of Polanyian theories to the contemporary South Korean context, I present the 
conceptual framework of this thesis, built on the theoretical explorations of the earlier sections. 
Neoliberalism and Polanyian critiques4 
The Great Transformation of Polanyi’s time 
The main concern of Polanyi’s The Great Transformation is the perils of ‘economic liberalism’ that 
emerged in the early 18th century and proliferated throughout the 19th and the early 20th centuries 
in Europe. The principle of laissez-faire was ‘born as a mere penchant for non-bureaucratic 
methods’; however, it evolved into ‘a veritable faith in man’s secular salvation’, ‘a militant creed’, 
and eventually the organising principle of society behind the creation of market economy 
(Polanyi, 2001 [1944], p. 141). The ‘faith’ of the free market economy is founded on three liberal 
tenets: a competitive labour market where labour should find its price on an unregulated market, 
an automatic gold standard by which the creation of money should be the subject of an 
unregulated mechanism, and free trade by which goods should be free to flow across the borders 
without any interference of preferences or customs duties. 
Polanyi uncovered the unrealistic assumptions behind the tenets of market economy on the basis 
of a historical study. First, he challenged the assumption behind the competitive market where 
human beings always seek to maximise utilities for ‘gain’. He argued that, before industrialisation, 
the central principle of organising economic systems had never been the maximisation of ‘gain’, 
but ‘reciprocity or redistribution, or householding, or some combination of the three’ (Polanyi, 
2001 [1944], p. 57). Second, he also highlighted the false assumption that an unregulated market 
can be separated from society. Instead, he argued the economy is ‘embedded in social relations’. 
According to him, historical evidence demonstrates markets had never been more than 
‘accessories of economic life’ and ‘the economic system was absorbed in the social system’ (p. 71). 
Third, the market economy also unrealistically assumes that all elements of the industry, not only 
goods and services but also labour, land and money are produced for sale on the market and 
subject to the laws of demand and supply. He argues this assumption is in fact the fabrication of 
                                                             
4 The discussions in this section are developed from Castles et al. (2011), the first working paper of the Social 
Transformation and International Migration project, which I co-authored. 
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‘fictitious commodities’. Labour, land and money are not commodities by empirical definition, 
although they are essential elements of the industry that must be organised in markets. For 
example, labour is ‘another name for a human activity which goes with its life, which in its turn is 
not produced for sale but for entirely different reasons, nor can that activity be detached from the 
rest of life, be stored or mobilised’ (p. 75). The fictitious commodification of labour, land and 
money repudiates the economy’s social embeddedness and attempts to ‘subordinate the 
substances of society itself to the laws of the market’ (p. 75). 
It is significant that Polanyi discerned the role of the modern nation state in the process of 
marketisation. Contrary to the myth of laissez-faire, he argued the market economy was not an 
outcome of a natural evolution but was enforced and managed by states’ ‘continuous, centrally 
organised and controlled interventionism’ (Polanyi, 2001 [1944], p. 146). As Block (2001, p. xxvi) 
explains, the state continues to play ‘roles in economy’ such as by adjusting the supply of money 
and credit to manage inflation and deflation, shifting demand for employees by providing 
unemployment subsidies and job training, and influencing migration flows. The modern market 
economy and the modern nation state are not discrete elements but two intertwined aspects of a 
human invention that was regarded as of ‘market society’, as Polanyi (p. 227) named it. The 
market society is a political project of economic liberals, not an outcome of natural evolution. 
Polanyi also argued for the unsustainability of the self-adjusting market economy. The market 
economy is ‘a system of crude fictions’ with effects so destructive that society cannot withstand 
them (Polanyi, 2001 [1944], pp. 75-76). The perils of the market society are historically proved 
by the extremely poor working and living conditions in Western Europe during the Industrial 
Revolution, as vividly illustrated in literary works like Dickens (2012 [1854]) and Zola (2004 
[1885]). It is significant, as Burawoy (2015) reminds us, that Polanyi went beyond Marx’s account 
of exploitation as the defining experiential feature of capitalism. He articulated the destructive 
effects of commodification on society. Then, he argued society inevitably takes measures ‘to 
protect the human and natural substance, as well as its business organisation’ from ‘the ravages 
of this satanic mill’ (p. 77). Thus, he argued market economy’s process of social disembedding and 
society’s protective measures occur simultaneously, as seen in the 19th century in Europe. He 
referred to this as the ‘double movement’ of economic liberalism and social protection. The first 
movement sought to establish the self-regulating market with the support of the trading class and 
with the methods of laissez-faire and free trade. The other one, the protective countermovement, 
sought to conserve human, the nature and productive organisations with the support of those 
who were the most affected by the market and with the tools of protective or restrictive 
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legislation and other instruments of intervention (pp. 138-139). However, the latter may also 
adversely turn into another process of social destruction, especially for industrial and political 
democracy, as exemplified by the emergence of fascism in 1920s and 1930s Europe. 
Polanyi’s theory of social transformation is encapsulated by his three concepts that explain the 
complicated nexus of market, the state, and society: fictitious commodification that entails 
disembeddedness, market society as a political project, and protective countermovement. These 
concepts have significant analytic salience in the world of today. The next section discusses how 
Polanyian approaches analyse the contemporary global transformation driven by neoliberalism. 
Global transformations in the neoliberal era 
In the 20th century, economic liberalism was reborn as neoclassical economics, which narrowed 
down classical political economy to ‘a formal analysis of individual economic behaviour and the 
functioning of markets’ by marginal utility formula (Stilwell, 2012, pp. 151-152). Until the 1970s, 
neoclassical economic theory had not been an orthodox or dominant economic principle while 
Keynesian or Marxist economics predominated. Neoclassical economics was associated with 
right-wing politics and developed into a political ideology, neoliberalism. Hayek (2001 [1944]) is 
the founding theorist who linked the idea of the market economy and political liberalism. He 
claimed the central planning and government control of economic decision-making is possible 
only through ‘coercion’; and it inevitably leads to ‘dictatorship’ and tyranny (pp. 73-74). In 
contrast with Polanyi, Hayek argued fascism had the same origins as socialism, and both of these 
empower the state over individuals. 
Amid the end of the post-war economic boom and the emergence of long-term stagflation in the 
1970s, the neoliberal ideology began to gain currency in Western industrialised countries. As 
soon as right-wing governments came into power in the 1980s, the ideology was adopted as the 
cardinal principle of economic policy in the two powerful countries: the United Kingdom in the 
name of Thatcherism and the United States in the name of Reaganomics. Privatisation, 
deregulation, fiscal austerity and withdrawal of the state from social provision were propagated 
and enforced by these governments, which generated profound impacts on the societies. 
Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, neoliberal principles were also embraced by the 
authoritarian regimes in Latin America, the former Soviet countries, the newly industrialised 
countries of developmental states like South Korea and Singapore, and even the industrialised 
countries characterised by social democracy and welfare states such as New Zealand and 
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Australia (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberal ‘structural adjustment programmes’ were imposed on 
developing countries by the international financial institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Free trade was also imposed all over the world either by 
bilateral trade agreements or through the World Trade Organization (Stiglitz, 2002). 
Neoliberalism has been embraced by almost all states either voluntarily or in response to coercive 
pressure (Harvey, 2005). Neoclassical economic theory and the neoliberal political ideology have 
become ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ in the real world (Cahill, 2010, p. 303). 
Neoliberalism has not only become ‘the dominant political and ideological form of capitalist 
globalisation’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, p. 350), but has also assumed the status of a 
hegemonic discourse in almost every part of social life. Since neoliberals have occupied powerful 
positions in various social, cultural, economic and political institutions, they have made 
‘neoliberalism seem as if it were the natural and normal condition of humankind’ through ‘the 
ideological and promotional work’ at the price of ‘hundreds of millions of dollars’ as George (2000, 
p. 29) commented, borrowing the concept of ‘cultural hegemony’ from Gramsci (1999 [1971]). 
The process of neoliberalism has entailed the ‘creative destruction’, not only of ‘prior institutional 
frameworks and power’ but also of ‘divisions of labour, social relations, welfare provisions, 
technological mixes, ways of life and thought, reproductive activities, attachments to the land and 
the habits of the heart’ (Harvey, 2005, p. 3). 
The neoliberal vision that a self-regulating market will generate an optimal allocation of 
resources turned out to be, in practice, ‘extensive market failures’ and ‘a significant exacerbation 
of uneven development’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, p. 352). The impacts of the neoliberal 
transformation were massive and profound throughout the world. In high-income countries, the 
political power of capital overwhelmed that of organised labour; capital was freed from the 
restrains that had been imposed on it as an outcome of the post-war class compromise; 
deregulation and privatisation expanded the sphere of commodification; and the state withdrew 
social welfare spending (Cahill, 2010). In low-income countries, income inequality and the 
concentration of wealth increased; the class of micro-entrepreneurs rapidly expanded; the 
informal proletariat increased; violent crime rose in the cities; and migration abroad was 
increased and diversified (Portes and Hoffman, 2003).  
Neoliberalism has also led to fundamental transformations in labour relations. As Jackson (2016, 
p. 269) notes, it ‘reshaped the fabric of industrial relations’. He identifies five major processes of 
neoliberal transformation of labour. First, the neoliberals reframed labour market ideas in the 
way of ‘fostering greater hostility towards collective bargaining and labour regulation’ among 
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political and economic elites. Second, they disseminated the discourse of ‘sectional producer 
interests threatening the consumer’. Third, these processes have weakened ‘countervailing 
powers to protect employees from exploitation’ in the labour market, which ‘systematically 
favours the interests of employers’. Fourth, the neoliberals introduced legislation that hampers 
union’s organisation and reducing social protections. Fifth, they have grown a more self-confident 
and uncompromising business class, less interested in corporatism with workers and the state. 
The outcomes of these processes have been workers’ loss of bargaining leverage, deterioration of 
working conditions and actual wage levels, and retreat of labour and social rights. 
As the origin of neoliberalism is traced back to classical economic liberalism, the critical analyses 
of contemporary neoliberal transformation have been significantly informed by Polanyi’s 
insightful analysis of the ‘great transformation’ of the 19th century. As Stiglitz (2001, p. vii) 
commented, ‘the transformation of European civilisation is analogous to the transformations 
confronting developing countries around the world today, it often seems as if Polanyi is speaking 
directly to present day issues’. However, the spatial scope of the contemporary transformation is 
far beyond that of Polanyi’s Europe-centred analysis; it extends to almost every part of the world 
(Harvey, 2005). The commodification of labour, money and land has ever been intensified by the 
globalised labour market, global financial market and natural resource extraction at a global level. 
The neoliberalism of today has also affected a much wider range of social relations than economic 
liberalism did in Polanyi’s time, transforming education and knowledge production, trade 
unionism, and even personal relations (Springer et al., 2016). Thus, it is required to ‘scale up’ 
(Munck, 2006, p. 180) Polanyi’s theory in terms of time, spatial scope, and the range of social 
relations affected. 
Fictitious commodification and disembeddness in the neoliberal context 
An extensive range of studies draw on Polanyi’s theory to analyse contemporary neoliberal 
globalisation. His three analytic concepts, fictitious commodification that entails disembeddedness, 
market society as a political project and protective countermovement have received particular 
attention from critical social scientists. 
First, the fictitious commodification that entails disembeddedness has been employed to 
characterise the process of neoliberal globalisation. Munck (2004, p. 252) reminds us, employing 
Ruggie’s (1982) term, that ‘embedded liberalism’ was the dominant political economic order of 
the post-war period, that was embodied by the combination of ‘a transnational liberal order and 
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state intervention’. After ‘the concerted bid by the transnational capitalist class’ throughout the 
1970s and the 1980s, he argues, it had to concede to ‘disembedded liberalism’ that was promoted 
by the discourse and practice of globalisation. Block (2003, p. 276) argues that the notion of ‘the 
always embedded market economy’ underlies Polanyi’s theory, highlighting the historical facts of 
the market economy being embedded in law, politics, and morality of the time. 
Burawoy (2015, p. 19) elaborates how fictitious commodification destroys the ‘true’ or ‘essential’ 
character of the three factors of production, labour, land and money: 
When labour power is exchanged without protection against injury or sickness, 
unemployment or over-employment, or below-subsistence wages, the labour that can be 
extracted rapidly declines, and it veers towards uselessness. Equally, when land, or 
more broadly nature, is subject to commodification then it can no longer support the 
basic necessities for human life. Finally, when money is used to make money, for 
example through currency speculation, then its value becomes so uncertain that it can 
no longer be used as a means of exchange, putting business out of business and 
generating economic crises. 
The fictitious commodification of money has been the driving force of the neoliberal 
transformation, or as Polanyi Levitt (2013) terms it, ‘financialisation’. She argues the economic 
power has shifted from manufacturing products to controlling finance and capturing profits in 
global value chains. The increased power of the financial sector, as Harvey (2005) examined in 
the cases of industrialised countries, has reinforced capital’s commanding power over labour, 
which, in turn, has secured downward pressure on real wage and labour market restructuring. It 
has also sourced capital’s political power to threaten democratic governance at work and in 
society. The process of ‘financialisation’ in ‘financialised countries’ has been realised by the 
implicit or explicit collaborations between political parties and financial business, while the 
commodification of money in developing countries has been imposed by the complex of 
international financial agencies, financialised powerful states and transnational financial capital, 
in the name of the ‘Washington consensus’ (Stiglitz, 2002).    
The ‘recommodification of labour’ is another aspect of neoliberalisation. The welfare-state 
capitalism of the mid-20th century is, correspondingly to the idea of ‘embedded liberalism’, 
characterised by ‘decommodification of labour’ and the ‘system of entitlement based on the norm 
of industrial labour’ (Standing, 2007, p. 69). However, Standing critically argues the 
‘decommodification’ was ‘fictitious’ because the ‘labour-based welfare state’ made workers ‘more 
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dependent on the performance of labour for their welfare and social status’ (2007, pp. 70-71, 
emphasis in original). According to his analysis, ‘fictitious decommodification’ allowed the state 
and capital to weaken ‘the link between the performance of labour and the monetary wage’, which 
meant the wage no longer reflected ‘the service provided or the cost to the employer’. Its 
consequences were a weakened incentive to labour and inefficient resource allocation. Financial 
capital has gained hegemonic power and rolled back the ‘fictitious decommodification’; then, it 
rearranged and dismantled the distribution of social income by shifting its source from state and 
enterprise benefits to ‘money wages’ (Standing, 2007, pp. 69-71). Standing argues the process of 
disentitlement has taken three forms: changing legislation to weaken or remove benefits, 
assigning more people to statuses not entitled to the benefits (i.e. precarious jobs), and privatising 
social services and imposing the costs on workers. 
Despite Polanyi’s insightful analysis of the process and regulation of commodification and its 
relationship with de-commodification, Burawoy (2015) shows that he overlooked 
‘excommodification’ that characterises the precarity of the neoliberal labour market. Adopting 
the idea of the food justice movement, freeganism, about ‘the expanded production of waste’ 
(Barnard, 2011, 2016), Burawoy argues that many useful things, including labour, are expelled 
from the market and, eventually, damaged and wasted. Referring to the statement ‘if there is a 
condition worse than exploitation it is not being exploited’, he argues ‘increasingly all over the 
world, expanding reservoirs of surplus make it a privilege to be exploited’ (2015, p. 21). For those 
who are in the condition of excommodification, commodification can be a very attractive prospect, 
he says. This observation corresponds with Bauman’s (2013) notion of ‘wasted lives’, the 
‘superfluous’ populations of migrants, refugees and other outcasts that were produced as a side-
effect of economic progress and the quest for order in the modern world. 
Political project for a market society in the time of neoliberalism 
Second, Polanyi’s concept of market society as a political project have also given insights to many 
critical social scientists, along with the argument that ‘laissez-faire was planned’ (2001 [1944], p. 
147). Munck (2004, p. 253) rejects the neoliberal’s claims about smooth, gradual and organic 
evolution of the market according to natural principles and argues, quoting Polanyi’s statement 
(2001 [1944], p. 258), that ‘the market has been the outcome of a conscious and often violent 
intervention on the part of a government which imposed the market organisation on society for 
non-economic ends’. Block (2003) argues that market societies, by means of elaborate rules and 
institutional structures, have sought to limit the individual pursuit of gain and to channel 
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economic activities into a narrow range of legitimate pursuits, both historically and today. 
Similarly, Cahill (2010, p. 301) argues the economy has not been ‘freed’ from the state; instead, 
the state has continued to play an active role in the ‘introduction, implementation and 
reproduction’ of neoliberalism. Gray (1998, p. 17) also points out that free market is not, ‘as New 
Right thinkers have imagined or claimed, a gift of social evolution’, but ‘an end-product of social 
engineering and unyielding political will’ that was feasible when functioning democratic 
institutions are lacking.  
It is the state apparatus, as Harvey (2005, pp. 7, 66) puts it the ‘neoliberal state’, that embodies 
the neoliberal assumption of ‘individual freedoms […] guaranteed by freedom of the market and 
of trade’; and the freedoms are implemented in the way that ‘reflect the interests of private 
property owners, business, multinational corporations, and financial capital’ at the cost of 
democratic governance. Furthermore, referring to Polanyi’s fear that the liberal utopian project 
could be sustained only by resort to authoritarianism, Harvey argues that the neoliberal state 
disciplines the opposition to the neoliberal agenda by mobilising ideological rhetoric such as 
‘international competition and globalisation’ or suppresses it by resorting to ‘persuasion, 
propaganda’ or even to ‘raw force and police power’ (2005, pp. 69-70).  
Jessop (2001, pp. 203-205) theorises the process of the market society whereby market forces 
and the logic of capitalist accumulation become established as the ideologically and politically 
dominant principle. He argues that the process of ‘capitalist societalisation’ involves four features. 
First, commodification extends into the spheres not currently subject to logic of exchange and 
accumulation, which began with labour, land and money in Polanyi’s time and has continued to 
political, educational, health and other spheres in neoliberal era. Second, ‘a secondary economic 
coding’ is imposed on the domains and activities that remain non-commercial in their orientation, 
making all decision-making systems of these sectors ‘subordinated to the imperatives of 
international competitiveness of the economy’. Third, ‘the superior dynamism and reach of a 
globalising capitalist economy’ force other systems to adjust to the logic of capitalist accumulation 
more than other systems oblige the capitalism to adjust to them. Fourth, through the ‘asymmetric 
interactions between capitalism and other orders’, the neoliberal hegemonic project establishes 
the capitalist accumulation as the dominant principle of societalisation, making the 
competitiveness ideology the most imperative social value and, in turn, subordinating all other 
spheres of social life into the capitalist strategy of accumulation. 
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Countermovement and questions on its agent 
Third, the protective countermovement, that derives from the concept of ‘double movement’, has 
also been widely discussed with regard to the growing global discontents with neoliberalism. 
While economic liberalism seeks to establish the market society and to disembed the free market 
from society, as Polanyi (2001 [1944]) argued, society inevitably protects itself against the perils 
of the free market by re-embedding the market into society. Munck (2004, p. 253) highlights the 
contemporary relevance of Polanyi’s idea of the ‘double movement’ as below: 
The attempt […] to set up ‘one big self-regulating market’ (Polanyi, 2001 [1944], pp. 70, 
138), was bound to create resistance in those social sectors ‘most immediately affected 
by the deleterious action of the market.’ While economic liberalism forged ahead to 
create a self-regulated market, […] the principles of social protection come into play to 
protect people and the environment. Markets could spread globally and the circulation 
of commodities could accelerate to an unprecedented degree, but the capital, currency 
and commodity markets would need to be organised and ultimately regulated. If this 
was the case when Polanyi wrote, it is doubly so today as a successor strategy to the 
Washington Consensus is debated in the corridors of power to prevent the global system 
being destabilized further by a utopian project to create a global self-regulating market. 
Munck (2004, p. 251) also draws attention to the ‘Polanyian problem’ applicable for addressing 
contemporary globalisation: ‘how the tendency towards the creation of a global free market 
economy can be reconciled with a degree of stability and cohesion in society?’ This question 
resonates with Gray’s (1998, p. 17) observation that the free market and democracy cannot 
coexist, since the social costs of the free market are such that it ‘cannot for long be legitimate in 
any democracy’. 
In addition, it is notable that Schierup et al. (2014) suggest the ‘precarity’ to be understood in the 
context of the ‘double movement’. They argue the precarity marks the contemporary world of 
work by representing ‘an institutionally embedded hegemonic norm embodying market driven 
imperatives of “flexibility”, “availability”, “multilocality” and compressed “mobility” across time 
and space, with “the migrant” as its quintessential incarnation’; this concept is equally adopted as 
‘a self-ascribed emblem by contemporary social movements questioning the premises of this very 
norm’ (Schierup et al., 2014, pp. 1-2). The precarity implies a ‘condition’ driven by structural 
forces for the precarisation of labour, which epitomises the downside of the utopian free market 
as well as a watchword for ‘resistances’ of social movements for justice and identity. Accordingly, 
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they argue the ‘duality of precarity’ harnesses Polanyi’s theory of the ‘double movement’. This 
notion is also relevant to the condition and resistance of migrant workers, who make up a 
disproportionate part of a globally growing social category named the ‘precariat’.  
Critical social scientists, however, have questioned Polanyi’s theorisation of protective 
countermovement, especially in three ways: whether countermovement is an inevitable reaction 
to the disembeddeness; how countermovement occurs; and who the agents of countermovement 
are.  
First, with regard to the ‘inevitability’ of countermovement, Munck (2004, p. 253) notes Polanyi 
conceptualised the double movement ‘as arising spontaneously in reaction to the depredations of 
the free market’. Then, he argues this shows that Polanyi’s view on countermovement still had ‘a 
whiff of functionalism’ and even ‘necessitarianism’ employing the term of Unger (1987, cited in 
Munck (2004)). In fact, although Polanyi consistently sought to overcome Marxism’s 
deterministic approaches throughout The Great Transformations, his work still did not go far 
beyond the then predominant paradigm. 
Second, Munck (2004, p. 253) also points out that, due to the presumption of inevitability, 
Polanyi’s theory had ‘a distinct lack of mediations to explain how the “double movement” might 
operate’. Schierup et al. (2014, p. 5), referring to Webster et al. (2008), also argues that Polanyi 
was short of analysing ‘the organization of countermovements and the social basis of 
countermovements’ actual agents’. Burawoy (2015, p. 19) puts it as Polanyi’s ambiguity about 
‘how and why’ double movement happens and how fictitious commodification ‘contributes to 
social movement’. Also, Burawoy (2010) argues, Polanyi was short of analysis of capitalist 
accumulation, relations of power, class conflict and exploitation, which are all related to the 
countermovement as Marxists have concerned about. 
Burawoy (2015, pp. 19-21) highlights three sources of the countermovement: ‘accumulation 
through dispossession’, ‘growing inequality’, and ‘articulation of the (ex)commodification’. While 
Polanyi attributed the countermovement to the ‘act of exchange itself’ of commodification, 
Burawoy pays attention to ‘the process through which entities are turned into commodities’ and 
the ‘processes of disembedding the commodity from its social integument’. He refers to this 
processes as ‘accumulation through dispossession’, borrowing Harvey’s (2005) term. For 
example, the ‘deskilling’ (Braverman, 1998 [1974]) process, exemplified by Fordism, has 
expropriated knowledge from the craft worker; consequently, it generated labour protests, as 
historical evidence shows. Likewise, the privatisation and corporatisation of tertiary education 
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has commodified and expropriated the knowledge from a public good to a sellable asset. Just as 
deskilling has historically generated labour protest, the dispossession of knowledge has also 
become a source of students’ and education workers’ protests. The ‘growing inequality’ is a result 
of commodification as well as another source of countermovement. Making labour power sellable, 
i.e. the commodification of labour power, generated ‘precarity’ or insecurity as a dominant 
experience of working people. The commodification of money, i.e. financialisation, deepened the 
stratification by making the ‘precariat’, who has replaced proletariat as Standing (2014a) noted, 
more reliant on debt and credit. The discontents of the unemployed and debtors have become 
major driving forces of social movements. Burawoy identifies social movements as not ‘a reaction 
to the (ex)commodification of a single fictitious commodity’, but ‘responses to the articulation of 
the (ex)commodification of labour, money, nature and knowledge’. For example, the Arab Spring 
of 2010 and 2011 represents a democratisation movement situated in ‘the intersection of the 
precarity of labour and indebtedness due to micro-finance’; student movements are driven by the 
intersection of ‘precarity of labour and privatisation of knowledge production’; and 
environmental movements are motivated by ‘the intersection of the destruction or 
commodification of nature and the precarity of labour’. 
The third question is who the actors of the protective countermovement are. Polanyi’s answer 
was ‘all groups in society’ (Block, 2001, p. xxviii). For Polanyi, since society is threatened by the 
expansion of the market, it ‘reacts by (re)constituting itself as an active society, thereby 
harbouring the embryo of democratic socialism’ (Burawoy, 2003, p. 193). He also saw both ‘the 
subaltern classes’ and ‘powerful capitalist interests’ were threatened by the hazardous outcomes 
of market economy, i.e. the ‘dislocation’ of society and the ‘destruction’ of the market itself. Thus, 
both would be the parts of ‘a social reaction to the market that would spur counter-hegemonic 
movement’ (Munck, 2006, p. 181). However, Polanyi was not always clear about ‘what populates 
active society’: it could be ‘trade unions, cooperatives, the organisation of the factory movement 
to curtail the length of the working day, the Chartist movement to expend political rights, and 
rudimentary development of political parties’ (Burawoy, 2003, p. 198).  
Polanyi’s notion that ‘the “challenge” is to society as a whole and the “response” comes through 
groups, sections and classes’ (2001 [1944], p. 160) is still unspecified about ‘which “groups” or 
“sections” of society are likely to respond to the encroaching marketization and commodification 
of life’ and ‘[w]hat is the role of social movements in this process’, as Munck (2006, pp. 184-185) 
argues. Thus, he suggests the countermovement of society has ‘to go beyond dispersed and 
possibly contradictory struggles’ and, referring to Jessop (2003, p. 7), it will be possible by taking 
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into account ‘the role of specific economic, political and social projects, of hegemonic visions, and 
of associated contradictory struggles’ (Munck, 2006, p. 185). 
Polanyi’s focus on the organisation of ‘counter-hegemony’ is often compared with Antonio 
Gramsci’s (1999 [1971]) analysis of ‘capitalist hegemony’. Gramsci argued the civil society ‘acts, 
with the state, to stabilise class relations and provide a terrain for challenging capitalism’. 
However, since the ‘capitalist hegemony’ is organised in the realm of production and as the basis 
of capital accumulation, he argues ‘the agent of counter-hegemony’ would be ‘the proletarian 
party’ (Burawoy, 2003, pp. 193, 231); experiments which turned out to be failures in the real 
world of the 20th century. Gramsci’s vision of counter-hegemony is ‘based on the illusory and 
productivist vision of an alternative moral and intellectual order’, whereas Polanyi’s notion of 
hegemony arose from ‘illusions about weakness of capitalism’ which led his counter-hegemonic 
notion to be grounded on a ‘universal interest in restriction of market’ (Burawoy, 2003, p. 231). 
As Munck (2004, p. 253) argued, we may consider Polanyi’s ‘incipient theorising of a concept of 
counter-hegemony in a way that complements rather than contradicts Gramsci’s’. Nevertheless, 
we still need to articulate the idea of the protective countermovement by employing 
contemporary social movement theories. 
Finally, anti-globalisation activism has drawn particular attention from scholars who have 
envisioned contemporary forms of countermovement. This global resistance has emerged in the 
form of mass-protests against international economic and political decision-making systems, 
which have been condemned for operating undemocratic processes and also generating global 
inequality. Beginning with the protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s ministerial 
meeting in Seattle 1999, the anti-globalisation movement has continued to the Group of Eight 
summit in Genoa 2001, the World Economic Forum in Davos 2003, the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation summit in Busan 2005, and the Group of Twenty summit in Toronto 2010. The 
protests have extended toward targeting the transnational financial corporations, responsible for 
corrupt connections with politics, fraudulent financial trades, and illegitimate profits that they 
have made. Massive vigils and the slogan of Occupy Wall Street turned up in New York in 2011 
and spread to banking districts in metropolitan cities throughout the world, including London, 
Istanbul, Sydney, Seoul and Mexico City. 
Jessop (2002, p. 470) argues these new forms of global resistance represent people’s aspirations 
for ‘alternative paths of economic, social and political restructuring’ and challenges to neoliberal 
globalisation. Stiglitz (2001) argues that the issues raised by the anti-globalisation movement are 
actually consonant with Polanyi’s concerns about economic liberalism. Udayagiri and Walton 
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(2003) suggest that while globalisation has created a growing detachment between traditional 
forms of state and civil society, it has also highlighted the importance of people’s movement in 
achieving global justice.  
As reviewed in this section, Polanyi’s three concepts, which he introduced to explain the social 
impacts of economic liberalism in the 19th century Europe, hold analytic salience for the 
contemporary social problems generated by neoliberal globalisation. The concept of fictitious 
commodification that entails disembeddedness helps explain financialisation and its accompanying 
processes of recommodification and excommodification of labour during neoliberal 
transformations. Their social consequence is the increased precarity in people’s social relations. 
The concept of market society as a political project provides an analytical basis for understanding 
the neoliberal state. It also reveals the neoliberal fabrication of the free market as a smooth, 
gradual and organic evolution according to natural principles. The idea of a protective 
countermovement provides an analytical basis for understanding the dynamics of social 
movements in the context of neoliberal globalisation, although there still remain some aspects to 
articulate such as the actors of the movements. 
Polanyian theories are, however, still limited in addressing the specifics of my research: 
international labour migration, temporary migration policy, and migrants’ social movements in 
the neoliberal era. The following three sections explore how the Polanyian perspectives may be 
expanded to address my research questions. 
International migration in the process of global commodification of labour 
Migration scholars often identify that the literature on international migration falls into two 
distinct sets of theories depending on the authors’ priority concerns: ‘the causes of migration 
processes’ and ‘the impacts of migration for sending and receiving communities and societies’ 
(Castles et al., 2014, p. 26). This section focuses on the first set of theories in an attempt to answer 
the first research question in theoretical terms. There have been extensive studies on this topic 
from the micro-, meso- and macro-perspectives like neoclassical microeconomics, migration 
network theory and historical-structuralist approach (Castles et al., 2014, Massey et al., 1998). 
The theoretical account of the causes of migration will contribute to understanding the contexts 
of both the South Korean labour migration policy and the migrant workers’ claims, the two other 
34 
topics of this research. The theoretical exploration begins with a brief review of a broad range of 
migration theories. Then, I seek to extend the existing theories, especially the theories on the 
segmented labour market and global division of labour, taking into account the process of 
neoliberal transformations that have influenced the trends of international labour migration for 
the last three decades. I also look at how the process has been accelerated by the fictitious 
commodification that entails disembeddedness. 
Migration theories of micro- and meso-perspectives 
The early migration scholars employed physical science terms to explain the causes of migration. 
The gravity model suggested the volume of migration could be predicted by physical and 
economic factors such as the distances between origin and destination places and the differences 
of population sizes or economic opportunities (Zipf, 1946, cited in Bodvarsson and Van den Berg, 
2013). This theory developed into the ‘push-pull’ model with the assumption that the push factors, 
including population pressure, economic underdevelopment and political repression, would push 
people out of origin places and the pull factors including labour shortage, economic prosperity 
and political freedom would pull them into destination places (Passaris, 1989). This model has 
served as an influential analytical framework of economic studies on labour migration and very 
often as a theoretical basis for migration policy-making. 
The ideology of the free market is, as in contemporary mainstream economics (see Stilwell, 2012), 
an influential creed among those in labour economics oriented toward migration studies as well. 
The ‘labour market of immigration’ (Borjas, 1990) is considered as a basic framework for 
understanding the causes and consequences of international labour migration. This theory 
highlights the ‘wage differentials’ between origin and destination economies, which are the major 
factor driving human migration (Hicks, 1932, cited in Bodavarsson & Van den Berg, 2013). It 
assumes migrants are individual rational actors in the competitive labour market of migration, 
who have full access to market information and make decisions by a cost-benefit calculation to 
maximise their income. Migration cost is considered as ‘a selective investment’ for both the 
increased productivity of ‘human capital’ and the maximum returns in the value of lifetime 
earnings (Sjaastad, 1962, cited in Castles, de Haas, & Miller, 2014). On the basis of the ‘pull-push’ 
and the immigration labour market models, neoclassical economists formulate a ‘general theory’ 
of demand and supply in labour migration. Bodvarsson and Van den Berg (2013, pp. 24-25) argue 
the consequences of migration are likely a loss for employers in the origin country and local 
workers in the destination country, a gain for remaining workers in the origin area and employers 
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and migrant workers in the destination; thus, in sum, net loss in real income for the origin country 
but net gain for the destination and the world. 
Despite its dominant influence in mainstream economics, neoclassical migration theory has been 
broadly criticised for its unrealistic foundational assumptions (Castles et al., 2014). First, 
migrants do not always make rational choices in order to maximise their interests. A migrant’s 
decision on whether, when or where to migrate depends on various social, political, historical and 
cultural factors, not only economic interests. Second, it is almost impossible for a migrant to have 
full or even a reasonable amount of information about the labour market in a destination country. 
Very often, they have never been to the country nor are they able to speak the language. Third, 
they do not usually have full access to the free and competitive labour market in a destination 
country. There are various economic, social or legal obstacles like high travel cost, including 
brokerage fee, racial discrimination at work, restrictive immigration or emigration control, or 
language and cultural barriers.  
The fallacy of neoclassical migration theory becomes even more discernible when we take into 
account Polanyi’s concept of fictitious commodification that entails disembeddedness. As discussed 
in the previous section, economic liberalism’s assumption that labour can be commodified is 
fictitious. Likewise, I argue, neoclassical migration theory also fictitiously commodifies labour 
migration. As Polanyi stated, although labour is an essential element of production, it ‘is not 
produced for sale […] nor can be detached from the rest of life’ but is ‘another name for a human 
activity’ (Polanyi, 2001 [1944], p. 75). Likewise, the labour of migrants cannot be simply reduced 
to a unit of workforce sellable or purchasable at an overseas labour market according to the laws 
of supply and demand. It is an aspect of human activity that entails significant transformations in 
the conditions and social relations of a person including living and working conditions, family 
relations, community relations and social and political lives. The migrant’s labour cannot be 
detached from the rest of his or her life both in origin and destination societies or from the other 
aspects of his or her life. As much as the economy is embedded in a society, migration is also 
embedded in the societies of both origin and destination. The neoclassical migration theory that 
fictitiously commodifies labour migration and neglects the social embeddedness of migration 
exemplifies ‘a disembedded understanding of migration’ (Castles, 2010, p. 1578). 
The new economics of labour migration (NELM) approach seeks to overcome the individualistic 
assumptions of the neoclassic model. It argues labour migration is a joint decision of both 
migrants and non-migrants, not an isolated choice of an individual migrant. This approach, 
however, has been criticised for obscuring ‘intra-household inequalities and conflicts of interest 
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along the lines of gender, generation, and age’ (de Haas and Fokkema, 2010, cited in Castles et al. 
(2014), p.29), because migrants do not always move to help their families but sometimes to 
escape from abusive or oppressive conditions in the family. I also argue it still remains within the 
frame of neoclassical economics in the sense that it emphasises the rational choice of migrants 
and their communities. Just like neoclassical migration theory, NELM replicates the ‘economistic 
fallacy’ (Block and Somers, 1985) of neoclassical economics. 
While both neoclassical migration theory and the NELM approach look at how migration is 
initiated from micro-level perspectives, migration network theory and migration system theory 
explain how migration continues from the view of meso-level social structures. For reasons of 
space, meso-level theories are not discussed in detail here. 
Migration network theory argues migrants create and maintain social networks with other 
migrants in the destination country and non-migrants in the home country, which facilitates 
further migration. Once pioneer migrants have developed a migration path and settled down in a 
destination place, their family, friends and community members follow the ‘beaten path’ of 
migration. 
Migration system theory looks at the links and networks between origin and destination societies, 
including the exchanges of goods, ideas, and money. It argues these connections alter the social 
context within which subsequent migration decisions are made; thus ‘cumulative causation’ 
(Massey et al., 1998, pp. 45-46) makes migration a self-sufficient process. Both theories, however, 
explain neither why pioneer migrations do not always lead to the formation of migration 
networks and systems nor under what conditions the networks are weakened or break down (de 
Haas, 2010). 
Macroscopic migration theories 
While both micro- and meso-level studies sought to investigate the cause of migration within the 
contexts of migratory process, dynamics and mechanisms, they tend to lose sight of structural 
aspects by which migration is conditioned. Migration studies from macroscopic perspectives 
analyse the historical, political economic, developmental and labour market structures in which 
migrants and non-migrants are situated. 
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Migration transition theory looks at transitions in migration patterns and developmental 
processes, and also the relationship between the two. This theory argues that both internal and 
international migration increase during the early stages of economic development but as 
industrialisation proceeds, labour supply declines and wage rises; thus, emigration decreases and 
immigration increases. When the economic development of a country reaches a ‘turning point’ 
(Fields, 1994, Park, 1994b), the size of immigration surpasses that of emigration, which leads to 
transformation into a ‘net immigration country’ (Castles et al., 2014, p. 47). Skeldon (1997) 
suggests that countries show different migration patterns depending on five hierarchical 
‘development tiers’: the ‘old core’ and ‘new core’ countries characterised by immigration, the 
‘expanding core’ showing growth in both immigration and emigration, the ‘labour frontier’ 
experiencing high emigration and the ‘resource niche’ with low international migration. South 
Korea is often presented as an extreme example of ‘migration transition’, which has gone through 
the three bottom tiers to become a ‘new core’ (DeWind et al., 2012, Fields, 1994, Park, 1994b). 
Although transition theory has been popularly referred to, particularly in the South Korean 
context, it has significant problems in explaining the nexus of development and migration. Firstly, 
as noted by Castles et al. (2014), this theory shows a deterministic approach based on the belief 
that development would automatically lead to a migration transition and it would be inevitable 
and irreversible. The transformation from an emigration to immigration country depends on 
various political and social factors that affect the process of economic development (Castles and 
Delgado Wise, 2008) or geopolitical and global economic factors. Secondly, I argue the transition 
theory is descriptive rather than analytic. Although it aptly described the parallel patterns of 
economic development and migration, the theory fails to analyse what specific social factors 
create such patterns. It neglects an important factor affecting migration patterns: the 
transformation of the labour system that consists of labour market, labour-related legislations 
and policies. Thirdly, I also point out that the empirical studies based on this theory, especially in 
the South Korean context (e.g. DeWind et al., 2012, Park, 1994b), tend to falsely reduce the 
working definition of ‘development’ into economic growth by presenting such economic index as 
gross domestic product (GDP) only. As broadly accepted by development studies, development 
should include such social and political aspects as redistribution of income and wealth, racial- and 
gender-based inequalities and human rights, and welfare (Desai and Potter, 2014). As Sen (1999) 
famously noted, development should entail freedoms including political freedom and 
transparency, freedom for the opportunity to enhance and apply capabilities, and economic 
protection from abject poverty. In this regard, Human Development Index (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2009) may be considered as an alternative index. 
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Historical-structural approaches are useful for locating labour migration and the labour market in 
a global picture. It argues that international migration is an outcome of unequal economic and 
political power in the world economy as a way of extracting cheap labour for capitalist 
accumulation (Massey et al., 1998, pp. 34-41, Wood, 1982). However, this approach is often 
criticised for being too determinist. Although the structural conditions have important impacts 
on individuals’ lives, they do not always determine all aspects of their lives. The human agency of 
migrants should not be ignored. 
Labour market and international migration 
Dual or segmented labour market theory argues that international migration is driven by the dual 
structure of labour demand in developed countries (Piore, 1979, cited in Massey et al. (1998)). 
While the labour demand in the advanced economies has shifted toward highly-skilled work as 
high technology industries have grown, there is still continuing demand for low-skilled manual 
work that cannot be automated or offshored but instead continues to rely on low wages, like 
assembly line work, garment production, catering, cleaning and construction. Local workers with 
higher education or living standard refuse such jobs; thus, migrant workers from low-income 
countries take them up. The labour market is divided into the primary and secondary markets, of 
which segmentation becomes further complicated and reinforced by such factors as ethnicity, 
race and gender. The economic polarisation in global metropolitan cities exemplifies the extreme 
segmentation between the highly paid professionals in finance and management and the poorly 
paid workers who service their needs (Sassen, 2001). As Castles et al. (2014, p. 35) pointed out, 
the segmented labour market theory shows how the demand for labour migration is ‘structurally 
embedded in modern capitalist economies’.  
Labour market segmentation is often institutionalised and reinforced by the destination 
government’s labour migration policy. It restricts the jobs that migrant workers may take up and 
the industrial sectors where they may work. Such institutionalised discrimination is justified in 
the name of the protection of local workers’ jobs and wages. The next section on temporary labour 
migration policy discusses the rationales and consequences of the employer-driven and 
government-operating labour migration segmentation. 
Labour market segmentation theory has been plausibly applied for explaining the increased 
arrivals of labour migrants in South Korea. Lee (1997, pp. 356-357) argues that labour migration 
was induced by the segmentation between SMEs and large firms. Also, I argue a close 
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investigation of industrial structure and labour systems informs us that the labour market 
segmentation was created or reinforced under the neoliberal restructuring process. For example, 
the South Korean case shows the restructuring process has created a hierarchical outsourcing 
system linking transnational corporations or chaebols (South Korean conglomerates) and the 
SMEs. This process is not an isolated and inevitable stage of economic development. It has to be 
understood as a part of the neoliberal restructuring process of industrial organisation, 
employment system and the state’s role, which has been driven by global capital in association 
with major political actors in South Korea. Chapter 5 examines this issue on the basis of empirical 
data. 
On the basis of the historical-structural approach and segmented labour market theory, critical 
social scientists have built up global political economy of migration to analyse the migratory 
process of labour in the context of neoliberal globalisation (Phillips, 2011, Talani and McMahon, 
2015). They argue two foundational concepts mark the globalisation process: the global value 
chain and a new international division of labour. The global value chain describes ‘the full range 
of activities that firms and workers perform to bring a product from its conception to end use and 
beyond’, especially ‘carried out in inter-firm networks on a global scale’ (Gereffi and Fernandex-
Stark, 2016, p. 7). Due to the advancement of transportation and communication technology, the 
manufacture of components of a single product can be carried out in several countries where it 
can be done most cheaply. This has led to the spatial shift of manufacturing industries from 
industrialised countries to developing countries, a process known as the new international 
division of labour. It is new because the less developed countries, which used to be the suppliers 
of natural resources under an old international division of labour, now participate in the 
production process (Charnock and Starosta, 2016). However, control of the process remains with 
transnational corporations and most of the value is realised in core countries. 
The new international division of labour entails the polarisation of the global labour market. 
Simple tasks are relocated and outsourced to lower-skilled workers in low-wage economies, 
while highly skilled and highly valued jobs are concentrated in rich countries. Lower-skilled 
workers are expected to remain in the low-wage origin countries, while highly qualified 
professionals are encouraged to migrate to industrialised countries. The polarisation of workers’ 
mobility is institutionalised by destination countries’ immigration policies like preferential 
treatment to highly qualified workers and restrictive and temporary entitlement to lower-skilled 
workers. The labour market has been stratified not only according to ‘human capital’ (i.e. 
possession of education, training and work skills), but also according to the non-productivity-
40 
related factors like gender, race, ethnicity, origins and legal status. The process has been 
particularly intensified by the ‘interplay between market forces demanding freedom of 
movement and political forces demanding control’ (Castles et al., 2014, p. 254). 
The neoliberal transformations in employment practices also have significant impacts on labour 
migration. The conventional form of employment in industrialised society was based on wage-
work, labour standards protected by law and collective bargaining. However, it has radically 
shifted toward what the employers call ‘flexible’ forms of employment, which is marked by more 
profit for employers, and lower wages and bargaining power, and poorer working conditions for 
employees. Subcontracting, temporary work and casualisation have become typical employment 
practices in neoliberal economies. Schierup et al. (2014, p. 2) succinctly illustrated how the 
‘changing modes of labour force management’ take place and lead to the precarisation of migrant 
labour: 
The financialization of global capitalism, operating in tandem with corporate stratagems 
of offshoring, outsourcing, sub-contracting, renewed sweatshop production and home-
working, has resulted in shrinking labour rights and increasing informalization of labour 
(e.g. Harvey, 2010). In the wider context, precarization of work and citizenship has 
generated a globally mobile reserve army of labour forged by austerity programmes 
which rolled back the social compacts of welfare and developmental states […] A 
precarious workforce is segmented and discriminated against on the grounds of race, 
ethnicity, gender, and suitability for specific niches of local and national labour markets 
[…] Broadly speaking, we may thus call precarity a mode of keeping the ‘reserve army of 
labour in labour’ […] thereby both maximizing productive activity and placing 
downward pressure on wages. It functions as a vehicle for labour market regulation 
(Bauder, 2006) and the instigation of morality (Harvey, 2005). 
And, Castles et al. (2014, p. 262) emphasised the consequences of the neoliberal employment 
practices on migrants: 
Temporary and casual employment, chains of subcontracting, informalization and new 
forms of labour market segmentation affect both native and migrant workers. However, 
it is the disadvantaged and vulnerable groups of workers – migrant women, irregular 
workers, ethnic and racial minorities – who end up in the most precarious positions. 
Deprivation of human and worker rights for groups that lack legal status and market 
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power seems to be an integral aspect of all advanced and emerging industrial economies 
today. 
The polarisation of global labour market and the precarisation of work are crucial factors that 
affect not only the conditions of migrant workers but also the flows and patterns of migration. 
They are also the expressions of the fictitious commodification of labour extending throughout the 
world. An extreme example of the commodified forms of labour migration is temporary labour 
migration (Rosewarne, 2010). The next section discusses the temporary labour migration and the 
state’s role in its implementation. 
Temporary labour migration policy as a political project for market economy 
The second research question of this thesis is ‘what was the policy process of temporary labour 
migration scheme and what are its rationales and governance mechanism?’ Political scientists 
suggest there are several approaches for how to understand the state’s public policy process like 
pluralist, structuralist, institutionalist or neoclassic perspectives (Adolino and Blake, 2011, Hill, 
2009). The theories of public policy are closely related to the debates on the nature of the state 
such as developmental state, the welfare state and neoliberal state (Chang et al., 2012, Hay et al., 
2006, Pressman, 2006, Woo-Cumings, 1999b). Migration scholars have taken a step further to 
specify the factors that shape migration policies and that cause their failure (Boswell, 2007, 
Castles, 2004a, Hugo, 2010). This section examines the historical development of temporary 
labour migration policy and critically analyses the policy from the perspective of the 
transformation of neoliberal labour system that has been propelled by political project of the 
state. 
No settlement, workforce only 
Temporary labour migration is often defined as a migration phenomenon ‘in which migrants 
come to a receiving area for a few months or years and then return to their homelands’ (Castles 
et al., 2014). Temporary labour migration can be discussed in two dimensions: first, temporary 
labour migration as a migratory pattern that describes migrant workers’ intentions and 
behaviour of sojourn for a fixed timeframe; second, temporary labour migration as a state policy 
that involves states’ planning and implementation of policies on recruitment, sojourn and return 
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of migrant workers. Considering the research question that this thesis addresses, I focus on the 
second dimension, temporary labour migration as a state policy. 
Industrialised countries have devised temporary labour migration programmes to address 
labour shortages during periods of economic expansions. They designed the programmes to 
prevent potential social issues that might accompany permanent immigration of migrant workers. 
Thus, the analysis of a temporary labour migration policy requires the consideration of both 
aspects of labour market and immigration control.  
The temporary labour migration as a state policy typically operates as below. The governments 
and employers of the destination country have invited a set-number of ‘guest workers’ from 
neighbouring less developed economies. Their assumption is that a migrant worker is ‘a unit of 
temporary workforce’ (Castles, 1986) rather than an immigrant who may settle down in the 
society. Accordingly, they require the guest workers to hold work permits valid only for a 
restricted period of time, a specific job, and sometimes a specific residential area. Accompanying 
family are either prohibited or discouraged. Governments argue they are measures to minimise 
the negative consequences of the programme in the national labour market. The programmes 
also allow governments or employers to easily deprive the work permit from the workers with 
various reasons. Once the fixed-term contract terminates, the migrant workers are expected to 
return to their home country; otherwise, they would face deportation. 
After the Second World War, almost all highly industrialised countries in Europe introduced 
temporary labour migration schemes as a way of meeting the increased labour demand during 
the post-war economic boom. The United Kingdom was the first to introduce the European 
Voluntary Worker scheme through which it employed workers from Italy and refugee camps in 
Europe. The workers were tied to designated jobs and prohibited from bringing family. If they 
failed to maintain discipline, they could face deportation. Belgium, France and Switzerland also 
adopted similar programmes. Some of the programmes operated for short periods and on a small 
scale, others continued to run until the mid-1970s. The ‘guestworker (Gastarbeiter) system’ of 
the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) is widely known as one of the most highly 
organised programmes. The government set up recruitment offices in Mediterranean countries, 
which recruited workers and operated skill and medical tests on behalf of German employers. 
The number of temporary migrant workers began with 95,000 in 1956 but increased up to 2.6 
million in 1973 (Castles et al., 2014).  
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The United States operated the Mexican Farm Labor Program, also known as Bracero Program, 
between 1942 and 1964 under diplomatic agreements with Mexico. The programme was to fill 
the labour shortages particularly in agricultural sectors and other manual-work sectors. It 
required ten percent of Mexican workers’ wages to be paid when they returned to their home 
country. This wage deposit system was introduced to ensure the Mexican worker’s’ return after 
their fixed-term contracts terminated. It was largely considered as a complementary measure to 
the harsh deportation of undocumented immigrants. However, the workers often failed at 
receiving the deposit back in their home country.  
The temporary labour migration schemes were devised with the belief in ‘temporary sojourn’, 
‘the restriction of labour market and civil rights’, and ‘the recruitment of single workers’. 
However, they entailed such contradictions as ‘the inability to prevent family reunion’, ‘the 
gradual move towards longer stay’, and ‘the inexorable pressures for settlement and community 
formation’ (Castles et al., 2014, pp. 104-108), which fuelled growing resistance to the system. 
First, employers opposed the repatriation of their migrant employees because they feared labour 
shortages and upward pressure on wages. Second, civil society actively engaged with the 
movement against the schemes. Finally, constitutional law, especially of West Germany, 
recognised the migrants’ right to family reunion and ruled the prevention of family accompany is 
unconstitutional. 
By the mid-1970s, temporary labour migration schemes in most European countries had failed. 
The social consequences of the failed guest-worker system were significantly negative. The 
labour market had been segmented; thus, jobs left by migrant workers, were not replaced by local 
workers. The governments, especially German, had denied the settlement of the former 
temporary migrant workers until 1998; consequently, informal settlement and migration 
increased. These consequences also entailed the formation of ethnic minority and the 
racialization of occupations (Castles et al., 2014). 
Temporary labour migration policy in neoliberal era 
In the mid-1980s, Castles (1986) announced the ‘obituary’ of the guest-worker system. Twenty 
years after, however, he observed ‘a resurrection’ of the temporary labour migration system in 
Europe (Castles, 2006) and other parts of the world. The new version of programmed temporary 
labour migration tends to ostensibly emphasise the migration of the highly skilled; but in practice, 
it still operates as a major source of various forms of lower-skilled migration. Due to official denial 
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of labour shortage in lower-skilled sectors, the labour migration often occurs through 
undocumented processes. To justify the revival of guest-worker system, the states and 
international organisations often mobilise deceptive concepts such as ‘circular migration’ and 
‘triple-win’ by exaggerating the development implication of the temporary migration, especially 
from remittances (Castles & Ozkul, 2014). 
Temporary labour migration programmes have resurrected in the context of the transformation 
of work driven by neoliberal globalisation of production. New forms of employment have been 
devised under the neoliberal production system as discussed earlier. Migrant workers are often 
the first affected by the transformations. As Castles et al. (2014, pp. 256-257) argue, the 
employment of migrants on a temporary basis is a ‘way of enhancing employer control and 
reducing demands for better wages and conditions’. The recent employment data of European 
immigration countries substantiate their argument: ‘migrants were more likely to be employed 
in temporary jobs than natives’ and more likely to be affected by economic crisis.  
The discourse of ‘migration management’ also contributes to the proliferation of temporary 
labour migration programmes throughout the world. Recently, international organisations and 
industrialised countries have advocated that ‘managing labour mobility’ would contribute to ‘the 
evolving global economy’ (International Organization for Migration, 2008). Many migration 
scholars are, however, sceptical about the state project for ‘managed migration’. They suggest it 
is a process of neoliberal transformation of global labour market and a migration control system. 
Schierup et al. (2014, pp. 2-4) identify four characteristics of ‘so-called “managed migration”’. 
First, temporary labour migration schemes, as a major programme of a managed migration policy, 
‘propel competition within precaritized and ethnically niched labour markets’ by criminalising 
irregular migration. Second, the criminalised irregular migrations are ‘functioning as spearheads 
for “flexibilisation”’ that is ‘a de facto informal labour market regulatory mode’. Third managed 
migration is ‘the manifestation of formalized rules and regulations’ that belongs to a hegemonic 
neoliberal state. Forth, it is a more effective form of disciplining the transnational mobility of 
people than the previous guest worker schemes. 
The temporary labour migration policy is particularly popular among Asian governments 
including the South Korean government. According to Castles et al. (2014, p. 156), this happens 
because four key actors’ initial intentions were matched: 
 The governments ‘seek to control migration strictly and migrants’ rights are 
often very limited’ and also see labour migration ‘as a temporary necessity, 
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which should not lead to permanent settlement or to changes in the culture and 
identity of destination countries’; 
 ‘Employers want low-skilled workers to meet immediate labour needs’;  
 ‘Migrant workers wish to work abroad for a limited period to improve the 
situation of their families at home’; and, 
 ‘Sending-country governments do not want to lose nationals permanently’. 
The Asian governments’ intention to control labour migration on a temporary basis is highly 
probable to turn out to be failure. As already experienced in Europe in the 1970s, labour 
migration does not operate only for economic interest but also involves social aspects like 
migrant’s social networks, cultural influences and political participation in the destination 
society. The governments are no longer able to control immigration by economic methods, but 
rely on physical and violent measures like arrest and deportation. As policing is a typical strategy 
of the states to enforce neoliberal restructuring (Harvey, 2005), immigration policing including 
deportation is intrinsic in temporary labour migration schemes. 
I argue the current rise of temporary labour migration policies have to be understood in the 
context of the neoliberal transformation of global and national labour markets; and the Asian 
cases are not exceptional. I also argue the temporary labour migration system of today is the 
neoliberal state’s political project to extend market society throughout the labour market. As will 
be discussed in Chapter 6 and 7, South Korea is a typical example. The South Korean case shows 
how the neoliberal state drives the formation of the neoliberal labour market in practice and why 
temporary labour migration policy is an intrinsic part of the project of the state-capital nexus. 
Social movements of migrants and pro-migrant activists as a part of 
protective countermovement 
This section deals with theories that can be used to address my third research question: ‘what are 
migrant workers’ experiences of the scheme and in what way have they engaged with the policy 
process, especially in connection with South Korean social movements?’  
Social movement studies have discussed such issues as structural conditions including the 
market, conflictual or consensual relationship with the state, the actors of social movements and 
their causes. They resonate with the experiences of the social movements of and for migrants in 
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South Korea. A review of social movement literature helps to conceptualise the problems in 
reality. 
Perspectives and scope of social movement studies 
Early social scientists had some divided views on the social movements of their time. Some 
considered the social movement as irrational and pathological behaviour. Émile Durkheim saw 
social movements as ‘symptoms of societal malaise’, whereas Max Weber thought they were 
‘irrational sentiments’ mobilised by charismatic leaders (Burawoy, 2015, p. 17). These views 
prevailed in the social sciences until the early 1960s, especially in the United States (Goodwin and 
Jasper, 2014a, Martin, 2015). By contrast, Marx and Engels traced the labour movement to the 
exploitation of the proletariat. They saw the proletariat was ‘the subject and object of history’ 
(Burawoy, 2015, p. 17); therefore, they could theorise the proletarian revolution (Marx and 
Engels, 2004 [1872]). However, Marxism after Marx, such as Leninism, Maoism and Gramscian 
approaches, was reduced to the theories and actions of political parties, which defined 
themselves either as a vanguard or as leaders of ‘the mass line’ (Cox and Nilsen, 2014, McLellan, 
2007). No room for social movements was in their party-dominant politics. 
Since the late 1960s, researchers radically departed either from the negative and pathological 
perspectives or the class struggle-oriented ‘old movement’ approaches (see Della Porta and Diani, 
2006, Goodwin and Jasper, 2014b, Martin, 2015). Amid the rise of the civil rights movement in 
the United States, American social scientists began to see social movements as a rational political 
process and an extra-parliamentary form of politics. In Europe, scholars drew attention to the 
rise of new social movements that were powered by a new middle class of various post-industrial 
interests. The US-based researchers have focused on such issues as resource mobilisation and 
social movement organisations (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), political opportunity (McAdam, 
1982), cycle of protests (Tarrow, 1995), repertoire of contention (Tilly and Wood, 2009) and 
framing process (Benford and Snow, 2000). On the other hand, the Europe-based scholars have 
been interested in culture patterns and historicity (Touraine, 1985), collective identity and the 
democratisation of everyday life (Melucci, 1996).  
These two trends have often been considered as two distinct schools of social movement studies: 
the North American school and the European school (e.g. Burawoy, 2015). The former sees the 
ultimate goal of social movements as ‘the integration of previously excluded issues and groups 
into the “normal” political process’, while the latter argues social movements ‘strive to be 
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autonomous of the political system’ (Martin, 2015, p. 5). On the other hand, Cohen (1985) 
distinguished the two trends into strategy paradigm and identity paradigm. Unlike the 
conventional juxtaposition, Della Porta and Diani (2015) and Klaus (2015) suggest that the field 
of social movement studies is mapped into three theoretical perspectives: a macro-theoretical 
approach that looks at the role of social movements within structural and social transformations; 
a micro-theoretical tradition that analyses micro-dynamics of collective actions; and a meso-level 
approach that looks at movements’ cultures, organisation models, and repertoires of action. 
There have been attempts to produce a synthetic approach to the social movement studies. Fraser 
(1995, pp. 74-79) suggests ‘bivalent collectivities’ be considered for understanding contemporary 
social movements, which combine both aspects of material redistribution and cultural 
recognition. She argues this is because the real-world struggles are mobilised at the intersection 
of gender, ‘race’, sexuality and class. Melucci (1989, cited in Martin (2015, pp.94-95), original 
emphasis) argues social movement studies must examine ‘both the how and the why of collective 
action’.  
Through their synthetic approach, Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 20) suggest the definition of 
social movements from the view of how they are distinguished from other collective actions in 
three aspects: 
 social movements are involved in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents; 
 they are linked by dense informal networks; and, 
 they share a distinct collective identity. 
This definition helps identifying the key theoretical issues for my research in relation to 
‘protective countermovement’. As discussed earlier, Polanyi’s concept of protective 
countermovement seeks to re-embed the market economy into society in response to economic 
liberalism’s project of fictitious commodification and consequent disembeddedness. Thus, the 
countermovement intrinsically has transformative forces to reverse the hegemonic movement of 
neoliberalism. The transformative forces are involved in conflictual relations with clearly or 
sometimes vaguely identified opponents, often the states or employers. This is how social 
movements as an expression of countermovement are distinguished from ‘consensual 
movements’ that eventually contributes to reinforcing the current social systems (Della Porta and 
Diani, 2006, p. 23). This problem also resonates with the long-standing question on collective 
actions: whether a movement will rupture the existing social and political narratives, practices, 
status and order or reproduce them (e.g. Bassel and Lloyd, 2011). 
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As not all collective actions can be considered to be countermovement, not all forms of 
countermovement are social movements. As discussed earlier, Polanyi’s protective 
countermovement implies a broad scope of movement that includes protective or restrictive 
legislation and other instruments of intervention (Polanyi, 2001 [1944], pp. 138-139). On the 
contrary, the social movement literature highlights the collective actions ‘from below’ based on 
informal networks among the people of a collective identity. Therefore, social movement 
organisations are distinguished from professional or interest groups which engage with social 
issues typically ‘from above’. 
Social movements in the capitalist society 
While social movement studies have considerably advanced in the aspects of strategy and 
identity, critiques note that they have largely ignored the structural context in which social 
movements are situated as well as which the social movements target. Hetland and Goodwin 
(2013, p. 84) point out that ‘the dynamics of capitalism played an extremely important role’ in 
many social movement studies in the 1970s and 1980s, referring to such authors as Tilly (1978), 
Skocpol (1979) and McAdam (1982). These scholars commonly analysed ‘the processes directly 
linked to capital accumulation, especially the proletarianisation […] of labour, the 
commodification of productive forces […] and the concentration and centralisation of capital’ as 
constraining, inciting or enabling collective actions (Hetland and Goodwin, 2013, pp. 84-85). They 
also looked into ‘capitalist institutions’ such as factories and banks or ‘institutions that capitalists 
may come to control’ such as legislatures and courts as the source or target of popular grievances, 
which in turn contribute to shaping collective identities and solidarities, and eventually facilitate 
collective actions. 
Noting the contributions of these Marxian approaches to the analysis of social movements in the 
structural context, we need to pay attention to new structural conditions that have dominated the 
era of neoliberal transformation as well as new trends of collective actions that have responded 
to them. I examine two globally emerging phenomena: the emergence of the precariat 
accompanied by the precarisation of work and the rise of global resistance concurrent with the 
globalisation. 
First, the precarisation has recently risen as a foremost agenda of social movements, particularly 
in the industrialised societies. As discussed earlier, precarity implies, on one hand, a ‘condition’ 
driven by neoliberal forces precarising labour and, on the other hand, a ‘watchword for 
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resistance’ of social movements claiming justice and identity (Schierup et al., 2014). The precarity 
has become not only the predominant condition of workers but has also profoundly affected the 
representation and recognition of those in precarious conditions and redistribution for them 
(Standing, 2014b). As the precarity movement has been increasingly visible throughout the 
industrialised world (e.g. EuroMayDay in 2004, Occupy movement in 2011 and 2012), scholars 
have paid attention the collective identities of those adversely affected by precarisation (see 
Martin, 2015, pp. 78-86). Standing (2014a) names this emerging new mass class as the ‘precariat’, 
which consists of three factions: ‘those who have fallen out of manual proletarian communities’; 
‘the ultimate denizens, migrants and minorities’; and ‘the highly educated’. He notes the second 
faction ‘who feel deprived by having no sense of the present, no sense of home’ tends to be 
politically detached but becomes ‘radicalised if their ability to survive is threatened by particular 
events or policies’, while the third faction is emerging as a ‘potentially transformative new mass 
class’ (Standing, 2014b, pp. 971-972). 
Second, in response to the global force of neoliberal transformation, social movements 
increasingly recognises the imperatives of overcoming nation state-oriented approaches but 
holding onto a global perspective. Observing the recent rises of social movements around the 
world, Burawoy (2015, p. 24) points out the limits of the national-level movements: 
First, although they are globally interconnected and mutually influential […] these 
movements are primarily shaped by national political terrains, and have difficulty 
building global solidarity. Second, even if commodification is the common experience 
propelling subjugated populations into collective action, there is no reason to believe 
that forging a united front even within a nation-state can be easily accomplished. Third, 
although emerging as reactions to commodification, these movements can also have the 
unintended consequence of extending marketization. 
Thus, he argues, to reverse the ‘marketisation’, a ‘countermovement will have to assume a global 
character, couched in terms of human rights since the survival of the human species is at stake’ 
(Burawoy, 2015, p. 24). 
Migrant movements 
Social movements of migrants have been researched from diverse perspectives. Migration 
scholars have looked into migrants’ resistance since the 1970s, especially in the Western 
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European context. A seminal work is Castles and Kosack (1974, pp. 511-513) that analysed the 
West German trade union’s incapability in representing migrant workers during the 
manufacturing workers’ strikes in 1973. They took notice of the growing roles of migrant’s ‘self-
organisations’; but they were also concerned about the institutionalisation of ‘separate unions’ 
between migrant and local workers, ‘the split in the working class’, and the rise of racism among 
the unions.  
The social movement studies on migrants in the 1990s and 2000s often relied on mainstream 
theories such as resource mobilisation and political opportunity theories (e.g. Eggert and Giugni, 
2015). They argued the collective actions of migrants tend to follow logics similar to other social 
movements but to have different patterns depending on their national contexts. 
Recent studies pay attention to the political impacts on citizenship that the social movements of 
migrants and pro-migrant activists generated. Tyler and Marciniak (2013) suggest there are three 
perspectives on the transformative quality of migrant resistance. First, many social movement 
scholars are limited to ‘integrationist politics’. Second, in response to the ‘exclusions, inequalities, 
hierarchies, securitizations’ (Nyers, 2007, p. 2) accompanied by the neoliberal reshaping of 
citizenship, social movements have developed an immediate strategy to challenge existing legal 
and political frameworks and to gain the ‘rights of citizenship’ like access to legal aid, welfare, and 
education (Tyler and Marciniak, 2013, p. 146). Third, radical critiques argue the humanitarian-
oriented advocacy, despite its necessity, importance and effectiveness, inevitably reproduces ‘the 
inclusive/exclusive logic of citizenship’ which has been ‘designed to fail specific groups and 
populations’ (Tyler, 2010, pp. 70-72). Instead, they emphasise the ‘autonomy of migration’ 
approach, which sees ‘migrancy’ as a ‘creative and productive form of movement’ to ‘escape’ and 
‘exceed’ the current legal and conceptual frameworks of citizenship (Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 
2013, p. 178). A neo-Marxist strategy of this approach is to mobilise ‘the category of “worker” to 
defetishize the figure of the “immigrant” or “illegal”’; therefore, to reconceptualise ‘migrancy as 
strategies to escape from economic abjection, and migrant resistance as the vital political 
solidarities and friendships of precarious workers on the move’ (Tyler and Marciniak, 2013, p. 
148). On the other hand, Papadopoulos and Tsianos (2013) argue it is problematic to reduce 
migrant mobility to the question of labour and capital, because it excludes economically inactive 
migrant populations like dependent children, the elderly and the sick. 
Other scholars take their argument to radical lines by arguing for ‘acts against citizenship’. Isin 
(2008, p. 16) suggest citizenship can be reclaimed as acts of subjects constituting themselves as 
‘those to whom the right to have rights is due’ referring to Arendt (1973 [1951]), Balibar (2004) 
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and Rancière (2004). Tyler and Marciniak (2013) argue this notion enables ‘the populations who 
are disenfranchised by the states in which they reside, and are “outside of politics” in any 
normative sense’ to act in ways ‘that allow them to (temporarily) constitute themselves as 
political subjects under sometimes extreme condition of subjugation’. Therefore, they argue the 
‘radical potential of immigrant protests’ arises when ‘migrants organise and act despite their lack 
of access to the rights and protection of citizenship’ (Tyler and Marciniak, 2013, pp. 149-150). 
Examples are the recent protests of refugees and their supporters on the ethical ground of 
‘maternity’ (Tyler, 2013) and ‘medical aid’ (Castañeda, 2013).  
International migrants, especially temporary and irregular, are ‘politically disenfranchised 
populations whose political marginality is compounded by various socio-economic problems’ 
(Castles et al., 2014, p. 296). The lack of political representation and access to citizenship is 
apparently the immediate source of migrant resistances. However, it is also imperative that 
migrants make a large proportion of the precariat as well as a significant part of the globalisation 
process. Here, the question is whether and how social movements of migrants and pro-migrant 
activists form a part of global social movements challenging the prevailing socio-economic 
problems, specifically precarisation and neoliberal globalisation. This may be an indirect answer 
to my question about whether and how the movements contribute to a protective 
countermovement which challenges the fictitious commodification of labour and migration and, 
eventually, re-embeds economy and migration into society. I suggest the case of social 
movements in South Korea against the state’s temporary labour migration policy may suggest a 
form of latent countermovement against the neoliberal commodification of labour and migration, 
as will be examined in Chapter 8 and 9. 
Conclusion: a social transformation approach theoretical framework 
This chapter has examined the contemporary and spatial relevance of Polanyi’s three key 
concepts: fictitious commodification that entails disembeddedness, market society as a political 
project and protective countermovement. The literature informs us that these concepts, which 
were developed to analyse the rise and consequences of economic liberalism in the 19th and the 
early 20th centuries, still provide significant insights to understanding the emergence and 
proliferation of neoliberalism in the contemporary world. The concept of fictitious 
commodification that entails disembeddedness helps to explain financialisation and its 
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accompanying processes of recommodification and excommodification of labour, a social 
consequence of which is the increased precarity in people’s social relations. The concept of 
market society as a political project provides an analytical basis for explaining the state’s roles in 
the neolieralisation process, questioning the neoliberal fabrication of the free market as smooth, 
gradual and organic evolution according to natural principles. The idea of a protective 
countermovement provides an analytical basis for understanding the dynamics of social 
movements in the context of neoliberal globalisation. Many scholars have also endeavoured to 
overcome the Eurocentric limitation of Polanyi’s work and to adapt the concepts to apply to other 
parts of the world with localised history and culture. The Polanyian theory has been ‘scale[d] up’ 
(Munck, 2006, p. 180) to accommodate the contemporary global neoliberal transformations. 
This chapter has also explored the possibility to expand the Polanyian theories to address the far-
reaching influences of neoliberalism throughout a wide range of social relations including 
international labour migration, temporary labour migration policy and social movements. The 
global political economy of migration is a plausible approach to understanding the contemporary 
flows of international labour migration. The global division of labour has generated polarisation 
of the global labour market and has been accompanied by precaritisation of work. These 
processes have fictitiously commodified migrants’ labour and reduced migrant workers to a 
‘reserve army of labour’ (Schierup et al., 2014, p. 2). The influential neoclassical migration theory 
justifies these processes with the hypothetical law of supply and demand and the false 
assumption of the individual’s rational choice. It is only an example of ‘disembedded 
understanding of migration’ (Castles, 2010, p. 1578). Temporary labour migration is an extreme 
form of the fictitious commodification of labour migration, institutionalised by the state for 
employers’ interests. It has to be understood in the context of a political project to create and 
reinforce the market economy. Just as the history of industrialisation showed, the contemporary 
neoliberal transformations, which entail fictitious commodification and disembedding, have led 
to the growth of protective countermovements of societies. The current wave of global 
marketisation cannot be reversed by national and fragmented reactions. But, ‘a planetary 
response’ and ‘an ideological challenge to the supremacy of the market’ are crucial for effective 
countermovements (Burawoy, 2015, p. 24). As learnt from the history of the early 20th century, 
the countermovements may not necessarily proceed toward the protection of society, but may 
adversely reinforce the perils of neoliberalisations. 
From the theoretical exploration in this chapter, I identified three theoretical accounts of my 
research questions: 
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 The political economic background of international labour migration to South Korea has 
to be understood in the context of the transformation of the mode of production 
management on a global scale which derives from the fictitious commodification of labour 
and results in disembededness of labour migration; 
 The rationales of the South Korean government’s introduction of the temporary labour 
migration scheme has to be understood in the context of social transformation into 
market society as a neoliberal political project; 
 The motivations of migrant workers and their supporters to protest against the South 
Korean government’s labour migration policy has to be understood in the context of 
countermovement to protect society from the neoliberal social transformation on a global 
scale. 
Social transformation is the core concept that penetrates above three explanations. As mentioned 
in Chapter 1, this research employs a ‘social transformation approach’ to analyse the realities of 
international labour migration, temporary migration policy and social movements which are 
marked by a complex and ambivalent nature and are intertwined and interplaying. Castles (2015, 
p. 10) argues international migration is ‘an integral element of contemporary social 
transformation processes’ and always occurs in specific national and transnational social, 
political economic and historical contexts. Thus, he suggests migration studies has to be closely 
connected to broader trends of social theories and to be re-embedded in society, proposing a 
‘social transformation framework’ (Castles, 2010). The social transformation approach is an 
initiative to synthesise existing migration theories and to contextualise them in the broad realm 
of social scientific studies on social transformations. It also recognises that a grand theory may 
lead to an over-simplified and out-of-context understanding of the reality. Middle range theories 
seems to be a more useful approach to understanding the social phenomena, extremely complex 
in their processes and relations with other social dimensions, and extremely diverse in their 
motivation, types, patterns and outcomes.  
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Chapter 3 Methodological principles, methods and 
reflections 
This chapter discusses the methodological principles that derive from the theoretical framework, 
situated in a discussion of broader literature on methodology. It also introduces the research 
methods that I used for this project, the rationale behind those methods, and reflections on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the approach I took. 
Methodological principles: historicity, political economic structure and 
transformative agency 
As discussed in the previous chapter, this project identifies ‘social transformation’ as a core 
concept that underlies the analysis on my three research areas: labour migration, temporary 
migration policy and social movements. I suggest that a way of developing a social transformation 
approach involves at least three methodological principles: historicity, political economic 
structure and a transformative agency. 
First, I take note that the historically oriented tradition of social sciences has revived in the form 
of historical sociology. The classic social scientists teach us that a social phenomenon can be best 
understood by ‘historical analyses of social structure and social change’ by ‘explaining particular 
sequences of historical events’ (Skocpol, 1985, p. 4). The classic examples are Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s (2008 [1838]) historical analysis of republican representative democracy in the 
United States, Karl Marx’s (2012 [1867]) analysis of ‘modes of production’ in Western European 
history, and Max Weber’s (2012 [1905]) interpretive understanding of the processes of 
rationalisation, secularisation, and disenchantment in association with the rise of capitalism and 
modernity in Western Europe. Theda Skocpol (1985, p. 1) suggests that contemporary historical 
sociology has four characteristics. First, its ‘questions about social structures or processes’ are 
‘concretely situated in time and space’. Second, it addresses ‘processes over time’ and takes 
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‘temporal sequences seriously in accounting for outcomes’. Third, it attends ‘to the interplay of 
meaningful actions and structural contexts’, to understand both ‘unintended and intended 
outcomes in individual lives and social transformations’. Finally, it highlights ‘the particular and 
varying features of specific kinds of social structures and patterns of change [emphasis in the 
original]’. This approach is compared with the ahistorical and structural-functionalist approach 
of ‘grand theory’ and ‘abstracted empiricism’, that originated in Émile Durkheim’s work (1964 
[1938]) and was advanced by Talcott Parsons (1968). In this thesis, I seek to apply the historical-
sociological approach in explaining the structure and changes of labour migration, migration 
policy and social movements in South Korea. 
The second perspective, to which I pay attention, is political economy. In addressing real-world 
concerns, political economy ‘emphasises the connections between economic problems, social 
structures, and political processes’ (Stilwell, 2012, p. 10). The dominant orthodoxy of 
contemporary society has been a neoclassical economic theory, which assumes that consumers 
and firms make rational choices to maximise the utility of their income and the profits from their 
production respectively, and also represents consumer preferences as the driver of economic 
activity and firms as engines of efficiency. Political economists’ critical perspectives, derived from 
Smithian, Marxist, institutionalist or Keynesian analyses, have revealed that neoclassical-
economic principles are a set of distinctive ideologies that create illusions of real power relations. 
Political economist approaches have contributed to migration studies by taking into 
consideration historical and structural dimensions and also by analysing labour migration in the 
context of unequal access to resources, exploitation of the global South for the profit of the North, 
and the international division of labour (see Castles et al., 2014, pp. 31-37). This research seeks 
to understand the international migration and labour migration policy in South Korea in the 
context of the global political economy. 
Methodological attention to historicity and political economic structure does not de-emphasise 
the importance of people’s individual or collective agency in the course of social transformations. 
Whether structure or agency has the primacy on shaping human behaviour has been a long-
standing question of social science. While methodological holism based on structuralism 
dominated in classic social sciences (e.g. Durkheim, 1964 [1938], Marx and Engels, 1996 [1867]), 
methodological individualism oriented to the primacy of human agency is still influential 
particularly among mainstream economists. There have also been consistent initiatives to 
reconcile the two aspects: for example, the ‘structuration theory’ (Giddens, 2013). Recently, some 
critical researchers, especially in education and sociology, have paid attention to the concept of 
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‘transformative agency’ as a way of examining ‘oppositional initiatives to reproductive tendencies’ 
in society (Sannino, 2015, p. 1). They suggest ‘the institutionalised mechanisms of power 
hierarchies and social dynamics’ simultaneously ‘sustain norms of passivity and provide 
opportunities for transformation’; and, ‘conflicts and crises’ are often ‘key sources of 
transformative agency and ensuing structural change’ (Béhague et al., 2008, cited in Sannino, 
2015). Nevertheless, it has been proved, in the context of migratory processes, ‘people confronted 
by social changes can and do react in varying and often unpredictable ways, ranging from 
compliance, through informal subversion, to open resistance’ (Castles, 2015, p. 11). Thus, it is 
essential for my project to look at the aspect of ‘transformative agency’ especially in relation to 
social movements in South Korea. 
Methods and data 
Mixed methods 
This study adopts a mixed methods approach to handle the complicated nature of social 
phenomena across international migration, temporary labour migration policy and social 
movements. Mixed methods are a research strategy that selects and then synergistically 
integrates ‘the most appropriate techniques’ from a myriad of qualitative and quantitative 
methods to ‘more thoroughly investigate a phenomenon of interest’ (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 
2010, p. 8). Despite the debates over ontological, epistemological and methodological questions 
(see Biesta, 2010), this approach rejects the epistemological claims of ‘incompatibility of methods 
thesis’. I follow the position of mixed method practitioners by maintaining a ‘pragmatic stance’ 
(Green and Hall, 2010, p. 130) and overcoming the dichotomy between quantitative and 
qualitative methods. 
I used both quantitative and qualitative data that can explain each study area in the best way. 
Statistical data were analysed to understand the political economic background of labour 
migration to South Korea; both media reports and policy and legal documents were examined to 
explain the migration policy process and to assess the policy; extensive ethnographic data, 
including my field notes and materials that I collected from participatory observations and the 
interviews of my research participants, were used to analyse the social movements of migrant 
and pro-migrant activists. 
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A transformative mixed methods approach allows a researcher to engage with ethics, reality, 
knowledge, and methodology even more proactively. Mertens (2010, p. 469) proposes the 
‘transformative paradigm’ as a framework for ‘researchers who place a priority on social justice 
and the furtherance of human rights’. Under the transformative paradigm, she argues, 
researchers focus ‘on ethics in terms of cultural responsiveness’, recognise ‘those dimensions of 
diversity that are associated with power differences’, build ‘trusting relationships’, and, therefore, 
develop ‘mixed methods that are conducive to social change’ (Mertens, 2012, p. 802). A study of 
the transformative mixed methods approach, as she noted, may encounter challenges ‘in terms of 
the accepted role of the researcher’ such questions as whether researchers ‘should be distant 
from their subjects’ or ‘close to and involved with their participants’ to eliminate bias; how 
researchers may ‘establish a trusting relationship’ or whether it is advisable or harmful to the 
conduct of valid research (Mertens, 2012, p. 811). They were indeed pressing questions that I had 
reflected on throughout my research, especially during my field research. I will discuss my 
reflections on these question in the next section. 
Data collection 
Statistical data were extensively used to describe trends of in- and out-migration, immigration 
control operations, employment and general economic index. The data were also used to analyse 
the relation between the variables and the time-series variance of the variables. Official 
immigration data were extracted from Immigration Statistical Yearbook from the year 1960 to 
2016, which were published on the website of the Korea Immigration Service (1961-2017). There 
were difficulties in using the data for time-series analysis because the Yearbook did not always 
provide precise definitions of each data item, which were again repeatedly changed according to 
changing immigration policy. I had to refer to relevant articles of the Immigration Control Act to 
confirm the definitions of each term in the Yearbook. Official data of the labour market and the 
economic index were available from the national statistical portal website, Korean Statistical 
Information Service, which was provided by Statistics Korea (2017). 
Legal and policy documents were extensively examined to analyse debates over the introduction 
of temporary labour migration policy. I analysed the discussions at the National Assembly for the 
introduction of the EPS by reviewing the Bills proposed by members of the Assembly and the 
Petitions submitted by the civil society. I also analysed key provisions of relevant laws, including 
the Immigration Control Act, the Nationality Act, the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of 
Overseas Koreans, the Act on the Employment, etc. of Foreign Workers, and the Framework Act on 
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Treatment of Foreigners Residing in the Republic of Korea. I also reviewed the chronic changes of 
the relevant legal provisions to chase the changing policy. The National Law Information website 
(Ministry of Government Legislation, n.d.) was a useful source of legal documents, while the 
website of Korea Legal Research Institute (2017) provided useful English translations. Other 
policy documents such as The 1st and 2nd Basic Plan for Immigration Policy were also examined to 
understand the implementation process of the legal provisions. 
News archives were an important source of information about the government’s announcements, 
the political debates and the migrants’ and pro-migrant activists’ collective actions on migration 
policies. The news searching service of a South Korean commercial internet portal site Naver was 
most often used. I mostly referred to reliable South Korean major newspapers like The Hankyoreh 
and The Kyunghyang Shinmun. I also referred to independent internet media like the Pressian or 
the a human rights organisation’s news bulletin Human Rights Daily published by SARANGBANG-
Group for Human Rights when they reported specific details on the issues that were not covered 
by the major papers. 
Ethnographic data was also broadly collected for this research. I conducted extensive 
participatory observations of South Korean social movements for and of migrant workers 
between February and November 2012 in South Korea. During this period, I attended 42 events 
including rallies, public or internal meetings and public forums. I also conducted 40 interviews 
with social movement activists, labour unionists, migrant service providers, professionals and 
migrant workers (see Appendix I). I sought to get ‘deeply and fully immersed’ (Mertens, 2012, p. 
79) in the society of the migrant rights activists in South Korea during my field research period. 
My ethnographic research has three features. First, it follows the tradition of sociological ‘urban 
ethnography’ that seeks to analyse such issues as social changes, power and class relations, and 
segregation of a minority in an urban setting rather than to describe the lifestyle and culture in 
an ‘exotic and primitive field’ (Madden, 2010, pp. 39-45). Second, my approach is ‘ethnography at 
home’ and ‘interrogating home’, because I studied a research field and participants that were 
already familiar to me, but in new relations and from new perspectives (Madden, 2010, pp. 45-
51). I was born and grew up in South Korea and also worked in the area of migration and human 
rights before I started this research. Thus, I experienced few language or cultural barriers. The 
knowledge that I had acquired through my previous work experience was useful for 
contextualising the collected data in the history and culture of the society. Third, due to the social 
and cultural closeness between researcher and research participants, I particularly endeavoured 
to maintain the principle of ‘reflexive ethnographic research’ (Davies, 1999, p. 5). Throughout my 
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field studies, I constantly reflected whether and how my research activities and my research 
products would affect my research participants and the society I studied. My reflections are 
discussed in the next section. 
The interview strategy tailored for my specific research conditions and relations with research 
participants was as follows. First, before field research, I developed a semi-structured interview 
schedule on the basis of the theoretical knowledge that I obtained from a literature review and 
the practical knowledge that I acquired through my prior work experience. The questionnaires 
consisted of information on research participant, research participant’s history of social 
movements, and research participant’s view on the issues of my research problems (see Appendix 
II). Second, I conducted a preliminary internet research of migrant and pro-migrant 
organisations’ websites and newspaper reports to collect information on their history and action 
plans, key actors, and key interests. Then, I contacted the organisations to request interviews 
when email addresses were available. The information I collected through this process also 
directed me to major public events organised by these organisations. 
During the early stage of field research, I focused on participatory observations by attending as 
many public events as possible, such as rallies, public forums, and press conferences (see 
Appendix I). These participatory observations helped me identify and recruit my research 
participants. For example, when I attended a conference on racial discrimination in March, which 
was my first participatory observation (PO_01), I had a chance to identify a few key migrant rights 
activists and to approach them to request interviews. 
When I identified or recruited a research participant, I conducted the second round internet 
research to collect publicly available information on activities and thoughts of the individual 
research participant. Since many of the research participants had already been actively involved 
in social activities, their activities and thoughts were broadly exposed to the public in the form of 
media interviews, statements of opinion and essays. They were available from newspapers, 
magazines and the websites of their organisations. I was able to collect information on historical 
events and other factual information and to crosscheck them with news reports or the academic 
literature before I conducted interviews. 
During the interviews, I focused on bringing about discussion on specific events, research 
participants’ activities and thoughts and my research topics rather than collecting information 
about them. Since I had already collected a significant amount of specific information during the 
pre-interview stage, I tried to help my research participants reflect their experiences and self-
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evaluate their activities. For example, instead of asking ‘What happened in 2003?’ I asked ‘What 
was your role during the sit-in protests in 2003? What was your observation of them? What is 
your evaluation of the organisational strategy of the protests? What were their social implications, 
do you think?’ Although not all research participants actively engaged in the discussions, most of 
them showed interests in the new style of interview, which differed from what they had 
previously participated in with media or other researchers. I tried to give my research 
participants an impression that I was prepared for an in-depth discussion because of the breadth 
of research I had already completed and by doing so, I aimed to include them in the process of 
analysing the information and building a theoretical account of their experiences together. I also 
tried to give them a chance to reflect on and assess previous activities. I sought to extract their 
thoughts rather than to collect information. It was an encouraging experience that one of my 
research participants CHM (RP_14) said my ‘reflexive and interactive interview style’ was a 
worthwhile way to spend his time and gave him a chance to think deeply about his work. 
Reflections 
Research ethics and positionality 
The reflexive and interactive interview strategy was an outcome of my consideration on research 
ethics. When I approached pro-migrant activists for interview requests, one of my research 
participants (RP_09) expressed her discomfort about such an interview for the purpose of 
academic or policy research. She said ‘Most information asked by researchers, especially student 
researchers, is in fact available on our website. They don’t do a minimum amount of homework 
before they request interviews. I don’t want to waste my time repeating the same story for their 
business.’ Many of my research participants complained about their experiences of previous 
interviews, similar to what Clark (2008) identified as ‘research fatigue’. Some of them said that 
they even had the feeling of being ‘exploited’ by the researchers, just like a refugee research 
participant’s statement that Pittaway et al. (2010) quoted to discuss the ethics of research with 
the vulnerable group: ‘Stop stealing our stories’. 
Upon the unwelcoming responses of the potential research participants, a question occurred to 
me: ‘What would or should my research mean to my research participants?’ This reminded me of 
the initiatives of ‘Minjung sociology’ (Kim, 1996a) and ‘public sociology’ (Burawoy, 2004), both 
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sought to engage with non-academic audiences, especially vulnerable groups. I thought the 
process and the product of my research should be something useful and meaningful for my 
research participants or at least not waste their time and energy. The interview strategy, as 
described above, was important to convince my research participants to think their participation 
would be meaningful to their activism as well as my research. The final product of the research 
will have to be useful to my research participants. It will be important for to share it with them 
and to discuss it again. 
I was also struggling with the question of positionality between activist and researcher. I have 
never been comfortable with writing and talking about the disadvantaged, the impoverished, the 
persecuted and the oppressed and also those who fight for them. I was somehow overcome with 
the shame or guilt that I would never fully understand their lives without having personal 
experience of their situation. It was the dialogues with my research participants that gave me a 
clue to untangle the thoughts about my identity, which is indeed a product of relationships 
between myself and others. Thus, I turned the focus of my reflection toward the relation between 
a researcher and research participants. 
Relationship between a researcher and research participants: a comrade or an outsider 
On 7 June 2012, I was sitting in a meeting room of the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions 
(KCTU) in the central Seoul with a hope to observe an internal meeting of the Alliance for 
Migrants’ Equality and Human Rights (PO_14) in preparation for a migrant workers’ rally in 
August. By that time, I had already attended several public events that were co-organised by the 
Alliance and other social movement organisations. For example, my participation at the 
conference on racial discrimination (PO_01) in March and the Migrant Worker’s May Day Rally in 
April (PO_07) helped me identify that the Alliance was a network of migrant, pro-migrant, and 
other social movement organisations and trade unions, which had played a central role 
organising those public events. My assumption was validated by an interview with migrant rights 
activist, KGD whom I have kept an acquaintance with for several years (RP_07). I had asked him 
whether I might observe some of the internal meetings of the Alliance, so he took me to one of the 
Alliance’s steering committee meetings.  
Before the meeting started, the committee members discussed whether I would be allowed to 
observe their meetings. KGD explained my background, mainly as a former staff member of an 
international organisation which had cooperative relations with pro-migrant organisations. He 
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added some of his personal experiences of me from when we worked in partnership. Then, I 
explained my research interests and the purpose of my participatory observation. Some of the 
members, who had seen me at the public events, recognised and welcomed me; others still looked 
sceptical, although they reluctantly accepted me. 
Their scepticism about my participatory observation was related to their previous experience. 
The confidentiality of the internal meetings was not a serious issue,  contrary to my presumption, 
because they thought nothing should be undisclosed to the public about their activities. Their 
scepticism was related to the distrust of researchers, widely spread among South Korean social 
movement activists. This is connected to the long-standing tensions between the professionals or 
experts, who worked on a voluntary basis while holding relatively well-paid and stable jobs, like 
professor or lawyer, and the activists or practitioners, who worked full-time for the organisation 
with passion and commitment despite low wages and poor working conditions. This relationship 
was the most problematic when hierarchical relations were involved. The professionals often 
dominated policy discussions and made theory-driven decisions about the organisation’s 
activities, while the activists were supposed to implement the decision without fully participating 
in the decision-making process despite their rich insights from field experience. The professionals 
often took advantage of their involvement in the social movement to establish their career path 
and promote their positions, while the activists were often left behind in the same position and 
sometimes with a sense of betrayal. It was even worse if their former professional colleagues 
behaved against their previous commitments once they achieved an influential position. The 
activists endeavoured to break out of the hierarchical relations throughout the 1990s and 2000s. 
For example, one of major human rights organisations in South Korea, SARANGBANG-Group for 
Human Rights (2006 [1998]) announced the ‘Declaration of the Principles of Activism’ to 
emphasise the independence of activists. As a result, they established the idea of ‘activist-oriented 
activism’ that values the experience and insights of activists and equal relationships among the 
members of the movement. Although the activism-oriented activists did not utterly refuse the 
involvement of the professionals, they did not hide sceptical views of the academics. 
Devotion, sincerity and sympathy were critical attitudes, that I was expected to show, to build the 
activists’ trust in a researcher. I tried to attend as many events and meetings and to collect as 
much information as I could. I tried to read as many articles written by or about them and their 
activities as I could. When I saw the activists, I tried to share the knowledge that I learnt from the 
readings or participations. After very intensive first three months, the activists began to 
appreciate my efforts: they invited me to meetings, shared information, and sometimes asked my 
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opinions about their plans. It was the outcome of sincere efforts, not an articulated research 
strategy. 
One day, a junior trade unionist, who attended a meeting of the Alliance, called me ‘Comrade 
Chulhyo’. Although the term ‘comrade (dongji)’ is still used among trade unionists in South Korea, 
no other activists had used the term with me. It seemed the junior activists felt more comfortable 
to call me ‘comrade’ than others. At first, I considered this situation indicated that I was successful 
in building a close rapport with my research participants. On second thoughts, however, I was 
worried I might fail to keep enough distance from them to ensure the objectivity of my research. 
It seemed the experienced-activists understood that I would not become their comrade due to 
this complicated problem, so they just called me ‘Mr Chulhyo (ssi)’. I asked to myself whether I 
was their comrade or an independent researcher. 
This question remained unresolved throughout the ten months of my field study. The day before 
my departure, several research participants organised a small dinner party for me. We had drink 
and a meal, but it naturally became a chance to debrief them on the outcome of my field study. I 
asked them about the unresolved question: ‘Why did one call me comrade, but not others?’ They 
laughed, and one of them said, ‘You know the reason better than we do.’ They asked me about my 
future plans after my research. My answer was ‘Well, somewhere between your comrade and an 
independent professional.’ I conducted my research neither to help my research participants nor 
to do anything against them. However, I did not want to pretend to be an outsider-observer or to 
hide my opinions. When I agreed with my research participants, I supported them; when I 
disagreed, I criticised them face-to-face. The whole process of my field research was a reflexive 
and interactive ethnography.  
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Chapter 4 Development, democratisation and 
international migration before neoliberalism 
: a historical account 
This chapter and the following one seek to answer the first research question ‘What is the political 
economic background of international labour migration to South Korea?’ They analyse the 
political economic changes in South Korean society before and after neoliberal transformations; 
and, then, they argue the increase of international migration in South Korea is related to the 
neoliberal transformation of South Korea. 
This chapter begins with a chronicle of social transformations in South Korea for the last century. 
The chronicle covers a hundred year before neoliberal transformations arose in the mid-1980s. 
Throughout the 20th century, the Korean peninsula indeed experienced a series of major social 
transformations from feudal monarchy to colonial rule, a division of territory by foreign forces, 
the establishment of two nation states, and a proxy war. Then, the southern half of the peninsula 
went through rapid industrialisation under authoritarian regimes and democratisation.  
Throughout the historical turbulence, there had always been issues of international migration, 
labour policy and social movements. Out-going migration of Korean workers continued since the 
late 19th century as a way of escaping poverty and political oppression. Later, the South Korean 
government promoted both temporary and permanent emigration as a part of economic and 
population strategy. 
Even before South Korea became highly industrialised and financialised, occasional arrivals of 
migrants continued since the late 19th century. The government’s response was a systematic and 
exclusionary policy on the migrants and asylum-seekers. Exclusionary immigration still lasts as 
the principle of the contemporary South Korean immigration policy. 
This chronicle provides a historical account of neoliberal globalisation and the international 
migration of the three decades afterwards, which will be examined in the next chapter. It also 
helps demonstrate the contemporary transformation from a comparative perspective. 
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Rapid economic growth, exploitation of workers and resistances under 
authoritarian developmental regimes 
The poverty on the ashes of wars and political oppression under colonialism and post-
colonial rules (1890–1960) 
Since the late nineteenth century, Korean society under the Kingdom of Joseon slowly 
transformed toward a modern society with ‘nascent capitalism’ (Kuznets, 2006, p. 5). The 
modernisation project was initiated by the kingdom as well as elite groups who were influenced 
by Western or Japanese civilisation. Agriculture was commercialised, international trade was 
increasing, a modern financial and monetary system was introduced. In the meantime, the Korean 
peninsula had become an arena of the contest for colonial powers, which threatened the 
sovereignty of the country. The top-down transformation project failed to address the poverty 
and inequality. Instead, Korean people perceived it as a part of foreign invasions. They mounted 
resistances such as Donghak Peasants Revolution in 1894-1895. Despite nation-wide popular 
resistance, the colonial rule of a neighbouring country, Japan, finally overthrew the dynasty of 
five-hundred-year history in 1910. The colonial rules lasted 36 years.  
Imperial Japan was in the process of rapid industrialisation and militarisation, and consequently 
in need of an extended market as well as a source of natural resources and labour forces. Korean 
people were the victims of the colonial exploitation (Seo, 2010). Although the Japanese imposition 
of a capitalist economy led to the urbanisation and industrialisation in some parts of Korea, the 
exploitation further intensified during the Second World War for the procurement of military 
supplies. Whether colonial rule produced the ‘offspring’ of the capitalist economy in Korea or 
quelled the ‘sprouts’ of endogenous modernisation is controversial (Shin, 2006). Some argue the 
growth of small entrepreneurs and the instalment of infrastructure during this period are 
considered as ‘foundational capitalism’  (Kuznets, 2006, p. 8). Others emphasise the people’s 
experiences of exploitation and oppression under colonial military rules as well as the increased 
economic dependence to Japan (Seo, 2010). 
Colonial occupation was terminated by the winners of the Second World War, but the 
independence of the nation in 1945 was immediately followed by another foreign occupation: the 
military administration of the United States in the southern half of the Korean peninsula and of 
the Soviet Union in the northern half. Three years later, two separate republics were established 
in each part of the peninsula, respectively under the auspices of the two big powers of the Cold 
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War. The nation was split into two states. They repudiated the legitimacy of each other and 
denounced each other as illegal occupation of territory. In 1950, the two states entered into a war, 
in fact, a proxy war between the two Cold War powers. The three-year war ceased by an armistice.  
South Korea was left only with the ashes of the war, being one of the poorest economies in the 
world with 67 US Dollars of Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in 1953 (Korea National 
Statistical Office, 2008). Political turbulence continued. The Liberal Government of the first 
President Syngman Rhee, who was once an independent movement activist, faced severe 
resistance from citizens when it attempted to prolong its power through a corrupt and fraudulent 
election. In the end, the president stepped down after a series of mass student demonstrations in 
April 1960. Soon after, a Democrat Government was elected, but it did not last even a year. In 
1961, the government was again overthrown by the military coup of General Park Chung Hee, a 
former Japanese army officer. 
‘Miracle of Han River’: rapid economic growth under authoritarian regimes (1961 – 1986) 
The authoritarian rule of Park Chung Hee continued for two decades until he was assassinated by 
his right-hand man in 1979. The oppressive regime dismantled democracy and the rule of law, 
particularly through the Yushin Constitution of 1972, which gave absolute power to the president 
(Im, 2011a). Human rights, especially freedom of expression and association, political rights and 
labour rights, were severely restricted. The antagonistic relations with North Korea made 
political repression even worse by justifying it ‘in the name of national security against the 
presumed threat from the North’ (Amnesty Internaional, 1975, pp. 94-95). The dramatic 
termination of the authoritarian regime was followed by another military coup in 1979. After 
quelling people’s determined resistance, especially through the Gwangju Massacre in May 1980, 
General Chun Doo Hwan continued the authoritarian rule for another seven years.  
The two authoritarian regimes strongly pursued economic growth projects in the name of the 
Five Year Economic Development Plan with the slogan of ‘the modernisation of the nation’, 
copying the Meiji Restoration, a Japanese modernisation project in the 19th century (Moon and 
Jun, 2011). The projects strategically focused on ‘export-oriented and outward-looking 
industrialisation’. The government promoted international trade and foreign loans and in 
response to the project, businesses concentrated on the industries favourable for export, which 
were, at that early stage, light industry relying on cheap labour (Harvie and Lee, 2002, Moon and 
Jun, 2011). On top of the accumulation of capital, the primary export effort was transferred to 
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heavier industries, being supported by the government through massive investment in 
infrastructure and technology. Consequently, the economy became highly dependent on the 
international economy (Bradshaw et al., 1993, p. 339). The government maintained a 
protectionist approach to international trade and a nationalist approach to industrialisation by 
fostering local business rather than encouraging foreign direct investment. The local businesses 
under the auspice of the government later grew into the Korean version of conglomerates, 
chaebol.  
During the three decades of the authoritarian period, the South Korean people experienced the 
breathtaking speed of industrialisation, urbanisation and economic growth. Macroeconomic 
indexes display the rapid economic transformations. The GNP per capita increased 38 fold. The 
industrial structure also fundamentally changed from the agriculture- to the manufacturing-
oriented. The primary sector of manufacturing rapidly shifted from light industry to heavy 
industry. International trade increased almost 60 fold. Principle export items used to be mostly 
natural resources in the 1960s, such as iron ore, fish, raw silk, and pig hair; and light-industry 
products in the 1970s such as wigs and textiles. However, in the 1980s, heavy-industry products 
such as ships and steel became the major export items for South Korea (see Table 4-1). 
 
Table 4-1 The growth of the South Korean economy by major economic indexes, 1960–1990 
Economic index 
Year 
Growth rate 
1960 1990 
GNP per capita (current US Dollar) 156  6,153  3,844% 
Industrial structure (Proportion of nominal GDP) 
     Agriculture 36.8% 8.9% - 76% 
     Manufacturing 13.8% 27.3% 98% 
     Heavy industry 23.4% 60.3% 158% 
     Light industry 76.6% 39.7% - 48% 
Exports of goods and services 
(Current US Dollar, Million) 124.3 73,735.9 59,221% 
Export items 
     Natural resources 45.4% 4.9% - 89% 
     Light industry products 4.9% 38.5% 686% 
     Heavy industry products 9.2% 42.2% 359% 
     IT products 0.0% 14.3% - 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office (2008) and World Bank (2017).  
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There was also impressive growth in the average wages of urban workers. The official statistics 
show the average nominal monthly incomes of a household of urban workers rapidly increased 
throughout the period. The income level was lower than the household expenditure in 1963 but 
grew faster than the expenditure afterwards. The proportion of food among the expenditure 
continued to decrease over the period. This statistics suggests the quality of life of urban workers 
improved (see Table 4-2). 
The industrialisation of South Korea was often referred to as a success model for developing 
countries. Mainstream economists argued the economic growth was the outcome of the fast 
accumulation of production factors, which was achieved through active pursuit of export-
oriented policies, non-excessive government intervention, emphasis on education, and stable 
macroeconomic policies (Tcha et al., 2003, p. 2). They named it the ‘East Asian model’ (Richter, 
2000). International organisations such as the World Bank also praised the economic growth as 
the ‘East Asian miracle’ (The World Bank, 2003). They argued the economic success derived from 
the ‘carefully balanced’ intervention, which sought to ensure macroeconomic stability with such 
methods as making markets works more efficiently or creating markets rather than replacing 
markets with government planning, strategically assisting direct investment for economic growth 
and stability, and creating an atmosphere conducive to private investment (Stiglitz, 1996, p. 156).  
However, there are alternative explanations. A ‘dependency theory’ approach argues that the 
history of Japanese colonisation and the subsequent military rule of the US yielded the 
background of ‘dependent development’ of the South Korean economy. The dependent feature 
was intensified by the high concentration of South Korea’s international trade to and foreign loans 
 
Table 4-2 The increase of incomes of urban workers in South Korea, 1963–1990 (Korean Won) 
  1963 1970 1980 1990 
Nominal monthly incomes of a household 
of urban workers      5,900     28,180     234,086     943,272  
Nominal monthly household expenditure 
of urban workers      6,330     26,710     183,578     723,035  
Differences between incomes and 
expenditure -6.4% 5.5% 27.5% 30.5% 
Proportion of food expenditure among the 
household expenditure 61.3% 46.5% 43.0% 32.7% 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office (2008).   
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from the US and Japan. However, the ‘dependent development’ of the Korean economy has a 
unique political dimension that was generated by its geopolitical situation. The US had political 
and military interests in restraining the proliferation of Communism in East Asia, and this was an 
important motive to support South Korea’s incorporation into the international capitalist system. 
This political situation also allowed a considerable degree of bargaining power for the peripheral 
South Korea in relation to the centre countries (Lim, 1985, pp. 133-134). 
Another dominant explanation is ‘developmental state’ model, characterised by aggressive 
industrialisation processes driven by the state (Evans, 1995, Woo-Cumings, 1999b). The strong 
state project of a ‘growth first’ strategy was possible because of the authoritarian regimes’ 
repressive drive. The military regimes maintained complete controls over bureaucracies, politics 
and financial agencies. State intervention supported market and business through facilitating 
foreign loans rather than guiding business or planning production. The government’s nationalist 
development strategy facilitated the rapid capitalist accumulation of local bourgeoisie, protecting 
the national market from multinational corporations. The local bourgeoisie were the key actors 
that carried out the government strategy of export- and heavy industry-oriented growth (Kim 
and Park, 2011, Kuznets, 2006), and eventually grew to large chaebols like Hyundai and Samsung. 
An important factor that justified political repression by the authoritarian regimes and the 
developmental state model was the excuse of the threat of an external ‘enemy’, North Korea 
(Evans, 1995). In this context, South Korean sociologist Cho (2012b, p. 3) defined the South 
Korean model of the developmental state as an ‘anti-communist developmental regime’. The 
South Korean ‘developmental state’ model was often contrasted with ‘predatory state’ model of 
some African countries (Evans, 1995). It was even considered as ‘the antithesis of the neoliberal 
path’ in comparison with some Latin American countries suffering inequality and 
underdevelopment (Delgado-Wise and Invernizzi, 2005, p. 419).  
These broadly accepted explanations are challenged by those who emphasise the role of the 
working class in the process of capital accumulation. Chang (2013) notes that behind the success 
of statist development project, there were anti-labour policies that disempowered and 
depoliticised the working class. The capital accumulation was possible because the authoritarian 
regimes facilitated the establishment of a ‘capital-dominant class relation’ on top of constant 
suppression of class struggle (Kim and Park, 2007). The constant military confrontation with 
North Korea created a political situation that could excuse controlling the discontent of workers 
and ignoring their demand. Mass production for export-oriented growth was the outcome of 
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extreme exploitation of labour through low wages, long working hours and poor working 
conditions.  
‘The way to Seoul is so long’: internal migration and exploitation of workers behind the 
economic growth 
The macroeconomic indices fail to capture the workers’ experiences of labour exploitation and 
political repression. Throughout this period, South Korean society saw the swift, abrupt and 
intense ‘proletarianisation of the labour force’ that involved a large-scale internal migration of 
rural peasants to the urban and industrial areas (Koo, 1990). The number of wage workers 
increased 335 percent between 1963 and 1985, and among them, manufacturing workers 
increased more than 7.5 fold while agricultural workers decreased almost by half (Koo, 2001, pp. 
33-36). This also meant the rapid collapse of rural communities. Approximately 11 million people 
are estimated to have moved from rural to urban areas between 1966 and 1984. The rural 
communities collapsed, and the relative income level of farming households rapidly deteriorated 
throughout the period (see Table 4-3). The government maintained low grain price policies to 
feed urban workers at low cost, which was also another factor that intensified the low income for 
farming households.  
The repressive regimes severely restricted the freedom of expression and thought. Thus, many 
social scientific studies were government-patronised and failed to engage with the miserable 
 
Table 4-3 Rural-urban migration, growth of manufacturing workers and collapse of rural 
economy 
 1963 1975 1980 1985 
Number of wage workers 2,414,000 4,803,000 6,485,000 8,090,000 
     Agriculture 725,000 677,000 551,000 437,000 
     Manufacturing 417,000 1,782,000 2,475,000 3,146,000 
 1966 –   1975 1975 –   1984 
Rural-urban migration (estimated)  5,100,000  5,900,000 
 1966 1975 1985 1990 
Farm household as percentage of  
total population  
53.6% 37.5% 20.9% 15.1% 
 1965 1974 1981 1985 
Extent of agricultural income  
covering household living 
expenditures 
88.4% 124.4% 92.5% 78.9% 
Source: Various source cited in Koo (2001, pp. 35-41).  
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lives of workers critically. Instead, the critical metaphor of literary works often vividly described 
the worker’s experiences.  
Kim Mingi is a prominent folk singer and songwriter. His songs in the 1970s and 1980s 
represented the lives of the oppressed workers and the urban poor. They also resisted 
authoritarian rules and rapid industrialisation. Many of his songs were censored and banned by 
the authoritarian governments, but were widely distributed underground by pro-democracy 
activists and students. The moratorium was lifted after democratisation in 1987. His music 
became a significant influence on the ‘song movement’ as a part of social movements in the 1980s. 
One of his songs represented the emotions of an internal migrant worker as below: 
On the way to Seoul 
Three years since my parents have been lying sick in bed, 
I dug out all the herb roots on the hills and gave them to my parents. 
Who is going to take care of my old parents, when I have left? Who is going to do it? 
The way to Seoul, it is so long. 
Magpie, you are coming to us every morning and cry. 
Come again and comfort my parents, when I have left. 
Who is going to take care of my old parents, when I have left? Who is going to do it? 
The way to Seoul, it is so long. 
Yellowy doggy, you are walking ahead of me. Why do you come along with me? 
Go back and take care of my parents. 
Who is going to take care of my old parents, when I have left? Who is going to do it? 
The way to Seoul, it is so long. 
Until when I get good medicine and come back, 
A Shade tree in front of my house, do not have your colour faded. 
Who is going to take care of my old parents, when I have left? Who is going to do it? 
The way to Seoul, it is so long.  
(Kim Mingi, 1972) 
The South Korean economy enjoyed an ‘almost unlimited supply of labour’ until at least the mid-
1970s, due to an abundant reserve army of labour force in rural areas as well as an additionally 
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large pool of potential female labour. Thus, South Korean companies hardly experienced any 
serious labour shortage until the mid-1980s (Koo, 2001, pp. 32-33). This job market situation 
meant for workers, despite the increased income, severe precarisation of employment. The 
workers were easily replaceable, so employers were not interested in improving their working 
conditions or motivating workers by providing welfare (Koo, 2001, p. 58). Threats of dismissal 
were one of the most common ways of personnel management, especially in low- or semi-skilled 
sectors. The oppressive authoritarian governments even intensified the vulnerable employment 
of workers. The laws on labour standards were hardly implemented. Moreover, one of the first 
measures that the military regime took, as soon as it seized power, was to dismantle the existing 
national federation of trade unions and to create a yellow union. It also continued to prohibit 
trade unions from political participation by law. In 1971, the government audaciously suspended 
the two primary labour rights: right to collective bargaining and right to collective action (Choi, 
1989). Workers had no way to protect themselves from the exploitative employment practices. 
Although the internal migrant workers had left rural homes in the hope of escaping poverty and 
harsh living conditions, they soon faced even harder working and living conditions in rapidly 
industrialising urban areas. One of the most common experiences was the long working hours. 
The comparative advantage of the South Korean economy, which was the prerequisite to the 
export-oriented growth strategy as a late industrialisation country, was cheap labour. The major 
exporters of South Korea, at least during the early stage of economic growth, were labour-
intensive industries such as the production of garments, textiles and electronics. The profit of 
these industries was heavily extracted from the exploitation of cheap and abundant labour. The 
working hours of manufacturing workers were the highest in the world throughout the period. 
According to a survey conducted by a religious organisation in the early 1980s, the working hours 
in the electronic and textile factories in Guro Industrial Complex in West Seoul were more than 
sixty hours a week (see Table 4-4). The Guro Industrial Complex was the first industrial zone 
established by a government plan to export-oriented industries. Later, it became a centre of South 
Korean labour movement. 
 
Table 4-4 Working hours of manufacturing workers in three countries, 1980 (per week) 
US Japan South Korea 
Electronic and textile workers  
at Guro Industrial Complex 
39.7 hours 38.8 hours 53.1 hours 60-70 hours 
Source: Various sources cited in Koo (2001, pp. 48-55).  
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Human rights lawyer Cho Young-rae describes the hard working conditions in the garment 
industry, which was one of the major South Korean exporters in the 1970s, as below: 
When work was plentiful the schedule for the workers was from 8 am to 11 pm, 14 to 15 
hours per day on average. There were many days when they would work all night, and in 
some instances two or three nights consecutively. That was when the factory owners 
would buy anti-sleep pills or administer injections to ensure the workers stayed awake 
while working. (Cho, 2003b, p. 123) 
Another way of maximising corporate profit was the minimisation of costs for the working 
environment. The safety requirements at the factory were often ignored to accelerate the speed 
of work or to save costs. In addition to the dangerous working environment, the mental and 
physical exhaustion that accumulated with the continuous overtime and lack of rest also added 
to the danger of industrial accidents. The government’s labour statistics show very high rates of 
industrial accidents throughout the industrialisation period. (see Table 4-5). Considering the 
figures reflect only the cases voluntarily reported by employers, there seem still more workers 
who suffered industrial accidents but were not compensated adequately. The poor working 
environment also worsened workers’ health in the long term. Many workers suffered from 
various industrial diseases due to noise, dust, heat, and gas that exceeded safe labour standards. 
A young worker in his twenties suffered chest pains, digestion problems, hearing difficulties, loss 
of eyesight, frostbite, and skin problems after several years of working in the factories (Koo, 2001, 
pp. 55-56). In the end, the workers were burnt out, worn out, and kicked out. 
As presented earlier, the official statistics show the impressive increase in average incomes of 
urban workers. Economists also suggest that relatively equal distribution accompanied South 
Korean economic growth. However, they fail to represent the vast income disparities between 
female and male workers, between manual and non-manual workers, and between workers of 
 
Table 4-5 Industrial accidents by frequency rate5, 1970–1990 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
15.5 16.8 11.1 11.6 6.7 
Source: Various sources cited in Koo (2001, pp. 48-55).   
                                                             
5 Total number of accidents divided by (Yearly working hours × Total number of workers), multiplied by 10,000. 
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different levels of education (see Table 4-6). The real experiences of workers were very hard. 
Although the average incomes were higher than average expenditures, it was also true that many 
workers were still paid wages below subsistence level (see Table 4-7). A survey at Guro Industrial 
Complex shows most workers were paid about Korean Won 100,000, about one-third of the 
national average income. More than half of the wage was earned by overtime work. More than 
one-third of the workers said they ran out of money two weeks after they earned monthly wages; 
and most other workers managed to use money for another week (Korean Church Social Mission 
Association, 1985). 
The housing of manufacturing workers was also in deplorable condition. Many workers lived in 
multiple-dwelling houses, called a ‘honeycomb house’ (Beoljip). Some companies offered 
dormitories to their workers, but many workers lived in the honeycomb houses. According to a 
 
Table 4-6 Income disparities, 1975–1990  
Income differentials 1975 1980 1985 1990 
by gender  
(Women’s wages as percentage of men’s) 
42.2% 42.9% 46.7% 53.4% 
by educational level  
(University graduates’ wages as percentage of high 
school graduates’) 
214.4% 228.5% 226.5% 185.5% 
by educational level  
(University graduates’ wages as percentage of 
middle school graduates’ or the less-educated) 
271.6% 297.3% 301.2% 269.3% 
by job   1983  
(Manual workers’ wages as percentage of  
non-manual workers’) 
n/a n/a 52.0% n/a 
Source: Koo (2001, pp. 58-59). 
 
Table 4-7 Low wages insufficient for expenditure, 1982 
Average monthly expenditure of urban households  
per one income earner 
KRW 191,521 
     Average monthly wage of bottom 50% income earners KRW 140,000 
     Average monthly wage of bottom 25% income earners KRW 100,000 or less 
The rate of average manufacturing wages as percentage of subsistence 
requirements (the 1970s – mid-1980s) 
50–60 % 
Source: Federation of Korean Trade Unions, cited in Koo (2001, p. 58).  
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survey of workers in Guro Industrial Complex, the average size of a worker’s room was 2×3 
metres. The room was often shared by two female workers or sometimes even by three. A kitchen 
half the size of the room was attached, which was also used for the shower and washing. There 
was no private toilet, so the workers shared a common toilet: one toilet by average 26 workers; 
in the worst case, even by 65 (Korean Church Social Mission Association, 1985). Most workers 
spent 30-50 percent of their incomes on such poor housing conditions. They could not live on 
their wages. 
The rapid economic growth and industrialisation were never possible without the exploitation of 
low-wage workers in poor working conditions. This exploitative labour system has never 
disappeared, even after South Korea reached a high-level income society. It has served 
continuously as the basis of extracting profits from the industry of lower productivity, underlying 
the national and global economy. Chapter 5 and 8 discuss how and why this labour system 
persists and also identify today’s victims: non-regular workers and migrant workers. 
‘We cannot last long like this’: discontent of workers and the sprouts of mobilisation 
A general strategy of workers in response to such hard working conditions and low wages was to 
seek a new employer who provided better working conditions and wages (Koo, 2001, p. 60). 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, almost two-thirds of all workers changed their employers more 
than one time (Korea Labor Institute 1994, cited in Koo, 2001, p. 57). Although many workers 
were afraid of arbitrary dismissal, they could also counteract by leaving their employers. The 
right to choose a job was an essential leverage for workers in negotiation with their employers. 
This issue arose again three decades later with migrant workers, as will be discussed in Chapter 
8. 
South Korean workers in the 1970s and 1980s not only resorted to the individual solution as 
above but also began to express their discontent collectively and to seek collective solutions. Park, 
No Hae had worked in textile, chemical and metal industries from the age of 16. He published a 
collection of labour poems under the title of The Dawn of Labour in 1984. His pen name is the 
acronym of ‘The emancipation of Persecuted Workers’. Labour poet and revolutionary socialist 
activist Park No Hae vividly described the despair and frustrations of workers. However, he also 
dreamed of ‘the dawn of labour’ where workers are emancipated from the exploitations; and he 
called for ‘solidarity’ to struggle against the exploitations.  
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The Dawn of Labour 
Finishing the night shift like war, / I pour cold soju, 
ah, / on my sore breast in the dawn. 
Cannot last long like this. 
Can never last like this. 
After three meagre ration meals, /the battle of endurance, drenched in grease. 
Squeezing out all my energies and struggling, / this labour work is like a war. 
Cannot last long. 
Can never last. 
Cannot help it, though. 
If only I can get away from this. 
Worn out and hollowed, / my fate of twenty-nine years, if only I can fly away from it. 
Ah, but, / cannot help it, cannot help it, 
if it is not by death, I cannot help it. 
This unrelenting life, / under the yoke of poverty, 
cannot help this fate. 
For the labour of tomorrow / coming again to my drooping body,  
on my sore breast in the dawn, / I pour cold soju. 
Doggedness and perseverance stronger than soju, 
rage and sorrow, I pour. 
This wall of despair that I could not get away from, / by all means, I will break through 
with harsh drops of sweat and tears of blood. 
For quietly breathing and growing / our love,  
our rage, / our hope and solidarity,  
on our sore hearts of dawn, / passing and passing cold soju glasses, 
we pour, / until the new dawn of workers 
rises. 
(Park No Hae, 1984) 
Under the oppressive authoritarian regimes, the workers’ resistance against the exploitations 
were restricted but desperate. On 13 November 1970, 22-year old tailoring worker Chun, Tae-il 
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and several colleagues of his organised a picket to call for the improvement of working condition 
at Seoul Peace Market. The picketing was, however, dispelled by the police and employers. Chun 
Tae-il burnt his body to death, shouting ‘Observe the Labour Standards Law.’ ‘We are not 
machines; let us rest on Sundays.’ and ‘Do not exploit workers’ (Cho, 2003b, pp. 31-32). Before 
the incident, he was a typical garment worker who had moved from a regional city to Seoul. Being 
shocked by the exploitive working conditions, he documented the illegal conditions in the 
garment factories in Seoul and submitted complaints to labour offices. He also organised workers 
and studied labour laws. However, all his efforts could not make any change. He ended up burning 
himself to make the exploitation known to the public. This incident sparked the development of 
the labour movement in South Korea. Workers started to organise independent trade unions, and 
occasionally went on strikes against poor working conditions or illegal dismissal. However, the 
collective actions of workers were mostly quelled by the police, and the efforts for organising 
independent unions were disrupted by yellow union members who were sponsored by the 
employers (Koo, 2001, pp. 70-99). 
The workers’ desperate resistance triggered the involvement of students and religious groups in 
the labour movement. It was a striking story for students that Chun Tae-il lamented ‘if I only had 
a university student friend’ who could help him in his struggle against the government (Cho, 
2003b, p. 187). From the 1970s, progressive churches were involved in the labour movement 
through providing spaces for workers and helping individual labour dispute cases. From the early 
1980s, students began to get deeply involved in the labour movement. They recognised the 
importance of solidarity between students and workers for the overthrow of the authoritarian 
regimes. Students often gave up their university degrees and declared ‘class transfer’. Then, they 
disguised themselves as working class and joined factories. Through underground activities, they 
educated workers or, in other words, they carried out ‘conscientisation’ campaigns and organised 
workers for ‘democratic or independent union’ (Koo, 2001, pp. 100-125).  
While South Korea’s industrial structure was shifting from light industry to heavy industry, the 
dominant group of workers also shifted from female to male. Labour disputes in the 1970s were 
rather occasional and resulted from desperate claims of suffering workers. The labour movement 
in the 1980s grew more organised, militant and radical, though the workers’ resistance was often 
quelled by the government, which supported employers. 
The experiences of workers during the period of rapid economic growth in South Korea support 
the argument that the ‘miracle of Han river’ was the bloody outcome of the exploitation of 
workers. It was a process of capitalist accumulation sponsored by the state and also a 
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reorganisation of social, political and class relations. However, the workers’ movement for 
independent unions gradually grew through the persistent collective actions and began to draw 
the attention and support of students, politicians and the public. The workers’ resistance was an 
important social factor that caused cracks in the oppressive authoritarian regimes. 
Out-migration of Korean workers 
Forced and economic emigration of poor Korean people under colonial rule 
Throughout the late 19th century, Korean (then, Joseon) peasants in poverty migrated to 
Northeast China and the Russian Far East for the cultivation of wasted land. They were followed 
by independent movement activists who organised armies and organisations in exile to fight 
against Japanese colonial rule between 1910 and 1945, as vividly illustrated in the reportage of 
Kim and Wales (1941).  
The Koreans in the Russian Far East were forcefully relocated to Central Asian republics by 
Stalin’s ‘population transfer project’. It is recorded that 171,781 people were forcefully relocated 
in 1937 (Kang (1995) as cited in Yoon, 2012a, p. 420). Although the Koreans in the Soviet Union, 
also known as Koryo Saram, suffered hard living conditions, they managed to build a middle class 
community in between Russians and the indigenous ethnic groups. After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the Korean migrants again faced ethnic exclusions and discriminations amid growing 
nationalism in the region (National Archives of Korea, n.d.). When the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) was established, it is reported at least 280 million people lost their 
citizenship due to the inconsistency between nationality law and practices of the new 
independent states (Faruharson, 2011). The majority of Koryo Saram were also rendered 
stateless (Kim, 2014a).  
When Japan occupied Manchuria by building a puppet state in 1932, it forcefully relocated more 
than 250,000 Korean workers to this region to launch development projects; another 250,000, 
supposedly, were voluntary migrants (T. Kwon, 1996 as cited in Yoon, 2012a, p. 414). Another 
60,000 were conscripted to the then Japanese-occupied Sakhalin Islands between 1941 and 1944 
(Jeon and Lee, 2012, p. 142). After the Second World War, Manchuria and the Russian Far East 
were re-occupied by China and the Soviet Union respectively. The majority of Koreans stranded 
79 
in these areas could not return home, mostly because of the ignorance of the United States and 
the Soviet Union Military Administrations, which divided and occupied the Korean peninsula 
(Lee, 2012b). 
The Koreans in China, also known as Joseonjok, built Korean communities in the Northeast 
Chinese provinces. They made significant contributions to the establishment of Communist China. 
Their political and economic influences, however, gradually decreased after the Cultural 
Revolution and economic reform in 1960s in China. These ethnic Koreans and their descendants 
returned to South Korea after the 1990s. The Joseonjok and Koryo Saram became the major source 
of migrant workforces for South Korea, as will be discussed in Chapter 5. Some 4,000 victims of 
the forced migration in Sakhalin returned to their home country after South Korea, Japan and the 
Soviet Union agreed on a repatriation programme in 1990 (Kim, 2014a). 
The forced migration to Japan intensified during the Second World War. The Japanese colonial 
government conscripted Korean people for the forced labour in coal mines, fight on the 
battlefronts or even ‘sex slavery’. The Korean population in Japan reached up to 2.3 million in 
1945 (Lee, 1996 as cited in Yoon, 2012a, pp. 414-415). Although approximately three-quarters of 
them returned to Korea after Japan’s defeat in the War, the rest could not return (Heo, 2012). 
Later, the remaining Koreans built two separate communities, which had close relationships with 
either the North or South Korean governments respectively, many of whom still remain stateless 
(Kim, 2014). Although the Korean communities suffered systematic racial discrimination, they 
played crucial roles in building multiethnic migrant communities and pressing the Japanese 
government to recognise migrant rights (Lee, 2012c, Lim and Kim, 2013). 
Emigration to the US began in the 1890s in the form of ‘indentured labour migration’ (Castles et 
al., 2014, pp. 88-89). Several thousand Koreans migrated to sugar plantations in Hawaii. The 
recruitment was facilitated by American missionaries. Later, they were followed by ‘picture 
brides’ to marry the single male migrant workers who had arrived earlier (Patterson (1988) as 
cited in Yoon, 2012a, p. 414). They suffered hard working and living conditions, but later built an 
economically influential community. This migration flow continued until the US Immigration Act 
of 1924 prohibited Asian immigrants (National Archives of Korea, n.d.). The emigration to the US 
was re-boosted by the US involvement in Korean War. More than 10,000 Koreans migrated to the 
US between 1950 and 1962 as partners or children of American soldiers. Thousands of war 
orphans were also adopted by American families. 
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The South Korean government had discriminatory approaches toward the Korean diaspora. Its 
diaspora policy favoured the migrants of Korean ethnicity from developed countries like the 
United States and Japan. However, it was restrictive toward those from less-developed countries 
like China and the Central Asian countries. The Chapter 7 analyses political-economic implication 
of this discriminatory policy of the South Korean government. 
Temporary labour migration of South Korean workers and their struggles 
Throughout economic growth, the South Korean government promoted the emigration of young 
workers as a part of its development strategies. The temporary labour migration of South Korean 
workers started in the form of the recruitment of individual workers. Later, it shifted to the form 
of collective migrations of the workers attached to South Korean construction companies. Both 
made significant contributions to the economic growth of South Korea: the remittance of the 
workers became ‘the seed money for the economic growth in the 1970s’ (Yun, 2013, p. 388). The 
earnings of the construction companies contributed to South Korea’s foreign exchange, especially 
when it faced the oil crisis in the 1970s (Kim, 1988). The government also promoted the 
permanent emigration of ‘surplus population’ as a response to the post-war exponential 
population-growth (National Archives of Korea, n.d.). 
The first flows of temporary labour migration were initiated by a European guest-worker 
programme. Between 1963 and 1977, almost 20,000 mining workers and nursing assistants went 
to the former West Germany (Yun, 2014, pp. 433-434). According to the testimonies of the 
workers, high-level wages were attractive enough for the young and highly educated workers to 
accept the hard and dangerous manual works. The opportunity to travel overseas made it even 
more attractive while the authoritarian regimes strictly controlled overseas travel (Choi, 2013d, 
Kwon, 2010). Workers recall that they were satisfied with the relatively advanced working 
conditions and welfare system in the destination country and, more importantly, they also learnt 
the better working conditions were the outcome of workers’ collective struggles (Cho, 2007). 
According to a survey, approximately 40 percent of the South Korean workers remained in 
Germany after their contracts, while another 20 percent re-migrated to other European or North 
American countries (Yun, 2014, p. 439). They achieved permanent residence through struggles 
to challenge the temporary labour migration system. The female nurses initiated meetings, rallies 
and petitions. In 1977, the West German government granted permanent residences or 
citizenship to them. This experience of struggle ‘taught them social movement’ and they 
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organised ‘Group of Korean Women in Germany’ afterwards (Choi, 2007, Kwon, 2010). Choi, 
Young Sook, who is still a nurse and also a social movement activist, remembers her struggles 
against the temporariness of labour migration as below: 
We argued ‘we are not such communities that you can bring in when you need and 
throw away later. We are a human being. If we go back to Korea now, the life will not be 
easy due to cultural differences. So, we will live where we want to live, and will go back 
when we want to go back.’ (Choi, 2007) 
Male mining workers, at first, sought the permanent residence through marrying the female 
nurses. They soon joined the struggles for the recognition of the right to residence. They had 
already been actively involved in the strikes, calling for safe working conditions and fair 
treatments. By the late 1970s, their struggles shifted to challenging the guest-worker system. The 
mining workers eventually achieved permanent residence in 1980 (Cho, 2007). ‘Association for 
Human Rights of Korean Miners in Germany’ was one of the most active organisations for the 
movement (Choi, 2013d). Later, some of these migrants, like Choi, Young Sook returned to South 
Korea and made significant contributions to South Korean pro-migrant groups in the 2000s. 
The second flows of the collective temporary labour migration were organised by South Korean 
companies that brought construction workers to overseas construction sites. After the 1973 oil 
crisis, construction booms surged in the Middle East. South Korean companies managed to get 
subcontracts for huge projects like highways, waterways and buildings (Chung, 1993). The 
‘mythology’ of hard-working but not-complaining South Korean workers satisfied the Middle East 
oil-rich contractors (Disney, 1977, p. 23). South Korean companies became one of the biggest 
constructors in the region. The number of South Korean workers in the Middle East continued to 
increase to more than 170,000 by the early 1980s and their remittance’s became significant 
contributions to household incomes (Kim, 1988, pp. 229-230). The success in the Middle East was 
a platform for the capital accumulation of some South Korean chaebols like Hyundai.  
However, the ‘mythology’ of hard-working South Korean workers was only a deceptive term to 
disguise the exploitative working conditions. The companies trained and managed workers like 
soldiers and accommodated them in barracks. They worked more than ten hours a day and had 
only two days off a month. The wages were lower than other migrant workers in the region, 
although higher than the average wages in South Korea (Disney, 1977, p. 24). The workers’ 
discontent grew about militarised and oppressive personnel management and the relatively low 
wage. On 13 March 1977, the violent behaviour of a manager ignited the counter-violent strikes 
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of the furious workers. Thousands of Hyundai Construction workers in Saudi Arabia attacked 
their managers, burnt their offices and occupied communication facilities. The Saudi Arabian 
military force was dispatched to quell the violence. The strike was resolved by the mediation of 
South Korean embassy and labour office: they agreed to a 20 to 25 percent increase in income 
(Sungkonghoe University Democracy Archives, 2009). The construction workers in the Middle 
East were, in practice, under the jurisdiction of the South Korean authoritarian developmental 
regime and treated as if they were still in South Korea. Although this strike was hardly known to 
South Korean society due to the authoritarian government’s control of information, it is still 
considered as an important part of labour movement history. 
The recession of oil trade in the mid-1980s pressed countries in the Middle East to reduce new 
construction projects. Accordingly, South Korean construction companies had to retreat from the 
region and their employees also returned. From the mid-1990s, their overseas business revived 
and expanded toward Southeast Asia and Latin America. However, they did not take South Korean 
temporary migrant workers to these new construction sites this time. The employers preferred 
hiring cheaper local workers to paying high South Korean wages increased after the 
democratisation. The share of South Korean migrant workers in the overseas construction sites 
of South Korean companies dropped from 95 percent in the mid-1970s to 6 percent in the mid-
1990s (International Construction Association of Korea, 2009). South Korea was transiting from 
an origin country of temporary migrant workers to a destination. 
South Korean workers that went to the former West Germany were an important force for 
abolishing the temporary labour migration system. On the other hand, the workers that went to 
the Middle East under the auspices South Korean employers had almost same working conditions 
as in South Korea and eventually returned home. This comparison may be explained by several 
factors such as democracy in the destination countries and origin countries’ strategy (Castles, 
2004b), or the individual characters of the workers. However, the method of labour management 
also seems to be a decisive factor: the individually hired workers in Germany managed to settle 
down, while the workers attached to a South Korean company in the Middle East all returned. 
Government-promoted permanent emigration of ‘surplus’ population 
The South Korean government promoted the permanent emigration project as a method of 
population management. The introduction of Overseas Emigration Act of 1962 was an initiative 
to facilitate the emigration. As stipulated in the Act, the project aimed at ‘optimising population 
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level, stabilising the national economy and enhancing the prestige of the country’ (Article 1). The 
project focused on the migration to Latin American countries like Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina 
for the cultivation of wastelands. However, the migrants had no skills or experiences of 
agricultural work, so they soon moved to cities and ran retail or garment production businesses 
(National Archives of Korea, n.d.). The effect of this project was only marginal on population 
management; thus, it stopped in the 1960s. 
After the ‘discriminatory national-origins quota system’ was abolished in the US immigration 
policy in 1965 (Castles et al., 2014, p. 129), the US became a major destination for South Korean 
migrants. From the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, more than 30,000 South Koreans emigrated to 
the US every year (National Archives of Korea, n.d.). These migrants had social and economic 
characters different from the previous batches of migrants. Most of them were ‘new middle class’ 
who were already established in cities, often after internal migrations from rural areas. They 
settled down in the US and opened small businesses. They were quickly integrated into the 
mainstream society; however, they were often in conflictual relations with minority communities, 
as seen in the case of 1992 Afro-American uprisings in Los Angeles (see Seo, 2003). 
Another flow of migration to the US was international students. Highly qualified students sought 
higher education in the US universities under scholarship programmes (Yoon, 2012a). While 
many students returned home, others settled down in the US. The student migrations have had 
particularly significant influences in academia and, eventually, throughout the origin society (Kim, 
2010a, Korea Progressive Academy Council, 2003). They are often blamed for leading the US-
oriented ‘intellectual colonisation’ in South Korean society (Cho, 2003a). 
The most flows of international migration during the period of colonial rule and authoritarian 
regimes were out-going migration. Many Koreans emigrated to China, Russia, Japan and the US. 
They sought the opportunity to escape the poverty and political oppression in their homeland. 
Throughout rapid economic growth, South Korea was mainly the origin of temporary or 
permanent migration to Europe, Middle East and America. The South Korean government played 
significant roles in promoting emigration as a strategy of national income and population control. 
Most South Korean migrants had to endure hard working condition to send the remittances back 
home, which eventually contributed to economic growth in the home country.  
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Arrivals of migrants and exclusionary immigration policy 
The South Korean migration literature has paid little attention to immigration before the 1990s. 
This section highlights two notable cases of early migrant arrivals. The first was the arrivals of 
the earlier generation Chinese migrants who sought business opportunities in late 19th century 
Korea amidst the competitive intrusions of the colonial powers. The second was the temporary 
or emergency landings of Vietnamese ‘boat people’ in the late 1970s and the 1980s, who survived 
the perilous exodus and sought asylum. These groups of migrants were not large enough to make 
a significant impact on the society. However, the way that the South Korean government treated 
these migrants is worth examining because they reveal the extremely exclusionary and 
systematically discriminatory origins of the South Korean immigration policies. 
Through the two cases, I illustrate how ‘ethnic nationalism as the predominant principle of the 
organisation of South Korean society’ (Shin, 2010a), was reflected in the immigration policy. The 
exclusionary and discriminatory nature of early immigration policies operated in the context of 
totalitarian and developmental regimes that propagated ‘ethnic nationalism’ to mobilise the 
populace toward the ‘national’ goals of security and economic growth and suppressed diversity. 
Civil society was complicit in the totalitarian exclusion project: in competition with the regimes, 
they advocated an alternative ‘ethnic nationalism’ but ignored the ethnic minorities. The South 
Korean society was hardly considerate of the minority and migrants. 
Understanding the characteristics of the early immigration policies helps in extending the 
understandings of current immigration policies in a historical context. Considering ‘ethnic 
nationalism’ still prevails as a dominant political discourse in South Korea, it particularly provides 
an analytical insight to understand the ethnic-nationalist political dimensions of the current 
immigration policies. This section begins with illustrating the two cases, and then, discusses their 
implications on the current immigration policies. 
Systematic exclusions of 100 years: the settlement of old-comer Chinese migrants 
The first arrival of immigrants in modern Korea was the Chinese merchants from Shandong area 
the northeast of China. The arrival began in the 1880s when imperialist competition over the 
Korean peninsula reached its peak: the UK, the US, France, Russia, Germany, Japan in addition to 
China were all trying to involve themselves in the economy and politics of Joseon. Throughout the 
Japanese colonial period, these old-comer Chinese immigrants, known as Huaqiao or Hanhua, 
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were successfully established in Korean society, especially in the sector of commerce and trade. 
The population of the Chinese immigrants reached 80,000 in 1942, the majority of whom resided 
in the northern half of Korean peninsula (Park and Jang, 2003, p. 6). According to an estimation, 
there were about 12,000 old-comer Chinese in South Korea in 1945 (Jang, 2002, p. 247). 
The exclusionary policy on the Chinese migrants in Korea traces back to the colonial period. In 
the aftermath of violent incidents between Korean and Chinese farmers in Manchuria in 1931, 
known as the Wanbaoshan Incident, a series of violent attacks on the Chinese community in Korea 
occurred throughout the country, which resulted in the killings of 142 Chinese migrants in three 
days (Park, 2014b, p. 250). The incident used to be understood as an outcome of Japanese 
colonialist’s manipulation or a spontaneous expression of Korean workers’ discontent over 
increasing Chinese coolies. However, recent studies reveal there were several incidents of attacks 
on the Chinese community, which were systematically organised by Korean nationalist groups as 
a means of taking the lead among independent movement groups (Min, 1999, Park, 2014b). They 
argue the Chinese migrants were used as scapegoats by independent movements for mobilising 
‘ethnic nationalism’ against colonialism. 
After independence, the governments of South Korea officialised extremely exclusionary policies 
against the Chinese migrants. The authoritarian anti-communist government of Rhee Syngman 
strictly prohibited the new entry of foreigners in 1948. The government also forbade the 
immigrants from possessing foreign currency and engaging in international trade (Lee, 2012f). 
The military junta of Park Chung-hee even further intensified the discriminations against the 
Chinese migrants by prohibiting foreigners from owning land in cities including Seoul where the 
major Chinese enclave was (Article 5, the Foreigner’s Land Acquisition Act of 1961). It also 
imposed unfair taxations on them. It eventually expelled the Chinese community from the capital 
city during urban gentrification projects in the late 1960s (Park, 1999). The government never 
granted permanent residence to these foreigners. Thus, the Chinese migrants had to renew their 
visa every one-to-two years even though they were the second or third generations born in South 
Korea. The acquisition of South Korean nationality was extremely difficult, as the naturalisation 
process required sponsorship from high-level government official or a large amount of asset 
(Article 4, the Nationality Act).  
International relations in North Asia during the Cold War aggravated the isolation of the Chinese 
migrants in between their anti-communist country of residence and communist country of origin. 
They were impelled to acquire anti-communist Taiwanese citizenship, although their origin was 
mainland China. They were under the consistent suspicion of having potential connection with 
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communist China (Lee, 2012f). Under such political repression, any mobilisation against the 
discriminatory treatment or any expressions of discontent were almost impossible. When the 
South Korean government broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1992 and established a 
new diplomatic relationship with People’s Republic of China (PRC), their situation became even 
more complicated. New-comer Chinese migrants, mostly with Korean ethnicity (Joseonjok), 
gradually migrated from the PRC to South Korea. They gained considerable attention from the 
public and the government, while the old-comers remained abandoned and forgotten. 
Exclusionary and discriminatory policies were often justified by the law in the name of ‘the public 
necessity’ (Article 5, the Foreigner’s Land Acquisition Act of 1961). In the context of the 
authoritarian developmental regimes, ‘public necessity’ was often used as the excuse for 
expropriating or restricting the properties of the most vulnerable. Some of the people’s resistance 
against such expropriations drew the public’s attention, for example, the Gwangju Housing 
Complex incident in 1971. However, no resistance of or redress for the old-comer Chinese is 
publicly known. The media often described the Chinese enclaves as ‘the old-fashioned’ and called 
for their removals in the name of the ‘urgent request of modernisation’ (see The Kyunghyang 
Shinmun, 1968). There was no room for the Chinese migrants both in the authoritarian 
government’s project of ‘modernisation of fatherland’ and in the civil society’s fight for the 
emancipation of national workers. As both the South Korean state and civil society took for 
granted ‘ethnic nationalism’ (Shin, 2010a, p. 228), they were ignorant of the discrimination 
against ‘foreigners’. The Chinese migrants were excluded entirely from the South Korean society 
by the complicity between the state and civil society. 
After democratisation in South Korea, the Huaqiao community finally began to raise their voices. 
With the support of civil society groups and politicians, they sought to introduce new laws to 
recognise their rights and permanent residence (e.g. Bae, 2000, Chung, 2001). The South Korean 
government finally granted them permanent residence visas in 2002 and the right to vote for local 
government election in 2006. It was the first ‘official recognition of their settlement only after 
100 years’, as the president of Chinese Residents’ Association Seoul Korea, Lee, Chung Hyun 
commented at a conference which I attended (PO_19). However, the discrimination persists, 
especially in education and welfare services, according to the media reports (see Kim, 2012c, Park, 
2013b). The discriminatory government policies also generated the legacy of wide-spread daily-
life discriminations (Jang, 2002, Park and Jang, 2003, Yang and Yeou, 2011). Over the 100 years 
of survival under the systematic discriminations, the old-comer Chinese migrant community was 
never able to grow in size: there were 12,038 people with permanent resident visas for Overseas 
87 
Chinese in Korea (F-5-8 visa) in 2012, which is as many as in 1945. The Chinese Resident's 
Association Seoul Korea (2006) reports that since the 1970s approximately 20,000 people have 
re-migrated to third countries like the United States, Australia and Taiwan to escape from the 
discrimination. 
The case of the old-comer Chinese migrants exemplifies the deep-rooted exclusionary and 
discriminatory nature of South Korean government policies against migrants. The government 
policy of exclusion and discrimination against migrants was implemented as a part of the ‘ethnic 
nationalist’ totalitarian development project. There was no room for the Chinese migrants to raise 
their voices when ethnic nationalism was the dominant discourse both in the government and 
civil society. They survived the systematic exclusion and discrimination for 100 years. 
Absolute exclusion of asylum-seekers: the temporary landings of Vietnamese ‘boat-people’ 
Throughout authoritarian regimes, there was almost no migratory flow into South Korea. The 
country had no economic or political merit to attract migrants, as one of the world’s least 
developed post-war countries and under the authoritarian regimes. Its geopolitical location was 
another obstacle for the movement of people, given it was surrounded by the ‘enemy countries’ 
during the Cold War period. The political situation made its borders one of the world’s most 
highly militarised, especially toward the north. Consequently, strict immigration controls and 
‘closed immigration policy’ (Kim, 2012d, pp. 2-6) allowed almost no arrivals of migrants. 
An exceptional case of migrant arrivals was the landing of Vietnamese asylum-seekers after the 
Vietnam War. Between 1975 and 1989, almost 3,000 Vietnamese asylum-seekers landed in South 
Korea. The first group was those who accompanied the South Korean nationals when they left 
Vietnam during South Korean Navy’s evacuation campaign a few days before the ‘Fall of Saigon’ 
in 1975: 910 Vietnamese, 31 Chinese and 1 Filipino, all related to South Korean nationals. After 
that, the landings of Vietnamese ‘boat people’ who were rescued in the South Korean territorial 
seawater or international waters continued until 1989 (Chung, 2009). 
Selective reception of asylum-seekers was made on the ground of kinship-ties rather than in 
accordance with the international responsibility of refugee protection. Only a small number of 
the first arrivals, who were related with South Korean nationals by family or common law 
relations, were granted South Korean nationalities or long-term visas. The government imposed 
marriage on those who did not have a pre-existing relationship with a South Korean citizen as a 
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way of obtaining citizenship (Chung, 2009, Nho, 2013). The rest of the asylum-seekers were 
absolutely excluded. All were confined in an asylum-seeker camp, run by the UN Refugee Agency 
and the National Red Cross, at a remote suburb of a harbour city, Busan. None of them were, 
reportedly, permitted to settle down or even to stay outside the camp. Most of them were 
resettled in a third country after several months or years of ‘temporary landing’ in the camp or 
even repatriated to Vietnam (Nho, 2013). Without any consideration of refugee protection, the 
South Korean government recognised only family relations for accepting asylum-seekers. 
South Korea’s diplomatic relation with the US as an anti-Communist alliance was an important 
reason for the exceptional permission of migrant arrivals. South Korea had already participated 
in the Vietnamese War both under the pressure of ‘blood-ally’ and for the economic rewards 
endowed by the ally. The South Korean government could not avoid further requests from the US 
to share the burden of humanitarian responsibility. However, it also took a political benefit from 
the asylum seekers: the accepted asylum-seekers were mostly mobilised to testify against 
communist Vietnam, which was used to justify South Korea’s anti-communist authoritarian 
regime against communist North Korea (Nho, 2014b). 
Later, the government’s policy turned to blunt and total blockades of asylum-seeker arrivals. The 
government discouraged South Korean ship operators from rescuing boat people in international 
waters, which is against the international maritime law. The ship’s crews, who persisted in 
rescuing the boat people, often faced economic and political pressures from the government. For 
example, the captain of a South Korean deep-sea fishing vessel, who rescued 96 boat people in 
1985, suffered severe investigations by intelligence agencies and dismissal from his work, as 
reported by a newspaper (see The Chosun Ilbo, 2004). After this incident, there were no more 
rescues of boat people by South Korean vessels in international waters (Nho, 2013). In the late 
1980s, the government overtly pushed out to international waters all boats that were considered 
having Vietnamese asylum-seekers on board. It permitted no more landing of any asylum seekers.  
The South Korean government’s policy toward the Vietnamese asylum-seekers was far from the 
international principles of refugee protection. Scholars argue the delay in South Korea’s 
ratification of the Convention on the Status of Refugees is partly derived from the government’s 
intention to avoid the international responsibility for the protection of the Vietnamese asylum-
seekers (Chung, 2009). South Korea acceded to the Convention in 1992 only after it resettled all 
the asylum-seekers in other countries. Also, although the country was already a State Party to the 
Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons, such international responsibility was ignored 
entirely (Kim, 2014a). 
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South Korean civil society was either ignorant or ambivalent about the Vietnamese asylum-
seekers. Although the forceful expulsion cases in the late 1980s drew the attention of the media 
(e.g. Chung, 1991), no reliable documentation of the conditions in the asylum-seeker camp was 
produced by government agencies, civil society group or academics. Although some researchers 
assumed that there was some interaction between the asylum-seekers and local people (Nho, 
2014a), no evidence was found of the South Korean civil society’s involvement in the protection 
of the asylum-seekers. Although the National Red Cross of Korea was involved in the camp 
management upon the commission of the government, this organisation was considered as a 
quasi-governmental organisation. On the contrary, there was even an incident where local people 
publicly refused the landing of asylum-seekers in 1989 (Nho, 2013). The Vietnamese asylum 
seekers were not part of South Korean civil society’s concern. 
The South Korean government’s treatment of the Vietnamese ‘boat people’ is another example of 
extremely exclusionary origins of its immigration policy, which was implemented and justified in 
the context of the ‘ethnic nationalist’ anti-Communist regimes. The international obligations of 
refugee protection were never a concerned; kinship-relation and the anti-Communist politics 
were the only considerations of the government. 
Exclusionary immigration policy in the context of ethnic nationalism 
The South Korean policies on the old-comer Chinese migrants and Vietnamese asylum-seekers 
show how the two dominant political discourses, ‘ethnic nationalism’ and anti-communism, were 
reflected in the immigration policy during the authoritarian governments. Anti-Communism, 
being conflated with the ethnic nationalism, exacerbated the discrimination against migrants 
from communist countries during the Cold War period, as the government’s suspicions toward 
Chinese migrants exemplified. However, the ambivalent stance on the Vietnamese asylum-
seekers reveals that anti-communism was not always the core principle. Although South Korea 
involved itself in the Vietnam War as a part of anti-communist allies, the government never 
allowed reception and settlement of the people who fled from their ‘blood-alliance’ South 
Vietnam. The absolute exclusion of Vietnamese asylum-seekers exemplifies how ethnic 
nationalism overrode the anti-communist political agenda. 
Ethnic nationalism appeared in Korea as an ideological ground for the resistance against 
imperialism and colonialism. Since Korea has had a long history of political and linguistic 
continuity as a nation-state, imperialist invasions in the late 19th century and Japanese 
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colonisation afterwards were perceived as serious external threats toward the continuity of 
nation. Opposing Japanese colonialist’s propagation of ‘Pan-Asianism’ and denial of the 
distinctiveness of Korean nation, the leaders of independent movement mobilised the ethnic 
nationalism as an ideological ground of resistance against invasion and struggles for the 
emancipation of people. 
After the independence, however, the ideology of resistance and emancipation was reformulated 
as a government ideology by the post-war authoritarian regime. The Korean War, the territorial 
division of the nation and constant military threats were traumatic and unnatural experiences for 
Korean people. Both South and North Korean governments accused each other of the ‘crimes 
against the nation’. Both claimed to overcome the situation by ethnic nationalism, which was 
conflated with ‘anti-communism’ or ‘anti-capitalism’ respectively. Both Rhee Syngman’s ‘One 
Peopleism (Ilmin Juui)’ in the South and Kim Il Sung’s ‘Self-reliance (Juche)’ idea in the North 
functioned as the totalitarian ruling ideology. They subsumed people under the holist ideology 
and compelled them to sacrifice their lives for the abstract whole (Shin, 2010a, p. 230). The 
totalitarianism allowed no room for not only political opponents but also ethnic minorities. 
Ethnic nationalism also functioned as a key driving force for resource mobilisation and capitalist 
accumulation during authoritarian developmental regimes. Since Park Jung-hee had seized 
power through a military coup and lacked political legitimacy, his government prioritised the 
rapid and tangible achievement of economic growth over democratic values such as the rule of 
law, civil rights and recognition of minorities. The ‘developmental regime’ propagated the ethnic 
nationalist, totalitarian and patriarchal ideology of ‘the Modernisation of Fatherland (Choguk 
kundaehwa)’ to justify the exploitation of the populace, especially the workers who suffered poor 
working conditions and political suppressions (Koo, 2001, Woo-Cumings, 1999a). The nationalist 
ideology eventually served capitalist accumulation and facilitated the growth of chaebols in the 
name of ‘the enterprise of the nation (kookmin kieop)’. Ethnic nationalism overrode all other 
identities, including class and compelled workers to conform to employers and the government. 
Thus, little room for a labour movement was available. The economic and political sacrifice of 
workers benefited the complex of authoritarian rulers and chaebols. 
Resistant movements against authoritarianism were also trapped within the frame of ethnic 
nationalism. The civil society contested the governing ideology of national identity by promoting 
an alternative view of the nation, minjung (Wells, 1995). The notion of minjung identified the 
subjugated, marginalised and oppressed as peasants, workers and the poor. The ‘emancipation of 
minjung’ was one of the key slogans of social movements under the authoritarian rule. However, 
91 
this alternative notion also took for granted its ethnic base of the nation and accused the 
authoritarian regime as being ‘anti-nation’. As Shin (2010a, p. 228) commented, the nationalist 
politics became ‘so emotional and bitter’. Where civil society and the state competed for the 
legitimate notion of nation, again no space was allowed for the claims of ethnic diversity and 
cultural pluralism. 
Ethnic nationalism indeed became the dominant principle for the social organisation in South 
Korea. The principle of ‘bloodline’ or jus sanguinis was institutionalised throughout the legal 
system, most explicitly in the Nationality Act. No serious effort was made by either state or civil 
society to develop an inclusive notion of citizenship as equal members of a democratic polity. The 
South Korean legal system still to the present has no concept of ‘citizenship’ per se, but only 
‘nationality’. The bloodline-oriented notion of Korean nationhood and citizenship was defined by 
the institution, reinforced by both the state and civil society discourses, and became ‘inseparable 
in the mind of Koreans’ (Shin, 2010a, p. 234).  
The consequence of the ethnic-nationalism-oriented social organisations was absolute exclusion 
and systematic discrimination. As the cases of early migrants in South Korea illustrate, the 
primacy of the nation, preached by the government, allowed no consideration of minority 
identities in immigration policies. Ethnic nationalism deliberately functioned as the grounds for 
the totalitarian repression of ethnic diversity and identities. The South Korean public was broadly 
complicit by ignoring the systematic exclusion and discrimination. They even actively 
participated in the discriminations in their daily lives (for example, see Park and Jang, 2003). 
The cases of the South Korean government’s policies on the migrants before the era of 
neoliberalisation identify the lineage of the nature of the current migration policies. Although 
anti-communism has limited resonances after the Cold War phased out, ethnic nationalism is still 
dominant political ideology underlying the formation of the government policy as well as civil 
society’s political agenda, especially about immigration. The ‘developmental state’ model is now 
replaced by the ‘neoliberal state’. This issue will be revisited in Chapter 7 in the contemporary 
context of neoliberal transformation and temporary labour migration policy.  
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Conclusion 
South Korean society has experienced a breathtaking speed of social transformations for the last 
century. The rapid industrialisation during the authoritarian developmental regimes 
transformed the country from the devastation of colonial exploitation and war to an 
industrialised society of high technology. The impressive economic growth was, in fact, derived 
from the exploitation of workers in poor working conditions with low wages. The authoritarian 
regimes quelled the discontentment of workers; the workers could hardly find a way to resist it. 
The deadly claims and statements of tailoring worker Chun, Tae-il, ‘Observe the Labour Standards 
Law’ and ‘We are not machines; let us rest on Sundays’ sprouted workers’ collective actions. 
The out-migration of Korean workers continued throughout the colonial and authoritarian 
developmental periods. The first flows of emigration were the mixture of forced and economic 
migration. The diaspora communities in China and Central Asian former Soviet states are now the 
primary origins of labour migration or quasi-return migration to South Korea. The second flows 
of emigration were the temporary labour migrations, promoted by the government as a part of 
their economic growth strategy. The South Korean migrant workers in West Germany achieved 
the entitlement of permanent residence through their struggles. This experience later influenced 
the migrant rights advocacy movements in South Korea. 
Although immigration was strictly controlled throughout the authoritarian regimes, there were 
small groups of migrants in South Korea. The first-comer Chinese migrants, who arrived before 
and during the Japanese colonisation, experienced systematic discriminations. Vietnamese 
asylum-seekers, who landed after the end of Vietnamese War, experienced extreme exclusion 
from the society and eventually resettled in the third countries. These cases show that the roots 
of South Korea’s immigration policy were extremely exclusionary and discriminatory. 
Authoritarianism based on anti-communism and ethnic nationalism penetrates the history of the 
20th century South Korea. These two concepts were the dominant ideologies for industrialisation 
and economic growth. The divisions of the nation into two enemy states and the geopolitical 
position of Korean peninsula were manipulated for the justification of authoritarianism. The 
experiences of devastating colonialism and civil war were conflated with the experiences of rapid 
economic success, which eventually produced the sense of national superiority. This South 
Korean version of defensive ethnic nationalism generated exclusionary and discriminatory 
approaches to migrants. There was no acceptance of migrants as permanent members of society. 
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South Korean people have encountered another major transformation of their society since the 
early 1990s. The transformation was accompanied by a neoliberal restructuring of economy and 
labour as well as new inflows of international migrant workers. The next chapter examines 
international migration to South Korea in the era of neoliberalism.  
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Chapter 5 Labour market and international migration in 
the neoliberal era: a political-economic 
account 
This chapter continues the enquiry into the first research question of this thesis: ‘what is the 
political-economic background of international labour migration to South Korea?’ While the 
previous chapter discussed a historical account of migration, labour, policy, and social 
movements during the pre-neoliberal period, this chapter focuses on a political-economic 
account of the neoliberal transformations during the period from 1987 to 2016.  
This chapter does not intend to analyse specific changes in government policies; it rather seeks 
to analyse what the relations are between the increase of international migration and the 
neoliberal societal changes that involved the changes in industrial system, the mode of 
employment and the role of civil society. 
The first section begins by examining both the internal forces that drove neoliberal economic 
restructuring and the external forces that imposed the structural adjustment programme. The 
East Asian financial crisis of 1997 was a critical turning point for South Korean society. The 
country has been swiftly transformed from a ‘post-war developmental state’ to a ‘neoliberal state’ 
through the post-crisis ‘reforms’ under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and with the consensus of domestic elites. This neoliberal transformation is proceeding far 
swifter than the previous ones and is accompanied by growing inequality between the ‘ownership 
classes’, benefiting from their financial and real-estate assets, and the working class suffering 
labour flexibility (Lim and Jang, 2006b). The democratised governments, of which members were 
former anti-authoritarian activists, adopted neoliberal principles in economic, labour and social 
policies (Sonn, 2009). As Lim and Jang (2006a, p. 442) stated, ‘political democracy is hijacked by 
neo-liberalism’. 
The second section examines the social consequences of the neoliberal social transformation with 
focus on the industrial structures, labour market, employment management practices and 
precarious jobs. It also analyses their impacts on individual workers. 
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The third section examines the changes in international migration from and to South Korea. It 
transformed from an origin country of builders, miners and nurses to the most popular 
destination for Asian migrant workers and foreign brides. During this period, the South Korean 
government introduced a series of quasi or formal labour migration programmes to meet 
employers’ demands for a low-skilled, low-waged temporary and precarious workforce.  
By analysing international migration and the labour market in the context of neoliberal 
transformations, this chapter argues the increase of temporary labour migration is related to the 
neoliberal transformation of South Korean society, especially the transformation of the labour 
market that accompanies the precarisation of work. This argument is primarily based on the 
examination of statistical data, including immigration data and economic indices. 
Democratisation and neoliberal transformations 
Liberalisations in politics and economy (1987–1996) 
On 15 January 1987, the last year of Chun Doo Hwan’s presidential term, a newspaper reported a 
student of Seoul National University, Park Jong Chul was found dead at a police detention facility 
the day before (JoongAng Ilbo, 1987). Four months later, he turned out to have been killed by 
water torture. His death ignited the South Korean people’s discontent against the repressive 
authoritarian regime. Millions of people throughout the country spilt into the streets, calling for 
democracy. On 9 June, a student of Yonsei University, Lee Han Yeol, was shot in head by a tear-
gas canister at his university campus. His death led to the explosion of people’s rage against the 
regime. Nation-wide demonstrations continued for a month. Popular social movements finally 
achieved institutional democracy, including the direct election of the president and freedom of 
expression. Immediately after, the Grand Struggles of Workers burst out. Ten million workers 
participated in more than 3,000 strikes from July to September, calling for decent working 
conditions and appropriate levels of wages (Koo, 2001). The people’s experiences of the June 
Democracy Movement and the Grand Struggles of Workers in 1987 paved the path to build an 
independent civil society, independent trade unions and radical student movements (Suh, 2007). 
The presidential election followed in December. This time, another member of 1979 coup, Roh 
Tae Woo, was elected through the free election, while the opposition leaders failed to form a 
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coalition. Although the remnants of authoritarianism were still had political power, the process 
of democratisation was irreversible.: at the general election a year after, the government party, 
Democratic Justice Party failed to hold the majority at the National Assembly for the first time in 
history. Despite an appreciation of South Korean democratisation as a ‘shining example’ in the 
Asian region (Kim, 2003e), democracy was still far from consolidated. In 1990, the government 
party managed to hold an extreme majority by merging with two opposition parties: one was a 
branch of a long-standing democratisation movement group, the other was a group formed from 
the remanent of the 1960 military coup. This opportunistic alliance faced severe resistance from 
students and workers, which again responded with aggression and violent suppressions (Chang, 
2001). Student movements and trade unions continued to be suppressed. The government 
criminalised the Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union and forcefully quelled the 
protests of students advocating the re-unification of the two Koreas.  
After democratisation, the government pursued the Northward policy by extending its diplomatic 
relations toward the countries in the communist bloc (Choi, 1992a, p. 41). This pragmatic 
approach intended to expand the export market, to diversify diplomatic relations beyond the 
‘blood-alliance’ with the US, and also to isolate North Korea from international politics. In 1991, 
both South and North Korea, which had each not recognised the other as an independent state, 
joined the United Nations together. The South Korean government opened up its borders to 
attract foreign tourists during the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and to promote overseas travels of 
its citizens by withdrawing restrictive departure controls. In 1992, South Korea established 
diplomatic relations with China in the expectation of the increase in trade, but at the cost of 
breaking the long-standing anti-communist alliance with Taiwan. Since then, China has become 
the largest country of origin of migrants to South Korea. 
In 1993, Kim Young Sam was elected as the first president with a non-military background for 
three decades. He was once the leading member of an opposition party during the authoritarian 
period. However, when he was elected he represented the opportunistic coalition of authoritarian 
and democratisation groups, the Democratic Liberal Party. This government’s catchphrase was 
the ‘Korean disease’, taking the idea from the ‘British disease’, which was the declaration of 
neoliberal transformations in the UK in the 1980s, known as ‘Thatcherism’. President Kim, in his 
inaugural address in 1993, proposed ‘the creation of a new Korea’ with a ‘new economy’ to tackle 
corruption and to address workers’ discontent. It implied a significant shift of economic and social 
principles from regulation and protection to deregulation, autonomy and competition (Lim and 
Jang, 2006a). It was a launching declaration for the endogenous neoliberalisation of South Korean 
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society. The government also declared ‘Segyehwa’ (globalisation) and promoted ‘the 
reinforcement of national competitiveness’, which overwhelmed public discourses (Shin, 2000). 
The ‘catching-up model of state-bank-chaebol nexus’ (Shin and Chang, 2003) of the authoritarian 
developmental state gave way to the new model of neoliberal globalisation of the democratic 
neoliberal state. 
There had been some precursors of endogenous neoliberalisation during the previous military 
regime (1980–1987). A group of new bureaucrats and economists who were educated in the 
United States emerged in the government. They enthusiastically initiated market-oriented 
policies like deregulating the finance market, opening the national market to international 
investors, promoting international competitiveness of business, and distributing resources 
through markets rather than government planning. Despite the support of the authoritarian 
president Chun Doo Hwan, their initiative failed due to strong resistance of developmental-state-
oriented bureaucrats (Ji, 2011, pp. 111-120). Businesses were rather ambivalent about the 
initiative: they welcomed the flexibilisation of employment but refused the market-opening, the 
promotion of competition and the introduction of foreign direct investment. 
The failed initiatives revived about ten years later by the same bureaucrats’ group, but this time 
with full political support from the government in the name of ‘creating new economy’. The 
government actively participated in the international initiatives for free trade, which transformed 
the global trade regime from protectionism to neoliberalism. It engaged with the Uruguay Round, 
which replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with the WTO in 1995. The 
government’s strategy was to increase the comparative advantage of manufacturing in the global 
market at the cost of agriculture. The consequence was, despite the severe resistance of farmers 
and students, the collapse of rural communities. South Korea also joined the Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996, announcing its commitment to radical 
opening of its financial and capital markets (Ji, 2011, pp. 140-141). Membership of the OECD was 
propagated as a symbol of economic success, which made people proud of their sacrifices and 
contributions. 
The government also accelerated the process of financial deregulation, which was especially 
encouraged by chaebols. The deregulation of the financial sector, which began in 1991, speeded 
up from 1993. The interst rate was deregulated; chaebols were permitted to get involved in 
financial business; they were allowed to make loans with short-term low-interest foreign captial. 
They transformed the structure of the South Korean financial market, making it vulnerable to 
external financial factors and dependent on the performance of the cheabols (Cho, 1999). 
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The other side of the deregulation was the precarisation of work. Despite the massive resistance 
of workers and opposition parties, the government passed a bill for the amendment of labour 
laws through illegitimate processes on 26 December 1996. The amended labour laws legalised 
redundancy, the temporary employment of replacement workforce or the increased subcontract 
production during strikes, and the prohibition of the payment of wages during strikes, known as 
the ‘no work, no pay’ rule. Their underlying neoliberal assumption was that the flexibilization of 
the labour market would reinforce global competitiveness. Trade unions immediately staged 
general strikes against the deterioration of labour standards. As a result, the redundancy was 
postponed for two years, and the replacement by temporary workers from outside or subcontract 
production was prohibited during strikes (Choi et al., 1999, pp. 296-336). It should be noted, amid 
the debates over the flexibilisation of the labour market, the short-term contracted, un-unionised 
and precarious migrant workers were already filling the workforce shortages under the deceptive 
name of industrial trainings.  
Neoliberalisation was not only pursued by the endogenous initiatives of domestic elite 
economists, but was also pressed by external forces. On the one hand, the US increased 
protectionist pressures on South Korea to ‘rectify’ the long-lasting adverse balance of trade. It 
applied a retaliatory dumping tariff on South Korean products and filed disputes to the WTO (Ji, 
2011, pp. 132-137). On the other hand, the Washington Consensus increased the influences on 
developing economies by imposing its three standard prescriptions: fiscal austerity, privatisation, 
and market liberalisation (Stiglitz, 2002). The neoliberal credos rapidly replaced the planned 
economies. After the collapse of Soviet and Eastern Bloc, the world was being swept up by the 
tsunami of the ‘new great transformation’ (Munck, 2004, p. 1) of neoliberalism. The South Korean 
economy was also caught up in the tsunami. The process of the transformation was, however, 
poorly managed by the government (Lee, 2011c, pp. 32-33, McKay, 2003, p. 81). 
A model student of IMF: Rapid neoliberalisation of the society (1997–2002) 
In January 1997, the 16th biggest South Korean conglomerate, Hanbo Steel, went bankrupt due to 
excessive investment and bank loans. The company’s debt was 22 times its equity (Pollack, 1997). 
This incident was a prelude to the 1997 Financial Crisis, most commonly called the ‘IMF Crisis’ by 
South Koreans. In response the government-initiated financial deregulation project, businesses 
had rapidly increased bank loans and investments. However, the excessive loans generated high 
financial and credit risks of businesses. Chaebols went bankrupt in succession throughout the 
year. The collapse of businesses was immediately transmitted to the banks, which had heavily 
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relied on foreign investment. As soon as international credit rating agencies downgraded the 
‘sovereign credit rate’, foreign investors, especially hedge funds, rushed out of South Korea. The 
foreign exchange crisis that started in Thailand earlier that year rapidly spread to South Korea. 
The foreign exchange reserves of South Korea rapidly decreased, and the value of South Korean 
Won dramatically dropped (Cumings, 1998, pp. 153-158, Ji, 2011). The South Korean government 
finally resorted to the IMF’s bailout in November 1997. 
Economists have debated the cause of the crisis. The IMF and mainstream economists argued that 
the crisis was a consequence of unbalanced fundamentals in the South Korean economy, which 
were the legacy of the old development model and corrupt government-business relationships, 
in other words ‘crony capitalism’ (Corsetti et al., 1999, Hughes, 1999). There are also alternative 
views. Radelet et al. (1998) argued that the crisis was the outcome of the overreaction of 
panicking international investors in financial markets rather than real market problems. Chang 
(1998) denounced the under-regulation of the economy, such as mismanagement of financial 
deregulation, abandonment of investment coordination, and poor management of exchange rates. 
Lee (2011c) ascribed the crisis to the withdrawal of the developmental state and the ill-managed 
introduction of neoliberalism.  
The IMF imposed on the South Korean economy its standard prescription, the ‘Structural 
Adjustment Programme’. The conditionality of loans was austerity policy in government 
expenditure and currency, high-interest rates, increased foreign ownership up to 100 percent. 
There was growing criticism against the conditionality set by the IMF, which was considered to 
be ‘unnecessary shock therapy’ (Stiglitz, 2002). Although the crisis undermined the power of 
some economic elites who were responsible for the poor management of financial and currency 
policies, the domestic neoliberal economic elites still played leading roles in pushing forward the 
restructuring programmes. Korean economist bureaucrats welcomed the opportunity to 
accelerate the neoliberal ‘reform’ project, which they had already pursued (Ji, 2011, pp. 231-240). 
The Structural Adjustment Programme reinforced the pre-existing neoliberal restructuring 
projects led by the domestic elites, rather than was unilaterally imposed by IMF (Lim and Jang, 
2006b). The South Korean government did not passively take all the IMF prescriptions, but 
actively engaged in the negotiation with the IMF. For example, the government managed to 
expand the social welfare expenditure to mitigate the rapid increase of income gap and the 
polarisation of labour market as will be presented in the next section. Nevertheless, it is 
undeniable that the South Korean government performed the central role as a ‘neoliberal state’ 
(Harvey, 2005) in the neoliberal restructuring processes. 
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Neoliberal restructuring coincided with the consolidation of democracy in South Korea. In the 
middle of the crisis Kim Dae Jung of the opposition party, was elected as the president. This 
government achieved significant improvements in the relationship with North Korea as well as 
the institutionalisation of human rights and gender equality. However, the government’s 
economic policy aimed at sweeping away the legacies of the state-dominated economy and 
moving towards a market-driven system (Lee, 2012a, p. 185). The leaders of political 
democratisation movements converted themselves into advocates of the neoliberal economy. 
There was a widespread public consensus that economic liberalisation was a part of political 
liberalisation. As Lim and Jang (2006a) critically pointed out, political liberalisation and 
democracy were ‘hijacked by neoliberalism’. 
In 2001, the South Korean government finalised the repayment of IMF loans, and its vigorous 
implementation of IMF’s conditionality was praised as ‘a model for other countries’ by the IMF 
(2001). However, it is controversial whether the IMF’s prescriptions helped reduce the crisis or 
aggravate it. For example, Stiglitz (2002) argued the recovery from the crisis was due to the South 
Korean government’s refusal of some of the IMF prescriptions, like control over exchange 
management. Later, the IMF admitted its mistakes about the austerity-oriented fiscal policy, but 
still not about its monetary policy (Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 128-129). 
Table 5-1 The impacts of restructuring programme, selected years 
Financial sector     
Number of financial institutes (year) from 2,102 (1997) to 1,617 (2000) 
     Banks from 33 (1997) to 22 (2000) 
     Non-bank financial institutes from 30 (1997) to 9 (2000) 
     Credit unions from 231 (1997) to 78 (2000) 
Number of employees in financial sector  from 114,919 (1996) to 67,171 (2001) 
Industrial sector     
Debt ratio of top 30 chaebols (year) from 500 % (1996) to 200 % (2000) 
Foreign direct investment, US Dollar (year) from 3.2 billion (1996) to 15.2 billion (2000) 
Foreign share in the Korean stock market (year) from 14.6 % (1997) to 36.6 % (2001) 
Foreign ownership of major companies, 2001    
     Samsung Electrics 56 % Hyundai Motors 57 % 
     POSCO 63 %   
Public sector    
Layoff at Public sector, 1998–2000   131,082 
Government employees 13.2 % Public enterprise employees 25.1 % 
Local government employees 16.5 % Other government-affiliated institutions 18.3 % 
Source: Lee (2002b) and Lee (2011c). 
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The IMF-prescribed restructuring programme had profound impacts throughout the South 
Korean economy and society (see Table 5-1). The financial sector was severely smashed: one out 
of three banks were closed down by bankruptcy or hostile mergers and acquisitions. More than 
41 percent of financial workers lost their jobs. The impacts on the industrial sector were even 
more severe. By the government’s guideline, major chaebols significantly reduced the debt ratio. 
At the same time, the ownership of businesses rapidly shifted to foreigners: foreign direct 
investment increased more than 4.7 fold; foreign shares in the Korean stock market increased 22 
percent. More than half of the ownership of major enterprises were taken by foreigners. The 
public sector was also affected. The main issue was the layoffs. More than 130,000 employees 
within the public sector lost their jobs. The employees of public enterprises faced particularly 
severe layoffs compared with government employees. 
Intense neoliberal globalisation (2003–2016) 
In 2012, South Korean people elected Roh Moo Hyun as the president, again from the liberal side. 
By this time, the generation involved in the 1987 democratisation movement had become broadly 
involved in the government and politics. The government sought to eliminate the authoritarian 
legacies and to settle down participatory democracy in South Korean society. South Korean 
people enjoyed vibrant political debates, and the conservative-dominant political terrain was 
divided into the conservative, the liberal and the progressive (Song, 2007).  
Along with the extension of democratisation, neoliberal globalisation accelerated even further. 
The Roh Moo Hyun government aggressively pushed ahead bilateral free trade agreements 
(FTAs). Starting from the FTA with Chile in 2002, it produced FTAs with 49 countries (Ministry 
of Trade Industry and Energy, 2013). The FTA with the United States (KORUS FTA) was the most 
controversial due to its potential impacts on the economy, considering the United States is the 
third largest trade partner for South Korea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2012). The 
negotiation process of the KORUS FTA was also controversial. The process was not open to the 
public on the pretext of trade expertise and national interest, which eventually brought about 
severe suspicion and resistance from the people. It is also reported that chaebols (e.g. Samsung) 
were involved in introducing the KORUS FTA with the expectation of benefits from the 
deregulation of the service sector, like healthcare and health insurance (Ji, 2011, pp. 399-402). 
The KORUS FTA was most severely opposed by farmers, who had already experienced 
disadvantages throughout the industrialisation period. The government openly acknowledged 
the potential disadvantage to the agricultural sector, which they argued would be offset by the 
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advantage to the manufacturing sector. The government advertised the FTA’s advantage to car-
manufacturing, but studies show even that advantage is uncertain or minimal (Chae, 2012). The 
government suggested it would give a subsidy to the agricultural sector (Moon, 2012), but it only 
generated the distrust and discontent of farmers. 
On the contrary to the conservatives’ claim that the two consecutive liberal governments had a 
‘left-wing’ bias, their economic policy was far from the left (Park, 2010a). They show the typical 
characteristics of the ‘neoliberal state’ (Harvey, 2005). They pursued typical neoliberal policies, 
like privatising state-owned companies, introducing a workfare system, repressing labour unions, 
and compensating the losses of business and finance using government funds. Also, the South 
Korean liberal governments made a unique neoliberal-state model ‘by actively initiating and 
creating the capital accumulation policy rather than by only reflecting the capital’s interest in its 
policy’ (Ji, 2011, p. 407). Eventually, the Roh Moo Hyun government faced the discontent of both 
the progressives and the conservatives: the progressives resisted the neoliberal economic 
policies, and the conservatives challenged the political reforms.  
The liberal governments did not last long in South Korea. In 2007, the candidate of the 
conservative party Lee Myung Bak won the presidential election. He was the former CEO of 
Hyundai Construction, which was a key business actor of the South Korean authoritarian 
development state in the 1970s and 1980s. Right from the beginning, he was a self-declared 
‘business-friendly president’ (see Lee, 2007). The government maintained a weak currency policy 
in support of exporting businesses, mostly big chaebol companies. It claimed a ‘trickle-down effect’ 
would benefit workers, which is typical in neoliberal propaganda. The revival of the old ‘export-
oriented growth’ policy helped the prosperity of large firms: major enterprise groups increased 
their assets more than 12 percent every year after 2005. However, the ‘trickle-down’ did not 
happen: wage incomes of average households fluctuated between -2.9 and 4.2 percent during the 
same period (see Figure 5-1).  
The ‘business-friendly’ government also pushed forward the privatisation of the  
airport, railway, gas, electricity, water and healthcare (see Park, 2012b). Severe resistance from 
workers and the opposition party were not able to stop the neoliberal drive of privatisation. The 
conservative government carried over the drive to the next conservative government, when Park 
Geun Hye, the daughter of the authoritarian ruler, Park Jung Hee, was elected as the president in 
2012. The conservative government accelerated the neoliberalisation of the South Korean 
economy and bluntly served the benefits of the chaebol and transnational corporations at the cost 
of the people’s livelihood. 
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Expansion of the civil society and challenges from neoliberalism 
While the South Korean state had driven the society into neoliberalism, the South Korean civil 
society had significantly expanded in size and diversity. South Korean social movements were the 
major driving forces for democratisation. During the period of authoritarian regimes, the civil 
society as an autonomous political and social space of people hardly existed. The relatively small 
social movement groups had grown throughout the 1980s, but were mostly maintained as 
underground organisations of activists, workers and students. They played crucial roles during 
the mass struggles in 1987 and successfully mobilised the middle class to participate in the 
movement. 
South Korean sociologist Cho (2012a) argues the June Democracy Movement of 1987 and the 
following institutionalisation of democracy made two significant political achievements: first, the 
expansion of autonomous and free political space for the civil society; and second, the increase of 
self-awareness of people as right-holders. After 1987, South Korean civil society enjoyed 
gradually increased political freedom. The expanded political space enabled various civil society 
groups to openly raise various political and social agendas, not only a radical transformation of  
 
Figure 5-1 Growth rates of business assets and wage income, 2004–2012 
 
Source: Statistics Korea (2017).  
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the political system but also lifestyle issues (Cumings, 2007). Those groups orientated in the 
institutional changes often continued to identify themselves as a ‘Minjung movement’ or 
specifically identified themselves as a ‘social movement’.  
The ‘citizen’s movement’ was a new form of social movement that appeared in the early 1990s as 
an outcome of the increased self-awareness of ‘citizens’ as right-holders. The ‘citizen’s movement’ 
groups were mostly led by professionals, the middle-class and any people who identified 
themselves as ‘citizens’. Their agenda was not limited to political democratisation but covered 
various social issues, including economic justice, environment and minority rights. They set up 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to pursue consistent actions for their agendas, typically 
in collaboration with full-time activists, advisory professionals and citizen supporters. The 
‘citizen’s movement’ is often compared to the ‘new social movement’ in the European context. 
However, this South Korean version of new social movement is unique in the sense that it 
maintains the confrontational relationship with the government and often gets deeply involved 
in the political agenda (Kim, 2006a, Kim, 2013a). 
The labour movement also grew to be significantly influential in South Korean society. The 
movement for an independent labour union, which had begun as early as the time of Chun Tae-il, 
the 1970s, exploded as the Grand Struggles of Workers immediately after the June Democracy 
Movement in 1987. South Korean workers finally established the independent national union, the 
KCTU in 1995. It was an alternative to the existing right-wing yellow union, Federation of Korean 
Trade Unions (FKTU), which was established in 1946 under the auspices of the authoritarian 
regime and had been the only national union after the socialist National Council of Trade Unions 
was banned by the anti-communist government in 1948. Since the establishment of the KTCU, the 
two Unions were in competition for the agenda-setting of labour policies and the unionisation of 
workers. 
The progressive sects of both the Protestant and Catholic churches also made crucial 
contributions to the democratisation movement. They often took leadership of the movement or 
offered moral supports or physical spaces safe for social movement activists (Clark, 2007). They 
also contributed to the labour movement by sprouting grassroots unions throughout the 1970s 
and the 1980s (Koo, 2001). The churches' social participations were often mobilised by the 
‘activist clergy’ (Kim, 2011a, p. 1649) who had ideological basis in minjung theology, the Korean 
version of liberation theology. After the growth of the ‘citizen’s movement’ and the labour 
movement, the religious group gradually transferred the political leadership to these groups.  
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This thesis does not discuss other important groups within the civil society, such as the women, 
those of sexual minorities, the disabled and the environmental movement. This is not because 
they are insignificant within civil society, but they had less or no organisational and personal 
relations with migrants’ collective actions than the three groups mentioned above.  
The neoliberal transformation generated significant challenges to the South Korean civil society. 
Although the polarisation of the wealth increased social tensions, both the citizen’s movement 
and the labour movement were unable to address the problems adequately. The collapse of the 
middle class became an existential threat to the citizen’s movement. Some of the citizen’s groups, 
mostly led by professionals, either neglected the perils of the neoliberal transformation or even 
promoted the neoliberal agenda like globalisation, privatisation and flexible labour (Kim, 2014b). 
Trade unions were based on the organised workers with regular or permanent contracts at large 
firms. They were more concerned about the wages and working conditions at their workplaces, 
but less interested in the unorganised, non-regular and precarious workers in small and medium 
enterprises (Jang, 2006). South Korean political scientist, Choi (2012, p. 176), encapsulates these 
situations in a phrase: ‘a civil society versus the civil society’ after democratisation. He also 
identifies the endogenous problems that weakened the South Korean civil society: lack of 
‘pluralism’, neglect of ‘labour’ and a ‘non-political and class-blind’ approach (Choi, 2012, pp. 180-
184).  
In this context, it is significant and insightful that critical political economist Hundt (2015) 
analysed the nexus of neoliberalism, the state and the civil society in South Korea. He argues ‘for 
some states, neoliberalism is a means of retaining economic and political influence’, and ‘former 
developmental states may be particularly adept at co-opting elements of civil society into 
governing alliances’ (Hundt, 2015, p. 466). By embracing neoliberalism and co-opting the civil 
society, the South Korean state retains the political and economic influences throughout society. 
Thus, I argue it is essential to analyse how government policy operates to materialise the state’s 
influences to understand the social issues, including migration, labour and social movements in 
the South Korean context. 
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Polarisation in the labour market under neoliberal transformations 
Transformation of the old employment system to the 1987 system and the 1997 system 
As examined in Chapter 4, the ‘old employment system’, which is represented by the ‘barrack-like 
control’ of workers and the ‘immobile labour market’ (Park, 2002a, p. 145), underlay South 
Korea’s industrialisation under the authoritarian developmental regimes. In parallel with the 
democratisation in the late 1980s, the employment system was also in transition. As an outcome 
of the Great Struggles of Workers in 1987, the ‘1987 labour system’ replaced the ‘old employment 
system’. The ‘1987 labour system’ was characterised by the status of extreme conflicts between 
the ‘hard-line struggles’ of militant unions and the ‘hard-line crackdown’ of the government and 
employers (Roh, 2000, p. 169). The system put on hold the neoliberal transformation of the 
labour market and continued for a decade. 
This general trend, however, did not reach the SMEs in the so-called 3D (dirty, difficult and 
dangerous) sector. While the labour market of the SMEs was already segmented from that of the 
primary industries of the chaebols, the workers in this sector were also increasingly isolated from 
the development of the labour movement. While the workers in the large-scale chaebol 
companies were strongly unionised under the enterprise-based union system, the workers in the 
SMEs were hardly able to organise unions. Consequently, they had little chance to mobilise any 
resistance against the introduction of neoliberal employment policies like the temporary and 
fixed-term employment of migrant workers.  
After the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the South Korean government rapidly pushed forward the 
introduction of the neoliberal labour system, so-called the ‘1997 employment system’ in the name 
of ‘corporatism to overcome the economic crisis’ (Park, 2002a, pp. 146-151). It was a response to 
the continuing employers’ demands for labour market flexibilisation. The neoliberalisation of the 
labour system was even further accelerated by the imposition of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme of the IMF. The restructurings of finance, business and the public sector meant layoffs 
or redundancy for many South Korean workers. The layoff of workers, which began during the 
‘IMF crisis’, continued even after the economy recovered from the crisis. It became employers’ 
key strategy to reduce production costs and increase their profits over workers’ sacrifice.  
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After employers laid off their employees, they often replaced them with non-regular workers6 
like temporary workers or workers who were dispatched by their subcontractors. They even 
hired workers as individual subcontractors to avoid the employers’ legal obligations. They 
sometimes re-hired the same worker, who they previously laid off, for the same position, with a 
lower wage and a more precarious status.  
The ‘flexibilisation’ of employment using ‘non-regular workers’ is a typical neoliberal 
employment system, institutionalised by the corporatism of the government, employers and a co-
opted union. At a very early stage of the restructuring project, the Kim Dae Jung government set 
up a ‘social dialogue system’ (Lee, 2012a, p. 187), the Korea Tripartite Commission. The 
Commission sought to draw a consensus on the flexibilisation of employment, especially from 
labour unions. In 1998, the government, employers and labour unions agreed to the Social Pact 
of the Commission in the name of ‘pain-sharing’. It allowed the government to put into effect the 
provision of redundancy in labour law. It also legalised the ‘dispatch of employee’: in other words, 
it allowed large companies to use their subcontractors’ employees in their workspace (Choi et al., 
1999). The Tripartite Commission was ‘a key instrument of new governance for national-level 
labour relations’ (Lee, 2012a, p. 188). Consequently, the redundancy, casualisation of jobs and the 
flexibilisation of working hour and work type came into place in the South Korean labour laws 
(Park, 2002a, pp. 146-151). 
The Tripartite Commission agreed on the definition of the ‘non-regular worker’ in July 2002, 
which includes: 
 temporary (or contingent) workers who have a fixed-term contract, non-fixed 
term contracts that are repeatedly renewed or no expectation on the continuation 
of work;  
 hourly workers (or part-time workers); and, 
 non-standard workers including temporary agency (or dispatched) workers, 
subcontractors’ employees, and on-call workers (Statistics Korea, 2017).  
This definition is, however, controversial. The KCTU withdrew itself from the Tripartite 
Commission and refused the narrow definition (Kim, 2001a). Instead, they argued non-fixed term 
contract workers who have the position of temporary or daily work should be included. The 
                                                             
6 Bijeonggyu Nodongja in Korean. The government uses both ‘non-regular worker’ and ‘irregular worker’ for English 
translation. However, I use ‘non-regular worker’ to avoid confusion with irregular migration. 
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government separately defines this group as ‘vulnerable worker’ but did not include them in ‘non-
regular worker’ category. This debate exemplifies that the reality of the proliferated precarisation 
of jobs throughout society became a national agenda. 
The labour market was significantly affected by the transformation of the employment system. 
Figure 5-2 presents the rapidly growing proportion of temporary and daily employment, which 
implies the intensifying precarisation of work (Lee, 2012a, pp. 191-192). According to an 
academic survey, in 2000, when regular workers were paid on average 8,401 Korean Won per 
hour, non-regular workers received only half of that, 4,427 Korean Won (Kim, 2001a). 
Unemployment tripled, and youth unemployment doubled between 1996 and 1998; they 
remained relatively high afterwards. The gap between the total employment and youth 
unemployment also grew (see Figure 5-3). Scholars argue, considering the official unemployment 
rate does not include those workers who feel unemployed, such as the ‘marginally attached 
workers’, ‘discouraged workers’, and ‘underemployed’, the actual unemployment rates increase 
as high as 2.24 times of the official rate (Kim, 2005b). 
The neoliberal state also incapacitated trade unions in the name of the ‘the advancement of 
labour-employer relations’, while it pushed forward the neoliberalisation of the labour market. 
When the discontent of workers grew, the government and conservative media mobilised anti-
labour discourses: they denounced labour unions with such terms as ‘the selfishness of big 
unions’, ‘labour aristocracy’ or ‘anti-democratic, illegal and violent organisation’ (Roh, 2006). If 
workers went on a strike against abnormal labour management, layoffs, privatisation or a 
government policy, the government criminalised the workers for ‘demanding beyond what an 
employer can meet in practice or by law’, ‘having procedural problems’ or ‘political strike’ (see 
Park, 2013c). The police often crushed the strikes and employers claimed compensations for the 
loss of profits against leaders of trade unions. Then, the court ruled the individual workers were 
liable for the compensation of an extremely high amount of money, which they could not pay even 
with their life-long savings. 
Violent repressions of strikes were justified in the name of the ‘rule of law’ without questioning 
the legitimacy of neoliberal labour laws. As the public broadly accepted the ideological campaign 
of the 'rule of law’, labour unions were isolated. They were also criticised for not being able to 
accommodate the rights of non-regular workers adequately. Industrial sociologist Roh (2010) 
argues that the middle class, who participated in the political democratisation throughout the 
1980s, now became ‘liberal bourgeois’ and integrated into the neoliberal alliance between 
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Figure 5-2 Proportion of temporary and daily employment, 1992–2002 
 
Source: Statistics Korea (2017). 
 
Figure 5-3 Unemployment rates, 1989–2004 
 
Source: Statistics Korea (2017).  
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chaebol and the conservatives. The transformations of class relations made the controls of social 
relations even more available for the neoliberals.  
The neoliberal transformation accompanied the growing inequality between the ‘ownership 
classes’ who earned from their financial and real-estate assets and the low labour cost derived 
from the flexibility of labour and the precarious and low-wage jobs that the ‘working class’ 
suffered from (Lim and Jang, 2006b). Figure 5-4 shows the deterioration of income equality and 
the increase of poverty. According to official data, the Gini coefficient rapidly increased between 
1996 and 1998 and, then, remained high afterwards. Urban households, of which income was 
lower than 50 percent of median income, also consistently increased; this reflects the increase of 
relative poverty. 
On the contrary to the typical patterns of neoliberal transformation (see Chapter 2), however, the 
restructuring in South Korea accompanied a rapid expansion of social welfare expenditure both 
in the government and private sectors. The share of welfare expenditure in GDP leapt in 1998 and 
gradually grew to ten percent in 2013 (see Figure 5-5). During the period of rapid economic 
growth, it was the family that maintained South Korea’s social security net, as named as ‘a residual 
model’ welfare system (Park, 2008) or ‘welfare orientalism’ (White and Kwon, 1998 cited in Hahn 
and McCabe, 2006). In the middle of recovering from the 1997 IMF crisis, the Kim Dae Jung 
government promoted a state-led welfare system under the slogan of ‘productive welfare’. This 
initiative reframed social welfare as ‘the right to a decent minimum standard of life’, ‘the right to 
work and participate’, and ‘social welfare as a human capital investment’ (Lee, 2004a, p. 293). 
However, the idea of ‘productive welfare’ or workfare is controversial. Although some argue it 
has the potential to develop into a social democratic or Scandinavian model of social welfare, 
South Korea’s share of social welfare expenditure is still far lower than that of other welfare states. 
Others argue it is only an attempt ‘to celebrate economic productivity and private responsibility’ 
in social welfare (Hahn and McCabe, 2006, p. 316). Despite the increased welfare expenditure, 
social polarisation became even worse, as the income inequality level shows (see Figure 5-4). The 
‘productive welfare’ benefits the business sector by ‘enabling’ people to work, but there is little 
evidence that the business sector contributed to the welfare system. 
As social policy scholar Hwang (2004) identified, despite a growing sign of social security’s 
contribution to reducing income inequality, it was still of little use in mitigating the increase of 
inequality of original incomes in South Korea. His recent empirical study identifies that ‘the  
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Figure 5-4 Income distribution and poverty, 1990–2009 
 
Source: Statistics Korea (2017). 
 
Figure 5-5 Social welfare expenditure per GDP, 1990–2013 
 
 Source: Statistics Korea (2017).  
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design features of social provisions are progressive, but their distributional profiles are not’ 
(Hwang, 2016, p. 571). One of the external factors that diminish the progressivity of the South 
Korean welfare system is the excessively polarised labour market. His data shows ‘the near 
universal social insurance coverage of permanent workers, compared to the around 20 percent 
coverage rate of temporary workers’ (Hwang, 2016, p. 584). Since too many workers are excluded 
from the social insurance, the system has become less sustainable and solidaristic. The uninsured 
temporary workers has become more vulnerable against social contingencies. 
Hierarchical relationship between large firms and small and medium enterprises 
Throughout the neoliberal transformations, South Korea’s national economy continued to grow. 
The Gross National Income per capita by purchasing power parity increased steadily except 
during the two periods of financial crises in 1997 and 2008 (see World Bank, 2017). This 
macroeconomic index, however, fails to show the consequences of the neoliberal transformation, 
especially the increased disparity between the large firms having more than 300 employees and 
the SMEs having less than 300 (Statistics Korea, 2017). The survivors of the ‘IMF crisis’, chaebols 
successfully integrated themselves into the global market and grew to transnational corporations. 
On the contrary, the SMEs, which were mostly subcontractors supplying materials and parts to 
the big companies, either went broke or became even smaller and poorer. 
In 2014, American business magazine Forbes reported that Samsung had become the ninth most 
valuable brand in the world (Forbes, 2014). Samsung Electronics was the 20th biggest company 
in the world by sales, profits, assets and market value. The company’s president, the son of its 
founder, is now the 69th richest person in the world with 13 billion US Dollars worth of assets. His 
son, who is the vice-president of the company, is the third wealthiest South Korean on the same 
list with 4.1 billion US Dollars. 
In stark contrast, several years before this report, a major South Korean newspaper, The 
Kyunghyan Shinmun, reported 240 employers of small and medium business went on strike on 
17 March 2008 (Kim, 2008a). They claimed the supply prices of subcontractors should increase 
to a reasonable level. They argued that while the prices of raw materials increased from 120 to 
190 percent, the supply price of their products increased only 20 to 30 percent over the last ten 
years. These two episodes symbolically exemplify the polarisation between the large firms and 
SMEs. 
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Statistical data confirm the growing disparity between large firms and SMEs. According to official 
data, SMEs have comprised the absolute majority in numbers of companies in the manufacturing 
sector. Since 1995, more than 99 percent of all South Korean companies have been SMEs (see 
Figure 5-6). The total number of employees that were hired by SMEs was more or less same as 
that of large firms in the 1980s. However, the share of SME-hired employees rapidly increased 
afterwards. In 2011, more than two out of three employees worked at SMEs (see Figure 5-7). As 
an independent research institute, Saesayon (Research Institute for Opening a New Society) 
argues, neoliberal restructuring transformed the South Korean economy ‘from high-growth and 
high-employment system to low-growth and low-employment system.’ The ‘rationalisation’ and 
‘jobless growth’ system were largely driven by chaebols and large firms (Saesayon, 2009, pp. 276-
281). In the course of the economic crisis, the chaebols restructured their employment system 
toward ‘slimming down’ organisations through outsourcing and offshoring and also by mergers 
and acquisition. It explains the radical decrease in the number of large firms and their employees. 
At the same time, the neoliberal production system based on outsourcing required more 
subcontractor companies. Thus, the SMEs and their employees increased.  
There were significant disparities in wages and working conditions between large firms and SMEs. 
The workers at SMEs were paid almost 40 percent less than their counterparts at large firms in 
the 1990s. The wage gap significantly increased throughout the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 5-2). 
Wage disparities were more significant for the workers who were aged more than 45 years or 
who had no trade union at their company (Jeong et al., 2005, pp. 149-150). There was no prospect 
that SME workers would be better off as they aged. The SME workers were also in more 
dangerous workplaces than the large firm employees. Although the industrial accident rate had 
gradually decreased in general, the rate of SME workers was still six times higher than that of 
workers at large firms between 2011 and 2015 (see Figure 5-8). 
SME workers had less chance to be protected by trade unions than large firm workers. According 
to Workplace Panel Survey conducted by Korea Labor Institute (Statistics Korea, 2017), the rates 
of SME workers who joined trade union were 30 percent lower than the same rates of large firm 
workers in 2007 (see Table 5-3). The wave of workers’ struggles to establish independent unions, 
the increased wages and improved working conditions achieved by the struggles in the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s did not reach the SMEs. As the level of unionisation had a positive effect on 
the increase in wages, the wage gap between the SME workers and large firms continued to 
increase (Bae et al., 2008, p. 56). 
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Figure 5-6 Number of SMEs and large firms in manufacturing sector, 1980–2011 (selected 
years) 
 
Source: Small and Medium Business Administration (2013, pp. 158-160). 
 
Figure 5-7 Employees of SMEs and large firms in manufacturing sector, 1980–2011 (selected 
years) 
 
Source: Small and Medium Business Administration (2013, pp. 158-160).  
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Figure 5-8 Rate of industrial accidents (number of victims per all employees), SMEs and large 
firms, 1991–2015 
 
Source: Statistics Korea (2017). 
 
Table 5-2 Wage of large firm workers as percentage of wage of manufacturing SME workers, 
1983–2001 (selected years) 
 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 
Total wage difference 109.8% 115.9% 128.3% 121.9% 126.4% 138.2% 138.0% 
Net wage difference 
estimated7 
104.4% 106.1% 115.2% 106.6% 110.4% 114.6% 115.7% 
Source: Jeong et al. (2005) 
 
Table 5-3 Workers organised by trade unions, SMEs and large firms, 2007 
 Rate of unionised workers Rate of workplaces having trade unions 
SMEs 10.36 % 31.14 % 
Large firms 37.10 % 58.41 % 
Source: Bae et al. (2008, p. 56). 
  
                                                             
7 This figure takes into account the education level, gender, continuous service year and experiences before the 
current job of employees, size and region of the company, occupation, and industrial sector (Jeong et al., 2005, pp. 87-
88). 
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The disparity was mainly due to an asymmetric and ‘exploitative subcontract system’ between 
SMEs and large firms (Chung, 2007, Saesayon, 2009). According to an independent survey, most 
South Korean SMEs rely on subcontract transactions with less than five big companies; and half 
of them have subcontracts with only one or two companies (Saesayon, 2009, pp. 203-205). The 
large firms gained profits by making use of the subcontractors’ high dependency: their cost 
burdens, such as increased import prices of raw materials, increased wages, and high bank 
interest rates, were all shifted onto their subcontractors, SMEs. Due to the increased number of 
SMEs, they had to win acute price competitions to remain subcontracts with the large firms, which 
was vital for their survival. Moreover, the South Korean government’s high exchange rate policy, 
especially during the Lee Myung Bak government, aggravated SMEs’ production cost because they 
were major importers of raw materials. They produced parts of a final product out of the 
imported raw materials and sold them to large domestic firms. The beneficiaries of the exchange 
rate policy were the large exporters. 
The most common business strategy for SMEs to reduce production costs was to cut down labour 
costs. Some managed to automate the production lines. Others relocated production to less-
developed countries, seeking cheaper labour forces and fewer regulations on labour standards. 
They relocated not only the business but also the old labour management practices to the 
developing countries. Many other SMEs could not afford either option because both entailed 
investment costs and risk. Thus, the strategies of the remainders were either to give up 
manufacturing and switch to other service businesses, like leasing businesses, or to just continue 
the old exploitative labour system based on low wages and poor working conditions. 
The remaining SMEs experienced severe labour shortages. The labour shortage rate of SMEs rose 
up to eight percent in the early 1990s. Then, it stayed between 3.5 to 5.5 percent after the South 
Korean economy recovered from the 1997 economic crisis. This means that the SMEs, with less 
than 300 employees, were short of 10 to 16 workers all the time. The SMEs experienced six to ten 
times more severe labour shortages than the large firms (see Figure 5-9). The SMEs were not 
popular with workers.  
High levels of education and large wage differences by education level are the primary factors of 
the high labour shortage in SMEs. South Korea is a highly educated society. The workers who had 
tertiary education gradually increased over the last three decades. University graduates earned 
50 to 60 percent more than the less-educated workers (see Table 5-4).  
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Taking into account the disparities in wages, working conditions and prospects, the SMEs had 
almost no merit to attract the increasing number of university graduates. It was rational that 
highly educated South Korean workers avoided jobs at SMEs; thus, it was unavoidable that the 
SMEs experienced increasing labour shortages. As Chung (2013) observed, the South Korean 
labour market has been transformed to the ‘neoliberal and segmented’ employment system, 
where the segmentation of employment is prevalent by the size of business. Other factors 
influencing segmentation are the type of employment, whether regular or non-regular, and 
gender. They will be examined later. 
 
Figure 5-9 Labour shortage rates, SMEs and large firms, 1991–2015 
 
Source: Statistics Korea (2017). 
 
Table 5-4 University graduates in economically active population 1993–2014 
 1993-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2014 
Proportion of 
university graduates 
to economically active 
population 
18.7 % 22.6 % 29.3 % 36.5 % 41.6 % 
University graduates’ 
wage compared to the 
less educated workers 
149.4 % 152.1 % 158.9 % 160.8 % 159.9 % 
Source: Statistics Korea (2017).  
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One of the measures promoted by the South Korean government to address the SMEs’ labour 
shortage was the so-called ‘SME Youth Internship Programme’. This programme intended to give 
young people opportunities to have work experiences and to contribute to their career 
development. Throughout the country, both government agencies and the private sector 
introduced this programme. However, it was, in practice, only another form of non-regular work. 
The government promoted precarious work and employers gained benefit from the low cost of 
hiring young interns. The online newspaper Pressian critically reported ‘youth interns returned 
to jobless after 6 months employment’ (Seon, 2009). Another expedient the Lee Myung Bak 
government particularly promoted was that ‘young people should downgrade job expectations’, 
work harder, work in SMEs and do more manual work.  
The Kyungyhang Shinmun critically commented ‘this is no more than to shift responsibility to 
individuals and to blame them’ (Park, 2010b). My research participant, KGD (RP07), who was a 
pro-migrant activist, also commented the President’s statement could be ‘no more than an absurd 
joke’. As examined above, it is not a rational choice for the university graduates to take low-waged 
and dangerous jobs at SMEs. In the end, a realistic recruitment strategy of the SMEs was to hire 
workers who otherwise would not have any chance to work. They were irregular migrants who 
began to arrive in the late 1980s. 
Precarious job, life and human relations  
While the social polarisation intensified, the middle class gradually shrank (see Figure 5-10). 
According to South Korean sociologist Jang’s (2013) critical analysis of class structure under 
neoliberalism, the middle class was divided into two groups. The first one is ‘old middle class’ or 
‘old petit bourgeois’ who owns the means of production but are self-employed. The second is the 
‘new middle class’ or high-income working class who has advantages in the labour market and 
holds relative autonomy in the labour process, like managers and professionals. Analysing official 
data, she argues the new middle class gradually increased their incomes during the period of 
neoliberalisation, while the old middle class went in the opposite direction (see Table 5-5). This 
data implies that the lower-middle class has dropped down toward lower class, while upper- 
middle class has moved up. The middle class has gradually collapsed. During the industrialisation 
period, South Korean society experienced the first collapse of the old middle class: farmers were 
proletarianised to form the urban working class. Jang (2013, pp. 23-25) observes, during the 
neoliberalisation period, the old middle class in the service sector has significantly decreased. 
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The self-employed in the service sector were the worst influenced by the polarisation. Quoting 
taxation data, Yonhap News reported the top 20 percent of the self-employed took 71.4 per cent 
of total income of the same group in 2009. The bottom 20 percent took only 1.6 percent of the 
total income. The top 20 percent self-employed earned 55 percent more than ten years before, 
while the bottom 20 percent earned 54 percent less than before (Ahn, 2011). Many of the self- 
 
Figure 5-10 Urban households of disposable income between 50% and 150% of median 
income, 1990–2013 
 
Source: Statistics Korea (2017). 
 
Table 5-5 Incomes by class and occupations as percentage of total average income, 1994–
2008 (selected years) 
 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Middle class         
Old middle class household (%) 99.7 98.2 93.2 93.3 92.9 92.0 89.0 88.4 
New middle class household (%) 124.8 127.0 133.6 130.3 124.2 138.1 135.7 138.6 
Working class         
Office worker (%) 100.0 102.1 106.2 110.1 96.5 114.5 120.0 112.7 
Manufacturing worker (%) 87.9 87.7 84.7 91.7 89.6 89.7 90.4 91.1 
Sales service worker (%) 84.5 76.5 84.8 81.8 73.4 83.1 89.4 88.2 
Manual worker (%) 83.0 81.2 77.9 72.3 71.6 70.0 70.9 67.4 
Source: Jang (2013). 
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employed were those who lost their jobs through the layoffs in large companies. They invested 
their retirement payment in small businesses such as fried chicken franchises, internet cafés and 
bakery franchises. They often rely on mortgage loans for extra funds for investment, as a 
newspaper reported (Hong, 2013). However, the rapid increase of self-employed businesses 
intensified competition among themselves, which only benefited the franchise headquarter 
companies. For example, every year between 2003 and 2012, 7,400 new fried chicken restaurants 
opened but 5,000 closed. Both international and national newspapers reported that the fried 
chicken restaurants increased three fold during the same period, but half of them went broke in 
three years (Achin, 2013, Kim and Bang, 2013). In the end, the old middle class moved down to 
the ‘working poor’ (Saesayon, 2009, pp. 234-242). 
Polarisation within the working class has also significantly intensified by occupation (see Table 
5-5). Office workers earned more than average income. Their income gradually increased. 
Manufacturing workers and sales service workers earned 10 to 17 percent lower than average 
income. Manual workers’ income is a particular matter of concern. It had already been at the 
bottom of the income structure before the ‘IMF crisis’ but it had consistently dropped down 
toward near poverty line: 67.4 percent in 2008. Manual workers were falling from working class 
to the ‘working poor’. 
The ‘working poor’ is a term often used to describe the deterioration of workers’ incomes after 
the neoliberal transformations in South Korea. Although the definition is quite controversial, the 
term is broadly understood as the workers whose income remains below the poverty line, 
although they do income earning activities (Pressian, 2010). According to government research, 
the estimated share of the ‘working poor’ has been approximately 10 percent of all workers since 
2006 (Kim et al., 2011, pp. 155-168). ‘Hard work’ or ‘diligence and assiduousness’ had been one 
of the most powerful moral principles in industrialising South Korean society under authoritarian 
developmental regimes. South Koreans had a strong belief that hard work would save them from 
extreme poverty and brought about rapid industrialisation and economic growth. However, 
people began to question the myth of ‘hard work’ after the ‘IMF crisis’. Their hard work achieved 
the shiny growth of the national economy, but they were still poor. Moreover, their working hours 
remained at the highest level in the world (Lee et al., 2007).  
The increase in the working poor is related to the increase of non-regular work. Along with the 
massive restructuring of the labour market, the extremely flexible and precarious forms of 
employment increased: as discussed earlier, half of all workers are non-regular workers, who 
earn half of what regular workers earn (Jang, 2006). The government and employers have often 
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justified non-regular employment with such terms as the ‘flexibilisation’ and cost-cutting 
‘rationalisation of management’. However, a study on non-regular workers in South Korea reveals 
the rhetoric of ‘flexibilisation’ means no more than lowering workers’ income, intensifying 
precariousness in workers’ lives, and increasing discriminations at workplaces (Jang, 2006). It is 
a typical practice that after a regular worker is laid off for ‘managerial reasons’, he or she is re-
hired for a non-regular job with a lower wage. When non-regular workers asked about the 
difference between their jobs and regular jobs, the answer was simple: ‘Nothing but lower wage’ 
(Jang, 2006, p. 107). Non-regular workers do the same job as regular workers, but are paid as 
little as the half of regular workers. 
A typical form of non-regular employment is a ‘fixed-term contract’. For management, it may be 
a ‘rational’ decision, but for workers, it only means a precarious presence in the workplace and 
an uncertain future. Workers with fixed-term contracts often say ‘I am always reluctant about 
savings or insurance. I am not sure about my future, so I tend to postpone everything until I get a 
permanent job’ (Jang, 2006, p. 104). They are living a postponed life.  
Another type of non-regular employee is the ‘dispatched worker’. They do the same work as their 
regular-worker colleagues at the same workplace. The only difference is they are hired by a 
subcontractor company and dispatched to the main contractor’s workplace. Because they are 
non-regular workers, they are paid half the rates of regular workers. The wage difference is not 
the only discriminations against non-regular workers. They are often excluded from basic 
entitlements at work like the usage of canteens, locker rooms, staff lounges and shuttle buses 
(Jang, 2006, p. 111). 
Non-regular workers are not protected by a trade union. The ‘dispatched workers’ do not work 
at the workplace of their employer; thus, they are not accepted by the trade union of the main 
contractors’ employees. It is also difficult for them to organise a separate trade union. Even if they 
managed to organise a union, they would have to deal with their employer, who does not have 
control over the workplace of the major contractor. Moreover, the non-regular workers are 
mostly employed by SMEs, where workers also find it difficult to organise a union. 
The distinction between non-regular and regular workers generated a hierarchy among workers 
doing the same jobs at the same workplace. Such discriminations at work are broadly spread 
throughout all industries. This means half of South Korean workers live with half the wages, 
precariousness, discrimination and vulnerability. 
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Desperate protests of precarious workers in the depressing neoliberal society 
On 31 October 2013, Choi Jong Bum, air-conditioner repair worker, was found dead. According to 
the report of a major independent internet news service Ohmynews (Choi, 2013c), he left a 
message to his colleague trade unionists, ‘It was too hard to work for Samsung Service. I was 
starving. It was too hard to look at suffering colleagues. Although I cannot do like Chun Tae-il, I 
hope this would help.’ Choi had worked for the Cheonan Centre for Samsung Electronics Service 
since 2010. He was proud of his uniform with its Samsung logo and people envied him working 
for a global company (Jung, 2013). However, he was not an official employee of Samsung. His 
employer was a subcontractor of Samsung, named GPA (Great Partnership Agency). This was a 
typical non-regular employment system. His work was paid for on a piecework basis. At the worst 
season, his wage went down as low as the minimum standard wage. The expenses incurred during 
his work, including petrol, was deducted from his wages. Employees were often forced to work 
12 hours a day or on weekends without overtime (Choi, 2013b). 
Three months before his death, Choi and his colleagues organised a trade union to complain about 
poor working conditions under the subcontractor system. Reportedly, Samsung had been 
notorious for its ‘no union policy’ since its foundation (Choi, 2011a). Management began to put 
pressures on Choi and his colleagues. The main contractor, Samsung Electronics Service, took 
away the territory of business where Choi and his colleagues could get the most earnings. The 
main contractor also launched a special inspection on the performances of Choi and his colleagues, 
warning them that it would charge compensations for the damages and losses caused by the 
union. Then, the contractor seized their wages. The employer of the subcontractor company 
repeatedly insulted Choi and his colleagues and put pressure on them (Choi, 2013c). A non-
regular worker, Choi Jong Bum’s last resort to address his painful situation was, unfortunately, 
suicide.  
After his death, an independent research centre, Wonjin Institute for Occupational and 
Environmental Health, conducted a survey on the health conditions of subcontractor employees. 
The survey reported more than half of Samsung Electronics Service workers suffered severe 
psychological problems. The longer an employee had worked with the company, the more severe 
the levels of depression they showed. Almost four out of ten workers had either tried to commit 
suicide or thought about suicide mostly because of stress at work. The primary source of the 
stress was pressure from the main contractor. The workers also said Samsung’s ‘no union policy’ 
was the root-cause (see Table 5-6). The precarious work drove South Korean people into 
psychological depression (Pressian, 2010). 
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The workers who managed to keep their permanent jobs were also not safe from the aggressions 
of neoliberal transformations. On 9 January 2003, a trade unionist and factory worker Bae Dal Ho 
burnt his body to death at a corner of his workplace, Doosan Heavy Industry and Construction. 
According to a news report (Im, 2003), he left a note: ‘We went into the strike after we satisfied 
all the legal processes. But, the court said it was illegal. The law is for the haves not for the have-
nots.’ Bae was employed by a state-owned company, Hankook Heavy Industry, in 1981. He had 
been an active member of the union. Amid the ‘IMF crisis’, his company was privatised and sold 
to one of the chaebols. As soon as Doosan took over the company, it launched layoffs. Fifteen 
percent of all employees lost their jobs within a few months. The employer withdrew himself 
from the collective bargain in 2002 without any legitimate explanation, presumably in an attempt 
to weaken the trade union. The workers went on a strike. The employer’s response was lawsuits 
against the union leaders over damages to his business. After the strike, most of Bae Dal Ho’s 
wages went under provisional seizure. He received only 25,000 Korean Won (approximately 25 
US Dollars) for his monthly wage (Park, 2003). 
The Trade Union and Labour Relations Adjustment Act of South Korea requires trade unions to go 
through complicated processes to enter into strikes, including an industrial dispute adjustment 
process. If a trade union does not meet the pre-conditions, it is easily charged for causing an 
‘illegal strike’. Then, the law allows employers to claim compensation for damages to their 
business. The claims are made against individual union leaders. The compensations are usually 
an extreme amount that individual union members cannot afford to pay: for example, the average 
compensation that Bae and his colleagues were charged to pay back was more than their five- 
 
Table 5-6 Conditions of Samsung Electronics Service workers, 2013 
Working hours per week  Suicide  
70 hours or more 16.0 % Attempted suicide 4.5 % 
60 hours or more 33.8 % Felt suicidal 34.8 % 
50 to 60 hours 35.6 % Cause of feeling suicidal  
40 to 50 hours 23.4 %      Stress at work 72.7 % 
40 hours or less 7.2% Primary causes of stress at work  
Depression       Pressures from the main contractor 82.2 % 
Severe depression 30.4 %      ‘No-union’ policy 97 % 
Moderate depression 23.5 % Survey target: All employees including  
                               subcontractor employees 
Survey participants: 880 
Mild depression 23.4 % 
Normal 22.7 % 
Source: Adopted from Park (2013a) and Je (2013).  
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year worth of wages. The compensation for damage to the business became a key strategy for 
employers to target union leaders and weaken unions (Chung, 2003). Workers’ suicide protests 
continued afterwards. The employers’ strategy of attacking individual union members drove the 
workers to desperation and death. 
Young people had no opportunity to work, whether a regular or non-regular job. Youth 
unemployment emerged as a pressing social problem in South Korea after the ‘IMF crisis’. As 
discussed earlier, youth unemployment rates skyrocketed during the IMF crisis and have 
remained relatively high. Many young South Koreans experienced depression in the course of job-
seeking. According to a survey conducted by a youth group, the Busan Youth Union, one out of ten 
young people experienced suicidal feelings. The primary causes of their depression were 
unemployment and non-regular jobs. Almost half of survey participants stated the solutions for 
youth depression would be ‘removal of wage disparity between regular and non-regular jobs’ and 
‘improvement of working condition’. The biggest obstacle for seeking a job was financial 
difficulties: they needed to cover ‘living cost’ and ‘training cost’ to find work, and they tended to 
settle for casual jobs (Chung, 2015). Then, they had less time to continue seeking more permanent 
jobs, and eventually less chance to have a better job. The young South Koreans are trapped in the 
vicious circle of poverty and depression, as they cynically denounced their society as ‘Hell Korea’. 
 
Figure 5-11 Suicides per 100,000 population, top five OECD member countries, 1985–2013 
 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2015).   
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An increasing number of South Korean people have lost hope about their future and society. 
Although there was some improvement in the official social security system after the ‘IMF crisis’, 
the politically driven ‘workfare’ system failed to mitigate the rapidly growing income disparity, 
relative poverty, precariousness and vulnerability in the society. Despite the growth and 
prosperity of the national economy, people’s depression and desperation have continued to grow. 
In 2010 and 2011, South Korea was the country with the highest suicide rates among the OECD 
members. The suicide rate skyrocketed in 1997 when the ‘IMF crisis’ occurred; then, it constantly 
increased afterwards (see Figure 5-11). According to an official survey in 2012, the major reason 
people think about suicide was ‘the hardship of life’ by 39.5 percent (Statistics Korea, 2012). 
While South Korea has gone through neoliberal transformation, it has become a country of 
depression and suicides. 
As discussed throughout this section, the disparity between large firms and SMEs, precarisation 
of work, the collapse of the middle class and polarisation between classes, the increases of the 
‘working poor’ and non-regular workers represent South Korean society after neoliberal 
transformations. They are the political, economic and social backgrounds of the rapid increase of 
international migration to South Korea in the 1990s and the 2000s. 
Increasing international migration 
Before examining international migration to South Korea, I clarify the definition of migrant data 
used in this thesis. The United Nations’ definition of migrant may be the most broadly used in 
academia. It defines a ‘long-term migrant’ as a ‘person who moves to a country other than that of 
his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year’, and ‘short-term migrants’ as ‘for a period 
of at least 3 months but less than a year except in cases where the movement to that country is 
for purpose of recreation, holiday, visits to friends and relatives, business, medical treatment or 
religious pilgrimage’ (Statistics Division, 1998, p. 18).  
The South Korean legal term for migrant is ‘foreigner’, according to the Immigration Control Act 
(Article 2). The government categorises foreigners into two types depending on the period of stay: 
a ‘long-term foreign resident’, who is permitted to stay longer than 90 days and supposed to do 
either foreign registration or diaspora residence report to an immigration office, and a 
‘temporary foreign resident’, who is permitted to stay for or less than 90 days (Korea Immigration 
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Service, 2013a, pp. 272-282). The South Korean government publishes official migration statistics 
including the migration data of ‘foreign residents’, ‘temporary foreign residents’ and ‘illegal 
foreign residents’.  
Thus, the sum of ‘long-term’ and ‘short-term migrants’ by the United Nations equates to the sum 
of ‘long-term foreign resident’ and ‘illegal temporary foreign resident’ by the South Korean 
definition. This definition is used for statistical purpose throughout this thesis. 
Rapid increase and diversification of migrant population 
South Korean society experienced dramatic transformations throughout the twentieth century 
both in the economy and in politics, as well as international migration. South Korea was an origin 
country of millions of victims of forced migration during the colonial period and the Second World 
War, and then, a source country of migrant workers to the Gulf States, Europe and the United 
States until the mid-1980s. However, the country now became a major destination for more than 
one million migrant workers and marriage migrants from all over the world. 
 
Figure 5-12 Stock of international migrants in South Korea, 1984–2016  
 
Sources: Korea Immigration Service (1961-2017) and Seol (2005b). 
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The starting point of the dramatic increase of immigration was the early 1990s. According to 
official statistics, the number of immigrants increased more than 35 fold between 1987 and 2016 
(see Figure 5-12). The share of migrants in the total population of South Korea remained as low 
as 0.1 percent until 1987 but increased up to 3.22 percent in 2016 (Statistics Korea, 2017). The 
rapid increase of international migration to South Korea coincides with the neoliberal 
transformation of the South Korean economy and society. 
Table 5-7 presents recent patterns of immigration to South Korea. The majority of migrants 
arrived in South Korea for wage-work. At the end of 2016, temporary migrant workers made 35.9 
percent of all migrants, most of whom were low-skilled workers. Most of the low-skilled migrant 
workers moved to South Korea through one of two temporary labour migration schemes: the 
general low-skilled stream, Employment Permit System (EPS) and the special stream for the 
Korean diaspora from developing countries, Visit and Work System. There were slightly more 
workers under the former scheme than under the latter. According to recent changes in policies, 
their temporary visas are valid for up to three to five years and renewable for another four years 
and ten months. However, they have no access to a permanent residence. 
The second largest group is the Korean diaspora, or overseas Koreans who making temporary 
returns to South Korea for non-low-skilled work, study or other purposes. They are former South 
Korean citizens or the descendants of Korean citizens who hold foreign citizenship. The South 
Korean government’s diaspora policy grants them with preferential treatment for immigration 
and visa status (e.g. work permit without restriction) by the Act on the Immigration of 
Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans of 1999. However, workers from the Korean 
diaspora who are considered low-skilled and hold the citizenship of a less-developed country, 
particularly a non-OECD member state, are not entitled to the diaspora visa, but only to the above-
mentioned diaspora stream of temporary labour migration programme. This shows the South 
Korean immigration policy prefers the Korean diaspora holding the citizenship of developed 
countries, particularly the OECD member states, over low-skilled migrants from less-developed 
countries. 
The third largest group is the spouses of South Korean nationals, broadly known as marriage 
migrants. Many of their marriages were arranged by international match-making brokers, mostly 
funded by the South Korean spouse or sometimes sponsored by South Korean local governments 
(Lee, 2008a). Two or more years after arrival, they are entitled to apply for South Korean 
citizenship through a ‘simple naturalisation’ process with the endorsement of their South Korean 
spouse (Article 6, the Nationality Act). The South Korean government has introduced a series of   
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Table 5-7 Immigration trend, South Korea, 2016 
 
Population (percentage) Visa type 
Total immigrants 1,663,328   
Purpose of immigration 
  
 
Temporary labour migration 597,189 (35.90%)  
Professional 47,740 (2.87%) Professorship (E-1),  
Foreign Language Instructor (E-2), 
Research (E-3),  
Technical Transfer (E-4),  
Professional Employment (E-5),  
Arts & Performances (E-6),  
Special Occupation (E-7). 
Low-skilled 549,449 (33.03%)  
          General stream 279,187 (16.78%) Non-professional Employment (E-9), 
          Diaspora stream 254,950 (15.33%) Working Visit (H-2). 
          Vessel crew 15,312 (0.92%) Vessel Crew (E-10). 
Diaspora temporary return 372,533 (22.40%) Korean diaspora (F-4). 
Marriage migration 152,374 (9.16%) Marriage migration (F-6), 
Residence (F-2) 
Permanent resident (F-5) 
International student 76,040 (4.57%) International student (D-2) 
Working holiday 1,917 (0.12%) Tourist Employment (H-1). 
Length of immigration 
  
 
Permanent residence 130,237 (7.83%) Permanent residence (F-5) 
Temporary migration 1,533,091 (92.17%)  
Legal status 
  
 
Valid visa holders 1,454,357 (87.44%)  
Undocumented migrants 208,971 (12.56%)  
Refugee    
Refugee status determined 672 (0.04%) Residence (F-2), 
Permanent residence (F-5), 
Citizenship 
Humanitarian status 1156 (0.07%) Others (G-1) 
Refugee status determination 
 in progress 
6861 (0.41%) Visa type as the applicant holds before 
application or 
Others (G-1) after the visa expired, 
Source: Korea Immigration Service (1961-2017).  
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policies to ‘support’ or assimilate these migrants, so-called ‘multicultural family’ policies by the 
Multicultural Family Support Act of 2008. This policies, however, ignited debates over a Korean 
version of ‘multiculturalism’: it is often severely criticised for promoting ‘cultural paternalism and 
cultural fetishism’ (Kim, 2011d) or reinforcing patriarchal social order (Kim, 2007b, Lee, 2008a). 
As the table shows, more than 90 percent of all migrants are temporary visa holders, who are 
permitted to stay less than five years. Although their visas are renewable, only very few of them 
ever have the opportunity to acquire a permanent residence. This reflects the South Korean 
government’s immigration principle: no settlement. Scholars argue the exclusionary immigration 
policy shows how the South Korean government is confined within the frame of nationalism 
based on a firm belief of racial and ethnic homogeneity (Han, 2007, Watson, 2012). However, this 
policy only contributed to generating undocumented migrants. More than 12 percent of all 
migrants are categorised as ‘illegal stayers’ or undocumented migrants. All of them arrived with 
a valid visa and continued to stay after the visa was expired or cancelled due to unauthorised 
activities like wage-gaining without the government permission. 
 
Figure 5-13 Gender disparity of migrants in South Korea, 2013 
 
Source: Korea Immigration Service (1961-2017).  
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While the low-skilled migrant workers under the general stream of the EPS are predominantly 
male, those under the diaspora steam show a relatively balanced gender proportion (Figure 
5-13). This gender disparity is related to the government’s restrictions on the industrial sector 
where migrants may be employed, and to employers’ preferences toward male workers. The EPS 
restricts the employment of non-Korean-ethnic migrants to such industrial sectors as 
construction, manufacturing, agriculture, fishery and livestock (Korea Immigration Service, 
2013b). Since employers of these so-called ‘3D-industries’ prefer male workers for hard work, 
female migrant workers from Southeast Asian countries may have much less chance to be 
employed than their male counterparts. On the contrary, the diaspora stream of the EPS, the Visit 
and Work System, permits migrants of Korean ethnicity to work in a broader range of sectors 
including service sector like accommodation, catering and entertainment businesses. Female 
migrant workers of Korean ethnicity have chances to work in the service sector. 
Marriage migration also shows a significantly unbalanced gender ratio. Almost 90 percent of 
marriage migrants are female. Lee (2008a) argues this gender imbalance is caused by the high 
demand for female foreign spouses, derived from the unbalanced gender ratio in the South 
Korean demography. I argue another reason is the above-mentioned exclusion of Southeast Asian 
female workers from the EPS-arranged employment. Although Southeast Asian females still have 
aspirations for out-migration, they have little chance for labour migration to South Korea. As 
Piper and Roces (2003) argued, international marriage is a promising migration strategy for 
prospective female migrants. As several Vietnamese prospective migrants testified for the study 
of Kim et al. (2007), marriage migration became a strategy of women in developing countries to 
escape from the poverty and repression in their home country. 
International migration and neoliberal transformation in South Korea  
As discussed in Chapter 2, understanding the cause of international migration is one of major 
topics of migration studies. Migration theories explain the determinants of international 
migration with economic or political conditions in origin and destination, socio-historic and 
structural relations between the two places, or an individual’s aspiration or rational choices. 
These migration theories have been applied to explain the international migration to South Korea, 
as reviewed in Chapter 1.  
The ‘migration transition’ approach (Fields, 1994) and the argument of ‘turning point’ (Park, 
1994b) are more descriptive than analytical. The presupposition of ‘transition’ (e.g. Choi, 2001, 
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DeWind et al., 2012) lacks the analysis of empirical data. The currently available out-migration 
data of South Korea does not reflect the recently increasing and diversified forms of temporary 
migration. Official data shows the departures of South Korean people have increased to an 
unprecedented level (Korea Immigration Service, 1961-2017). However, it fails to identify 
whether they are students, working holidaymakers, migrant workers or tourists and whether 
they change visa status in the destination country or simply become irregular migrants. There is 
no empirical evidence that the net migration rate transited from a negative to a positive one. 
The ‘labour market segmentation’ theory (Lee, 1997) is a plausible explanation. It pointed out the 
‘segmentation’ between SMEs and large firms and the labour shortage caused by disparities in 
wages and working conditions generated the demand for labour migration. Also, I argue that 
labour market segmentation has to be analysed in a broad context of social transformations. As 
discussed earlier, the hierarchical relationship between large firms and SMEs, the precarisation 
of jobs accompanied by neoliberal restructuring of the labour market, and the government’s 
engagement with neoliberalisation projects are factors and consequences of the segmentation 
and disparities. 
On the other hand, South Korean sociologist Seol (1999, pp. 71-94) suggested that it was not a 
single economic factor, but a complex of various economic, social and political aspects that needed 
to be considered. He argues the increased immigration is related to: 
 the incorporation of the South Korean economy into the global division of the 
labour market; 
 the establishment of diplomatic relations with the socialist countries after the 
collapse of the Cold War system; 
 strengthened restrictions of labour migration in other destination countries in the 
region; 
 social networks that were built through the international trade and foreign 
investment or the diasporic networks such as the Joseonjok community in China;  
 most significantly, the shortage of the workforce in manufacturing sectors. 
He also suggested (Seol, 1999, pp. 100-102) the workforce shortage is related to: 
 exhaustion of internal migrants from rural areas,  
 the decrease in the youth population,  
 increased enrolment of the youth population in tertiary education,  
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 the decrease in skilled workforce,  
 workers’ avoidance of jobs in the secondary industries, and  
 intensified segmentation between large businesses and the small and medium-
sized businesses.  
This list identifies possible factors that affected migration to South Korea. However, it is also 
essential to understand the causality between each factor and to identify a global context where 
all the factors are situated. 
I argue the ‘changing modes of labour for management’ into ‘precarisation’ (Schierup et al., 2014, 
p. 2) (see Chatper 2) is a key dimension for explaining increasing international labour migration 
to South Korea. Throughout the 1990s and the 2000s, the South Korean economy was rapidly 
integrated into ‘financialised global capitalism’. The ‘corporate stratagems of offshoring, 
outsourcing, subcontracting’ became common management practices of South Korean chaebols. 
The ‘renewed sweatshop production’ became prevalent in the SMEs. ‘Precarisation of work’ in 
South Korea coincided with the expansion of the social security system and the rise of education 
levels. The ‘renewed sweatshop’ is no more an option for South Korean young workers. There are 
also increasing numbers of ‘globally mobile reserve army of labour’ in the region, which has also 
experienced the ‘precarisation of work and citizenship’ at home. For the ‘globally mobile reserve 
army of labour’, the ‘renewed sweatshop’ in developed countries may be a better option than 
extreme precarity and poverty in less developed home country. 
I also argue that the global political-economic condition was not enough to generate the flows of 
migration to South Korea. There was an institutional mechanism that triggered the flows. In the 
case of South Korea, the trigger was the temporary labour migration policy, introduced by the 
government as a part of neoliberal restructuring of the labour market. My argument will be 
further discussed in the next two chapters. 
Conclusion 
After the series of authoritarian regimes under colonial power and military dictatorship, South 
Korean society enjoyed a relatively consolidated institutional democracy that is checked and 
balanced by a vibrant civil society. Throughout the 1990s, however, neoliberalism rapidly 
replaced the developmental state, and market economy dogmas dominated governance and 
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social relations (Ji, 2011). The liberal government’s globalisation project hastily opened its 
economy toward international markets by preferring high-technology manufacturers, chaebols, 
over agriculture and small enterprises. The project was accompanied by the rapid flexibilization 
of the labour market, including the legislation of redundancy, subcontracted and temporary work, 
and limited union rights. Political liberalisation and democracy were ‘hijacked by neo-liberalism’ 
(Lim and Jang, 2006a). On top of the endogenous drive toward neoliberalisation, the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis became a watershed for the fundamental shift of the South Korean economy. The 
restructuring programme imposed by the IMF accelerated the privatisation of core business, the 
dependence of financial and the stock market on foreign investors, and the flexibilisation of the 
labour market. 
This process of neoliberal transformation in South Korea exemplifies how the state ‘imposed the 
market organisation on society’ (Polanyi, 2001 [1944], p. 258) as well as how it continued to play 
an active role in the ‘introduction, implementation and reproduction’ of neoliberalism (Cahill, 
2010, p. 301). The Kim Young Sam government (1993-1997) overtly announced the ‘Segyehwa 
(globalisation)’ and ‘reinforcement of national competitiveness’ project while it aggressively 
pursued the retrogressive revision of labour laws toward ‘de-regulation’ of labour market (Shin, 
2000). The following government of Kim Dae Jung (1998-2002) institutionalised lay-offs, 
casualization of work and control over trade unions under the ‘restructuring’ pressures of the 
IMF. The workers’ resistances were continuously suppressed by nationalist ideology and often 
quelled by police enforcement. Harvey (2005, pp. 69-77) calls this state apparatus the ‘neoliberal 
state’, that embodies the neoliberalism by mobilising ideological rhetoric and also by resorting to 
‘persuasion, propaganda’, and ‘raw force and police power’. 
The neoliberal transformation coincided with the increase of in-migration of workers from 
neighbor countries. Although in-migration appeared as early as the late 1980s, the full-fledged 
increase began in the mid-1990s when the South Korean labour market was rapidly segmented 
and precaritised. A close review of structural changes in the South Korean economy reveals that 
increased immigration was not a simple outcome of economic growth, but a part of the economic 
restructuring projects driven by the government and employers and sponsored by the 
international capitalist. The neoliberal transformations restructured the mode of production 
management. The ‘renewed sweatshop production’ deterred South Korean young workers from 
working for the SMEs, but invited temporary migrant workers from other Asian countries. Also, 
the South Korean government’s initiative to import a workforce without human settlement 
triggered the flows of labour migration. The next two chapters examine the policy process of the 
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South Korean temporary labour migration programmes and analyse their rationales and 
governance mechanisms from a political-economic perspective. 
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Chapter 6 Introduction of temporary labour migration 
programme: a policy process analysis 
This chapter and the next one examine the second domain among the three main areas of this 
study: international migration, migration policy and social movement. It seeks to answer the 
second research question as presented in Chapter 1: ‘What was the policy process of the South 
Korean temporary labour migration scheme and what are the rationales and governing 
mechanism of its operation?’ This question is related with my argument presented in the previous 
chapter: while the neoliberal labour market condition was the critical context of labour migration 
to South Korea, there was a political mechanism that triggered the flows of migration. This 
chapter focuses on an analysis of policy process before the next chapter discusses the rationales 
and governing mechanism of South Korean temporary labour migration policy. 
This chapter answers the research question by examining the development of the temporary 
labour migration policy in the context of the general migration policy. It also discusses its 
implications on migrant workers and South Korean society. On top of examining the existing 
literature, this chapter mainly relies on the analysis of interview data collected during my field 
research, which is also supported by media reports and a significant amount of legal and policy 
documents. Throughout this chapter, I identify the two significant characteristics of the South 
Korean labour migration policy: the establishment of temporary or ‘non-regular’ employment 
and the prevention of settlement. Then, I argue the temporary labour migration policy is a 
strategy to reinforce the neoliberal transformation of employment system.  
This chapter reviews the development of South Korean temporary labour migration schemes. 
Across the historical review, I identify the main actors involved in the policy-making process. I 
also examine their debates, which exhibit the conflictual or cooperative relations among the 
actors at each political juncture. The first and the second section discuss how the early stage of 
South Korean labour migration policies developed from a ‘back-door’ policy in response to 
irregular migration to a ‘side-door’ policy or pseudo-temporary labour migration scheme; and 
how they failed, too. The third section examines the process of introducing a fully-fledged 
temporary labour migration scheme later. 
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As reviewed earlier (see Chapter 1), a significant body of South Korean literature has studied this 
topic. Some of the studies provide a comprehensive overview (e.g. Chung, 2011) and critical 
analysis (e.g. Lee, 2008b). Lee (2008b) particularly engages with political economic theory of 
‘client politics’ (Freeman, 1995, Green, 2005, cited in Lee, 2008) to explain why the introduction 
of the EPS was delayed for 10 years. It also discusses the neo-institutional theories that emphasise 
the dynamics within a government (Boswell, 2007, Hollifield, 2004, Rosenhek, 2000, cited in Lee, 
2008) explains the negotiations among various agencies in the government in the course of 
legislation process for the EPS. Many others, however, still fail in contextualising their analyses in 
the political economy of migration. In this chapter, rather than applying the existing theories of 
public policy analysis as have already done by other scholars, I seek to understand the policy 
process in a broad political, economic and social context, particularly in the context of the 
continuing ‘ethnic nationalist’ political ideology and the neoliberal transformation. I also analyse 
the predominant political and economic fundamentals underlying the policy development to 
identify the two key principles of the South Korean labour migration policy: the establishment of 
temporary or ‘non-regular’ employment and the prevention of settlement.  
Opening a ‘back-door’ to international migrants (1987–1991) 
Increase of irregular migration and the lack of labour migration policy 
In the late 1980s, South Korean society experienced an unprecedented increase in irregular 
migration. The irregular migration started with Chinese herbal medicine traders, who arrived 
with tourist visas during the 1986 Asian Games (Seol, 1999). They were mostly Chinese ethnic 
minorities of Korean descent, known as Joseonjok. Since they were able to speak the Korean 
language, they were not significantly noticeable in the society at the beginning. Such form of 
irregular migrants steadily grew throughout the late 1980s. By the early 1990s, their number 
surpassed that of authorised migrants (see Figure 6-1). South Korean scholars agree the irregular 
migration was pulled by such factors as ‘the formation of social linkage among Asian countries’, 
‘the new position of the South Korean economy in the international division of labour’ and ‘the 
labour shortage in manufacturing sectors’ (Seol, 1999, pp. 71-106). Although these factors explain 
the social background of the migration, they did not identify the institutional mechanism that 
triggered the migration. I argue the increased irregular migration was encouraged by loosened 
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immigration control, and it continued to increase due to the South Korean government’s lack of 
official labour migration policy. 
The immediate trigger of the increased irregular migration was the loosened immigration control 
of the South Korean government. For decades before the mid-1980s, the government had 
maintained a ‘tightly closed border’ policy, as a government official noted (Kim, 2012d, pp. 2-6). 
It also upheld the exclusionary immigration policy (see Chapter 4). The policy of tight 
immigration control was, however, no longer compatible with the changing political situation, 
particularly the diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries. There were two particularly 
significant events that drove the change of immigration control. First, the 1986 Seoul Asian Games 
and 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, hosted as a means of propagating the justification of the then 
authoritarian rules, impelled the government to open its borders gradually. Since the government 
needed to facilitate the arrivals of the participants and international tourists who attended the 
two Games, it took temporary measures to exempt entry visas or simplify the arrival processes  
 
Figure 6-1 The number of authorised migrants and irregular migrants in South Korea 1987–
2004  
 
Sources: Korea Immigration Service (1961-2017) and Seol (2005b).8  
                                                             
8 Authorised migrants consist of those who hold valid visas among ‘registered foreigners’ and ‘address-reported 
diasporas’. 
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(see The Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1986a). Second, the Roh Tae Woo government’s announcement 
of the Northward Policy was also an important political juncture, which removed political 
obstacles to people’s movement between South Korea and the former ‘enemy countries’, China 
and the Soviet Union. As a part of the policy, the government simplified the visa issuance process 
for Chinese people with Korean ethnicity (see DongA Ilbo, 1988).  
Although the government loosened immigration control, it still took no steps to introduce any 
formal labour migration policy for low-skilled workers. The Immigration Control Act of 1983 
vaguely defined ‘the status of sojourn eligible for employment’ (Article 15). The government rule 
granted the status to ‘a person who wishes to be employed by and work for a public or private 
institution or an individual’ (Article 17(1), the Enforcement Decree of Immigration Control Act as 
amended in 1984). However, this provision was implemented solely for a small number of 
professionals mostly from the US. Table 6-1 shows, for example, the number of the status of 
sojourn categorised as ‘employment (911)’ was meagre in comparison to the total number of 
migrants. This provision was later revised to specify the ‘eligible status of sojourn’ by listing high-
skilled categories. The list includes ‘short-term employment’ (in the areas of entertainment, 
advertisement, fashion modelling, lecture, etc.), ‘professorship’, ‘special job’ (as recognised by the 
Minister of Justice), and exceptionally, ‘residence’ (mostly for the old-comer Chinese migrants) 
(Article 23, the same Enforcement Decree as amended in 1993). However, the government still 
had no official policy for the low-skilled migrant worker, before it introduced ‘training and 
employment’ visa (Article 23, the same Enforcement Decree as amended in 1998) as a part of 
Industrial Trainee System (ITS). The South Korean government never officially admitted the 
growing demands for and the supply pressure of the low-skilled migrant workers.  
 
Table 6-1 Nationalities of employment and other visa holders, 1989 
Nationality 
Employment 
(9–11) 
Accompanied 
family (9–15) 
Residence 
(9–16) 
Total 
sojourners 
Total 1,257 9,169 23,533 47,205 
United States 782 6852 9 12,738 
Japan 190 921 256 4,926 
Republic of China (Taiwan) 9 553 23,147 23,828 
 Source: Korea Immigration Service (1961-2017).  
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The apparent rationale behind the no low-skilled labour migration policy was ‘the principle of 
complementarity’ (Seol, 1999, p. 416). The government claimed that it intended to prevent a 
possible competition between local workers and migrant workers in the labour market; and it 
was concerned about a consequent deterioration of the wage, working conditions and  
productivity of the local workers. Thus, the government argued that allowing labour migration 
should occur for those jobs with a low possibility of competition. The ‘high-skilled’ foreigners 
were considered as complementing the labour shortages in the sector and were permitted to be 
employed without a ceiling, but not the low-skilled workers. 
However, the policy of no low-skilled migrant workers was not an outcome of any serious 
consideration of the labour market situation. The South Korean labour market had experienced 
rapidly increasing labour force shortages, especially in low-skilled jobs, since 1987. For example, 
the labour shortage rate in the low-skilled jobs was as high as 20.13 percent, while the rate in the 
high-skilled ones was only 1.34 percent March 1991 (Seol, 1992, p. 117). The government’s 
labour migration policy was actually in contradiction to its own ‘principle of complementarity’. 
In sum, while the South Korean labour market experienced severe labour shortages in low-skilled 
jobs, the government opened its borders without an adequate labour migration policy. The 
consequence was that more migrant workers arrived and sought jobs in South Korea and more 
South Korean employers under labour shortage sought to hire the migrant workers. Labour 
migration in late 1980s and early 1990s South Korea was triggered by the government’s tacit 
acceptance and welcomed by employers, but it was later illegalised by the government. The 
government had the first-hand responsibility for triggering the increase irregular migration. 
‘Back-door’ policy in the context of neoliberalism and ethnic nationalism 
The South Korean government’s labour migration policy in the late 1980s and the early 1990s 
was a typical ‘back-door’ policy. It officially denied the demand of low-skilled labour migration 
for political purposes but ‘tacitly condoned’ the employment of irregular migrants for economic 
benefit (Castles et al., 2012, p. 132). Although occasional arrests and deportations of 
undocumented workers were reported (e.g. Kim, 1989b, The Hankyoreh, 1988, The Kyunghyang 
Shinmun, 1986b), the employment of irregular migrant was not seriously punished. For example, 
the Immigration Control Act of 1983 (Article 84) stipulated the penalty for hiring irregular 
migrants to be less than 1 million Korean Won (approximately 1,000 US dollars), which was about 
two months of wages for an average worker in an SME in 1991 (see Yonhap, 1991). The 
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punishment of South Korean employers, identified as ‘Other’ type of immigration law violation, 
were less than 951 cases in 1991 (Korea Immigration Service, 1961-2017). On the contrary, there 
were at least 41,877 undocumented migrants in the same year (Seol, 2005b, p. 11). 
The question then arises why the South Korean immigration policy failed in reflecting the actual 
labour market situation. It may be answered in three terms. First, the government intentionally 
disregard the demand for low-skilled jobs as a strategy to propel the neoliberal industrial 
restructuring. As discussed in Chapter 5, the government’s priority under the neoliberal 
transformations was not to sustain the SMEs in the less productive 3D industries but to promote 
internationally competitive high-technology industries of large firms and chaebols. The 
government, especially the ministries in charge of industry and economic planning, preferred 
weeding out the less competitive industries; thus, it hesitated to introduce such measures that 
would subsidise the SMEs because that would only postpone their restructuring project. The idea 
of introducing low-skilled labour migration was never welcomed by the neoliberal policymakers. 
Second, the government’s hesitancy about introducing the low-skilled migrant workers was also 
a reflection of the society-wide ideological bias against the low-skilled labour. Korean society has 
a long-standing tendency of looking down on manual workers as unrespectable and undesirable, 
which originated in the East Asian Confucius ideology of social hierarchy based on occupations, 
as symbolised by such a term as Sa-nong-gong-sang (gentry scholars-peasant farmers-artisans 
and craftsmen-merchants and traders). This tradition persisted even over the period of industrial 
transformations between the 1960s and the 1980s (Koo, 2001, pp. 127-130), although the 
developmental state propagated such a term as the ‘pillar of industry’ to emphasise the 
significance of labour. The social attitude that underestimated manual labour intensified even 
more when the government and society promoted the post-industrial economy in the 1990s. 
While the jobs in the service sector and information technology-based industries emerged, 
manual labour was considered as outdated and fading away. In this context, the government could 
not encourage the introduction of migrant manual workers into society. 
Third, the racial prejudice against people from developing countries also influenced the 
government’s procrastination. South Korean historians and cultural studies scholars pointed out 
South Korean society was still influenced by cultural toadyism (Im, 1999, Park, 2002b) and ‘the 
coloniality of knowledge and existence’ (Ha, 2012, p. 550). This culture was conflated with the 
governing ideology of the ‘ethnic nationalism’ which had been playing as ‘a key organizing 
principle of Korean society’, as South Korean sociologist Shin (2010a, p. 16) argued. ‘Ethnic 
nationalism’ later developed into racially discriminatory attitudes towards the people from 
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developing countries. South Korean society’s immediate responses to the increasing irregular 
migrants, who came from developing countries for low-wage jobs, was often highly racially 
discriminatory. The media often proliferated racial prejudices that the migrant workers from 
developing countries were undesirable and even unsafe and unhygienic, while it welcomed the 
‘presumably’ high-skilled workers from developed countries (e.g. Kim, 1989a, Yonhap, 1992). The 
immigration policy was racialised by implementing the visa classification for the professionals 
and the low-skilled workers. The racialised policy was reflected in the statistics on the countries 
of origin of the professional migrants. The government most encouraged the employment of 
foreigners in the science and technology sector without serious considerations of the labour 
demands or its social impacts (see Yonhap, 1991), while it ignored the needs of the low-skilled 
migrant workers. The racialised immigration policy later developed in the form of the 
‘hierarchical nationhood’ (Seol and Skrentny, 2009, p. 150), which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Thus, the ‘back-door’ policy was a strategic choice of the South Korean government to mitigate 
the political pressures not to officialise the introduction of a labour migration policy, while it 
could resolve the labour shortages. This ambivalent attitude continued as the primary policy for 
labour migration until it introduced the ITS in 1991. 
A ‘side-door’ policy: Industrial Training System (1991–2004) 
Closing the back-door and opening a side-door 
The ‘back-door’ policy did not sustain for long. First, there were employers’ constant demands for 
a stable supply of migrant workforce. Second, the media was increasingly concerned about the 
irregular migration and often raised controversial issues such as ‘their negative impacts on the 
labour market’, ‘crime’ and ‘cultural influence’ (see Kim, 1989a, Yonhap, 1992). Employer 
associations such as Korea Federation of Small and Medium Businesses (KFSB) repeatedly 
claimed that the ‘foreign workforce is the only solution for the manpower shortage’, while trade 
unions opposed it for ‘the protection of low-waged national workers’ (Seol, 1999, pp. 421-422). 
The government was also divided: while the Ministries of Trade and Industry, and Construction 
were supportive to the small and medium businesses’ claim, the Ministries of Labour, Justice, 
Economic Planning, Health and Society opposed it for the reasons of immigration control or 
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labour market protection. The government was in a dilemma between the employer’s labour 
demand and the social impacts of immigration. 
The strategic choice of the South Korean government was a ‘side-door’ policy (Castles et al., 2012, 
p. 132). Instead of introducing a fully-fledged labour migration scheme, the government’s 
temporary expedient was to appropriate the already-existing ‘training’ visa system (Article 9 of 
the Enforcement Decree of Immigration Control Act, as amended in 1984. Until the 1980s, the 
number of migrants who held this visa was meagre: for example, 894 migrants in 1989, majority 
of whom were from developed countries like Japan (Korea Immigration Service, 1961-2017). By 
manipulating this visa system in the name of the ‘Industrial Trainee System’ in 1991, the 
government allowed a small number of South Korean medium-sized companies, which already 
had overseas investment, to bring their overseas employees to the headquarters in South Korea 
for training purposes. The next year, it expanded the programme to allow other SMEs without 
overseas investment to hire industrial trainees. In 1993, the government significantly expanded 
the programme and commissioned the employer organisation KFSB to operate it. The period 
allowed for ‘training’ was initially restricted to three months, but was extended to one year in 
1991 and again to two years in 1993. 
The ITS was a ‘side-door’ policy. The government used hypocritical language to disguise the real 
purpose of the policy. It was clear that the scheme aimed at supplying low-wage foreign 
workforces and reducing irregular migrants (Seol, 1999, p. 431). However, the government 
disguised the nature of the programme as if it aimed at the skill transfer to and the international 
cooperation with developing countries. The government rule on the ITS stated the purpose of the 
scheme was the ‘reinforcement of the cooperation with developing countries about industrial 
technology’ (Small and Medium Business Administration, 1996, Article 1). This was merely 
political rhetoric based on a ‘migration optimist’ assumption that labour migration would 
stimulate growth both in origin and destination countries (Castles et al., 2014, p. 70). The rule 
had no other substantial provision for the implementation of the ‘international cooperation’ or 
the skill transfer. Moreover, the ‘migration optimist’ assumption was far from the reality. The 
diminished small manufacturers were not capable of offering skill transfers by the nature of their 
low-skilled work. Some returned migrants testified they had learnt some business and labour 
management skills, which they used for running their own business back in their home country. 
However, according to a former migrant rights activists, CHM, whom I interviewed (RP_14), the 
‘management skills’ were not more than how to impose on their employees the exploitative 
working conditions, long work hours and low wages they had witnessed. Despite the misleading 
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title, the ITS was not a training scheme or even a policy of international cooperation for 
development.  
The government had two reasons for using the ambiguous language. First, as Seol (1999, p. 425) 
argued, the government wanted to avoid the political controversies over introducing labour 
migration. By branding the actual migrant workers as ‘trainees’, the government believed it 
would minimise their impacts on both the labour market and the society. Second, I particularly 
take notice that the government also wanted to justify the systematic discrimination against the 
migrant workers by branding them as ‘trainees.’ By defining their actual labour as ‘training’, the 
government justified the restrictions on the migrant workers’ fundamental labour rights, which 
were available to South Korean workers by law.  
Below four examples reveal the ITS’s deceptive and discriminatory nature. They also substantiate 
that the ITS was devised for employers to maximise profits by lowering labour costs and ensuring 
an absolute control over labour.  
First, the ‘trainee’ was not entitled to minimum wage, retirement payment, protection from 
overdue wages, paid leave and maternity leave (Hwang, 2011). By restricting the right to wage 
and welfare, the SME employers were able to maintain low labour costs. The government set the 
average wage of the ‘trainees’ as low as half of that of domestic workers. It in effect ‘subsidised’ 
the SME employers by discrimination against migrant workers (Seol, 1999, pp. 426-438). The 
government introduced some modifications only after facing the severe resistances of civil 
society and the pressure of the judiciary, as will be discussed in the next section.  
Second, the government deprived the migrant workers of the right to choose a job. It prohibited 
them from seeking a new job after being placed with an employer. The restricted employment 
made the workers vulnerable to exploitative working conditions, degrading treatments or even 
violence. Despite the abusive conditions, ‘foreign trainees’ had to stick with their employer by 
immigration law. The only alternative was ‘running away’ from the employer, taking the risk of 
being punished by law. This policy, however, benefited the employers by ensuring stable 
retention of the workforce. Moreover, by confining the ‘trainees’ to a designated employer, the 
government intended to prevent the migrant workers access to the labour market and eventually 
a possible wage increase.  
Third, by defining the migrant workers’ employment as a ‘training period’, the government 
justified the institutionalisation of short- and fixed-term contracts. The fixed-term contract was 
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not yet a general practice in the early 1990s, although there were rising debates over the 
flexibilisation of employment as a part of neoliberalisation (see Chapter 5). The government’s 
initiatives to introduce a flexibilisation policy had faced severe resistance from the militant labour 
unions of local workers. However, it was easily imposed on migrant workers in the name of a 
‘training period’. Migrant workers with short- and fixed-term training contracts were not ready 
to organise a union or resist the policy. Moreover, the mainstream South Korean labour 
movement largely overlooked the flexibilisation process in labour migration policy, which was a 
precursor to a full-scale imposition on local workers. The fixed-term contract allowed employers 
to maintain low labour costs by replacing a current employee with a new and cheap one, instead 
of raising the wages of the former. It also reinforced employers’ control over the workers, because 
a high turnover of employees makes it even more difficult to organise a union to protect 
themselves. 
Fourth, the brand of ‘training’ scheme also helped the government maintain its no-settlement 
principle. The government claimed the ‘trainees’ would return to their home after they acquired 
the necessary ‘skills’ and contributed to the industry of their home country. This claim justified 
the temporary nature of the labour migration scheme and eventually established it as a norm of 
labour migration policy. These approaches are a continuation of the exclusionary and 
discriminatory immigration policies of the previous governments, as reviewed in Chapter 4. 
Moreover, the prohibition of the settlement also contributed to employers’ control over workers. 
Without having a prospect for settlement or long-term stay, it was not easy for workers to think 
about organising a union against the inadequate wages and working conditions. Consequently, 
the employer was again able to maintain low labour costs.  
The ITS shows how the South Korean government served employers’ profits by formulating a 
pro-employer immigration policy. The ITS also shows how the government conflated the pro-
employer policy with its nationalist ideology. The government claimed the discriminatory and 
exclusionary labour migration policies were for the benefit of ‘nationals’ who were also 
employers; it eventually made the public take for granted that the employers’ profit equates the 
national interest. However, the government had almost no consideration of the fundamental 
human rights of workers. This approach, in the end, generated negative impacts on the society 
and the sustainability of the pseudo-temporary labour migration system itself. 
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Failure of the ‘side-door’ scheme 
An outcome of the discriminatory and exclusionary labour migration policy was extreme 
exploitation of the ‘trainees’, who had no legal protection. The long working hours, low wages, 
assault or harassment, overdue wages, and poor working conditions were commonplace (Cho, 
1995, Lee, 1994, Park, 1993, Park, 1995, Seol, 1997, 1999). Moreover, the high placement fee, 
which was often increased by corrupt recruitment agencies and brokers, worsened the 
vulnerability of the migrant workers. Many workers relied on high-interest loans to pay the 
migration cost; consequently, they were in a condition similar to ‘indentured labour’. Exploitative 
working conditions, which had fuelled the rapid industrialisation and economic growth under 
authoritarian rule in the 1970s and the 1980s, were revived for migrant workers in the 1990s 
and the 2000s. This time, it was to prolong the lives of the fading-out industrial sectors and to fuel 
neoliberal transformations. 
However, the exploitation of migrant workers became the source of the programme’s own 
destruction. The industrial trainees’ survival strategy was to render themselves undocumented. 
The ‘trainees’ under extremely exploitive working conditions abandoned designated workplaces 
and found better-paid jobs, taking the risk of visa-cancellation, arrest and deportation. Employers 
often preferred the undocumented but more experienced workers over newly-arrived and 
inexperienced trainees. The employers did not mind paying higher wages to the undocumented 
workers; thus, ironically, the irregular migrant workers enjoyed higher wages than the legal 
trainees (Seol, 1999, pp. 173-178). Eventually, the undocumented migrants’ wages doubled that 
of the trainees with valid visa status (see Figure 6-1). 
The exploitative working conditions and increasing irregular migration became growing 
concerns of society. The undocumented migrant workers began to appear in the public sphere 
through a series of protests (see Chapter 9). South Korean civil society groups also actively 
organised actions to support them and to call for the abolition of the ITS (see Chapter 8). The 
judiciary responded to the efforts of the civil society groups. The Supreme Court ruled the 
government had to recognise the ‘worker-ness’ of the industrial trainees; and later, the 
Constitutional Court commented the ‘unconstitutionality’ of the ITS (Hwang, 2011). It also 
decided that labour law protected migrant workers regardless their immigration status, stating 
‘their work is not illegal even though their immigration status may be illegal’ (Lee, 2002d, pp. 51-
52). 
146 
Due to the pressures from civil society and the judiciary, the South Korean government 
introduced several complementary measures for the protection of migrant workers. The Ministry 
of Labor (1995) introduced a guideline on the protection and management of the trainees, which 
stipulated employers’ obligations to pay the legal minimum wages to trainees, trainees’ 
entitlements to the industrial accident compensation, medical insurance and protection from 
forced labour, violence, overdue wages and long working hours. As a political compromise against 
the calls for the abolition of the ITS, it also amended the ITS to permit employers to hire the 
trainees for another year in a ‘worker status’ after two years of the training period. It also 
renamed the ITS to the Training and Employment System in 1998. The two-year-training and 
one-year-employment principle changed to one-year-training and two-year-employment in 
2002.  
The institutional changes, however, failed to bring about significant improvement in practice. It 
was often reported that the employers continued to ignore the rules and, especially, to take 
advantage of the vulnerable status of undocumented workers (Seol et al., 2002). The Training and 
Employment System was often criticised by civil society as a mere ‘disguised form of the ITS’ 
(Kim, 2010c, pp. 96-97). Debates over the reform of labour migration policy were, however, 
swamped by the occurrence of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The exploitative ‘side-door’ policy 
continued until the end of 2006. 
The ITS was a typical example of failed migration policy. As Castles (2004b, p. 207) defined, the 
failed policy did ‘not achieve its stated objective’. The ostensible purpose of this policy, ‘the 
cooperation with developing countries for industrial technology’ was never touched in the course 
of implementing the policy. Even when both the government and the civil society evaluated the 
ITS, the deceptive aspect of this claim of purpose was never discussed. 
This ‘side-door’ policy also failed in its actual purposes. It failed in reducing the number of 
undocumented migrants. The imposition of exploitative working conditions adversely facilitated 
increasing their number. The policy also failed in maintaining low wages. The free undocumented 
migrant workers dominated the labour market in the 3D industries; consequently, they raised the 
wage of migrant workers because the employers voluntarily paid higher wages to these workers.  
The case of the ITS shows that migration policy oriented toward economic interests only is 
inevitably blind to the social ‘embeddedness’ of the migratory process (Castles, 2010, p. 1570). 
Its consequences were a failure in accommodating its social impacts and, consequently, failure in 
achieving its economic goal as well.  
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Contextualising the pseudo-temporary labour migration schemes in neoliberal 
transformations 
The ITS was first introduced in 1991 and remained until the end of 2006. It survived for three 
years even after a new temporary labour migration scheme was introduced in 2004. Why did the 
South Korean government retain the failed immigration policy for 16 years despite the 
continuous oppositions and challenges since the early stage of the introduction?  
Seol and Skrentny (2004, p. 507) answer this question from the political economic perspective of 
‘client politics’. The South Korean government intentionally, rather than mistakenly, introduced 
the ‘side-door’ policy to serve its key clients, the employers of SMEs. Lee (2008b, p. 121) takes 
this a step further and argues that, considering how the employers’ interest group, KFSB, 
manipulated the policy process using its political influences, the politics of the ITS was beyond 
the level of ‘client politics’. She argues it rather exemplifies how ‘the state gives up its raison d’être: 
the coordination of the public interest and cost.’ She also explained, applying a neo-institutional 
approach, the retention of the policy was an outcome of ‘the power struggles between 
government agencies to take leadership in immigration policy formulation’, which also delayed 
the introduction of an alternative policy (Lee, 2008b, p. 123). The Ministry of Justice and the 
Ministry of Labor, which are respectively in charge of visa policy and labour market policy, 
competed particularly hard for a bigger share of power in the area of migration policy 
implementation. 
On top of these explanations, I pay particular attention to how the ITS functioned as leverage to 
accelerate the process of neoliberalisation in South Korea. I argue the ITS contributed to the 
process of neoliberal restructuring both in the employment system and the industrial system of 
South Korea. This functionality enabled the ITS to survive throughout neoliberalisation and post-
industrialisation. 
First, the ITS was instrumental in facilitating the introduction of the neoliberal employment 
system in South Korea. As discussed earlier, employment under the ITS was precarious and 
exploitative. It was indeed a typical example of the neoliberal employment system. The fixed-term 
contracts were a workforce management strategy to maximise profits by imposing workers to 
conform to the exploitative working conditions. The strategy was especially effective in the less-
skilled sectors, where the workers’ experiences and long-term commitment were less required. 
Moreover, the ITS was rather a fusion of the neoliberal labour system and the old labour system. 
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It maintained the ‘barrack-like control’ of the workers by branding the workers as ‘trainees’ and 
their work as ‘training’ as well as the ‘immobile labour market’. 
The fixed-term contract was not a general practice of employment by the time when the ITS was 
introduced. The South Korean government had sought to integrate its economy into the 
neoliberal global economy, for example, by actively participating in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations in 1986–1994. There were also the employers’ growing demands for the 
flexibilisation of employment. In the area of labour market transformation, the neoliberal 
initiatives faced stiff oppositions. The transition from the ‘old employment system’ to the 
neoliberal system was put on hold by the militant labour unions. However, the ‘1987 employment 
system’, which was an achievement of democratisation and labour rights movement, failed to 
stretch toward SMEs. The enterprise-based unionisation driven by the workers of large-firms was 
an obstacle for the SME workers to organise a union. The divided labour movement resulted in 
the segmentation of the labour market (see Chapter 5). 
Through the ITS, the South Korean government rather easily introduced the neoliberal labour 
system in the SMEs, which was a shadow area of the South Korean labour market. Little chance 
for workers to unionise generated little possibility to mobilise any resistances against the 
temporary and fixed-term employment of migrant workers. Moreover, by branding migrant 
workers as ‘foreign trainees’, the ITS uprooted any possibility to build solidarity for a union 
between the migrant workers and local workers. In turn, this situation reinforced the labour 
market segmentation and eventually became a stepping-stone for expanding the neoliberal 
employment system throughout the society. 
Second, the pseudo-temporary labour migration scheme also contributed to the neoliberal 
restructuring process of South Korea’s industrial system. Seol (1999, p. 423) argues that the ITS 
was a ‘political choice’ against South Korea’s general economic trends: the neoliberal 
restructuring process preferred letting the ‘fading-out’ industries wither away over subsidising 
their perpetuation. In contrast, I argue the unequal and hierarchical relationship between the 
SMEs in the ‘fading-out’ industries and the growing transnational corporations should be taken 
into consideration. As discussed in Chapter 5, the SMEs were dependent on the unequal 
contractual relations with the chaebols. They produced parts of a final product from high-cost 
materials and supplied them to the large-firms at competitively low prices. The production of the 
low-price products relied heavily on the low wages and poor working conditions of workers. 
Neoliberal restructuring was to ensure such a hierarchical chain of production, not to lay off the 
fading-out industries. The cheap workforce of unfree migrant workers in poor working condition 
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was essential to sustain the neoliberal production system. Migrant workers are at the bottom of 
the exploitation pyramid.  
Therefore, the ITS was a pseudo-temporary labour migration scheme that was introduced to 
ensure the installation of neoliberal employment and production systems. This is why the ITS was 
broadly supported by the business groups of both SMEs and large firms and continued for 16 
years despite the oppositions of civil society and the judiciary.  
The government’s active intervention was instrumental in the introduction of the neoliberal 
pseudo-temporary labour migration programme. The government devised the ITS and 
intentionally appropriated the existing training visa system to supply low-wage migrant 
workforce. Through the ITS, it introduced the temporary and fixed-term employment system in 
the South Korean labour market. This is an example of the neoliberal state (Harvey, 2005) that 
implements a neoliberalisation project (see Chapter 2). This government policy was oriented to 
the maximisation of employers’ profits, but it ignored the fact that migration is socially embedded. 
The ITS was a failed migration policy (Castles, 2004b) in the sense that it did not achieve the 
stated objectives. However, it made significant contributions to accelerating the neoliberalisation 
of the South Korean employment and industrial systems.  
Also, it is important to take notice of the problems of ‘temporariness’ inherent in the ITS. The 
introduction of the pseudo-temporary labour migration scheme contributed to institutionalising 
the ‘temporary labour migration’, which involved the ‘commodification of labour migration’ 
(Rosewarne, 2010, p. 99). The government treated the trainees as an ‘expendable resource’ or 
‘disposable labour’ (Amnesty International, 2009) with no concern about the protection of the 
migrant workers. 
The ‘commodification of labour migration’ is an integral part of the global neoliberalisation 
process. One of its significant outcomes is the creation of the ‘new class of global workers’ 
(Rosewarne, 2010, p. 105), for whom an extremely insecure life deprived of any social protections 
is a common characteristic. In the South Korean context, the ‘commodification of labour’ was 
relatively easily institutionalised in the SMEs and 3D sector through the pseudo-temporary 
labour migration scheme. Later, it broadly proliferated throughout the society through the 
neoliberalisation process. 
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Institutionalising temporary labour migration policy: Employment Permit 
System (2004–present) 
Contested proposals for an alternative labour migration policy 
Throughout the period of the ‘side-door’ labour migration policy, the heated debates over the 
reform of labour migration policy continued among the government, politicians, civil society, 
trade unions and the business sector. The first round of debates, which emerged at the early 
period of the ITS, ended up with no change in the policy due to the severe oppositions from 
businesses. The second round resumed after the economic crisis and was concluded with the 
introduction of the Employment Permit System (EPS) in 2004. This section begins with a review 
of how the debates developed. It analyses the related legislative and legal documents, as well as 
news reports. 
The first round of the debates was triggered by a series of migrant workers’ protests against 
exploitative working conditions under the ITS (see Chapter 9). In 1995, the Ministry of Labor, 
which is responsible for the implementation of labour standards, responded to the increasing 
public concerns about the conditions and protests of migrants. It proposed a new temporary 
labour migration scheme with three main aims: to officialise the employment of temporary 
migrant workers, to recognise their labour rights, and to regulate the recruitment process by 
direct operations. As reported by major newspapers, the Ministry of Labor prepared the Bill of 
Act on the Employment and Management of Foreign Workers (see Kim, 1995). Politicians and civil 
society groups actively engaged in the process of legislation. In 1996, both the ruling 
conservatives, New Korea Party (Lee, 1996) and the opposition liberals, National Congress for 
New Politics (Bang, 1996) proposed separate bills for a temporary labour migration scheme. Two 
civil society groups, the Joint Committee of Migrant Workers in Korea (JCMK) (Park, 1996) and 
the Catholic Church (Kim, 1996b), also formally submitted the Petitions for Legislation, mainly 
for the protection of migrant workers, in the same year. While the political parties’ proposals 
were broadly similar to the government’s plan for the EPS, the JCMK distinctively claimed the 
‘Work Permit System’ (WPS).  
A major difference between the proposals of the government and the civil society was the level of 
migrant workers’ access to the South Korea labour market. While the EPS permits employers to 
select migrant workers, the WPS permits migrant workers to seek a job in the South Korean 
labour market. It was a matter of whether to confine migrant workers within a segmented part of 
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the labour market or to give them free access to the labour market. In reality, however, there was 
some confusion about the term ‘work permit’. Although political parties often used the term in 
their Bills, they meant the permission for migrant workers to be selected and employed by an 
employer, which is ‘employment permit’ according to the definitions of the government and civil 
society. Civil society’s claim of ‘work permit’ was the permission for migrant workers to choose 
an employer.  
Another significant difference was that the WPS formally provided pathways to transfer the 
temporary status of workers to a permanent settlement status. Since one of the principles of the 
South Korean government was the prohibition of settlement, the EPS made it clear that no 
extension of the contract was available.  
However, all the efforts for a new temporary labour migration scheme fell flat. The opposition 
from business groups, especially of the KFSB, was strong enough to block all the initiatives. The 
business-oriented government agencies such as Ministry of Trade and Industry also insisted the 
retention of the ITS (see Chang, 1995). The government repeatedly changed its position and 
sought to mitigate the business groups’ opposition (see Kim, 1997); in the end, it never formally 
submitted the bill for the EPS to the legislature. As Seol and Skrentny (2004) argued, the South 
Korean government’s failure in the reformation of the labour migration policy is attributed to its 
inclination to the small and medium businesses and ‘client politics’ (Freeman, 1995, p. 886). 
All the bills and proposals of political parties and civil society groups were never seriously 
discussed at the National Assembly until they were all discarded by the termination of the 
Assembly’s term in 2000. Upon the occurrence of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the discussion 
on the reform of labour migration policy all disappeared from public discourse. Instead, the 
government made only minor changes in the ITS as a political compromise. Trainees who had 
completed their two-year training period were permitted to transfer their status to the 
employees and also to work for another year. It renamed the system as the Training and 
Employment System in 1998. The two-year-training and one-year-employment principle 
changed to one-year-training and two-year-employment in 2002. However, the civil society 
broadly criticised this new system as a mere ‘disguised form of the ITS’ (Kim, 2010c, pp. 96-97), 
because there was no change in the vulnerable status of ‘foreign trainees’. 
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Introducing a fully-fledged temporary labour migration scheme 
The second round of debates resumed in 2000 when the South Korean economic indices began 
to recover from the shock of the 1997 Economic Crisis. It was again initiated by the civil society’s 
initiatives: a report issued by the JCMK played the crucial role in raising awareness and triggering 
political debates on migrant rights. The report, titled White Paper on Human Rights Conditions of 
Foreign Industrial Technical Trainees: a Report on the Reality of Human Rights Violations (Joint 
Committee for Migrant Workers in Korea, 2000), was the first one of its kind that 
comprehensively investigated the conditions of migrant workers. When the report was released 
in March 2000, it drew only limited attention from the public (e.g. Choi, 2000a). Instead, it caught 
the attention of the President Kim Dae Jung who had proclaimed himself ‘human rights President’. 
By order of the President, the liberal government party (New Millennium Democratic Party, 
formerly National Congress for New Politics) immediately re-launched the preparation for the 
bill of the EPS (see Kim, 2000, Maeil Business Newspaper, 2000a).  
The Ministry of Labor also actively pursued the introduction of the EPS again. As articulated in its 
report on the Plan for the Introduction of Employment Permit System, the Ministry’s rationales for 
the introduction of the EPS were: 
 migrant workers’ entitlement to labour rights would not increase labour costs 
because the wage levels are decided by workers’ productivity;  
 it would not increase industrial disputes because the migrant workers would still be 
controlled by their short-term contracts;  
 the EPS would decrease the undocumented migrants;  
 the system would secure the prohibition of the long-term residence of the migrants 
(Lim and Seol, 2000, pp. 112-131). 
The initiatives for the EPS were broadly supported by the public; for example, a survey showed 
67.8 percent of the public supported its introduction (Lim and Seol, 2000, p. 120) and the media 
also expressed its support through editorial articles (e.g. Kookmin Ilbo, 2000 , Maeil Business 
Newspaper, 2000b). However, the opposition from the business sector seriously delayed the 
process again. Business associations, including the KFSB and the Federation of Korean Industries, 
the association of chaebols and large business, publicly opposed the EPS on the grounds that it 
may increase labour cost (see Chug, 2000). There were also oppositions within the government: 
both the Ministry of Justice, which was in charge of the implementation of the ITS, and the Small 
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and Medium Business Administration, which represented the interest of the KFSB, opposed the 
EPS (see Choi, 2000b). 
While the government’s official submission of the bill of EPS was again delayed, civil society 
groups and trade unions pushed forward the introduction of a new labour migration scheme. The 
JCMK again submitted the Petition for Legislation to the National Assembly in 2000 with the 
broad support of religious, human rights and civil society groups (Lee, 2000). On the contrary to 
the government’s proposal of the EPS, the JCMK re-claimed the WPS and the pathway to 
settlement. It also added new provisions that specified the workers’ right to change their jobs 
after the end of every one-year-term contract (Article 13(5) of Lee, 2000). 
Trade unions were also actively engaged in the debates. The right-wing-oriented FKTU was in 
‘policy-coalition’ with the liberal government party and supported the government proposal of 
EPS (Article 14 of Lee, 2002c). The progressively-oriented KCTU supported civil society’s 
proposal of the WPS (Dan, 2002). It is significant that both unions additionally proposed less or 
no regulations on the workers’ right to choose a job. Despite its importance, neither the 
government nor civil society was serious about the right to free choice of a job during the second 
round of debates.  
The government bodies never reached an agreement among themselves on the government 
proposal for the new labour migration policy. Instead, the majority New Millennium Party finally 
tabled the bill for the EPS for debate at the National Assembly in November 2002 (Lee, 2002a). 
The bill mostly followed the proposals of the Ministry of Labor without the sober reflection of the 
civil society’s or trade union’s proposals. The Bill proposed employers be permitted to make one-
year fixed-term employment contract for a migrant worker, which could be renewed up to three 
years (Article 7). As a measure of protection for the migrant workers, the Bill proposed the 
workers could change their employer, only when the current employer was in breach of the 
employment contract, especially in relation to wage and working conditions (Article 15). The 
recruitment of migrant workers was, according to the bill, to be operated exclusively by a public 
or governmental agency. This provision aimed at the prevention of corrupt recruitment process 
and illegal brokers, which were the source of significant financial burden for migrant workers 
(Article 6). The bill also proposed the Committee for the Policy on Foreign Human Resources be 
established in a tripartite model with equal participation of the representatives of workers, 
employers and the government (Article 3). The bill also proposed the ITS to be abolished 
immediately (Article 3 of Addenda). 
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The oppositions of businesses were persistent. The KFSB and other business groups had already 
submitted a counter-petition immediately after the JCMK’s petition for the WPS (Kim, 2001b). 
They again submitted another petition against the ruling party’s bill in February 2003 when the 
bill was on the table of the National Assembly (Kim, 2003f). Although the KFSB apparently 
claimed their opposition was for the protection of the SMEs, it was broadly perceived that the 
interest group aimed to maintain the privilege they had earned through managing the ITS, for 
example, the collection of monthly fees from the workers. It was even argued the Federation 
ignored the opinions of actual SME owners for the benefit of the Federation’s secretariat (Seol, 
2000b).  
Consequently, the business groups were increasingly split. The beneficiaries of the ITS severely 
opposed the EPS bill; for example, the KFSB organised a massive rally against the EPS in April 
2003 according to a newspaper report (Lee, 2003b). However, other SME owners, who had been 
isolated from the ITS and relied on undocumented workers, welcomed the plan for the EPS. 
Another newspaper reported the latter criticised that the KFSB was a ‘mere interest group’ of a 
small number of employers and failed to represent most other small enterprises (Kim, 2003a).  
Under the pressure of both civil society and businesses, the National Assembly discussed the 
revision of the original bill to accommodate the demands of both sides. The Committee in charge 
of the consideration of the bill proposed an alternative bill, including three major revisions 
(Chairperson of Environment and Labor Committee, 2003). First, the government proposed the 
ITS continue to operate in parallel even after the introduction of EPS, as a conciliation measure 
for the KFSB (Article 3 of Addenda in the original Bill was deleted, see Lee, 2002a). Second, it 
introduced a provision on the financial support for the organisation providing consultations or 
education to migrant workers after negotiations with some of the leaders of the JCMK (Article 
24). Third, it gave up the tripartite model for the governance of the policy; instead, the Committee 
for the Policy on Foreign Human Resources was now composed of only government officials 
(Article 4). The revised bill for the EPS was welcomed by business groups, although the KFSB was 
rather reluctant to accept it, as reported by a business paper (see Lee and Hong, 2003). The bill 
was a second best option for civil society. Some leaders of the JCMK welcomed it, but other groups 
strongly opposed the ‘reformist’ approach (see Chapter 8).  
The three revisions were political inducements to bring the debate to a conclusion. However, they 
left negative legacies. First, the parallel operations of the EPS and the ITS caused serious 
confusion for migrant workers both in origin and destination countries, for the governments of 
origin countries, and for employers. Second, the financial support for non-government 
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organisation contributed to splitting the pro-migrant organisations and weakening their political 
leverage. Third, the withdrawal of the tri-party governance model and the watering-down of the 
Committee’s role eventually contributed to the government’s domination of the decision-making 
process, which was in line with the employers’ demands.  
After all, the National Assembly adopted the revised bill of the EPS on 31 July 2003. The Act on 
the Employment, etc. of Foreign Workers (Act on the EPS) was officially legislated on 16 August 
2003 and entered into force on 17 August 2004. However, the two rounds of debates were 
somewhat swamped by the tensions between the civil society group’s appeal for human rights 
protection and the SMEs’ claims of wage-burden. The focuses were whether the minimum labour 
rights should be granted to the migrant workers. Importantly, I argue they failed in discussing the 
long-term social implications of the temporary labour migration scheme. The contested issues, 
which the debates failed to consider, are discussed below. 
Missed out issues and continuing discontent 
Although the debates over an alternative labour migration policy failed to cover the policy’s social 
implications, the proposals of the government, political parties, the civil society and trade unions 
still showed outstanding and distinctive concerns on this matter. The main issues were whether 
to allow pathways to settlement, how far to restrict the right to choose a job, how to control the 
growing corruption in migration industriesand, and more fundamentally, whether the temporary 
labour migration system would be sustainable. Although these issues failed to attract the public’s 
attention and to be seriously discussed during the debates, they became the core problems of the 
temporary labour migration scheme when it entered into force. 
The first and the most distinctive difference between the proposals of the government and 
political parties, and that of civil society groups, was whether they would allow the possibility of 
migrants’ long-term residence or settlement. Both the conservative government (see Article 16 
of Lee, 1996) and liberal opposition party (see Article 15 of Bang, 1996) argued the settlement of 
migrant workers should be strictly prevented; thus, the labour migration programme should 
ensure, whether under a ‘work permit’ or ‘employment permit’, the permit would not be 
renewable longer than three years. 
In contrast, the civil society groups proposed the pathway to the settlement of migrant workers. 
The JCMK’s petition explicitly proposed the workers should have a one-year ‘general work 
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permit’ renewable up to five years without limitation. Then, they would be entitled to have a 
‘special work permit’ which does not require renewal (see Article 4 of Lee, 2000, Park, 1996). The 
‘special work permit’ practically grants permanent residence to the migrant workers. If we take 
into account the Nationality Act (Article 5), it also opened the possibility to apply for South Korean 
nationality. The JCMK’s draft bill was the only initiative that challenged the exclusionary 
immigration policy and broke through the principles of temporary migration and no-settlement. 
This was the most distinctive aspect of the JCMK’s claim of the WPS. 
In contrast, the civil society groups were particularly concerned about the ‘rotation’ or circular 
migration principle. They argued the government’s proposal of the principle would not be 
sustainable in the long term, as seen in the failed case of German Gastarbeiter system (e.g. Park, 
2000). They warned it would result in a constant increase of unauthorised migrants and 
consequent human rights violations. However, this concern was never reflected in the legislation. 
Instead, the government only reaffirmed the principles of ‘temporary migration’ and the 
prevention of settlement. The temporary migrant workers were permitted to one-year fixed-term 
contracts up to three years (Article 9 and 18 of Act on the EPS of 2003). This issue became 
controversial later in two ways: first, the discrimination against non-co-ethnic migrant workers 
in comparison with the preferential policy for migrant workers of Korean ethnicity; second, the 
continued subjugation of migrant workers on the grounds of their temporary and vulnerable 
status. 
Also, I note that all the bills and petitions of both the government and the civil society commonly 
proposed the one-year fixed-term employment contract for migrant workers. As discussed 
earlier, the short- and fixed-term employment contracts were not yet a common employment 
practice in the South Korean labour market. The government’s initiatives to legislate the 
‘flexibilisation of labour’ were severely opposed by the labour movement. However, the problem 
of the one-year fixed-term contracts, which is one of the critical elements of the neoliberal labour 
market, was never questioned during the debates on labour migration policy. Since the debates 
were overly concentrated on the inhumane and degrading treatment of migrant workers under 
the ITS, there was no room for considering this issue. Eventually, all the proposals for the 
temporary labour migration policy, in effect, endorsed the legislation, that formally introduced 
the fixed-term and non-regular employment practice in the South Korean employment system.  
The second issue was whether to allow the migrant workers to change jobs while they stayed in 
South Korea. The civil society groups notably argued that the prohibition of changing jobs was 
the primary source of human rights violations under the ITS. It forced the trainees to be 
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subjugated to employers and also to accept the extremely poor working conditions and unequal 
labour relations. Thus, the availability of ‘job-change’ was a critical agenda for civil society. During 
the first round of debates, the ruling conservative party’s bill limited the right to change jobs to 
only very exceptional cases like the closure of the company due to the failure of the business (see 
Article 15 of Lee, 1996). The ‘job-change’ was, indeed, broadly considered as a measure to protect 
migrant workers from human rights violations at work: the bills and petitions of both government 
(see Article 19 under Chapter 4,  Bang, 1996) and civil society located the relevant provision 
under the chapter on the protection of workers (see Article 13 under Chapter 3, Lee, 2000, Park, 
1996).  
After the second round of debates, the Act on the EPS concluded to permit the migrant workers 
to change jobs in cases where employment could not continue due to the fault of the employer as 
proposed by the government and civil society (Article 25). The conditions were: 
 when an employer cancels or refuses to renew an employment contract;  
 when employment cannot continue due to the closure of a business, etc.;  
 when an employer’s employment permit is cancelled due to the breach of an 
employment contract, labour standards or immigration law.  
However, the Act imposed a further restriction by limiting the number of job-changes up to three 
times only for three years of the employment period. This restriction became a highly 
controversial problem later (see Chapter 7). 
I argue all the proposals of the government and the civil society groups commonly presupposed 
migrant workers deserve a certain level of restriction on their right to a free choice of job. 
Although the JCMK’s draft bill opened the possibility of the migrant workers’ full access to the 
labour market after acquiring the ‘special work permit’ (Article 4 of Lee, 2000, Park, 1996), it still 
presumed the restriction on job choices was inevitable for the first five years before the special 
permit. The restriction was justified in the name of ‘the principle of complementarity to national 
labour market’ (Lim and Seol, 2000, p. 109) or the protection of national workers. The 
government claimed if migrant workers were allowed to change jobs freely, it would lower the 
general wage level and damage the local workers’ jobs.  
However, this restriction is a problematic violation of migrant workers’ rights. The restriction on 
the right to choose a job fundamentally obstructs the access to job-seeking activities for a better 
wage and working conditions. This is against the ‘right to work, to free choice of employment, to 
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just and favourable conditions of work’, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Article 23(1)). Moreover, it is inevitable that migrant workers have limited access to the 
information on employers, working conditions or job-market conditions, while they are in an 
overseas recruitment process. Most often, they have access to appropriate information only after 
arrival in the destination country. Thus, if migrant workers are not allowed to have a job other 
than what was decided during the overseas recruitment process, it is highly probable that they 
would not be satisfied with the wage or working conditions they find. Nevertheless, temporary 
migrant workers still tended to have less access to the labour market of the destination country 
than local workers due to the limitation of language skills, personal networks and other 
conditions. 
A severe challenge against this presupposition was made by trade unions. The FKTU’s draft bill 
took a step further than the JCMK’s bill to add the ‘significantly low wage’ as grounds for applying 
to change jobs (Article 18(5), Lee, 2002c). The KCTU, in rivalry with the FKTU, went even further: 
its draft bill proposed the guarantee of unlimited changes of jobs for all migrant workers (Article 
18, Dan, 2002). It is significant that both trade unions claimed the equal labour rights for migrant 
workers because these attitudes reveal that local workers perceived the government’s claims of 
protecting local workers were not more than political rhetoric. They perceived the restrictions of 
migrant workers’ mobility would only benefit employers by maintaining low wages and poor 
working conditions, and eventually would affect their jobs in negative ways.  
The third issue was about the regulation of the migration industry. The question was whether 
employer organisations were allowed to get involved in the placement process in the South 
Korean context. This sensitive issue was related to the employers’ association, KFSB’s corruption 
in the course of operating the ITS. The chain of corruption, linked from the KFSB to the central 
and local government, recruitment agencies and local brokers in origin countries, was one of the 
root causes of the high placement fees, which in turn led to the irregularisation of the trainees. 
During the first round of debate, the conservative party proposed to allow the employers to 
continue to get involved in the recruitment process in origin countries (Article 9, Lee, 1996). 
However, both the liberal party (Article 11, Bang, 1996) and the JCMK (Article 5, Lee, 2000, Park, 
1996) proposed the governmental or public agencies should be commissioned exclusively to 
operate the recruitment process. The JCMK’s draft bill took a step further and proposed the 
placement cost should be borne by employers in line with an ILO (International Labour 
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Organisation) convention.9 The corruption of the KFSB was broadly known to the South Korean 
society: some of its leaders and staff members were even prosecuted. Thus, among the proposers 
of the alternative labour migration policy, there was a consensus that the migration industry 
needed to be controlled. During the second round of debates, all proposals of the government and 
the civil society specified that private agencies should be excluded from the placement process. 
Finally, the adopted Act on the EPS prohibited the private agencies’ involvement in the placement 
process (Article 9). This was, however, the primary source of the KFSB’s discontent. 
Consequently, the government compromised with the business group by allowing the ITS to 
continue to operate in parallel with the EPS. 
Finally, it is also significant that the former West Germany’s failed case of guest worker system 
was hardly discussed in the course of the legislation of the EPS. At the preparatory stage for the 
legislation, the Ministry of Labor already conducted a comprehensive study of four selected cases 
of temporary labour migration policy: that of Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Germany (Lim 
and Seol, 2000, pp. 33-96). The authors of this policy paper recognised that the failure of German 
system was due to ‘humanitarian permission of family accompany, permission of special work 
permit for five years or longer’ and ‘the breakdown of “rotation” principle’, which led to ‘the 
settlement of foreign workers’. Then, they emphasised, having learnt from the German 
experience, the other three countries prevented the possibility of migrant workers’ settlement by 
preventing them from access free mobility within the labour market. Thus, they argued the 
prevention of foreigners’ settlement is ‘not a matter of human rights violation but the exercise of 
a state’s legitimate sovereignty’ (Lim and Seol, 2000, p. 110).   
The South Korean government’s policy principle resonates with the analysis of Castles et al. 
(2014, p.156) on the popularity of temporary labour migration in Asian countries. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, the South Korean government, like many other Asian governments, sought to 
‘control migration strictly’ and to limit migrants’ rights. It also saw labour migration as ‘a 
temporary necessity, which should not lead to permanent settlement or to changes in the culture 
and identity’. South Korean employers wanted ‘low-skilled workers to meet immediate labour 
needs’ rather than considered its long-term effects. The matched intentions of the governments 
and the employers reinforced the idea that the failure of West German guest worker system 
would not happen in South Korea. 
                                                             
9 Article 4, Annex II of Convention concerning Migration for Employment, revised 1949 (ILO Convention No. 97). 
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The principle of temporary migration was hardly challenged by any government agency or even 
by civil society in the course of the debates over introduction of the EPS. They rather paid 
attentions on how the restrictive temporary labour migration schemes has functioned in the 
newly industrialising East Asian countries, although they were aware the similar policy  had 
already turned out to be incompatible with the European democratic societies during the post-
war economic boom (Castles, 1986). There were significant differences between the newly 
industrialising East Asian countries and the European societies, particularly in the level of 
democratisation and authoritarianism, the status of welfare state and the political leverage of 
trade unions. Seol and Skrentny (2009, p. 578) also argued the less migrant settlement in East 
Asian countries are ‘because of the lack of regional institutions pushing for family reunification 
rights, an elite political culture that still maintains the assumptions and repertoires of a 
“developmental state”, where rights may be sacrificed for economic growth and order, and 
migrant perceptions of greater immigration control in Asia’. Having observed the cases of Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Singapore, South Korean policy-makers anticipated that the principle of ‘rotation’ 
and a strict control over undocumented migrants would maintain the South Korean model of 
temporary labour migration scheme and the European experiences would not apply to East Asian 
countries. 
These four issues were not publicly debated during the legislation process for the EPS, but rather 
patched up by the political compromises between the government, civil society groups and 
business groups. These issues, however, continued to be the primary sources of discontent of both 
workers and employers about the EPS throughout the next ten years. The government continued 
to modify the EPS to incorporate the demands of employers and the civil society. The next chapter 
examines how the EPS had modified and also analyses what their nature and impacts were. 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with the question on the South Korean migration policy: ‘What was the policy 
process of the South Korean temporary labour migration scheme?’ To answer the question, I 
reviewed the development of labour migration policy in three stages: the periods of the ‘back-
door policy’, the ‘pseudo-temporary labour migration scheme’, and the ‘formal temporary labour 
migration scheme’. Analysing the government’s policies at each stage, I examined the nexus of 
political and economic factors in the formulation of the policies. I then argued the introduction of 
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the temporary labour migration schemes was a part of neoliberal transformations of employment 
and production systems, characterised by flexibilisation and precarisation. Also, the government 
played the leading role in the transformations, while civil society and businesses were also deeply 
engaged in the process. 
This chapter also analysed the political and economic rationales underlying the South Korean 
government’s labour migration policies at each stage. During the first stage (1987–1991), the 
government’s relaxation of border controls triggered the irregular migration in the context of 
South Korea’s changing labour market. The government’s response was a ‘back-door’ policy. The 
government was apparently hesitant to introduce a labour migration scheme. It was concerned 
about the ongoing neoliberal restructuring of the industries as well as the social prejudices 
against low-skilled workers and people from developing countries. However, the government 
could not totally ignore the still-existing labour demand of the small and medium enterprises in 
the manufacturing sectors. Consequently, its strategic choice was to tacitly condone the irregular 
migration by opening the ‘back-door’.  
The second stage of ‘pseudo-temporary labour migration’ policy (1991–2004) is characterised by 
the expediential implementation of the policy. Against the increasing pressures of irregular 
migration, the government introduced the Industrial Trainee System to introduce actual migrant 
workers with the deceptive name of trainees. It was again a strategic choice of the government 
on the grounds of the same rationales as those of the first stage. However, this scheme was a 
‘pseudo-temporary labour migration policy’ in the sense that it significantly functioned to settle 
down the neoliberal employment system as well as the neoliberal hierarchy of the industrial 
system. In the midst of the heated contests between the employers and the pro-migrant civil 
society groups, this ‘side-door’ policy was maintained for more than a decade during the critical 
period of the neoliberal transformation of society.  
The third stage begins with the introduction of the formal temporary labour migration scheme, 
EPS, in 2004. Despite some meaningful improvements in the protection of basic labour rights of 
migrant workers, I argued that this policy had substantially the same function as the previous 
policy to contribute to officialising and fixating the neoliberal industrial and employment system. 
Throughout the development of the temporary labour migration policies, I identify that there 
were two underlying principles: temporary or ‘non-regular’ employment of migrant workers and 
prevention of migrants’ settlement. 
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The first principle, the temporary or ‘non-regular’ employment, not only underlies the whole 
development of the South Korean labour migration policy but also transforms the labour market 
and eventually the whole society. The flexibilisation of employment is a core neoliberal strategy 
to maximise capitalist accumulation, which was also the case for the South Korean bourgeoisie, 
both the large firms and SMEs. They relied on state power to alter the legal mechanisms and to 
normalise the flexible and precarious employment system, as seen in the government’s persistent 
initiatives to change labour laws. This process reflects the government’s nature as the ‘neoliberal 
state’ (Harvey, 2005, p. 64) and exemplifies how it operates. The temporary labour migration 
scheme was a strategy for the government to pursue the ‘regulation of the labour market through 
migration’ (Bauder, 2011, p. 41). It was a more controllable model of labour supply than other 
options, like promoting women’s labour force participation (Lee, 1997, pp. 358-361). 
The second principle, the prevention of migrants’ settlement, has also been firmly established 
throughout the development of the South Korean labour migration policy. As discussed earlier, 
the South Korean government has maintained this approach from even before the 
industrialisation period. However, the government has recently loosened the restriction 
particularly on the migrants of Korean origin. This is related to the exclusionary nationalist 
politics based on the deep-rooted governance ideology of ‘ethnic nationalism as a key organizing 
principle of Korean society’ (Shin, 2010a, p. 16). 
The nature of the South Korean government as a ‘neoliberal’ and ‘ethnic-nationalist’ state 
becomes even more apparent after it introduced the formal temporary labour migration scheme. 
As the process of its introduction already showed in this chapter, the EPS was designed to supply 
particular types of labour forces, low- or middle-skilled, to a specific area of the labour market for 
a limited period. Since the labour supply programme was designed and governed by the 
government, the EPS is a typical non-market-oriented mechanism. It is also an employer-driven 
system, considering it aims at serving the demand-side of the labour market of the host country. 
In addition, the special treatment of ethnically Korean migrants within the frame of the EPS shows 
its ethnic-nationalist aspect. The next chapter is devoted to the full-fledged analysis of the 
rationales and governing mechanisms of the EPS. 
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Chapter 7 South Korean temporary labour migration 
scheme as a part of neoliberal transformation 
: a critical policy analysis 
This chapter continues to examine the second research question of this thesis: ‘What was the 
policy process of the South Korean temporary labour migration scheme and what are the 
rationales and governing mechanism of its operation?’ As the previous chapter discussed the first 
half of the question, this chapter focuses on the second half. 
The first section analyses the rationales behind the South Korean government’s introduction of 
the temporary labour migration scheme. It identifies two aspects of the EPS that reveal the 
government’s rationales. First, the EPS was modified throughout the last decade to meet 
employers’ demands. Second, it has taken economic advantage of the temporarily returned 
diaspora. Then, I also analyse how the policy principles of the EPS has been compromised with 
employers’ demands. I argue the EPS is an employer-driven and government-run temporary 
labour migration scheme. 
The second section explores how the government was able to settle down the temporary labour 
migration system as the primary labour migration scheme as well as the source of low-skilled 
labour. It identifies five governing mechanisms that contributed to the continuation of the EPS 
both within and outside the system. The restriction of job-choice was the key mechanism within 
the system that intended to satisfy employers’ demands for low-wage workers. The deportation, 
the duplicitous entitlement of social security, and the paternalistic ‘aid’-oriented ‘multicultural’ 
policy also made significant contributions from outside the system by supporting the controls of 
migrant workers. The discourse of national interest has also been frequently used to justify the 
disadvantage and hazardous working conditions of both local and migrant workers.  
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Rationales of the South Korean temporary labour migration scheme 
Tailoring the programme to employers’ demands 
As the Act on the Employment, etc. of Foreign Workers (Act on the EPS) entered into force, the EPS 
officially launched in August 2004. Soon after, the EPS faced severe challenges from both civil 
society groups and employers. The workers and civil society groups continued to claim the 
restrictions on changing jobs should be withdrawn. A pro-migrant organisations’ association, 
Migrant Rights Network (MNR) (2005) questioned the transparency of its recruitment process 
(see also Kim, 2005a, Lee, 2005c). The employers of SMEs also complained about the complicated, 
slow and expensive recruitment processes. They claimed the EPS should give way to the ITS (see 
Jang, 2005). Since the old scheme was still in place even after the introduction of the new one, the 
EPS was destined to compete with the ITS. As responses to the challenges, the government took 
immediate and repeated modifications of the scheme in a way favourable for the employers but 
without consideration of migrant workers’ demands (Choi, 2005). Since then, it continued to 
modify the policy in line with employers’ demands. 
The most significant and controversial change was the gradual extensions of the employment 
period. The EPS initially permitted migrant workers to be employed in South Korea up to three 
years. After the workers left the country, they were not allowed to come back for employment 
within one year (Article 18, Act on the EPS as enacted in 2003). These initial rules were to prevent 
the migrant workers from settling down in the country. On the other hand, the intensified labour-
market segmentation between large corporations and the SMEs generated a constant labour 
shortage of low-skilled jobs. For the South Korean government, short-term temporary migration 
seemed to be a promising source of workforce for the SMEs, which would also address the 
unbalanced labour market conditions. However, employers were not in demand for the short-
term and temporary workforce, but instead were in struggles with long-term and constant 
labour-shortage. Consequently, they continuously requested the government to extend the 
employment period of migrant workers. 
However, it has to be noted that the extension of employment period was still on the basis of 
temporary migration that prevents migrant workers from any access to transferring to a 
permanent residence or accompanying family members. As Castles et al. (2014, pp. 256-257) 
argue, the employment of migrants on a temporary basis benefitted employers by ‘enhancing … 
control [over workers] and reducing demands for better wages and conditions’. Both South 
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Korean employers and the government sought the stable supply of easily-controllable workforce. 
Thus, the EPS has developed toward a long-term temporary labour migration system. 
Less than a year after the EPS was launched, the government permitted employers to re-hire 
migrant workers for another three years, when the workers completed their three-year 
employment period and had a one-month break in their origin country before the new contract. 
In 2009, the government permitted migrant workers to extend the employment period up to four 
years and ten months without a break. In 2012, the government again allowed employers to re-
hire migrant workers for another four years and ten months after the first term, if the workers 
had a three-month break in their home country. This time, there was a condition: the worker 
should be considered as a ‘faithful worker’ (Ma, 2014, p. 91). After ten years, since the EPS does 
not prohibit re-application for recruitment, if a migrant worker re-applies and is re-selected by 
an employer, he or she may extend the employment period almost indefinitely under the 
condition of taking a three-month break every four years and ten months. However, considering 
high competition in origin countries, re-application is not always expected to be successful. Also, 
this extension of the employment period without stable residential status only prolongs the 
‘temporaryness’ of migrant workers ‘indefinately’ (see Figure 7-1). 
 
Figure 7-1 Gradually extended employment periods 
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Although the South Korean government permitted low-skilled migrant workers to work in the 
country for almost ten years, it continued to prohibit them from settling in the country. The rules 
on the four-year and ten-month period and the three-month break are an explicit expression of 
the government’s intention to prevent any legal possibility of settlement. The Nationality Act 
provides access to naturalisation to the foreigners who have lived in the country for five 
consecutive years (Article 5). Thus, the four-year and ten-month period was the maximum the 
government could allow employers to hire migrant workers without granting any access to 
second employment contract was a trick of the government to satisfy the employers’ demand for 
citizenship. The requirement of staying overseas for one or three months to be eligible for the 
long-term employees as well as to prevent migrant workers’ settlement. Hence, migrant workers 
in South Korea are now expected to commit themselves to providing workforces with uncertain 
long-term temporary status but without any access to pathways to permanent residence. 
The prolongation of temporary migration is a highly problematic and unsustainable policy. As the 
Nationality Act already suggested, five years is a long period for a migrant enough to settle down 
in the destination society and to have a sense of belonging to the country as much as the citizens. 
When the migrant workers begin their second term of employment, they are already well 
adjusted to the destination society, especially if they are recognised as a ‘faithful worker’. After 
the end of the second term, they will be even more settled in South Korean society, while having 
lost their bases of life in their origin country. If the government persists in adhering to the 
principle of temporary labour migration, it will inevitably lead to the increase of unauthorised 
settlement of migrants by the end of the second term. As a senior government official (RP_40) 
that I interviewed admitted, the ‘faithful worker’ scheme is only a short-sighted temporary 
measure. 
The long-term temporary migration policy is even more problematic when its social impacts are 
taken into account. The EPS strictly prohibits migrant workers from accompanying family 
members to South Korea as a measure of preventing their settlement. This rule also applies to the 
‘faithful worker’. The prolonged separation from family generates not only the breach of 
international human rights standards (Choi, 2013a, pp. 445-447) but also has negative impacts 
on the physical and mental health of the worker and his or her community in both origin and 
destination. For example, an undocumented worker who had been away from his family for more 
than ten years had suffered severe depression, which also affected his physical health, according 
to an observation of my research participant LY (RP_12), an activist clergyperson. Both academics 
(e.g. Choi, 2013a) and civil society groups (e.g. Migration Policy Forum, 2014) seriously 
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questioned the legality of the no-accompanied-family policy. However, the government has not 
taken any measures to change this, although it acknowledged the social impact of long-term 
temporary migration is a significant consideration (Ma, 2014, pp. 122-123). 
The notion of the ‘faithful worker’ was designed to reinforce the employers’ control over migrant 
workers, particularly regarding the restriction of the right to change jobs. The ‘faithful worker’ 
scheme requires the workers to stay employed by a single employer without any change for four 
years and ten months unless they experienced serious violations of labour standards or closure 
of the company (Article 18-2, Act on the EPS as amended on 28 January 2014). Then, they may be 
permitted to re-enter the country for another term. This measure obliges temporary migrant 
workers to conform to their employer and give up their right to seek better working conditions 
or wages. It eventually assists the employers with more close control over migrant workers, while 
it only increases the risk of labour rights violations for the workers. Migrant workers were 
ambivalent about this policy. They did not openly oppose this scheme because they may have an 
opportunity to legitimately work and live in the country for a longer period. However, they were 
not fully supportive of the scheme either because they were concerned about employers’ 
strengthened authority to influence their future. Some workers used this opportunity to continue 
their activism in trade unions or migrant rights organisations, which became an important 
contribution to the migrant rights movement in South Korea (see Chapter 9). 
Even before the ‘faithful worker’ scheme, the South Korean government had already designed the 
regulations restricting job changes as a measure to strengthen employers’ control over migrant 
workers. The original Act on the EPS had regulated the contract period not to exceed one year. 
This rule gave employers the authority to decide whether they would renew the employment 
contract of a migrant worker (Article 9(3), Act on the EPS as enacted on 16 August 2003). It was 
a measure to assist employers in having control over workers’ performance. As a government-
commissioned report envisaged, the government also expected the short-term contract would 
reduce the ‘industrial dispute’ by compelling the workers to be submissive to their employers 
(Lim and Seol, 2000, p. 115). 
Contrary to the expectations of the government and employers, migrant workers took this 
opportunity to seek better jobs after the termination of the one-year contract. Employers had to 
put more effort to retain the workers. In 2009, the government introduced a new rule to permit 
employers to make the employment contract period up to three years (Article 9(3), Act on the 
EPS as amended on 9 October 2009). It was a reflection of employers’ demands for a stable supply 
and retainment of the migrant workforce. However, paradoxically, there was widespread 
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discontent among migrant workers about the imposition of a longer-period contract. They 
preferred the shorter-term contracts, which enabled them to seek better jobs after the first year, 
as mentioned in Chapter 1 and as newspaper reports also confirmed (see Hong, 2009 , Shin, 2009). 
This case contradicts the neoliberal trend of flexible employment, which had been legislated and 
was rampant in the South Korean labour market since the late 1990s. It implies the clear 
segmentation between the labour market of migrant workers and local workers. The employment 
of migrant workers in South Korea relied on the old inflexible employment system rather than on 
the neoliberal system based on flexibility. 
Employers’ persistent pressures led the government to introduce an even blunter measure to 
restrict the job changes. In 2012, the Ministry of Employment and Labor (2012) announced that 
migrant workers would not be allowed to do job-seeking activities other than to have five job 
interviews as arranged by the government office. Although the government claimed this was a 
measure to prevent brokers’ involvement in the recruitment process, migrant workers perceived 
this as a mere excuse to justify its actual intention: to regulate even further migrant workers’ 
opportunity to seek a better job. The consequent resistance of workers was fierce, as mentioned 
in Chapter 1. The ten-year-long discontent burst out. At a rally of migrant workers I attended for 
participatory observation (PO_40), they again shouted the same slogan that was used against the 
ITS more than fifteen years ago: ‘migrant workers are not slaves’ (see Chapter 9). 
The modifications of the EPS between 2004 and 2014 were mostly oriented towards maximising 
employers’ profits and ensuring employers’ control over migrant workers. The consequences 
were restrictions of migrant workers’ labour rights, including the right to seek better working 
conditions and wages. The modification prioritising the principle of the labour market demand 
eventually distorted the implementation of other goals of the policy. The problems of faltering 
principles of the EPS will be discussed later.  
Lee (2008b, p. 108) argues the South Korean policy followed global trends of ‘the convergence of 
migration policy toward the expansion and inclusion’. Although I acknowledge the policy has 
developed toward the protection of migrants’ basic rights, I argue the seemingly expansive and 
inclusive policy development remains to reinforce and prolong the fundamentally exclusionary 
nature of temporary labour migration policy.  
I also argue the underlying principle of the EPS is to maximise the employers’ profits at the cost 
of other social values. Although the government propagates the principles of the EPS harmonised 
with each other, the continuous modifications of the scheme show the other values have been 
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compromised to prioritise employers’ demands. Thus, I argue the EPS has to be understood as a 
part of the neoliberal state-capital nexus that state largely serves the interest of the businesses. 
However, it does not mean the businesses had strong power enough to dominate the state policy 
to shape the overall direction of labour market restructuring. The case of the EPS shows the 
temporary labour migration policy was an outcome of fluid combinations of the interactions 
among the key actors in a society: the state, chaebols, SMEs, trade unions, political parties and 
civil society groups. The development of the South Korean temporary labour migration policy is 
an example of the convergence toward ‘the global resurrection of temporary labour migration’ 
(Castles, 2006, Castles and Ozkul, 2014, Rosewarne, 2010, Wickramasekara, 2010), which 
coincides with the process of global neoliberal transformations.  
Taking economic advantage from temporarily returned diaspora  
Among the low-skilled migrant workers in South Korea, the majority have been the temporarily 
returning diaspora, also known as ‘co-ethnic’ migrants (Lee, 2010, p. 559). Most of them are the 
descendants of economic migrants or political refugees who moved to China and Russia before or 
during the colonial period (see Chapter 4). They were one of the first migrant groups who arrived 
in the late 1980s (Seol, 1999). As the end of 2016, the ‘co-ethnic’ workers made almost half of all 
low-skilled migrant workers in South Korea (see Chapter 5). They are under the diaspora stream 
of the EPS, Visit and Work System (VWS). This stream is officially categorised as a part of the EPS 
but practically operates independently. Unlike other migrant workers, they are entitled to free 
access to the labour market (i.e. free job choices) and have pathways to long-term settlement. 
This subsection examines how the preferential treatment policy for the ‘co-ethnic’ workers has 
developed and what this implies for the South Korean temporary labour migration policy. 
 
Table 7-1 ‘Illegally overstaying foreigners’ by nationality, 1992 
Total 
China  
(ethnic Korean) 
United States The Philippines Bangladesh 
China  
(non-Korean) 
30,889 22,128 2,647 1,334 912 736 
Source: Korea Immigration Service (1961-2017).  
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During the anti-communist and developmental authoritarian regimes, the government either 
ignored the presence of the diasporas, especially those in China and the Soviet Union, or 
denounced their efforts for democratisation movement as ‘threats to the state’s security’, 
especially those in the United States and Europe. Although the 1992 Los Angeles riots triggered 
concerns to protect the diaspora, the government still had no serious diaspora policy at that stage. 
It was after the 1997 Financial Crisis that the South Korean government took a diaspora policy 
into account.  
The focus was to invite the diaspora, particularly in the developed countries, as potential 
investors for their homeland economy (Lee, 2011b). On the other hand, a growing number of 
Chinese with Korean ethnicity arrived in the country, after the South Korean government 
established a diplomatic relationship with China in 1992. Often known as Joseonjok, they arrived 
to visit their relatives, but eventually stayed for longer periods to seek job opportunities (Lee, 
2010). They became the major source of irregular migration: they made 71.6 percent of total 
unauthorised migrants in 1992 (see Table 7-1). 
How to deal with these economically very different but ethnically related two groups of migrants 
was a challenging issue for the South Korean government. The policy debates focused on their 
visa status. The government introduced the Act on Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas 
Koreans (Act on Overseas Koreans) on 2 September 1999, which provided the ‘overseas Korean’ 
with a privileged immigration status that permitted a three-year stay, without restrictions on 
renewals. It also entitled the diaspora to the same level of economic rights as South Korean 
nationals: the right to freely engage in economic activities and in real estate, financial and foreign 
exchange transactions (Article 10, 11 and 12).  
This law defined the ‘overseas Korean’ or Korean diaspora as those who lost their Korean 
nationality after the Republic of Korea was founded in 1948 (Article 3, the Enforcement Decree of 
Act on Overseas Korean as legislated on 27 November 1999). It eventually excluded the diaspora 
in China (Joseonjok) or the former Soviet countries (Koryo Saram). The government’s apparent 
intention was to avoid potential diplomatic pressures from the Chinese government, which was 
concerned about its citizens of an ethnic-minority background having the sense of belonging to 
their motherland state (see Goh, 1999). However, the government was indeed more concerned 
about the probable influx and settlement of Joseonjok migrants, who were considered to be job-
seekers in the low-skilled sectors. This definition was designed to deter ethnic Koreans in less-
developed countries from settling in South Korea. It faced severe resistance from the Joseonjok 
migrant workers and their supporters (see Kim, 1999) and was eventually ruled to be 
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unconstitutional and discriminatory by the Constitutional Court in 2001 (Constitutional Court, 
2001).  
In accordance with the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 20 November 2001, the Act was revised in 
2004. The revised Act included the overseas Koreans who emigrated before the foundation of the 
Republic of Korea to include the diaspora in China and the former Soviet countries (Article 2(2), 
Act on Overseas Koreans as partly amended on 5 March 2004) and their second generation 
descendants (Article 3 of the Enforcement Decree of Act on of Overseas Korean as partly amended 
on 20 November 2003). However, the government still sought to control the temporary return of 
those from the diasporas in developing countries by regulating the visa issuance. The 
enforcement rule of the Act reconfirmed that the ‘economic activities’, permitted to the ‘overseas 
Korean’, does not include ‘simple and manual work’ or low-skilled jobs. Moreover, it required 
those who hold such nationality as having high tendency of ‘illegal overstay’ (i.e. China, 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) to submit the complicated 
supporting documents for their visa application to prove they would not engage in the low-skilled 
work while staying in South Korea (Attached Table 5 of Article 76(2) of the Enforcement Rule of 
Immigration Control Act as partly amended on 23 August 2004). This policy was still criticised by 
the Joseonjok migrants and their supporters for being discriminatory against diasporas in 
developing countries (see Cho, 2004). 
Both the original and revised Acts exhibit the South Korean government’s principles on the 
diaspora policy. First, the low-skilled workers had to be controlled regardless of their ‘co-
ethnicity’. Second, the diasporas from developing countries had to be controlled because they 
tended to become undocumented low-skilled workers. The government’s diaspora policy is in 
line with its temporary labour migration policy, which strictly controls the number and the period 
of stay of low-skilled workers. This policy is based on the assumption that the low-skilled workers 
have a high tendency of irregular migration and that the migrants from developing countries are 
potential irregular migrants. Thus, for the South Korean government, the control of the low-
skilled and irregular migration outweighs the provision of the entitlement to the diaspora having 
‘co-ethnicity’.  
Despite the South Korean government’s restrictive and discriminatory policy, the inflows of 
Joseonjok migrants have rapidly grown. The Joseonjok communities in their origin country, 
especially in the Three North-eastern Provinces of China, Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, 
experienced marginalisation from the rapidly industrialising Chinese economy (Lee and Jin, 
2007). The consequent transformation of the communities accelerated the out-migration of 
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Joseonjok to their neighbouring motherland (Kwon and Park, 2004). The Joseonjok workers, who 
have fewer language barriers, were welcomed by South Korean employers who had been under 
a constant labour shortage in low-skilled jobs. However, a commentator also argued the diaspora 
workers were often considered to be less ‘docile’ and less conforming to employers’ demands; 
consequently, less preferred by some employers (Lee, 2010). 
The South Korean government sought to control the already prevalent employment practice of 
the Joseonjok by introducing a labour migration scheme specialised for temporarily returning 
diaspora. In 2002, it introduced the Employment Management System, which allowed Joseonjok 
migrants in China to be invited by their South Korean relatives and to engage in low-skilled jobs 
for two years. The change of job was permitted within designated sectors: the service and 
construction sectors. In 2003, the government incorporated this diaspora programme into the 
EPS by inserting a ‘special case’ provision in the Bill of Act on the EPS at the last minute of the 
debates over the legislation (Article 12). The law exceptionally permitted the ‘co-ethnic’ migrant 
workers to change their jobs freely and also to work in the service sector where other migrant 
workers were not allowed.  
The temporary return scheme for overseas Koreans developed toward including more ethnic 
Koreans and offering more pathways to long-term residence or settlement. In 2007, the 
government allowed work permits to the descendants of overseas Koreans having no relatives of 
South Korean nationality. It also extended the period of stay for the VWS to four years and ten 
months in line with the change of the EPS. After the termination of the Visit and Work visa (H-2 
visa), the workers were allowed to apply for a second visa after they returned to their home 
country if the total number of the visa issuances did not reach the ceiling set up by the government 
(Heo, 2011). The government also granted the same immigration status as of the overseas 
Koreans from developed countries, namely Overseas Korean visa (F-4), if those from developing 
countries acquired a certified technical qualification. As a news report pointed out, settlement 
migration had already become a general trend for Joseonjok migrants (In, 2015). 
Also, the South Korean government’s diaspora policy developed toward meeting the employers’ 
labour demands, as the VWS, diaspora stream of the EPS, exemplifies. There were debates among 
academics about the nature of this scheme. Lee (2010, pp. 583-585) argues the preferential 
labour migration policy is an ‘affirmative action’ in favour of the migrant workers with Korean 
ethnicity or ‘ex-citizens’ and compensation for the historical disadvantages they suffered in the 
past. On the contrary, Kim (2008b, p. 576) argues it is an expression of ‘illiberal direction’ of the 
government policy, which is based on ‘ethnic nationalism’. I argued, in Chapter 4, ethnic 
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nationalism was the grounds of the exclusionary and discriminatory origins of the South Korean 
immigration policy. In this sense, Kim’s (2008b) argument is meaningful because the ideology of 
the authoritarian and industrialisation period still operates as a primary principle of temporary 
labour migration programme in neoliberal era of South Korea. 
While both arguments analysed the diaspora labour migration scheme from the perspectives of 
diaspora policy, I argue the policy developed toward a direction to satisfy employers’ long-term 
and constant demand for a low-waged and low- or middle-skilled workforce. As discussed earlier, 
the EPS was designed to address the constant labour shortage in the low-skilled and low-wage 
sectors. As Figure 7-2 shows the migrant workers under the diaspora stream of the EPS, i.e. the 
VWS, has made more than half of the total low-skilled migrant workers, most of the time since the 
VWS was introduced. Overseas Koreans from developing countries had been the primary source 
of the low-skilled migrant workforce. It shows the policy for diasporas was primarily the policy 
for workforce supply in reality. 
 
 
Figure 7-2 Workers in general stream and diaspora stream of the EPS 
 
Source: Korea Immigration Service (1961-2017).  
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The development of policy for the last two decades also shows that changes in the diaspora 
stream of the EPS tended to be a precursor to changes in the general stream. The former extended 
the period of stay in 2007, while the latter followed it in 2012. The former allowed a pathway 
toward a long-term residence in 2011; the latter immediately followed it the next year (i.e. 
‘faithful worker’ scheme). The significant differentiation is whether the workers had free access 
to the labour market, including the right to change their jobs freely and whether they had 
pathways to settlement (i.e. ‘Overseas Korean’ visa). The South Korean temporary labour 
migration scheme tended to change toward the long-term and settlement-oriented one. The 
development of policy shows the sustainability of the temporary migration principle is highly 
sceptical. 
Compromised principles and prioritised employers needs 
When the EPS entered into force, the South Korean government announced the five principles of 
the policy: 
 ‘complementarity’ that the EPS permits employment of migrant workers only in 
the sectors which experience labour shortages in low-skilled jobs; 
 ‘transparency’ of the recruitment process, which is ensured by the government 
agencies managing the EPS;  
 ‘temporary migration’ that the EPS prohibits migrant workers’ settlement; 
 ‘no discrimination’ against migrant workers; and  
 ‘alignment with firms’ needs’ that supply of migrant workforce should comply 
with the market demand (Ma, 2014, p. 105).  
These principles were the government’s response to the claims of civil society and employers 
during the debates over the introduction of the new scheme. 
The government claimed it had adhered to the set of principles to ensure a ‘balance and 
harmonisation’ among the interests of local workers, migrant workers and employers, as my 
research participant who was a government official (RP_40) reiterated. However, a close 
examination of the scheme’s development reveals it evolved towards prioritising one principle 
over the rest: the compliance to the employers’ demands. This subsection analyses how the 
modification of the EPS over the last ten years affected the implementations of the original 
principles of the EPS. 
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First, the ‘complementary’ principle was ignored in the name of ‘deregulation’. As a measure to 
secure the ‘complementarity’ principle and to protect local workers from possible job-losses, the 
EPS required employers to put prior efforts to recruit local workers before hiring migrant 
workers. It also set an upper limit for the number of recruitable migrant workers for a company. 
However, these measures were soon lifted away by employers’ demands. The government 
announced its rationale was ‘deregulation’ and ‘convenience for employers’ (Lee, 2005a). When 
the EPS was introduced, it initially required the employers who was interested in migrant 
workers to make efforts to recruit local workers for one month (Article 2, Enforcement Rule of 
Act on the EPS as enacted on 30 April 2004). The required period was soon reduced to three to 
seven days (Article 2, Enforcement Rule of Act on the EPS as amended on 12 March 2005). Later, 
the ‘prior efforts’ rule became a mere formality for employers who were ready to hire migrant 
workers. Also, the original EPS law limited the number of employed migrant workers to less than 
50 percent of local workers. This regulation was soon lifted away too. The measures to protect 
local workers gradually faded away. 
There has been no known study on whether the original regulations had any positive implication 
or the withdrawal of them had any negative implication for the protection of local workers. It is 
also controversial whether the EPS workers replaced or complemented the local workforces (e.g. 
Kang et al., 2011). However, there have been increasing complaints of local workers, especially in 
construction sectors, where the workers believe migrants have taken away their jobs and 
dropped the average wage level down. Moreover, a recent study shows there were significant 
signs that migrant workers replaced local construction workers apace (e.g. Koo, 2014). Contrary 
to the government’s claims, the ‘complementarity’ principle was not taken seriously as a priority 
issue, but, in practice, the profits of employers were. 
Second, the ‘transparency’ principle was also compromised since the government introduced 
privatisation and outsourced parts of the EPS. As a measure of ensuring the ‘transparency’ of the 
recruitment and migration processes, the government initially appointed a government-affiliated 
agency, Human Resource Development Service of Korea to monopolise the processes. Under the 
ITS, the government had observed the sequence of corruptions in the recruitment process under 
the ITS, rising migration cost, and consequently increasing unauthorised overstays. Thus, it 
assumed the problem would be resolved if a government agency directly operated and controlled 
the processes. While commentators appreciated that this measure contributed to the 
transparency of the EPS (e.g. Lee, 2014c), some civil society groups questioned the excessive 
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trusts on the transparency of the government agencies, especially of some origin countries 
(Migrant Rights Network, 2006).  
During the initial stage of the EPS, recruitment and placement were entirely operated by the 
government agency both in origin and destination countries. As a result, private migration 
agencies had no room to get involved in the processes. However, the employers’ agencies, such as 
KFSB, persistently claimed they would have to take part in the processes. The government finally 
withdrew the principle. As a compromise for introducing the EPS, the government agreed the 
KFSB would continue to run the ITS in parallel with the EPS. The ITS survived another three years 
after the EPS was introduced. This situation caused significant confusions for those intending to 
become migrant workers, which, in turn, generated opportunities for mushrooming brokers and 
migration industries in the origin countries (Kim et al., 2007, Migrant Rights Network, 2006). 
When the ITS was abolished in 2006, the government agreed to outsource parts of the EPS 
management to the KFSB and other employers’ agencies, despite the civil society’s concerns (see 
Noh, 2006). The original Act on the EPS (as amended on 30 December 2005) limited the 
involvement of employer agencies in the operation of the EPS to the process related to the 
employer-side (Article 9(2)). However, the Act, amended on 9 October 2009, expanded the scope 
of employer agencies’ involvement to cover those related to migrant workers-side (Article 27-2). 
Despite stiff oppositions from civil society groups (see Choi, 2008) and the concerns of academics 
(e.g. Seol, 2008), the migration businesses are now back in the process of the South Korean 
temporary labour migration scheme.  
These policy changes were in line with the global trends of privatisation and outsourcing, which 
had also predominantly operated throughout the South Korean government. Outsourcing was 
particularly risky with regard to the ‘transparency’ of the temporary labour migration scheme in 
South Korea if the experiences of the ITS are taken into account. The government embraced the 
persistent demand of the employers’ organisations in the name of ‘business friendly’ policy or 
enhancing ‘national competitiveness’ (Ministry of Labor et al., 2008, p. 19). However, it failed to 
take appropriate considerations on growing concerns of the revitalised migration industry and 
corruption, as civil society groups criticised (e.g. Joint Committee for Migrant and Labor 
Movement in Korea, 2008). 
Third, the sustainability of the ‘temporary migration’ principle is highly doubted. As examined 
earlier, the government gradually extended the period of employment up to almost ten years 
upon the request of employers. The government still claims in public it adheres to the principles 
of ‘temporary migration’ and ‘rotation’ or circular migration for ‘unskilled workers’. However, it 
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also admits the necessity of the extended employment period as a way of retaining ‘skilled 
workers’ (Ma, 2014, p. 109). The government is trapped in a self-contradiction. It sought to 
prevent the settlement of ‘unskilled’ workers by adopting the ‘temporary migration’ policy; at the 
same time, it actively encourages ‘skilled or professional’ migrants to settle in the country 
(Immigration Policy Commission, 2012). The government eventually realised the ‘unskilled’ 
workers had learnt skills over the period of their employment in South Korea and became skilled 
or semi-skilled workers. However, the government did not recognise the initially ‘unskilled’ 
migrant workers as currently skilled migrants. Instead of encouraging them to settle, the 
government took impediment measures only: it extended and prolonged temporary migration. 
Many migrant workers have been almost permanently temporary migrants.  
Fourth, the EPS has fundamental and systematic constraints in implementing the ‘no 
discrimination’ principle. The Act on the EPS (as amended on 9 October 2009) declares ‘no 
employer shall unfairly give discriminatory treatment to a foreign worker on the ground that he 
or she is a foreign worker’ (Article 22). Migrant workers are entitled to fair and safe working 
conditions, minimum wage, health insurance and other labour rights by law. This principle was 
an achievement of civil society groups’ efforts to improve migrant workers’ working conditions. 
Since the public was broadly concerned about the issues of human rights violations, the 
government also paid significant attention to this issue. As a part of implementing the principle, 
the government claimed it conducted labour inspections on over 3,000 companies over 10,000 
times every year (Ma, 2014, p. 109), although it is not known whether they were for monitoring 
working conditions or searching for unauthorised migrant workers in practice. 
However, the declaration of this principle, in effect, disguises the fundamentally discriminatory 
nature of the EPS. The rules on the restrictions on job-change and the prohibition of the 
permanent employment contract are the operational mechanisms to ensure cost-effectiveness of 
the temporary labour migration scheme. These rules impose critical constraints on migrant 
workers’ bargaining power and consequently compel them to be submissive to employers. 
Migrant workers are compelled to accept a lower wage and poorer working conditions than local 
workers in the same job. The discriminatory treatment of migrant workers also contributes to 
discrimination among workers. Like the majority of local workers with a non-regular 
employment contract in South Korea, migrant workers are excluded from labour unions. There 
are only rare cases where migrant workers were included in the company-based trade union 
(Kim et al., 2013c). Reportedly, some migrant workers even suffered violence or harassment by 
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local workers. The EPS is not only responsible for the unequal wage levels and working conditions 
for migrant workers but also contributes to splitting unions and weakening worker’s solidarity. 
The government sought to reduce even the minimum level of entitlement that they had initially 
provided as a token of anti-discrimination measure. South Korean law provides migrant workers 
are also entitled to an equal minimum wage, although it recognises no rights to equal wages. As a 
way of retreating from the minimum wage principle, however, the government allowed 
employers to withdraw the provision of free accommodation and meals to migrant employees. 
Although it had been a common practice since the ITS period and even the industrialisation 
period, the government claimed the practice was an ‘irrational’ burden for employers and an 
obstacle to enhancing ‘national competitiveness’ (Ministry of Labor et al., 2008, p. 9). Since 2009, 
employers are not expected to provide accommodation or meals to the migrant employees but 
may deduct the cost out of the wages (Annexed Form 6, the Enforcement Rule of the Act on the 
EPS, as amended on 8 July 2009). The consequence was the decrease of migrant workers’ actual 
wages. Although the government claimed this measure would save 20.8 billion Korean Won per 
year, the South Korean civil society denounced the claim as a mere justification for paying migrant 
workers lower than the minimum wage standards in practice (Cheonhong, 2010). The saving for 
employers meant only losses for workers.  
The government also sought to reduce the migrant workers’ wages by extending the probation 
period during which employers may pay lower than the minimum wage (Ministry of Labor et al., 
2008, p. 9), although it failed in legislation. These cases exemplify that the priority of the 
government and employers was to reduce labour costs by employing migrant workers, not to 
protect them from discrimination. 
As discussed earlier, the preferential treatment of ‘co-ethnic’ migrant workers is also 
controversial. It has been debated whether the diaspora stream of the EPS is an ‘affirmative action’ 
for historically disadvantaged people (Lee, 2010, pp. 583-585) or discrimination based on 
‘ethnicity’ (Kim, 2008b, p. 576). There were also controversies over a temporary amnesty 
programme for unauthorised ‘co-ethnic’ migrants of 2011. The government claimed the 
programme aimed at ‘redressing difficulties’ experienced by the migrants with Korean ethnicity 
from a ‘humanitarian’ perspective (see Bae, 2012). However, civil society groups denounced this 
programme as ‘racial discrimination against non-diaspora migrant’ and called for amnesty for all 
undocumented migrants without discrimination (Lee, 2012d). An independent state agency, the 
National Human Rights Commission of Korea (2013, p. 701) also recommended the Ministry of 
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Justice to ensure not to discriminate against the non-diaspora foreigners, with the support of the 
civil society. 
While the four other principles of the EPS have been faltering through the series of modifications, 
the principle of ‘alignment with firms’ needs’ or complying employers’ demands has been firmly 
upheld over a decade. The government has never introduced a measure that might cause any 
damage to employers’ profits. The four other principles have been compromised to ensure the 
full implementation of this principle for employers. The EPS has supplied a migrant workforce at 
a low wage to ensure the maximum profit of employers, however, at the cost of compromising the 
‘complementarity’ principle for local workers. It eventually allowed the problematic employers’ 
organisation to get involved in the operation of the EPS at the cost of damaging the principles of 
‘transparency’ and operation by the government. The repeated extensions of the employment 
period threatened the very foundation of the scheme, the ‘temporary migration’ principle. Despite 
the relative improvement in workers’ rights, the ‘no discrimination’ principle has been 
systematically ignored. Now, the paramount principle of the EPS is to satisfy employers’ demands 
for low-wage workers, who willingly conform to employers’ labour control, whether low-skilled 
or semi-skilled, and who willingly endure poor working conditions whether legitimate or not. 
Governing mechanisms of the temporary labour migration scheme and their 
outcomes 
Unfree choice of job and wage gaps 
As discussed earlier, the South Korean temporary labour migration programme, EPS, is designed 
to supply a low-wage workforce to SMEs. The SMEs are in hierarchical subcontract relationships 
with large firms and transnational corporations and also in tough competition with other SMEs. 
The government’s low-exchange-rate policy, which favours large exporting firms, generated a 
severe pressure of material costs for the SMEs importing materials and supplying semi-products 
or parts to large domestic firms. A possible survival strategy for the SMEs was to reduce labour 
cost. However, the high wage level of local workers, partly resulting from the growth of trade 
unions, is another pressure. Their survival strategy was to maintain the low labour cost by 
employing a low-waged migrant workforce. Therefore, to maintain the low level of migrant 
workers’ wages was the fundamental purpose of the EPS. According to a survey, migrant workers 
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are paid 50 percent less than local workers in general and 7 to 36 percent less than the local 
workers having the same level of ‘human capital’ (Cho, 2010). 
The core mechanism that maintains the low wage is the restrictions on job-change. As discussed 
earlier, the EPS has persistently sought to prevent migrant workers’ free access to the South 
Korean labour market but to confine the workers within the segmented labour market for 
migrants. As seen from the ‘faithful worker’ scheme, the South Korean government consistently 
encouraged migrant workers to adhere to the same employer for an extended period. 
Consequently, the supply price of labour was not decided by the market but fixed to the lowest 
level allowed by labour law, minimum wage. The EPS functioned as a state machine to regulate 
the price of labour in favour of employers. 
The migrant workers with Korean ethnicity were exempt from the restrictions, partly due to 
employment practice which had been in place before the introduction of the EPS, but mostly as a 
result of the consistent resistance of the workers and their supporters as well as the ‘ethnic-
nationalist’ approach of the South Korean immigration policy. Consequently, the ethnically 
Korean migrant workers under the diaspora stream of the EPS, Visit and Work System (VWS) 
were paid more than the non-Korean-ethnic workers under the general stream. According to a 
survey commissioned by the government, the total monthly wage of Joseonjok migrant workers 
under the VWS was 12.3 percent higher than that of the workers under the EPS (Chung et al., 
2013, p. 347). Although the report interprets the wage differentials as being caused by the 
‘employer’s expectation of higher productivity and efficiency considering their language capacity 
and cultural similarity’, I argue this wage differential is rather caused by the different level of 
access to the labour market. Due to a freer access to the labour market, the VWS workers may 
have a higher level of bargaining power than the general EPS workers. This wage disparity 
confirms my argument that the EPS’s restriction of job-change functions to maintain the low level 
of wages of migrant workers.  
Deportation and managing irregular migrants 
Throughout the legislation and implementation of the temporary labour migration scheme, the 
issue of ‘illegal sojourner’ or over-stayers was at the centre of both the South Korean 
government’s and the civil society’s concerns. The ideal outcome of the ‘rotation system’ of the 
temporary labour migration would be that migrant workers voluntarily leave the country after 
their employment period and new arrivals fill the jobs-vacancies. The ‘rotation’, however, has 
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never worked as the policy-makers anticipated. In practice, the governing mechanism that 
maintained the ‘rotation’ was deportation. Throughout the implementation of the temporary 
labour migration scheme, the immigration authority consistently enforced repressive campaigns 
of ‘crackdown’ against irregular migrants. Deportation was indeed a pivotal measure to maintain 
the system of temporary migration. The outcome was often hazardous to the migrants. 
The first round of an ‘amnesty’ policy was implemented during the period of the ITS. As a result 
of the failed ITS, the number of irregular migrants had grown and reached overwhelming levels. 
The proportion of irregular migrants reached half of whole migrant population in 1996 and 
continued to grow up to 62 percent in 2002 (see Figure 7-3). The government repeatedly offered 
conciliatory measures to reduce the number in 1992, 1997 and 2002. It offered the migrants the 
‘gratuitous period’ from four months to one year before they had to leave the country, during 
which the ‘immigration penalty is exempted’ for both workers and employers (Seol, 2005b). 
Although the schemes generated some illusory short-term effects on the immigration statistics, 
the actual number of irregular migrants never decreased because after the irregular migrants 
took the additionally granted period, they simply continued to overstay. There have been 
consistent demands from the long-term migrant workers, whether regular or not, who have both 
work-experience and adaptability to poor working environments. On the supply side, many 
workers still wanted to work for a longer period for various reasons. 
The second round was before the introduction of the EPS. How to deal with a large number of 
irregular migrants was a pressing challenge for the government. Irregular migrants who 
outnumbered regular workers were an obvious obstacle to a full introduction of the new 
temporary labour migration scheme because the essential requirement for the scheme was to 
make sure the workers return home when their fixed-term employment contract terminated. 
The government’s strategy was to incorporate the irregular workers into the new labour 
migration scheme. Before the introduction of the EPS, the government offered them work permits 
valid up to two extra years, depending on the period they had spent without a valid visa (see Table 
7-2). The basic condition was that they had to report their whereabouts to the immigration 
authority. This measure was in line with the government’s general principle of settlement-
prevention. The government granted a longer extra employment period to irregular migrants 
who had stayed in South Korea for a shorter period, while it forced those who had stayed a longer 
period to leave the country. The workers who had stayed a longer period settled in South Korean 
society better. They also had more working experiences and a higher level of skills than the 
workers who had stayed a shorter period. 
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This is a typical example of a ‘disembedded migration policy’. The government concentrated on 
controlling the workforce of migrants but ignored all other social aspects of migration (see 
Chapter 2). This is also a self-contradiction for the South Korean immigration policy to claim that 
it controls low-skilled migrants and promotes highly-skilled migrants. 
This scheme contributed to a short-term reduction of irregular migration. Almost half of the 
irregular migrants either acquired legal status or left the country for the opportunity to return. 
The number of irregular migrants was at the peak in 2002, but it dropped by half in the next year. 
However, the effect did not last long. When the two years of extra employment period ended, the 
number again increased to the two-thirds of the peak number, which continued throughout the 
EPS period (see Figure 7-3). New arrivals of irregular migrants outnumbered the decrease of 
existing migrant workers. Moreover, many of those who were legalised again turned into 
irregular status after the amnesty period (Seol, 2005b). 
However, it was immigration raids and deportations that the government relied on as its primary 
strategy to reduce irregular migrant populations. As soon as the amnesty programme finalised at 
the end of 2003, the government operated a series of extensive crackdown campaigns in parallel 
with the implementation of the EPS. The campaigns were often in the form of joint operations 
between the immigration authority, the labour supervision agency and the police. The number of 
deportations dramatically increased in 2004 and remained at a high levels throughout the 
implementation of the EPS (see Figure 7-4). 
 
Table 7-2 'Special employment permit' for irregular migrants before the enforcement of the 
EPS, 2003-2004 
Irregular migrant’s  
periods of  stay  
including the period of legal stay 
Entitlements Conditions 
Less than three years 
Permission to be employed  
for two years or less 
With employer’s 
agreement 
Three years or longer but less than 
four years 
Permission to be employed 
no longer than 5 years including 
the period of previous stay 
After voluntarily leave and 
return 
Four years or longer 
- No permission to be employed, 
- Exemption from immigration 
penalty 
If voluntarily leave the 
country within ‘voluntary 
return period’ 
Source: Addenda Article 2 of the Act on the EPS of 2003.  
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Figure 7-3 Irregular migrants among immigrant population, 1987–2004  
 
Sources: Korea Immigration Service (1988-2010) and Seol (2005b). 
 
Figure 7-4 Deportations, 1987–2013 
 
Sources: Korea Immigration Service (1988-2014).  
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Contrary to the government’s claim that the reduction of irregular migration is one of the 
significant achievements of the EPS (Ma, 2014, p. 99), I argue it was managed by the regular 
operations of immigration raids and deportations. As the immigration authority and labour 
ministry publicly admitted, the control and deportation of irregular migrants was the essential 
mechanism for the ‘stable operation of the EPS’ (see Sun, 2004). 
The enforcement of immigration raids and deportations was often hazardous to the life and 
health of migrant workers. It often involved reppressive crackdowns, violence and even uses of 
weapons like stun guns or Taser guns, which sometimes led to severe injuries or even the death 
of the migrants being searched (see Choi and Kim, 2007). The legality of these repressive 
operations was often questioned. Although the arrest of irregular migrants constitutes the 
limitation of personal liberty in practice, South Korean laws considers it as an administrative 
process and requires no arrest warrant to be issued by the court. Human rights lawyer, Jung 
(2011), argues these operations are a violation of international human rights laws and the 
Constitution of South Korea.  
Arrested irregular migrants often experienced degrading and inhumane treatments in the 
processing centres before deportation (Seol et al., 2005a). Some even died in detention due to 
health deterioration or accidents. A fire at Yeosu Immigration Detention Centre on 11 February 
2007 was the most disastrous accident, where ten migrant detainees died, and another 17 were 
seriously injured. Civil society groups denounced the poor conditions and inappropriate 
management of the detention centres (see Choi and Park, 2007). According to the pro-migrant 
activist group, Migration Policy Forum (2014), at least 22 migrants were killed by falling 
accidents or heart attacks during the crack-down operations or the fire in detention. 
The immigration raids often targeted the leaders of migrant communities or migrants’ trade 
union. Between 2005 and 2008, the first three presidents of the Migrant Trade Union were all 
arrested and deported in a row (Amnesty International, 2009). The fourth was refused to re-enter 
the country after a short trip to his home country even though he had a valid visa (see Park, 
2012c). The targeted deportations had significantly negative impacts on migrant activists and 
migrant communities (see Chapter 8). 
Despite the oppressive attitudes, a complete removal of irregular migrants was considered 
neither realistic nor beneficial. The government instead sought to maintain a manageable number 
of irregular migrants, because it recognised them as a reservoir of the disposable low-skilled 
labour force. The government even sought to figure out the ‘optimum size’ of the irregular 
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migrant population (Ha et al., 2014), although an academic pointed out this concept is not 
compatible with immigration laws in principle (Seol, 2005b, pp. 26-27). Since the EPS was 
introduced, irregular migrants have made a significant addition to low-skilled migrant workforce. 
Their number remained around 200,000 throughout the period and about 40 percent addition to 
the number of the EPS workers with valid visa since 2008 (see Figure 7-5). The government 
maintains this seemingly ‘optimum size’ of irregular migrants by regular and occasional 
operations of immigration raids and deportations. 
These additional workforces are extremely precarious, flexible and disposable in the labour 
market. Irregular migrants are more easily controllable than local workers or authorised migrant 
workers because they are under constant pressure from immigration rules. During economic 
downturns, these workforces are even more disposable. For example, between 1997 and 1998, 
the number of irregular migrants suddenly dropped without a significant rise of deportations (see 
Figure 7-3 and Figure 7-4). Almost 33 percent of irregular migrants simply disappeared from the 
South Korean labour market during the economic crisis. The financial crisis was also used as an 
excuse for ‘strict control’ (Lee, 2008c) of irregular migrants, as Figure 7-4 shows the number of 
deportations leapt between 2007 and 2009. This case also exemplifies immigration law 
functioned as a supplementary measure to ensure the operation of temporary labour migration 
scheme. 
Figure 7-5 Low-skilled migrant workers with valid visa and irregular migrants, 2003–2016 
 
Source: Korea Immigration Service (1961-2017). 
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Immigration rules, however, sometimes stop functioning to the advantage of employers. The 
government was relatively generous toward employers for hiring irregular migrants, despite the 
lesson that the most effective strategy for controlling irregular migration is the punishment of the 
employers (Castles et al., 2012). The Immigration Control Act stipulates that the workers who are 
employed without permission and the employers who hire such workers are equally punished 
(Article 94). In practice, the enforcement of the law is often more generous toward the employers 
in violation of the law than the workers. According to immigration statistics between 2003 and 
2007, the rates of the migrant workers punished in violation of the law (Article 17(1), 18(1), (2) 
and (4), 20, 21(1), 24(1) and (2) and 25) among all migrant workers are always higher than those 
of the employers punished in violation of the same Act (Article 18(3), 19(1) and (2) and 21(2)) 
among all SME employers (see Figure 7-6). 
 
 
 
Figure 7-6 Punishments of migrant workers and employers by immigration law, 2003–
2007 
 
Source: Korea Immigration Service (1961-2017). 
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Deportation has been a primary governing mechanism to maintain the temporary labour 
migration policy in South Korea. The government strictly and oppressively implemented 
immigration raids and deportations to ensure the installation of the EPS. However, it also sought 
to maintain a manageable level of irregular migrants for the supply of flexible and disposable 
workforces. The immigration law functioned or sometimes did not function for the same purpose. 
Therefore, I argue the extremely flexible, easily replaceable and disposable, and reserved 
workforces, which were generated and maintained by the EPS, are typical examples of neoliberal 
employment system. I also argue the South Korean government’s use of force is also a common 
practice of neoliberal states to maintain the neoliberal system, as seen in many other countries 
(see Harvey, 2005, Plant, 2010). 
Inadequate and duplicitous entitlement of social security 
Since the EPS was introduced, there have been some improvements in the protection of migrant 
workers. The Act on the EPS paved the way for migrant workers’ access to the South Korean social 
security system, by recognising them as a ‘worker’ in legal terms (Article 2). Since the Labor 
Standards Act of South Korea recognises the universal entitlement of workers’ rights, it explicitly 
prohibits any discrimination based on nationality or social status (Article 6). Migrant workers are 
now eligible for the same social insurance schemes as entitled to South Korean workers: 
employment insurance scheme and industrial accident compensation insurance scheme. They 
are also entitled to the same social insurances as all South Korean nationals: national health 
insurance (Article 14, the Act on the EPS) and the national pension (Article 126, the National 
Pension Act). Also, the Act on the EPS requires employers and migrant workers to join four other 
insurance schemes specialised for migrant workers. Employers are liable for the retirement 
allowance insurance (Article 13), and wage guaranty insurance (Article 23) and workers have to 
participate in return-preparation insurance (Article 15) and injury insurance (Article 23). As Seol 
(1999, p. 443) noted, the migrant workers’ entitlement to the first four major social insurances 
was an achievement of the workers and pro-migrant activists who had been on a series of protests 
during the ITS period (see Chapter 9), despite some flaws in implementations in practice. 
However, the last four insurances specialised for migrant workers and employers are somewhat 
duplicitous. They are designed for the control of migrant workers rather than for their welfare. I 
argue the social security schemes for migrant workers also function as a governing mechanism of 
the temporary labour migration scheme. 
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First, the national employment insurance never applies to migrant workers in practice. This 
scheme is compulsory for all workers and employers of South Korean nationality. The workers 
and employers are supposed to share the insurance payment equally. Following the labour law’s 
principle of universal entitlement, the Employment Insurance Act does not discriminate against 
the workers of other nationalities when they want to join the scheme (Article 1). However, the 
Enforcement Decree subordinate to the Act allows their employers to be exempt from the 
application of the law (Article 3). The government argues migrant workers may still join this 
insurance if their employers voluntarily agree with it on the basis of the Act on the Collection of 
Premium, etc. of Employment Insurance and Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (Act on 
the Collection of the Insurance). However, employers hardly share the burden of payment in 
practice when it is not compulsory. Migrant workers have little chance to be protected by the 
South Korean employment insurance. This is an example of South Korean government’s 
superficial attitude toward social security for migrant workers. 
The superficial entitlement to and the actual exclusion from employment insurance results in the 
precarious livings of migrant workers during unemployed periods as well as reinforces 
subordination to employers. As mentioned earlier, migrant workers are often highly dependent 
on their employers, especially for accommodation. If workers leave their company at the end of 
the contract, due to employer’s fault or without permission, they also lose the accommodation 
offered by the employer. If they cannot find a new employer within three months, they are 
supposed to leave the country or may face deportation (Article 25, Act on the EPS). It is a difficult 
decision for migrant workers to spend several weeks seeking a new employer without income 
and accommodation and also to take the risk of deportation. Some workers still take the risk with 
the help of friends or pro-migrant organisations providing free shelter. As a result, the provision 
of temporary shelters and assistance in job-seeking often become the priority task of pro-migrant 
organisations. For example, KI (RP_08), a former film maker, wanted to set up a media education 
centre for migrant worker, but his organisation eventually became a popular shelter for 
Cambodian workers from all over the country. However, many workers give up such efforts and 
accept poor working conditions and low wages. Therefore, the exemption from employment 
insurance in effect contributes to employers’ control over migrant workers. 
Second, the national industrial accident compensation scheme is another example that shows the 
discrepancy between the principle of universal entitlement and the reality of migrant workers. 
The Article 5 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act and the Article 5 of the Act on 
the Collection of the Insurance reconfirm that all workers are entitled to industrial accident 
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compensation, and employers are responsible for the full payment of the insurance. A study 
shows migrant workers are exposed to a significantly higher risk of industrial accidents than 
South Korean national workers (Lee et al., 2008). However, another study shows approximately 
30 per cent of them were still not covered by the compensation scheme or not aware whether 
they were covered by the scheme (Chung et al., 2013). Another study suggests a significant 
number of industrial accidents that involved migrant workers were not even reported to the 
labour authority; consequently, they had only inadequate treatment (Park, 2012a). This situation 
was caused by the workers’ precarious visa status or ignorance about the scheme and employers’ 
concealment of the case. 
Although irregular migrants are also entitled to the national industrial accident compensation 
scheme, they are hardly protected by the scheme because they are not in a condition to report an 
accident for compensation. The Immigration Control Act is responsible for rendering the labour 
standards ineffective for irregular migrants. When the labour authority receives an application 
for compensation from an irregular migrant, it is obliged to notify the fact to the immigration 
authority. Thus, as soon as an irregular migrant seeks compensation for the industrial accident, 
he or she is known to the immigration authority. The government officials’ ‘obligation to notify’ 
(Article 84) under immigration law has been broadly criticised for rendering most migrant-
protection measures useless for irregular migrants (e.g. Kim et al., 2013a). Irregular migrant 
workers are mostly compelled to give up an application for compensation and to put up with 
many disadvantages in order not to be known to the immigration authority. This precarious 
condition of irregular migrants eventually contributes to weaker bargaining power, low wages 
and poor working conditions.  
On the other hand, the insurance schemes specialised for migrant workers are more duplicitous 
than favourable for migrant workers. The retirement allowance scheme tailored for migrant 
workers is one such example. According to the Labour Standards Act (Article 34) and the 
Guarantee of Workers’ Retirement Benefit Act, all workers in South Korea are entitled to 
retirement allowance as a part of their wages, and their employers should establish a system to 
pay the allowances. Since labour law does not discriminate workers based on their nationalities, 
migrant workers are also entitled to the same benefit. However, the South Korean government 
manipulated the retirement allowance scheme for migrant workers into a deposit system to 
ensure their access after their employment period. The Act on the EPS stipulates employers 
should join the retirement insurance scheme ‘in preparation for the payment of retirement 
benefits to the foreign worker when he/she leaves the Republic of Korea’. It names the scheme as 
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‘insurance policy for departure guaranty, etc.’ It also states this insurance policy for migrant 
workers substitutes ‘a retirement allowance system’ for local workers (Article 13). These legal 
provisions reveal the South Korean government’s intention. 
In 2014, the government’s intention became even more explicit. It amended the Act on the EPS 
(as amended on 28 January 2014) to make the allowance to be paid ‘only after’ the workers have 
left the country (Article 13). The proposer of the amendment intended to prevent the workers 
from ‘disappearing’ and becoming irregular migrants after they received the allowance, according 
to a news report (Park, 2014a). However, it practically deprives the irregular migrants of their 
right to the retirement allowance, which is a part of their wage. In practice, 21,968 workers failed 
to claim the retirement allowance due to their irregular migrant status in 2013. The amount of 
money that the insurance company earned from it reached 17.5 billion Koran Won 
(approximately 17.5 million US Dollar) in 2013 (see Yoo, 2013). Migrant workers and their 
supporters opposed this change because they were concerned it would only worsen the already 
prevalent practices of delay, reduction or failure in its payment (see Chung, 2014b). Moreover, 
this policy has an effect on discouraging the workers from looking for a better job, because after 
they change a job it often becomes difficult to claim the retirement allowance from the previous 
employer. 
Another duplicitous policy is the return preparation bond. The Act on the EPS requires migrant 
workers to purchase ‘an insurance policy or a trust deed to cover expenses necessary for their 
return to home country’ as soon as they are employed (Article 15). This bond amounts to the price 
of the workers’ flight ticket to return to home. Contrary to the government’s claim that this policy 
is to support migrant workers’ return, labour lawyer Yoon (2014) argues this bond is a form of 
‘forced saving imposed by the government’. The Labor Standard Act of South Korea prohibits 
‘forced saving’ (Article 22). The redemption of this bond is even more problematic in reality. Many 
migrant workers are unaware how to redeem the bond or consider the bond as a part of migration 
cost or tax. They often fail to claim back the bond when they return: there were more than 35,623 
cases as such and the amount of unclaimed bond reached almost 14.7 billion Korean Won 
(approximately 14.7 million US Dollar) in 2013 (see Yoo, 2013). This is another case that shows 
the South Korean government disguises its intention to control migrant workers in the name of 
welfare.  
The government often claims the seemingly improved migrant workers’ access to social security 
is an achievement of the EPS (e.g. Ma, 2014). However, I argue the migrant workers’ entitlements 
to the labour standards, and social security, is the state’s responsibility as stipulated in domestic 
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and international laws, not an achievement of a temporary labour migration scheme. Moreover, 
the exterior improvements of social security under the EPS are still inadequate for the needs of 
migrant workers or even duplicitous about its original aims. Some of the seemingly social security 
schemes function for strengthening the control over migrant workers rather than protect migrant 
workers’ welfare. 
Paternalistic ‘assistance’ discourse and downgraded human rights notion in ‘multicultural’ 
policies 
The South Korean government has been reluctant to accept the state’s responsibility to ensure 
migrant workers’ entitlement to labour standards and social security. Instead, it promoted the 
paternalistic ‘assistance for foreigners’ discourse in the context of the problematic ‘Korean style 
multiculturalism as welfare policy without citizenship’ (Kim, 2011e, p. 211). Although the 
assistance-oriented policy played a certain role in temporarily meeting the needs of migrant 
workers, its principal effect was to justify the exclusion from their legally binding entitlement to 
social security. The government also often adopted the language of ‘human rights protection for 
foreigners’ when it addressed employers’ violations of labour laws. However, the discourse of 
‘human rights protection’ without the entitlement of rights yielded ‘downgrading’ the notion of 
human rights from the entitlement of legally binding fundamental rights to the provision of a 
charitable service. I argue South Korean laws and policies proliferated the paternalistic discourse 
in society as well as functioned as a mechanism to strengthen the implementation of the 
temporary labour migration scheme. 
The Act on the EPS has two articles on the government services for migrant workers. Article 21 
on ‘Projects related to Foreign Workers’ provides that the Ministry of Employment and Labor 
shall ‘undertake projects for the promotion of services for foreign workers’ and ‘the efficient 
management of their employment’. Then, it lists the examples of the services. Most of the 
examples are oriented toward the ‘efficient management of their employment’ such as ‘support 
for entry and departure’, ‘training’, ‘cooperation with public agencies’, ‘public relations’ and 
‘computer system for the employment management’. Two other items are related to welfare 
services: ‘counselling service’ and services for ‘adaptation’ and ‘awareness of Korean culture’. 
However, the law clarifies the services are provided in the form of ‘projects’, which implies the 
government considers the welfare services as a discretionary authority, not a legally binding 
responsibility. 
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Article 24 on ‘Subsidization to Organizations, etc. related to Foreign Workers’ is even more 
explicit about the discretionary nature of the service provision: it states ‘the State may, within 
budgetary limits, partially subsidise’ the institution or organisation that provides counselling and 
training services to migrant workers. In other words, a migrant worker may or may not be eligible 
for such services depending on the political or economic situation. They are not entitled to them 
as a rights-holder. This article was added at the last moment of the legislation process as a result 
of negotiation with some pro-migrant activists. However, the process was not transparent, which 
caused conflicts among organisations (see Chapter 8). 
Although the government has put a significant amount of resources into service provisions, the 
quality of the services is often in question. In 2016, the Ministry of Employment and Labor (2015) 
allocated 2.6 billion Korean Won (approximately 2.6 million US Dollars) to a project related to 
migrant workers and another 10.3 billion Korean Won to subsidise service provider 
organisations. The former was mostly spent on training and assistance programmes for migrant 
workers or employers. The latter was used for operating Foreign Workforce Support Centres 
(eight major and 31 local centres) and the Foreign Workforce Counselling Centre. The Ministry 
implemented the whole budget by outsourcing all the operations to its affiliated public agency, 
Human Resources Development Service of Korea, which again subcontracts the operations of 
each Centre to NGOs experienced in service provision.  
It is often questioned, especially by pro-migrant activists, whether this government-funded 
service provision helps to enhance migrant workers’ living and working conditions and to 
promote pro-migrant civil society groups, or strengthens their subordination to the government. 
The top-down and bureaucratic approach of subsidisation required the service providers to 
standardise their services and quantify the outcomes. The annual reports of major Foreign 
Workforce Support Centres exemplify the standardisation and quantification (Incheon Foreign 
Workforce Support Center, n.d., Korea Foreign Workforce Support Center, 2014). They set up the 
target numbers of their performances for activities such as phone calls, training sessions and 
cultural events, as agreed with the donor, the government. Then, they present the rate of 
accomplishment. The NGOs eventually restrict their functions to delivering the standardised 
services in minimum quality to accomplish the outcomes at maximum quantity. Consequently, 
the service providers were often compelled to focus on one-off counselling and events-for-show 
without building long-term relations with migrant workers. Throughout my field studies, pro-
migrant and migrant activists often testified that many migrant workers were disappointed by 
the services of the government-sponsored organisations but expressed stronger trust and 
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attachment to independent pro-migrant organisations. They argued the workers often felt as 
though they were being treated like a ‘unit of workforce’ not a ‘worker’ or a person, noting the 
government symbolically named the organisations as ‘Foreign Workforce Support Centre’ (RP_07, 
RP_14, RP_18). 
The government’s service-provision-oriented policy eventually functioned as a governing 
mechanism to maintain the current temporary labour migration system. The institutionalisation 
of service provision to migrant workers eventually rendered the scope of pro-migrant 
organisations’ activities limited to resolving some immediate difficulties faced by migrant 
workers. The government-sponsored organisations no more addressed the fundamental 
problems inherent in the temporary labour migration scheme. Their services were one-sided, 
top-down and individualistic rather than inclusionary, participatory and community-oriented. 
They tended to objectify the migrant workers as passive beneficiaries rather than subjectify them 
as rights-holders or claimants of entitlements. 
This policy had significant implications for the workers and the South Korean civil society. After 
the EPS was introduced, many migrant workers became relatively satisfied, in the short term, 
with a more stable visa status, more service providers and less extreme working conditions than 
before. They became no more critical about the government rules but conformed it them, 
compromising with inequality and unfairness. Instead, they became more obsessed with short-
term economic interest. A migrant activist, that I interviewed, cynically commented on this: ‘Their 
mind was blown’ (RP_32). At least for the first several years, migrant workers under the EPS 
neither questioned nor challenged the long-term implications of the temporary labour migration 
scheme. As my research participant CHM (RP_14), former director of a pro-migrant organisation 
commented, the organisations were divided and antagonistic to each other, especially on the 
issues of whether to collaborate with the government-driven service provision project or not (see 
Chapter 8). The government policy efficiently conciliated the potential critical discourses against 
the temporary labour migration policy. 
It is meaningful to analyse the South Korean government’s policy on migrants’ labour rights and 
the rights to social security in the context of the paternalistic and discretionary approach 
prevalent in its general migration policy. In 2007, the government introduced a legal frame for 
immigration policy in the form of the Framework Act on Treatment of Foreigners Residing in the 
Republic of Korea. The Act aims at providing general guidelines overarching other legislation and 
policies on immigration. The law provides the legal definition of ‘foreigners in Korea’, general 
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principles on the ‘treatment of foreigners’ and administrative system for implementation of the 
policies (Article 2, Chapter 2 and 3, the Act as amended on 10 February 2012).  
The law is, however, problematic in at least three aspects. First, the law officialises the 
discriminatory and layered levels of service provisions to different categories of migrants. It 
categorises migrants as ‘marriage migrants’, ‘migrants holding permanent residency’, ‘refugees’, 
‘migrants acquired South Korean nationality’, ‘professional or skilled migrant workers’ and 
‘former Korean nationals’. Then, it specifies the layered sets of ‘treatments’ for each category 
(Article 12 and 17). Low-skilled temporary migrant workers with a valid visa are not under any 
specific migrant category; thus, they are only eligible for the minimum services available for all 
‘foreigners in Korea’ (Article 10 and 11). The discrimination is even worse for irregular migrants. 
The defining clause of the law explicitly excludes irregular migrants from the domain of 
immigration policy at all (Hwang, 2011). It defines ‘foreigners in Korea’ as those who ‘legally stay 
in Korea’ only (Article 2). Second, the law officialises the government’s discretionary power on 
the entitlement of migrants. Instead of stipulating the rights of migrants, it prescribes the 
government ‘may’ or ‘shall endeavour’ to offer the ‘treatments’ to migrants. Third, the law 
eventually downgrades the notion of ‘human rights’. It only presents ‘human rights’ as an offer 
that the government ‘shall endeavour to take necessary measures […] to safeguard’. This is the 
denial of the entitlement that migrants may claim as enshrined in the international human rights 
laws. It is also the neglect of the state’s obligation, stipulated by the Constitution of the Republic 
of Korea, to abide by international law and also to guarantee the status of foreigners ‘as 
prescribed by the international law’ (Article 6). 
The government’s discretionary service-oriented approach is prevalent throughout the South 
Korean immigration policy. For example, the Framework Act grants a seemingly privileged status 
to the specially-categorised marriage migrants. However, it only provides that the government 
still ‘may offer’ social services to the migrants. I does not entitle them to the right to access social 
security. The legal frame that specifies the services for marriage migrants, Multicultural Family 
Support Act, also confirms such approach: all the services are provided to marriage migrants as a 
matter of ‘support’, not of rights or entitlement (Article 6, the Act as amended on 2 March 2016). 
Moreover, the aid-oriented policy on marriage migrants is camouflaged by the language of 
‘multicultural family’, which overlaps with the debates on multicultural society in South Korea. 
As Kim (2011e, p. 205) critically argued, the government’s approach proliferates the problematic 
notion of ‘Korean multiculturalism as welfare policy without citizenship’ (Kim, 2011e, p. 205). 
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The service-oriented policy of the South Korean government has negative implications for the 
rights of migrants. While the ‘paternalistic’ approach sets in throughout the government policy, it 
has refused to recognise migrant workers as having ‘rational, contractual or politically equal 
relations’ with non-migrants (Shim, 2007, p. 41). While the government ‘treated’ migrant workers 
with patronising and individualised charities, it never recognised the active and collective claims 
of organised migrant workers. The civil society was not an exception. The language of human 
rights was often equated with the patronising charity, which drove pro-migrant activists to give 
up the potential political power of the term (e.g. Gray, 2007).  
In this regard, LYA (RP_10), director of a pro-migrant organisation, still recognises the potential 
of human rights language. Her statement during my interview offers an insight into the discussion 
of the rights of migrants: 
Human rights language can respond to the challenges that are not covered by the claims 
of labour rights. A migrant worker is not only a worker but also a migrant who has 
various needs of and entitlements to other than labour. 
Exclusionary nationalist politics 
Nationalist politics is also one of the governing mechanisms. The government has often used the 
languages of the ‘national economy’ and the ‘Korean nation (Hanminjok)’ to justify the 
introduction of the temporary labour migration policy. When the law on the EPS was introduced, 
the government declared the ultimate purpose of the scheme was the ‘smooth supply of human 
resources and balanced development of the national economy’ (Article 1, Act on the EPS of 2003). 
As discussed in Chapter 6, there were significant disagreements about the official introduction of 
temporary migrant workers among the SMEs, large firms and trade unions, depending on their 
position in the economy. However, the language of the ‘national economy’ nullified all the conflicts 
of interests. 
The government has constantly used ‘foreign workers’ as the official term for migrant workers. 
This term implies a migrant worker is a ‘foreign’ and external entity that may be temporarily used 
to meet the needs of the ‘national economy’ and be disposed of afterwards. They can never 
become a member of the ‘national’. On the contrary, many pro-migrant organisations moved from 
the term ‘foreign workers’ to ‘migrant workers’ after they reflected on the implication of the terms. 
However, the government went in the opposite direction. It increasingly changed the term 
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‘foreign workers’ to ‘foreign workforce’, reflecting employers’ interests. For example, the 
government-affiliated ‘Foreign Workers’ Support Centres were all renamed ‘Foreign Workforce’ 
Support Centres in 2011. The government agency in charge of the management of these Centres 
argued it was ‘to develop and manage the projects to support employers’ (Human Resource 
Development Service of Korea, 2011, p. 69). This shows the government’s rationale behind the 
service provision to migrant workers is to meet the demands of ‘national employers’. The term 
‘workforce’ also dehumanises migrant workers, considering them only as a unit of production. As 
a result, it justifies the exclusion of migrants from the entitlements that are enjoyed by the citizens.  
On the other hand, the language of the ‘Korean nation’ was often used to justify the introduction 
of migrant workers of Korean origin from developing countries. For example, government-
published promotional material advertises one of the aims of the Visit and Work System as 
promoting ‘the sense of fellowship of Korean nation’ among the diaspora (Ministry of 
Employment and Labour, n.d.). The diaspora stream of the EPS was claimed to be an affirmative 
action to redress discrimination against the diaspora from developing countries. As I argued 
earlier, however, it is clear that this programme took economic advantage of these diasporas. The 
promotion of the ‘Korean nation’ is only an example of mobilising ethnic nationalism to meet the 
employers’ demands for a low-wage workforce. 
I also argue mobilising nationalism to justify temporary labour migration policy is a risky strategy, 
taking into account its social impacts. This strategy arguably contributed to the rise of racism and 
xenophobia in South Korean society. The frame of the national employer and the foreign 
workforce, as portrayed by government policy, often reproduces employers’ racist attitudes 
toward their employees and also self-justifies the low wages, inadequate working conditions, and 
even violent treatment. For example, according to one of my research participants, KI (RP_08), 
who is pro-migrant activist, he often experienced awkward situations when he complained 
against South Korean employers on behalf of migrant workers because some employers 
expressed that they felt betrayed by him. The employers often said, ‘You are a Korean. How can a 
Korean support foreigners and reproach the people of the same nationality?’ 
It is also observed that recently emerging xenophobic groups often mobilise nationalist 
sentiments against the social service provision to migrants. On a leaflet distributed that I collected 
during my participatory observation of a xenophobic group’s event (PO_08), it is stated that ‘they 
are foreigners who came to South Korea to supply workforce, not to enjoy welfare’. It is even more 
problematic that the government takes the xenophobic groups’ claims into account when 
designing the national plan for immigration policy. For example, the 2nd Basic Plan for Immigration 
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Policy 2013–2017 recognises the rise of ‘anti-multiculturalist sentiment’ and the claims of 
‘balanced policy toward foreigners’ in the public. Then, it states, following the same logic of the 
xenophobic groups, ‘uneven support measures tilting heavily toward multicultural families have 
fuelled this public discontent’ (Immigration Policy Commission, 2012, p. 20). It is hard to deny 
the government’s responsibility for the recent rise of xenophobia in the South Korean society. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined my research question: ‘what are the rationales and governing mechanism 
of the operation of the EPS?’ In the first section, I examined how the EPS has been modified to 
meet employers’ demands including the introduction of the diaspora stream. I also showed how 
the government had ignored the declared principles of the EPS to adhere to one of the principles. 
Then, I argued the paramount principle is to satisfy employers’ demands for low labour cost. 
After all, the sustainability of the South Korean version of the temporary labour migration scheme 
is questionable. As European countries experienced in the middle of the 20th century, the 
temporary labour migration scheme is not a sustainable solution for the long-term demand of 
labour, especially if the labour demand derives from demographic conditions (Castles, 1986). The 
recent development of the South Korean temporary labour migration scheme, which repeatedly 
prolongs the workers’ migration period, is seen as the prelude to its future. The temporary labour 
migration scheme, sustained by prolonging the temporariness, later becomes the source of the 
newly ignited resistances of migrants.  
In the second section, I identified the five governing mechanisms that the government employed 
to operate the EPS. First, the principle of ‘cost-effectiveness’ of employing migrant workers is 
maintained by the restrictions on the job choice. Second, the ‘temporariness’ of labour migration 
is largely managed by the enforcement of deportation. Third, the social insurances provided to 
migrant workers are either inadequate for migrants or designed to control the workers. Fourth, 
the unequal treatment of the temporary migrant workers is overlaid by the paternalist service 
provisions and the discourses of ‘assistance for foreigners’ that, in practice, exclude migrants 
from the entitlement of citizenship and universal human rights. Fifth, the exclusion of migrant 
workers is justified by a nationalist political agenda like protection of the national interest, the 
national employers and the national workers. 
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Although the governing mechanisms effectively functioned to maintain the temporary labour 
migration scheme, their consequences were hazardous to the workers and society. The unfree 
employment conditions resulted in seriously deteriorating working conditions. As repeatedly 
criticised by human rights organisations, the restriction on the choice of job is one of the root 
causes of unfair, degrading and humiliating working conditions (Amnesty International, 2009, 
2014). A South Korean civil society group condemned it as reaching the level of ‘contemporary 
forms of slavery’ (see Kim, 2014c). The series of deportations were criticised even by a state 
agency, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK), for being responsible for 
inhuman or degrading treatment and the deterioration of the rights to the liberty and personal 
security (see Seol et al., 2005a).  
The analysis of the rationales and governing mechanisms of the EPS reveals the nature of the 
temporary labour migration policy. A migrant worker is considered as a unit of production or a 
commodity, rather than a person who has potentials to bring different culture, history and 
thoughts and to build new social and human relations with both host and home societies. The 
temporary labour migration scheme, as a part of the neoliberal project, commodifies migrant 
workers and eventually disembeds migration from society. As Polanyi (2001) observed, the perils 
of the disembedded economy of 19th century Europe, and many contemporary scholars identified 
the globalised form of the disembeddeness in our time (see Chapter 2), the neoliberal project of 
commodification and disembedding brings about hazardous outcomes in the society.  
How migrant workers experienced the consequences of the EPS is presented in the next chapter. 
It is also examined how the migrant workers developed their resistance against the consequences. 
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Chapter 8 Migrant workers’ experience and resistance 
This and the next chapters examine the dimension of social movement to answer my third 
research question: ‘what are migrant workers’ experiences of the scheme and in what way have 
they engaged with the policy process, especially in connection with South Korean social 
movements?’ This chapter examines the experience and resistance of migrant workers with the 
focus on how they challenged the introduction of the South Korean temporary labour migration 
scheme.  
It begins with a brief description of migrant workers’ experiences under the South Korean 
temporary labour migration policy. I illustrate two symbolic events that represent the workers’ 
experiences under South Korea’s two temporary migration policies: the pseudo temporary labour 
migration policy, ITS between 1991 and 2006, and the institutionalised temporary labour 
migration scheme, EPS from 2004 to the present. This topic has been extensively investigated by 
scholars (e.g. Lee, 1997, Seol, 1999), NGOs (e.g. Amnesty Internaional, 2003, Joint Committee for 
Migrant Workers in Korea, 2000) and an independent government agency, the NHRCK (e.g. Seol 
et al., 2002). Thus, I also review some significant outcomes of these investigations. 
The second and the third sections examine how the migrant workers’ resistances emerged and 
developed throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s. Early forms of resistance were desperate 
expressions of individuals’ grievances. Soon, it developed toward collective actions at workplaces 
and eventually against the government’s repressive deportation and temporary labour migration 
policies. The workers on strikes had to take risks both of being fired and of losing an opportunity 
to work in South Korea at all. Despite the extremely precarious conditions, they were able to 
sporadically organise collective actions and protests against employers’ unfair treatment and the 
government’s repressive immigration policy throughout the 1990s. 
In the early 2000s, migrant workers began to organise large-scale and long-term protests against 
the South Korean government’s labour migration policy. The workers’ resistance peaked in 2003. 
After the formal introduction of the EPS in 2004, however, migration workers’ collective actions 
rapidly decreased until they re-emerged in 2012. By examining the development of migrants’ 
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resistance, I pay particular attention to how migrant workers have changed their strategies as the 
South Korean government’s policies evolved. 
Throughout the events, South Korean pro-migrant activists made significant contributions to the 
mobilisations, organisations and negotiations for the protesters. However, it was still the migrant 
workers and their self-organised struggles that triggered the social movements for and of migrant 
workers.  
A few studies described the details of key resistances and examined their social significances (e.g. 
Seol, 2003). I seek to advance these studies by examining the claims of migrant workers and 
identifying the subjectivity of the workers in the social movements. I also pay attention to the 
emerging sense of transnational solidarity among migrant workers through the series of strikes 
at workplaces, which were a background of the nation-wide collective actions afterwards. 
Throughout this and the next chapters, I also seek to engage with the theoretical aspects as I 
discussed in Chapter 2. I take into account the three main characteristics of the social movement, 
‘conflictual relations’, ‘dense informal networks’, and ‘collective identity’ as defined by Della Porta 
and Diani (2006, p. 23). I also pay attention to the migrants’ condition that they are ‘politically 
disfranchised’ from the state they reside (Castles et al., 2014, p. 296) and to the notion of the 
‘radical potential of immigrant protests’(Tyler and Marciniak, 2013, pp. 149-150). Finally, 
Polanyi’s (2001 [1944]) concept of the protective countermovement is taken into account 
throughout the chapter to analyse the social movements for and of migrants in the context of 
neoliberal transformations in South Korea. 
Migrant workers’ experiences at work and living 
‘Severed hand’ and ‘delayed pay’ 
A major South Korean newspaper, Hankyoreh, reported a tribute concert was staged in Seoul for 
the 20th anniversary of Park No Hae’s poem, ‘the Dawn of labour’ (see Chapter 4) on 10 February 
2004 (Seo, 2004). His poems had been made into folk songs and sung by workers and students in 
the 1990s, and this time, they were remade as Korean classical, rock or hip-hop styles by popular 
South Korean singers. 
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The concert was well appreciated by the public (Kim, 2004b). However, a labour movement 
activist expressed his concern that the ‘reminiscence’ of the past conditions might lead to the 
ignorance of the present problems, especially those of the ‘non-regular workers’ (Lee, 2004b). 
After the democratisation and the growth of trade unions, the extremely poor working conditions, 
the overdue wages, and the injuries at work were broadly considered as the stories of Chun Tae 
Il’s and Park No Hae’s time. However, their past stories were still the present reality for migrant 
workers, even after two decades. 
Among the singers at the concert, there appeared an unknown band named ‘Stop Crackdown’. 
They sang a poem by Park No Hae, for which they wrote the music. 
The grave of hand 
In tears, 
holding the severed and bleeding hand, 
I was taken to the hospital on the cargo bed of a Titan [truck]. 
The boss’s good car doesn’t like me in working clothes. 
The boss’s white hands don’t like me stained with oil. 
My hand was jammed in the machine. I picked up the still-beating hand,  
wrapped it up in a plastic bag and held it in my arms. 
Like a madman, I wandered the street with no end, 
the street shining in the beautiful spring sunlight. 
In tears, now I’ll bury 
the hand, cut off by the press machine. 
Until the working hands come alive in joyful movements, 
I’ll bury it in tears, bury it in tears. 
The severed hand in my arms has got chilly cold. 
I washed the bluish hand in soju, 
buried it in a sunny place by the factory wall, 
oh, oh, for the blood and sweat of the workers. 
(Written by Park No Hae, 1984. Sung by Stop Crackdown in 2004.) 
Stop Crackdown is a migrant band, organised by undocumented workers from Nepal, Myanmar 
and Indonesia and a Korean member. It was formed in 2004 in the midst of the sit-in protests of 
undocumented workers against the government’s plan of immigration raids and deportations 
ahead of the introduction of the EPS. According to an essay written by Lee Ran Ju, a pro-migrant 
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activist who supported the band, they selected this poem for the concert because ‘the working 
conditions in 1984 are not different from the lives of migrant workers in 2004’ (Lee, 2009, pp. 
196-197). They said ‘The grave of hand’ might sound like a reminiscence of the past for South 
Koreans, but it was the reality for the present undocumented workers in the same place.  
This band wrote another song. 
Payday 
Today is my payday. / My heart is beating. 
Payment has been delayed for a long time. / They are going to pay only now.  
My precious family, / my beloved parents, 
now I am going to make you / happy with my own hands. 
Oh, boss, hello. / Oh, boss, pay me my salary. 
My dreams and hopes are from / the small but precious my salary. 
Some time ago, with white envelopes, / my [Korean] colleagues went home.  
They patted my shoulder / and said don’t worry. 
Only after midnight, / my work finishes. 
My salary is not paid in an envelope, / anyway, I couldn’t see it again today. 
When will a good day come to me? / Oh, boss, don’t be like this. 
Please pay my salary; it’s been delayed for a long time. 
I can stand you swearing at me. / But, just pay me my salary. 
(Written by Soe Moe Thu and Minod Moktan, 2004. Sung by Stop Crackdown.) 
The ‘severed hand’ and ‘delayed pay’ were not an exceptional experience of the band members. 
The first news reports on migrant workers, a few years after the migrant workers appeared in 
the South Korean society, were about their injuries, violence and exploitative working conditions 
(e.g. Kim, 1992a, Lee, 1992). As a result of the introduction of the ITS, the arrivals of migrant 
workers rapidly grew. The pseudo-temporary labour migration scheme, however, only 
engendered the precarious status of ‘industrial trainees’ and deteriorated their inhumane 
working and living conditions. According to a report by the coalition of South Korean pro-migrant 
organisations, JCMK (2000), human rights violations were a common practice at migrant 
workers’ workplaces. Employers confiscated workers’ passports and often confined them to their 
dormitories. Workers often suffered physical, verbal or sexual violence, deduction of wages for 
forced savings or industrial injuries. However, no compensation was paid.  
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A survey conducted by the NHRCK (Seol et al., 2002) reports the average working hours of 
migrant workers was much longer than the national average in 2002 and even longer than in 
1986 when the figure was the highest since 1980. Almost one-third of migrant workers that 
replied to the survey reported that they experienced work-related injuries and two-thirds had 
contracted diseases. More than half of the migrant workers said the wages were not paid on time 
(see Table 8-1). Racial discrimination was prevalent (Amnesty Internaional, 2003). 
Low wages and dangerous work 
After the EPS was introduced, the South Korean government and affiliated research institutions 
repeatedly announced the human rights conditions of migrant workers had significantly 
improved (e.g. Lee, 2012e, Lee, 2014b). They argued the EPS notably contributed to making the 
recruitment processes transparent and, consequently, to lowering migrant workers’ financial 
burdens. Their surveys showed both workers and employers were relatively satisfied with the 
EPS. 
On the contrary, pro-migrant organisations reported that the poor and dangerous working 
conditions, physical and verbal abuses, and discriminations persisted at temporary migrants’ 
workplaces (Migrant Rights Network, 2006, 2008, 2010). A government-sponsored survey 
 
Table 8-1 Working hours and working conditions migrant workers, 2002 
Working hours Hours Working conditions % 
Migrant workers 63.7 Experience of delayed payment 51.4 
National average 48.2 Work-related injuries 32.2 
National average (1986) 54.5 Work-related disease 60.0 
Source: Seol et al. (2002, pp. 70, 97, 142, 149 ), Statistics Korea (2017), and Koo (2001, p. 49). 
 
Table 8-2 Wages and working hours of migrant and local workers at manufacturing SMEs, 
2013 
 
Average monthly wages  
(Korean Won) 
Working hours  
(per week) 
Migrant workers at SMEs 1,550,000 58.7 
Local workers at SMEs 1,950,000 40.3 
Source: Chung et al. (2013, pp. 167, 172) , Statistics Korea (2017) and Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (2017).  
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(Chung et al., 2013) also shows there were significant differences in wages and working hours 
between migrant and local workers. Migrant employees of SMEs in the manufacturing sector 
were paid 20 percent less than their local counterpart in 2013 (see Table 8-2). The working hours 
of migrant workers at SMEs were 46 percent longer than those of average South Korean workers 
in the same year.  
Many migrant workers have been newly employed in the agricultural and fishery sectors under 
the EPS since the early 2010s. They also reportedly suffered long working hours and extremely 
poor working conditions (Oh et al., 2012). They are often provided with very unhygienic and 
unsafe accommodation by employers while many female workers are afraid of sexual, verbal and 
physical abuses. Pro-migrant organisations argue the employers of these sectors are often less 
informed about labour laws and less supported by the government, which intensifies the unfair 
treatment of migrant workers (Kim et al., 2013b). Due to the remote locations of workplaces and 
accommodation, their poor working and living conditions have not been well-known to the 
government, the media and even to pro-migrant activists. 
Pro-migrant organisations argue the primary source of migrant workers’ poor working 
conditions is the restriction against changing jobs imposed by the EPS. The right to seek a job with 
better working condition or payment is a vital source of bargaining power for workers when they 
negotiate with employers. According to a 2011 survey of a coalition of pro-migrant organisations 
(Migration Policy Forum, 2014), 76 percent of migrant workers wanted to change their 
workplaces within three years of their arrival. The aforementioned government-sponsored 
survey (Chung et al., 2013, p. 192) reported that 73.8 percent of migrant workers had difficulties 
in changing jobs. 
There is also a growing concern on mental health of migrant workers. The media and pro-migrant 
activists argue the restricted freedom of work and consequently unsafe conditions are partly 
responsible for the issues of poor mental health, as a recent suicide case showed an extreme 
example. On 7 August 2017, 27-year-old, Keshav Shrestha, was found dead on the rooftop of 
dormitory building attached to a factory in Cheongju. He had worked at this machine-part factory 
since he left Nepal a year and four months earlier. A major newspaper, Kyunghyang Shinmun, 
reported he left a message: 
Hello, all. Today, I am saying goodbye to the world. The reason why I leave this world is 
my health problem. I couldn’t sleep. Treatments didn’t help. It was too hard for me to 
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spend time like this. So, I request you to allow me to leave the world. My company was 
stressful, so I wanted to work at another factory. But, I couldn’t. I wanted to visit Nepal 
for treatment, but I couldn’t. I have 3.2 million won [approximately 3,200 US Dollars] 
left. I wish you would send this money to my wife and sister at home (Lee, 2017). 
The government’s repressive operations of deportation have also been a significant threat to 
migrant workers’ health and life. As discussed earlier, deportations have repeatedly been used as 
a governing mechanism to sustain the temporary labour migration policy. Repressive operations, 
however, very often entail dangerous situations for migrant workers such as the death of workers 
in the course of ‘crackdown’ operations. The conditions of detention facilities are also poor and 
dangerous, as an extreme example of the 2007 Fire Accident at Yeosu Immigration Detention 
Center showed (see Chapter 7). 
The ‘severed hand’, ‘delayed pay’, low-wage, long working hours, poor working conditions, 
precariousness, depression and risk of death represent many migrant workers’ experiences in 
South Korea. One ostensible purpose of the temporary labour migration policy in South Korea 
was to protect migrant workers’ human rights, as the Act on the EPS stipulates. Reportedly, the 
employers’ perpetuation of extreme human rights violations have certainly decreased in 
manufacturing sectors. However, they are still prevalent in the sectors newly employing migrant 
workers, i.e. agricultural and fishery sectors. It is notable that the government operations of the 
governing mechanisms to sustain temporary labour migration policy, i.e. deportations and the 
restrictions on the free choice of jobs, have adverse effects on migrant workers’ health, rights and 
lives.  
The South Korean cases show how the outcomes of a temporary labour migrations scheme may 
intensify ‘commodification of labour’ (Polanyi, 2001 [1944], Rosewarne, 2010, p. 103). Migrant 
workers are not considered as rights-holders or members of human society but as units of 
production. The government and its labour laws are prevalently ignored or have failed to protect 
migrant workers. This is also an example of how the temporary labour migration scheme can 
‘undermine the rule of law and the welfare state in liberal-democratic societies’ (Castles, 2006, p. 
760, Lenard, 2012).  
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Rise of migrant workers’ resistance 
From grievances to resistance 
In the early 1990s, migrant workers began to express their grievances and resentment against 
exploitative conditions, since the conditions had worsened beyond the level they could stand. A 
small number of desperate migrant workers made still passive and self-tormenting appeals. After 
a few years, however, migrant workers’ collective actions grew to be proactive and organised, 
challenging the South Korean government’s labour migration policy. 
Three significant protests sprouted the social movements for migrant workers’ rights in South 
Korea: the suicide of a migrant worker in 1993, the sit-in strike of 11 undocumented workers in 
1994, and the sit-in strike of 13 industrial trainees in 1995. After these protests drew nation-wide 
attention, migrant workers continued to strike at local workplaces throughout the 1990s and the 
early 2000s. 
The first incident was the suicide of a 39-year-old Joseonjok (Chinese nationals with Korean 
ethnicity) migrant worker, Im Ho, on 9 November 1993. Newspaper Hankyoreh reports he arrived 
at South Korea with a visitor’s visa valid for one month. He worked hard at construction sites and 
earned six million Korean Won (approximately 6,000 US Dollars) in a year. When he sent two 
million Won to his family in China, he excitedly wrote to his wife that the hard time would end 
soon. Later, he lost two million Won after being involved in a swindle. He still hoped that he would 
go back to China and buy a business car with the remaining two million Won. When he voluntarily 
reported his overstays to go back to China, Seoul Immigration Office charged him 1.8 million Won. 
When he bought a ferry ticket to China, he was left with 120,000 Won and no hope. He had his 
last dinner with a friend. He drank as much as he wanted for the first time in Korea. Then, he 
jumped down from a ten-metre-high motorway with the ferry ticket and a 10,000 Won note in 
his pocket (The Hankyoreh, 1993). The incident occurred only several months after the 
government increased the penalty for an ‘illegal stay’ tenfold, as ‘a measure of controlling 
irregular migration’ (Seol, 2003, pp. 250-251). If the government had not increased the penalty 
or had not charged him, Im Ho could still have saved 1.8 million Won and been able to go back 
home. 
Suicide by jumping or self-immolation were the most desperate forms of resistance for students, 
workers and activists during the authoritarian periods in South Korea. The news of a migrant 
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worker’s suicide reminded South Korean social movement activists of the tragic memories of 
their past resistance. The former director of a pro-migrant organisation, YH (RP_05), 
remembered during my interview that she and her colleagues immediately sensed the incident 
was a form of resistance to the excessive immigration penalty. Faith-based organisations, such as 
the Foreign Workers’ Refuge and the Jubilee Mission Fellowship, promptly organised a protest 
rally to denounce the government’s penalty policy. In front of the Seoul Immigration Office, the 
participants called for ‘the prohibition of slavery-like labour and the abolition of penalty law’ (Im, 
1993). This protest is significant as the first-ever protest against the South Korean government’s 
immigration policy. 
On 10 January 1994, two months after the suicide, eleven undocumented migrant workers from 
Nepal, Bangladesh and Ethiopia went into a sit-in strike at a hall of the then influential NGO, 
Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ). They testified about the extremely exploitative 
working conditions and unfair treatment that they had suffered in South Korea. According to 
Hankyoreh’s report, 26-year-old Nava Raj, one of the strikers, had worked for two companies in 
Gimpo since 1991. At the first one, he was locked up in a workshop and forced to work twenty 
hours a day. At the second one, he had to work with an injection-moulding machine but with no 
safety device. One day, the machine dragged in his right arm and crushed his shoulder. His 
employer gave him only minimal treatment and forced him to continue to work with his other 
arm. He received no compensation or medical expenses from the employer (Park, 1994a). Most 
other strike-participants had suffered similar injuries but received no compensation or even no 
wages. 
These cases were related to the change of a government rule. In September 1992, the South 
Korean government ruled undocumented workers were not entitled to the protection of the 
Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act and the Labor Standard Act (Seol, 2003, p. 252). 
Undocumented workers, who had already been outside any legal protection in practice, became 
officially excluded from it. Pro-migrant lawyers immediately challenged the government’s new 
rule. The Seoul High Court decided, on 26 November and 3 December 1993, the changes to the 
rule did not abide by the law, but the Ministry of Labour again appealed against these decisions 
in the Supreme Court (Seol, 2005a, pp. 84-85). 
The strike participants had still very passive attitudes. They appealed to humanity, charity and 
sympathy for ‘people from poor countries’. They were neither able to articulate their complaints 
nor to claim their rights. On the ‘letter of plea’, they stated: 
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Although we are illegal workers, we are human beings having blood and emotion like 
you. We know many Koreans suffered in overseas lands when Korea was poor in the 
past. We wish you would remember the feelings, understand our conditions and accept 
us as human beings and neighbour, as we are from poor countries (Amjad and Thapa, 
1995). 
It was the South Korean NGOs, including pro-migrant groups, which articulated the migrant 
workers’ claims. The representatives of the CCEJ claimed, on behalf of the workers, ‘the legal 
guarantee for minimum humane treatments including payment of overdue wages, medical 
treatment and compensation for industrial injuries by national law’ (Park, 1994a). They also 
organised a coalition, the Joint Task Force for Foreign Workers, in the participation of citizen’s 
movement organisations, religious groups and labour movement organisations to continue and 
intensify their actions against the government. The migrant workers’ sit-in strikes lasted 29 days. 
The government finally accepted their claims and decided to include undocumented workers in 
the Industrial Accident Insurance Scheme. The Ministry of Labour withdrew the appeals against 
the High Court’s decision on 7 February 1994 (Seol, 2005a, p. 85). 
This sit-in strike has a historical significance for the social movement of and for migrant workers 
in South Korea. It was the first collective action organised by migrants in modern South Korean 
society (Yang, 2011, p. 25). The outcome of this protest was also the first achievement for the 
status of migrant workers (Seol, 2003, p. 225). 
I also note that the experience of the strike made significant contributions to empowering migrant 
workers. The experience of the sit-in strike made the workers confident about raising their voices 
against the unfair treatment. Manjo Thapa was one of the participants of the sit-in protest. 
According to my research participant YH’s (RP_05) recollection, she had lost three fingers when 
her hands were rolled into a leather-pressing machine. After the protests, she was able to receive 
compensation and overdue wages. Then, she had to return to Nepal because her visa expired. Her 
activism continued after she returned to her home country. She was aware that many Nepalese 
workers returned home without having redress for industrial injuries, unlike her. She found 25 
such cases in a year and managed to help eight of them receive compensation. Later, she also 
worked for a migrant workers department at a national union, the General Federation of Nepalese 
Trade Unions (Yang, 2011). The experiences of the sit-in strike motivated her to go beyond 
claiming her rights and dedicate herself to supporting other workers in similar conditions. 
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Articulating problems and claiming human rights 
As the ITS was designed for, the migrant workers with industrial trainee status were in difficult 
positions to organise any collective actions against their employers or the government. Since the 
labour laws did not protect workers with so-called ‘trainee’ status, the employers could easily fire 
the workers. Once the workers were dismissed from the company, they lost visa and legal status 
and were eventually deported. The threats of dismissal or of being reported to immigration 
authorities were employers’ most often-used strategies to control the migrant workers (Seol, 
2003). Despite these hard conditions, a small number of workers began to claim their rights. 
On 9 January 1995, a year after the previous strike, another 13 migrant workers, all from Nepal, 
went into sit-in strikes in front of Myung-dong Cathedral, a symbolic site of the South Korean 
democratisation movement. The workers wore iron chains on their bodies and shouted ‘We are 
human beings, not animals!’; ‘Don’t treat us like animals!’; ‘We are not slaves!’; ‘Don’t beat us, 
please!’; ‘Pay us our wages!’ (Park, 2002c, Seol, 2003, p. 257). They were ‘industrial trainees’, who 
had arrived when the KFSB launched the ITS in May 1994. According to newspaper Kyunghyang 
Shinmun’s report, they had hoped to learn industrial technology and earn 400 US dollars a month, 
as they had been told they would by the recruitment agency. However, the reality turned out to 
be long working hours, physical violence, and only a half of the promised wage, which they never 
received anyway. They were even told their two colleagues were sexually assaulted by a factory 
manager (Kyung, 1995). They could not stand all these situations. They ran away to the Cathedral. 
As reported in monthly magazine Mal, the workers discerned their experience was not an isolated 
incident, but a part of the systematic problems that were not only tacitly condoned but actually 
‘supported’ by the South Korean government. In the ‘letter of thirteen workers’ plea to Korean 
people’ drafted by one of the participants, Thanesor Banjade, they articulated the problems: 
We met the people who consider us less important than the product that we produced. 
We also understood this situation is systematically supported by the Korean 
government […] We also realised if we leave the factory designated by the Korean 
government, the police and the recruitment agency will chase us. Then, the Korean 
society would name us runaways (Banjade, 1995, p. 121).  
Unlike the previous protests, they also clearly presented their claims. The employer should:  
 provide adequate industrial training to trainees as initially promised, and  
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 pay adequate wages for long working hours; 
and, the recruitment agency should:  
 stop withholding their wages, 
 stop violence,  
 stop confiscating passports, and  
 stop deceptive recruitment advertisements;  
and, also appealed to South Korean people and the government to help them: 
 ‘take back their basic human rights and stolen wages’ (Banjade, 1995, p. 121).  
It is significant that the migrant workers used the language of ‘human rights’ as grounds for their 
claims for the rights that they had not been entitled to by the positive laws of South Korea. They 
claimed ‘human’ rights, which are supposed to be held by all human beings. Also, they discerned 
that South Korean law had not considered them as rights-holders. I argue this case exemplifies 
the ‘radical potential of immigrant protests’ in Tyler and Marciniak’s (2013, pp. 149-150) sense. 
Those undocumented workers were ‘disenfranchised by the states in which they resided’ and 
‘outside of politics in normative sense’. Thus, the thirteen ‘industrial trainees’ were able to act ‘in 
ways that allow them to (temporarily) constitute themselves as political subjects’ by adopting 
‘being human’ as the ground of their claims. 
Their protests aimed beyond the redress of their own problems. They questioned whether it was 
legitimate that the government tacitly condoned the employers who appropriated the training 
programme and exploited migrant workers. When the government and employers offered the 
workers individual redresses for the confiscated passports and the overdue wages on condition 
that they would stop the strike, the workers refused (Yonhap News, 1995c). Instead, they 
demanded ‘fundamental improvements of the foreign industrial training scheme’ (Yoo and Lee, 
1995). During the nine days of sit-in protests, their claims had become systematic and 
fundamental: they claimed that the government should ensure foreign industrial trainees to be 
entitled to the same legal protection as South Korean workers are entitled to; the adequate wages 
beyond the level of minimum wage; and also the right to freely make employment contracts with 
employers. They also revealed the ITS was never an industrial training programme, but a 
temporary employment scheme in practice. They eventually argued ‘the ITS should be abolished’ 
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(Yonhap News, 1995a). The migrant workers’ protests rapidly developed from claims of 
individual redresses toward a social movement for institutional changes of a social system. 
Pro-migrant organisations, including the Foreign Workers’ Refuge and the Association for 
Foreign Workers’ Human Rights, immediately joined the sit-in protest (see Chapter 9). They 
organised a Joint Committee for the Protection of Foreign Industrial Trainees’ Human Rights in 
coalition with other NGOs and trade unions. They mobilised pro-migrant activists to support the 
sit-in protests and protect the workers from arrest and deportation. The Joint Committee also 
proactively engaged in negotiations between the workers, the government, and the employer. 
The local NGOs took a step further than the migrant workers: they demanded the Minister of 
Labor make an official public apology and to recognise the failed ITS as a ‘contemporary forms of 
slavery’ (Yonhap News, 1995e). 
As days went on, however, pressures on the workers continued to increase. The South Korean 
government warned them of deportations. The Nepalese Embassy also repeatedly urged them to 
stop the protest. After nine days, the migrant workers decided to stop the strike and accepted the 
South Korean government’s offers:  
 they would receive the overdue wages;  
 the payment would be made directly to them;  
 their passports would be returned;  
 their workplaces would be reassigned;  
 they would receive adequate wages and compensations for injury or death 
(Yonhap News, 1995b).  
However, their core claim was never accepted by the government: they still could not be equally 
treated as South Korean workers but remained with the status of trainees. 
The migrant workers’ protest of 1995 produced significant resonances in the society. The 
conditions of migrant workers and their claims drew the widespread attention of the public and 
the media. On 1 March 1995, the Ministry of Labor announced the industrial trainees would be 
entitled to join the major national insurance schemes like Industrial Accident Compensation 
Insurance and National Health Insurance. Also, the trainees would be partly protected by the 
Labor Standard Act: the provisions on the prohibition of forced labour and violence, the payment 
of wages and the working hours (Seol, 2003, pp. 258-259). From 1 July 1995, the trainees were 
entitled to the protection of the Minimum Wage Act: they were to be paid no less than the standard 
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minimum wage for local workers. The migrant workers’ protest served as a stepping-stone for 
the changes to the ITS, although the outcome was not enough to satisfy the workers’ claims. 
However, the aftermath of the protest was painful for the individual protesters. All the workers 
were reassigned to new companies to avoid the violence and poor working conditions. However, 
they only found the working conditions were still same. As they envisaged during the protest, the 
extreme working conditions did not disappear without fundamental changes in the ITS. 
According to a human rights issues-specialised independent paper, Human Rights Daily, the 
workers refused to work with the new companies and left them. They stayed at a shelter provided 
by the Foreign Workers’ Refuge. The Ministry of Justice charged them for ‘having broken away’ 
from the designated company. Navaraz Puel left the new company because the employer 
confiscated his passport again. He was arrested by immigration officers and deported to Nepal on 
11 March. Jiban Bazagai, who was also staying at the same shelter, was arrested by eight 
immigration officers on 20 March and deported two days later. Thanesor Banjade was also 
forcefully arrested on 24 March (SARANGBANG-Group for Human Rights, 1995). The government 
eventually deported all the strike-participants and prohibited them from re-entering the country. 
Since then, the government has continued to use the deportation of migrant leaders as a typical 
strategy to repress the migrant workers’ protests and their organisations (see Chapter 9). 
The pro-migrant activists were no exception. According to a major news agency, Yonhap News, 
the Ministry of Labor accused the director of the Foreign Workers’ Refuge, Kim Jae-Oh, for ‘having 
collected the information on the victims of the ITS who had returned to Nepal’ and ‘having incited 
the workers to organise the sit-in strike’ in breach of labour laws. The Public Prosecutors’ Office 
summoned and investigated him. The Prosecutors’ Office stated they might have prosecuted Kim 
Jae-Oh ‘for the violation of the Act on Assembly and Demonstration and also for the concealment 
of offenders’. However, they eventually decided not to prosecute him due to ‘the sympathetic 
sentiments of the public and other reasons’ (Yonhap News, 1995d). The South Korean 
government had often announced unfounded allegations and took legal actions against social 
movement activists, and eventually retracted them. It had been a typical strategy to de-motivate 
the activists and to repress the movements throughout the 1990s and the 2000s. This strategy 
did not always intimidate the experienced activists. Nevertheless, the South Korean government’s 
individualised repressions on migrant protesters and pro-migrant activists had influenced them 
to be reluctant to organise nation-wide collective action until the end of the 1990s. 
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Protests at workplaces and growing transnational solidarity 
Being inspired by a series of protests, migrant workers’ struggles developed in two directions. On 
the one hand, migrant workers sporadically organised strikes at workplaces throughout the 
country. Instead of an organised collective action against the government’s labour migration 
policy, the workers complained to their employers and called for adequate working and living 
conditions at their workplaces. On the other hand, pro-migrant activists organised a nation-wide 
coalition to abolish the ‘side-door’ temporary labour migration policy, ITC, and migrant workers 
also participated in it. This section focuses on the first movements that were mostly initiated by 
migrant workers. The latter will be discussed in the next section. 
In August 1995, more than 300 workers of industrial trainee status at a shoemaking company in 
Gimhae went on strike for seven days. They claimed their wages should be increased and vacation 
bonus should be paid. Their claim was partly accepted by the employer. In the same month, about 
100 workers, who used to be employees of the Philippine and China branches of a South Korean 
textile company, were dispatched to their headquarters in Gumi. They went on strike for two days 
to demand the rise of wages and improvement of meals provided (Seol, 1999, pp. 277-278). 
Industrial trainees at an electric company in Damyang went on strikes on 19 October 1999 and 
19 February 2001. They demanded the employer should pay the wages directly to the workers, 
not to their recruitment agency. They also claimed payment for overtime work, meals and daily 
necessities, as they had agreed in their ‘training’ contract (Park, 2002c). On 19 October 2011, the 
industrial trainees at a tyre company in Yangsan also went on strike and demanded the employer 
should abide by the ‘training’ contract (Seol, 2003).  
The collective actions of these workers were explosions of their accumulated discontents, as Seol 
(2003, pp. 261-262) noted. Their demands were no more than for their employers’ compliance 
with their employment contracts, which was already unfair under the pseudo-temporary labour 
migration policy, ITS. They were not yet imaginative or proactive enough to challenge the 
government policy, which was the ground for their poor working conditions. 
As the strikes of ‘industrial trainees’ increased, they began to build a sense of workers’ solidarity. 
They organised strikes in solidarity with their colleague workers, not for their benefit. On 21 
March 2002, Yar, an ‘industrial trainee’ at a paper box company in Shiheung, requested 
compassionate leave to attend his brother’s funeral back in Pakistan. The employer’s response 
was ‘if you want to go, leave the company.’ Then, he immediately dismissed Yar and his three 
colleagues. In a fury, ten other colleague migrant workers went on strike. The strike lasted 21 
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days until the employer agreed to cancel the dismissals and to allow Yar to leave. All fourteen 
workers were eventually transferred to other workplaces. 
Migrant workers on strike also extended their sense of solidarity toward a transnational level. On 
21 January 2002, 99 undocumented migrant workers at a furniture company in Pocheon went on 
strike. Unlike the previous strikes, which were often organised by the workers of same origin 
country, this strike manifested as a transnational solidarity of migrant workers from nine 
different origin countries. Their demand was just the payment of two months of overdue wages. 
Extremely poor working conditions were not even an issue for the workers, even though they had 
suffered long work hours: 14.5 hours for a weekday, 9.5 hours for a weekend and one day off per 
month. Verbal abuse from managers and poor living conditions, like a crowded and dirty 
dormitory, were even no issues that they raised (Lee, 2003d, pp. 194-197).  
When they were determined to begin a strike, the language barriers were not an issue among the 
workers from Uzbekistan, Russia, Iran, Rumania, the Philippines, Nigeria, Moldova, Thailand and 
Mongolia. They were not intimidated by their employer’s threat to report them to the 
immigration authority. The real challenge for the workers was the employer’s attempts to divide 
the unity among the workers. Lee Ran Ju, the former director of Bucheon Foreign Worker’s House, 
who assisted the workers from the first day upon their request, vividly describes the employer’s 
persistent attempts to break down the workers’ efforts to maintain the unity: 
The CEO ordered every word of his speech to be translated. […] 
“You don’t have all the same claim. Only 30 percent of you claim the full payment [of the 
unpaid wages]. They incited the rest of you. You will work if you receive a one-month 
wage. The inciters have made the atmosphere rough, so you are not able to present 
other opinions. We can remove those who have to be removed, and we can take only 
those who want to continue to work.” 
He even ranted,  
“It would be hard for you to speak genuinely in front of many other people because you 
mind others. Let’s talk one by one about each one’s claim.”  
What is this? He was trying to use even blunter and mean the strategy of division. […] 
Then, Mr Dmitri shouted. 
“Where is money, there is work. No money, no work!” 
His voice was loud and resonant. The workers, who had been icily watching it, started to 
make a commotion. Those who had held back their voices finally burst out. 
“No!” / “We are all the same.” / “Talk here together. No separately.” 
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“No Money! No Work!” / “Pay us! Pay us!” 
(Lee, 2003d, pp. 232-233) 
The strike drew nation-wide attention from the media and pro-migrant activists. They added 
pressure on the local government and the regional labour office, the police and the immigration 
authority. The employer was under pressure from these governmental agencies. After four days 
of the strike, the employer finally agreed to pay the full amount of overdue wages. The workers 
returned to the work only after they received the actual wages. The process of this strike was also 
filmed by an independent filmmaker and pro-migrant activist, Kim Ichan, under the title of ‘Going 
Together’ (2003b). This documentary film is often presented as a symbolic event of transnational 
solidarity of migrant workers in South Korea. 
As illustrated above, migrant workers’ protests against the exploitative working and living 
conditions had developed from passive to proactive and organised ones throughout the 1990s. 
The workers’ perceptions of the cause of their conditions also developed from an individual 
grievance to the systematic problems of the government’s labour migration policy. These cases 
exemplify the rise of migrant workers’ self-recognition, self-expression and self-organisation for 
the social movements of migrant in South Korea. 
Migrant associations in resistance 
On the other hand, migrants formed their own organisations to help each other. Self-support 
organisations were typically in the form of ethnic communities or hometown associations. The 
communities are diverse in their objectives and forms. Although their primary role is to provide 
welfare services to their members, some organisations were more interested in political activities 
on the issues of both homelands and destination country. 
The early migrant associations were mostly religious communities. For example, Sampaguita 
Philippines Community was the first recorded association of migrant workers in South Korea, 
organised by Filipino clergypersons and undocumented workers in 1992 (Seol, 2003). This 
community had begun as a parishioner group at a Catholic Nunnery in Seoul. However, it 
developed into a self-support association of migrant workers, with the support of a pro-migrant 
organisation, the Association for Foreign Workers’ Human Rights. Its members organised social 
meetings and helped each other for legal, labour-related and other matters. Later, this community 
was integrated into the community of Filipino workers at Hyehwa-dong Catholic Church with the 
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sponsorship of Seoul Archdiocese of Catholic Church (Lee, 2003c, pp. 364-368). According to a 
report of the Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Seoul (2016), there were at least 33 
religious organisations and 60 non-religious communities of Filipino migrants throughout the 
country in June 2016. The non-religious communities were organised in various forms, such as 
hometown associations (e.g. Cordillera Brotherhood Organization), local communities (e.g. Ansan 
Filipino Community), workers’ associations (e.g. Federation of Filipino Workers in Korea) or 
sports clubs (e.g. Legstrong Pinoy Bikers Club).  
Some of the non-religious communities were particularly active in political or social actions. They 
actively raised their voices on the issues of both countries of origin and destination. KASAMMAKO 
(Unity of Filipino Migrant Workers in Korea) is an example. This organisation was formed in 1998 
as the network of migrant workers’ groups that claimed to be ‘progressive Filipino organizations 
[…] fighting for the rights and welfare of […] overseas compatriots’ (KASAMMAKO, 2016). The 
ordinary activities of this organisation are not different from those of other migrant communities: 
regular meetings, communications among members, and self-supporting (Kim, 2007a). However, 
its members are particularly active in the participation in the collective actions against South 
Korean government’s immigration policies. For example, they presented a public statement 
condemning the South Korean government’s detention and deportation policy when ten 
undocumented migrants were killed in a fire accident at Yeosu Detention Center in 2007. During 
my field research in 2012, KASAMMAKO’s flags, banners and members were found at almost 
every site of collective actions against the EPS (e.g. PO_07, PO_26 and PO_36), including the rally 
of 19 August 2012 (PO_31) that I illustrated in Chapter 1. The members also played leading roles 
at almost every meeting of migrant communities and pro-migrant organisations (e.g. PO_34 and 
PO_36) including preparatory meetings for the rallies (e.g. PO_27–30 ). 
KASAMMAKO also organised occasional meetings with the Philippine Embassy in Seoul in 
cooperation with other Filipino communities, one of which I had a chance to attend as an observer 
(PO_41). They raised concerns about the Philippine government’s policies on overseas workers, 
like the embassy’s inadequate protection for Filipino workers or imposition of excessive tax on 
migrants. The organisation was also active in raising social awareness about political and social 
issues in the Philippines like extrajudicial killings, privatisation and anti-terrorism legislation 
(see KASAMMAKO, 2007). 
The Nepalese community was also active in the actions for migrant workers’ rights. Nepalese 
workers formed Nepalese Consulting Committee (NCC) in 1992. The association provided labour 
law-related consultations and welfare services to its member workers. It also functioned as a 
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consulate until the Nepalese Embassy opened in 2007 (Kim, 2007a). The NCC’s members played 
leading roles at the sit-in strikes of migrant workers in 1995 and 2003, which called for the 
protection of migrant workers’ labour rights and the legalisation of undocumented workers. They 
also made the vital leadership and significant membership of Migrant Trade Union, established 
in 2005 (see Chapter 9). Other ethnic communities have also engaged with migrant workers’ 
resistance. Bangladeshi migrants and Myanmar migrants, especially refugees, were engaged in 
political activities toward their homelands  (Kim, 2012b).  
The associations of Chinese migrants with Korean ethnicity (Joseonjok) were a significant actor 
in the debates on the South Korean diaspora policy. Despite a large population and their relatively 
long immigration history, Joseonjok migrants had not been active in forming ethnic organisations 
until the mid-1990s. The first formal association was organised in 1995: the Association of 
Chinese Workers. This organisation actively initiated advocacy work for Joseonjok migrants: it 
publicly claimed long-term visas, equal treatment at work and the free choice of employment. It 
also actively participated in the movement for the abolishment of the ITS. However, the 
Association broke down after only a year because the leadership was targeted by the immigration 
authority and eventually deported. They were charged with ‘organising illegal organisation and 
protesting in solidarity with opposition groups’ (Lee, 2003c, p. 370). After the Association was 
incapacitated by the government, Joseonjok migrants were hardly able to organise a migrant 
community. 
Instead, church-based pro-migrant groups took the lead of Joseonjok migrants’ struggles against 
the government’s unfair treatment. As discussed in Chapter 7, when the Act on the Immigration 
and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (Act on Overseas Koreans) was introduced in 1999, it 
excluded the Korean diaspora from China and Post-Soviet states from the preferential treatment 
of former Korean citizens and their descendants. The discontented Joseonjok migrants, however, 
did not organise their own collective actions. They entrusted their fates to prominent South 
Korean pastors, by converting themselves to Christianity and joining the famous churches (see 
Chapter 9).  
The Joseonjok Alliance was an exceptional case of Joseonjok migrants forming a self-support 
organisation. Joseonjok migrant, Yoo Bong Soon and Jin Bok Ja established this organisation in 
2000, amidst the growing discontentment of Joseonjok migrants about the South Korean 
government’s unfair treatment. They began with sponsoring the victims of immigration fraud and 
their children. They also provided counselling to Joseonjok migrants in difficulties. However, they 
realised the repetitive redresses of the individual cases would not resolve the problems and 
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decided to join the struggles for the amendment of the Act on the Overseas Koreans (Dongbukah 
News, 2010). After the struggles, they continued to offer shelters and services to stranded 
Joseonjok workers. They also organised a credit union to provide financial services to them, 
although it is controversial whether this was compatible with South Korean finance-related laws 
(Kim, 2015). 
As a result of the aggressive movements led by the churches, the South Korean government finally 
assured the Joseonjok migrants that they would enjoy a stable and long-term stay, would have 
free choice of jobs, and also amended the Act on Overseas Koreans in 2004. It also introduced the 
diaspora stream, VWS as a part of the EPS (see Chapter 7). After the stable status was secured, 
the self-supporting organisations of Joseonjok migrants mushroomed. The Returned Korean 
Union (Returned Korean Union, n.d.) and Han-maeum-hoe (One Soul Association) was organised 
in 2006. The Overseas Korean in Korea Association was established a year after (Overseas 
Koreans in Korea Association, n.d.). 
The growth of Joseonjok migrants was contrary to the situations that migrant workers of other 
ethnicities encountered. Most ethnic communities in South Korea had difficulties in mobilising 
members, sustaining their associations and actively getting involved in migration politics. The 
temporary labour migration policy was the most significant obstacle. As trade unionist of migrant 
background, UR argues during my interview (RP_32), 
The migrant community is indeed very difficult to sustain in Korea because most 
workers cannot stay longer than three or four years. Once a worker becomes an active 
member and takes up an important role in a community or movements, he has to return 
to home country. It makes things very unstable. 
As in other countries (e.g. Castles, 1984, Jupp, 2002, Massey et al., 1994), ethnic communities 
made crucial grounds for the mobilisation of migrants’ collective actions in South Korea. As 
mentioned earlier, Filipino and Nepalese communities were particularly active in the movements 
challenging temporary labour migration policy, while the communities of Joseonjok were actively 
involved in diaspora policy. As South Korean studies suggest, the social networks of migrants 
from same origin country played a major factor that made self-support communities active in the 
migrants’ social movements (Lee, 2005b, Piao, 2011). This became even more obvious during the 
organised resistance against the introduction of the EPS, as will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
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Resistance to new temporary labour migration policy 
Struggles against deportation operations 
After the lengthy debates among the South Korean government, civil society, employers and trade 
unions, the National Assembly passed the Bill of the Act on the EPS in July 2003 (see Chapter 6). 
The first operations that the government undertook before the law went into effect in August 
2004 were immigration raids and deportations. As I argued in Chapter 7, deportation is one of 
core governing mechanisms that the government enforced to ensure the functioning of the 
temporary labour migration scheme. It was a precondition for a successful introduction of the 
rotation-based temporary migration scheme to ‘sort out’ existing ‘illegal sojourners’ who had 
constituted a majority of the migrant population. 
In 2003, the government announced a ‘legalisation measure’ in accordance with a supplementary 
provision on ‘Special Cases for Illegal Foreign Workers’. It selectively offered undocumented 
workers the opportunity to legally extend their stay (see Table 7-2, Chapter 7). A critical condition 
was that undocumented migrants should report to the immigration authority within three 
months of the ‘voluntary report period’. After the period, the government announced it would 
enforce ‘intensive crackdown operations’ against undocumented migrants who failed to report to 
the immigration authority. 
More than 300,000 undocumented migrants faced a crossroad: whether to let the authority know 
their whereabouts by voluntarily reporting themselves and getting a legal permit to work for one 
or two more years, or to refuse the measure at all and remain undocumented as they had been. 
For those who had stayed for longer than three years without a visa, however, the government’s 
offer was not attractive enough: once they return to their home country, there would be no 
guarantee that they could come back to South Korea. Especially those who had stayed longer than 
five years and had somehow settled down in the country perceived that the government’s offer 
of ‘return without punishment’ was unfair and unacceptable (Lee, 2005b). 
As the government-set deadline of ‘voluntary report period’ was approaching, the pressures on 
undocumented workers grew to a maximum level. At least eight migrant workers reportedly 
committed suicide in the month out of anxiety about deportation (Lee, 2005b, p. 77). However, a 
large number of undocumented workers, especially those who had already stayed for longer than 
three years and had no chance to acquire a work permit, still refused the voluntary report. Before 
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the government launched ‘intensive joint operation of crack-down’ on 17 November, almost 
140,000 workers remained undocumented (Seol, 2005b, p. 16). Instead, many undocumented 
workers decided to hide in remote areas, lock themselves in their accommodation, or participate 
in protests against deportation.  
When the government announced the plan of ‘voluntary report programme’ in July, pro-migrant 
organisations and migrant workers had already discussed how to respond to the deportation 
operation. They already had an experience of dealing with a similar voluntary return programme 
in the previous year. The government implemented it partly in preparation for the introduction 
of EPS and also as a gesture of strengthened security before 2002 FIFA World Cup co-hosted by 
South Korea and Japan (Castles et al., 2012, Seol, 2005a).  
Undocumented migrant workers were affiliated with four different pro-migrant groups: the JCMK, 
the organisations which withdrew or were preparing to withdraw from the JCMK which later 
established the Migrant Rights Network (MRN), Seoul Joseonjok Church, and Equality Trade 
Union-Migrant’s Branch (ETU-MB). These four groups had significantly different approaches 
toward the government’s programme (see Chapter 9 for details of each organisation). The first 
two took a practical and realistic approach by leaving the decision whether to report to the 
authority or not up to individual undocumented workers (Park, 2005b). The last two took a hard-
line approach by refusing the ‘temporary remedy’ and claiming ‘legalisation of all undocumented 
migrants’ (Lee, 2006). Nevertheless, many long-term undocumented migrants, who were 
excluded from the opportunity to extend their legal stay, had no choice but to join collective 
actions to protest the ‘temporary remedy’. 
On the night of the last day of ‘voluntary report period’ (15 November 2003), undocumented 
migrant workers gathered to launch sit-in protests. Those who were affiliated with the JCMK sat 
together at Seoul Anglican Church. Joseonjok migrants gathered at Seoul Joseonjok Church and 
Seoul Foreign Workers and Diaspora House. The members and supporters of the ETU-MB set up 
protest camps in front of Myung-dong Cathedral. Many others gathered at other pro-migrant 
organisations throughout the country (Lee, 2005b). According to a newspaper article, the number 
of undocumented migrants who participated in the protests reached 5,700 throughout the 
country (Seo et al., 2003). For the undocumented migrants, the churches and pro-migrant 
organisations were safe places from the government’s ‘intensive crack-down operation’. 
All the groups in the sit-in protests argued the forceful immigration raids should stop. However, 
each group had different standpoints on what the alternatives should be to the deportation of 
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undocumented migrants. First, the Joseonjok groups claimed legalisation of undocumented 
Joseonjok migrants on the ground of their ‘right to live in homeland’ and ‘diaspora statuses’. They 
proactively mobilised ‘the politics of ethnonationalism’ (see Chapter 7) and intentionally 
distinguished Joseonjok migrants from migrant workers of other ethnicities. The Seoul Joseonjok 
Church of Rev. Suh Kyung Suk was particularly radical to claim ‘reinstatement of citizenship’ and 
to encourage undocumented Joseonjok migrants to abandon their Chinese citizenship (Piao, 
2011). Their strategy of mobilising ethnonationalism had an immediate effect: the President 
visited the Joseonjok sit-in protestors and promised ‘gradual solutions’ two weeks after they had 
launched the protest. Almost 2,400 undocumented Joseonjok migrants immediately wrapped up 
the sit-in protest, according to an online news report (Yeo and Im, 2003).  
Second, the JCMK and other migrant support organisations also called to ‘stop deportation’ and 
‘legalise all undocumented migrant workers’. These groups had partly accepted the ‘voluntary 
report programme’ and left whether to participate in it up to migrant workers’ individual 
decisions. Neither did they opposed the newly introduced temporary labour migration scheme, 
EPS. They had advocated the ‘Work Permit System (WPS)’, which recognised the migrant workers’ 
right to change their job. However, by the time the Bill of the Act on the EPS was passed by the 
National Assembly, they turned to accept it as a second best option and a way of abolishing the 
old pseudo-temporary labour migration scheme, ITS (see Chapter 6). When the government 
proposed a guarantee that the undocumented workers who participated in the ‘voluntary report 
programme’ would be able to come back through the EPS, these groups also accepted this 
proposal and discontinued the sit-in protests in January and February 2004 (Lee, 2005b). Then, 
migrant workers who joined these groups had to decide whether they would leave the country 
voluntarily with the uncertain guarantee to come back or remain undocumented. 
The third group, the members and supporters of ETU-MB, Nepalese Corps of Struggle, and a 
member of the MRN, Korean Migrant Human Rights Center, was the most uncompromising. In 
addition to ‘legalisation of all undocumented migrant workers’, they continued to refuse the EPS 
and continued to call for the WPS (Yeo and Im, 2003). The protestors of this group, who staged 
their protests at the front yard of Myung-dong Cathedral, never accepted the government’s 
appeasement policy of voluntary return, because they believed they had worked hard in South 
Korea and were entitled to a work permit and basic labour rights. As the documentary film, The 
undocumented is documented, directed by independent filmmaker Joo Hyun Sook (2004) 
illustrates, Bhidu, an undocumented migrant activist of the ETU-MB, was arrested by the police 
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while he was attending the ‘National Rally of Non-regular Workers’ on 26 October 2003. He 
expressed his strong convictions: 
[Bhidu was suppressed by several riot policemen and screamed.] I have rights. I have 
right to speak. When are you going to stop arresting us? I can speak of my rights, even 
though you close my mouth. Do you wanna see a migrant worker dies? […] You, your 
South Korean government is killing us. [He refused to be taken into a squad car.] My 
rights, I can speak of my rights on the land of South Korea. If I speak of my rights, you 
make my life this difficult. […] My rights, I can speak of my rights in any country in the 
world (Joo, 2004, cited in Lee, 2005, p.37). 
While all the other groups suspended the sit-in protests after they accepted the government’s 
offer of voluntary return, the ETU-MB and its 2,130 supporters publically announced 
‘Undocumented migrant workers’ refusal of voluntary return’ on 10 February 2004 (Lee, 2005b, 
p. 81). They continued the sit-in protest for 380 days with the support of a small number of South 
Korean social movement activists and trade unionists. However, they were isolated from larger 
migrant communities and migrant support organisations. The protest participants desperately 
sought to reach out to migrant communities at the risk of being arrested by the immigration police, 
instead of sitting in the protest campsite. The leaders of ETU-MB like Shamal Thapa, Huck, Khebi 
and Gupta were arrested and detained one by one; and they were eventually deported or forced 
to accept the ‘voluntary return’ (Lee, 2005b). The sit-in protests at Myung-dong Cathedral ended 
without a significant achievement in institutional changes. 
However, it is notable that the protests at Myung-dong Cathedral in 2003 and 2004 had a 
significant influence on migrant workers, as commented by my research participants JYS (RP_13) 
and UR (RP_32), who were involved in the migrants’ trade union later. Bidhu’s desperate 
resistance and screams represent the migrant workers’ construction of identity as rights-holders, 
claimants to labour rights, non-regular workers and the principal agents of migrant-rights 
movements. Also, the ETU-MB was successful in raising the self-awareness as the working class 
and a member of trade union among the undocumented migrant workers. 
Some of the workers who participated in the JCMK’s protests also realised their identity as the 
agent of movements of migrant workers. For example, the band Stop Crackdown, which I 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, was organised in the midst of the JCMK’s protests. They 
independently wrote and sung protest songs, which articulated their frustrations, identity and 
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claims in strong and simple tones. Their first song became the most famous one for migrant 
protesters: 
What we want 
Stop, stop, stop, crackdown. 
Stop, stop, stop, crackdown. 
Stop, stop, stop, crackdown. 
We are labour; we want labour rights. 
We are labour; we want labour rights. 
(Written and sung by Stop Crackdown, 2003). 
Declining migrant workers’ collective actions 
After the new temporary labour migration scheme, EPS, entered into a full operation in August 
2004, migrant workers’ collective actions drastically disappeared. Although pro-migrant activists 
occasionally organised protests against deportations, no collective action of migrant workers was 
organised in large scale for the following seven years.  
I argue the decline of migrant workers’ collective actions substantiates that the EPS effectively 
accomplished the South Korean government’s rationales behind the temporary labour migration 
scheme. As discussed in Chapter 6 and 7, one of the primary justifications for introducing the EPS 
was to ‘prevent industrial disputes’ and ‘control migrant workers’ (Lim and Seol, 2000, pp. 112-
131). The governing mechanisms of the EPS were particularly designed for this purpose and also 
efficiently functioned. 
Deportation was an obvious apparatus to suppress the resistance of migrant workers. The social 
movements of migrants lost the most active members during and after the protests in 2002 and 
2003. They were either arrested and forced to return to their home countries or incapacitated 
from organising further protests. 
The EPS also brought about two major effects that prevented the protests of migrant workers: 
making obedient workers and incorporating pro-migrant organisations. I focus on the first one in 
this section and will discuss the second mechanism in the next chapter in relation to South Korean 
civil society’s engagement with the movement for migrant workers. 
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The operating approach of the EPS has the effect of making migrant workers obedient to the 
government and employers. While the number of undocumented migrants dropped by half in a 
year as a result of the intensive deportation operations and the ‘voluntary report programme’, 
the workplaces were rapidly filled by new migrant workers who arrived through the EPS. The 
new migrant workers tended to have rather different characteristics and identities from their 
predecessors. Migrant activist who participated in the sit-in protests in 2003, UR (RP_32), 
remembers, during my interview, they tended to be more conforming to authority but have less 
working-class identity than the undocumented workers under the ITS. He says: 
The EPS workers are now different. They don’t care about labour rights. They only seek 
to earn as much money as possible in short time. They think they can go back home with 
a lot of money. They are selfish and absurd. They don’t have the idea of ‘We are labour’. 
The EPS’s inter-governmental agreements between South Korea and origin states were designed 
to ensure the recruitment of migrant workers of ‘good character’. When the South Korean 
government negotiated with origin countries for the introduction of the EPS, it stressed the 
workers’ conformity to immigration regulations as the primary condition. It prioritised the origin 
countries from which citizens showed lower tendency to become undocumented in South Korea 
for the inter-governmental agreements. It also scrutinised whether the country’s ‘migration 
management system’ was strong enough to ensure its citizens returned home after the end of 
employment contract (International Organization for Migration, 2005, 2006). While the 
Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand were the first origin countries that the South Korean 
government agreed to receive migrant workers from under the EPS, Nepal, Bangladesh and 
Myanmar, the nationals of which showed a high rate of irregular migration, had to spend one to 
three more years to assure the South Korean government before any agreements were made. 
The mandatory pre-departure orientation programme, which was a prerequisite to the origin 
state’s participation in the EPS, was often designed to train migrant workers to conform to the 
immigration rules of the destination country or the demand of employers. The MRN conducted 
on-site investigations in the origin countries of the EPS in cooperation with the NHRCK. According 
to its report, the pre-departure training failed to inform the prospective EPS workers of labour 
rights or legal protection, but primarily focused on the ‘conformity to immigration rules’, 
‘submissive attitudes toward employers’ and ‘hard-work for more income’ (Kim et al., 2007). In 
some origin countries like Sri Lanka and Vietnam, the programmes even involved military-style 
camp-trainings, which were named ‘moral education’ but were indeed aimed at brainwashing 
migrant workers into giving up their labour rights (Migrant Rights Network, 2005). The migrant 
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workforces in South Korea were rapidly replaced by the workers from these new origin countries 
(Korea Immigration Service, 1961-2017).  
Migrant workers’ self-governed union in a new phase 
During the last stage of the sit-in protest at Myung-dong Cathedral, the remaining migrant 
workers and the members of the ETU-MB were placed under a significant pressure to wrap up 
the protests without any achievements. The participants agreed they would establish an 
independent union of migrant workers as a stepping-stone for continued struggles against 
deportation and employer-oriented temporary labour migration scheme. On 3 May 2005, the 
migrant workers and pro-migrant activists dissolved the ETU-MB and launched Seoul-Gyeonggi-
Incheon Migrants’ Trade Union (MTU). By affiliating itself with the KCTU, the MTU sought to be 
different from the yellow unions and become a part of the South Korean labour movement.  
The Inaugural Declaration of the MTU (2005) stresses that all migrant workers, regardless of 
their legal status, have to be recognised as ‘workers’ who are entitled to fundamental labour 
rights, rather than ‘foreigners’ whose status is arbitrarily regulated by immigration law. I aruge 
this statement exemplifies, in Tyler and Marciniak’s term (2013, p. 148), the neo-Marxist strategy 
to mobilise ‘the category of “worker” to defetishize the figure of the “immigrant” or “illegal”’. 
The MTU also argues the employer-oriented temporary labour migration scheme is inherently 
incompatible with labour rights because it restricts the workers’ right to choose a job. The 
Declaration explicitly states the Union’s claims: 
 Stop the crackdown! 
 Stop the repression of migrant workers! 
 Legalize all undocumented migrant workers! 
 Recognise the Migrants Trade Union! 
 Replace the Employment Permit System with the Work Permit System! (see 
Chapter 6) 
 Ensure the protection of migrant workers’ human and labour rights!  
(Migrants’ Trade Union, 2005). 
Not long after their establishment, the MTU encountered critical obstacles. First, the fact that the 
founding leaders and members were all undocumented migrants was such a fundamental 
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weakness of the MTU that it could not perform the basic functions of a trade union. The South 
Korean Ministry of Employment and Labour refused to recognise the MTU having an official 
status as a trade union. It argued the union organised by ‘illegal stayers’ could not have a legal 
status. The government’s repudiation paralysed the MTU from exercising the three major rights 
of workers as stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea: the right to organise, the 
right to collective bargaining and the right to collective action. If the MTU involved itself in a 
collective action of workers, the South Korean government accused its members of conducting 
‘unlawful intervention’. On 25 June 2015, ten years after the MTU’s establishment, the Supreme 
Court finally decided migrant workers also had right to organise unions (Koo, 2015). The Ministry 
of Employment and Labour accepted the decision a year after with the condition that the MTU 
would not explicitly oppose the EPS and deportation. 
Second, the union leaders were, as soon as elected, all targeted by the immigration authority, 
arrested and deported. The first chairperson, Anwar Hussein, was arrested only 20 days after the 
election. All his successors faced the same situations. The fifth chairperson, Michel Katuira, who 
was elected in July 2009, was the first chairperson having a valid visa as an EPS worker. Despite 
his legal status, the government again claimed his activities as a trade unionist were violations of 
immigration law and the Act on the EPS. It even sought to cancel his visa, however, due to the 
Court’s decision against the government on 2 March 2011, they were unsuccessful. Although 
Michel Katuira avoided deportation, he was eventually refused re-entry to the country when he 
returned from an overseas trip (Newsis, 2012). 
Third, since the majority of members were undocumented workers who arrived during the 
period of the ITS, the MTU prioritised the interests of these workers. It was rather inactive about 
addressing the newly arising problems of new migrant workers under the EPS, which made the 
EPS workers indifferent to the union. The series of deportations of leadership also made the EPS 
workers reluctant to join the union. As stated by TT (RP_17), a migrant activist that I interviewed, 
‘migrant workers knew the MTU helps them, but they were afraid of immigration authority’s 
attention when they actively participate.’ 
Despite these obstacles, the MTU persistently demanded the government’s recognition as an 
official union and protested against deportations. It also provided labour-related legal services to 
migrant workers and protested against employers’ unlawful labour management. The election of 
Michel Katuira in 2009 was a watershed in the MTU’s activities: it gradually turned its policy 
priorities toward the EPS workers. As a staff member of the MTU, UR, stated for my interview, the 
MTU began to see results from its persistent efforts: ‘EPS-visa-holders outnumbered 
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undocumented members in 2012’ (RP_32). The MTU played an increasingly central role in the 
social movements of migrant workers in South Korea. 
Resistance to the global commodification of labour and migration 
The MTU and some South Korean pro-migrant organisations began to engage with the resistance 
against the global securitisations and precarisations. A small number of pro-migrant activists 
began to problematise the temporary labour migration policy in the context of the global 
transformations driven by neoliberalism. For example, although the statement was not precisely 
articulated at that point, social movement activist Cho Dae Hwan highlighted the global context 
in which labour migration occurs at a training workshop for the establishment of the ETU-MB: 
The inflow […] and circulation of migrant workers occur in complex connections with 
such issues as the uneven development of the capital in the capitalist world system, the 
capital’s globalisation strategy, the flexibilization of labour, and the absolute poverty and 
uneven distribution in sending countries. The inflow of migrant workers […] happens in 
the context of class relations between the capital and workers. Thus, the most important 
are the root-causes of migrant workers’ inflow in the context of class-relations and the 
formation of the subject of migrant workers through protests (Cho, 2001, pp. 17-18). 
I argue this statement exemplifies a South Korean social movement’s initiative, using Burawoy’s 
(2015, p. 24) term, to promote the ‘countermovement’ that assumes ‘a global character, couched 
in terms of human rights’. However, this approach was not yet widespread among pro-migrant 
activists. Most faith-oriented activists, who were the majority in the movement, failed to extend 
their perspectives toward understanding the dominant structural changes in society, such as the 
neoliberalisation of the labour market and growing neoliberal state. The political economic 
context of neoliberal transformation was hardly taken into account when they talked about 
individual migrant workers’ problems. Most pro-migrant activists also failed to understand the 
increase of temporary labour migration in connection with the government’s initiatives of 
flexibilisation of the labour market like the labour law amendments in 1996 and 1997 or with the 
growing discourse of ‘non-regular employment’. 
The MTU and the pro-migrant social movement activists took a practical approach in that respect. 
Their protests against the G20 Summit of 2010 in Seoul showed how migrants were affected by 
globalisation in their daily lives and how they could challenge the global forces. The first public 
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announcement the South Korean government made after it hosted the Summit was about ‘the 
establishment of public order’. In preparation for the event to be held in November, the 
government operated an ‘intensive crack-down of illegal foreigners’ between June and August 
2010 and a ‘general crack-down of foreigners’ crime’ between May and June 2010 (Yoon, 2010). 
Their impacts on migrants were immediate: international students were arrested and detained 
for not carrying identity card; undocumented migrants were beaten and arrested by immigration 
officials; deportations increased (Sohn, 2010). The MTU and pro-migrant activists organised a 
human rights watchdog. The MTU entered into a sit-in protest on 13 July against the crackdown, 
and its chairperson went on a hunger strike for 30 days. The protests attracted media attention 
and wide support from anti-globalisation groups, although they failed to achieve any actual 
changes in government policy. It is particularly significant that the migrant workers’ movement 
became a crucial part of the South Korean civil society against neoliberal globalisation. 
Reviving migrant workers’ collective actions 
The series of collective actions of migrant workers in 2012, which I illustrated in Chapter 1, were 
a break from the long silence of discontented migrant workers that had continued for ten years 
since the introduction of the EPS. The resistance of 2012 also generated a significant change in 
the movements: the MTU played a central role in re-organising the coalition of pro-migrant 
organisations, trade unions, and social movement organisations. It is also an unprecedented 
situation where the new EPS workers finally became the dominant force of migrant workers’ 
movements. While the previous collective actions mostly focused on deportation and legalisation 
of undocumented workers, the protestors of 2012, for the first time, challenged the core 
governing mechanism of the temporary labour migration programme: restriction of the right to 
choose a job. It was also the first time that the workers, who were employed by the EPS, publicly 
claimed ‘Stop EPS’.  
Their claims influenced the pro-migrant organisations’ attitudes toward the EPS. Except for the 
MTU and its supporters, most pro-migrant organisations had been reluctant to re-claim the Work 
Permit System. In 2003, they had to withdraw it and support the EPS as a way of stopping the 
retention of the ITS. They had considered the Work Permit System, which recognises migrant 
workers’ right to a full access to the labour market and to pathways to permanent residence, as 
an unrealistic or unreachable goal. Their defeatist attitude continued for the next ten years. Being 
inspired by the series of migrant workers’ protests in 2012, the major coalitions of pro-migrant 
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organisations, the JCMK and the MNR, publicly turned their positions to re-claiming the Work 
Permit System. 
Finally, the protests of 2012 were the meaningful revival of the collective actions self-organised 
by migrant workers. Throughout the preparatory meetings for the protests, I was able to observe 
the pro-migrant activists, who had learnt from their experience of the protests in 2003 and 2004, 
patiently avoid taking any lead in discussions. They sought to encourage the workers to form the 
free agency as migrant activists (PO_27, PO_28, PO_29, PO_30). The Alliance for Equality and 
Human Rights of Migrant Workers, which was organised in 2007 as the coalition of the MTU, pro-
migrant organisations, trade unions and political movement organisations (see Chapter 9), 
facilitated the migrant workers’ meetings with particular sensitivity about democratic and 
transparent decision-making, effective communication among migrant workers of different 
languages, as well as equal relationships between pro-migrant activists and migrant workers. I 
argue that it eventually contributed to building trust among the new EPS migrant workers. 
Conclusion 
The experience of many migrant workers in South Korea included extremely poor working 
conditions, low wages, and discrimination at workplaces. These experiences were the outcomes 
of the ‘commodification of labour and migration’: migrants were seen as a mere ‘workforce’ or a 
unit of production, not as human beings with a whole life history, culture and human relations. 
The commodification of labour was proceeded by the government to maximise profits for 
employers. 
The ‘countermovement’ of migrant workers began with desperate expressions of grievance but 
soon developed toward collective actions challenging the employers’ unfair treatment and 
eventually the systematic problems of the pseudo-temporary labour migration schemes, the ITS. 
The country-wide protests of undocumented migrants were triggered by the intensive 
immigration raids and deportations, which were parts of the governing mechanisms of the newly 
introduced EPS as well as the expression of the ‘ex-commodification’ of undocumented workers. 
The government’s strategy to handle undocumented migrants was to make divisions between the 
preferred and the unwanted and to exclude the latter. The lines of division were between short-
term undocumented migrants and long-term ones and also between ethnic Koreans and others. 
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The government’s strategy of division and exclusion severely hampered the unity of migrant 
workers and their solidarity with South Korean civil society groups. Many migrant workers 
eventually conformed to the governing mechanisms of the EPS and many pro-migrant 
organisations were incorporated into it. Only a small group of hard-line migrants and activists 
continued the protests against the temporary labour migration scheme. 
The social movements of migrants, however, experienced a downturn after the 
institutionalisation of the temporary labour migration scheme as a result of the effective 
operation of the governing mechanisms of the EPS. The series of migrant workers’ protests in 
2012 indicate a revival of migrants’ challenges against temporary labour migration policy and its 
neoliberal commodification of labour and migration. After ten years of operations, the temporary 
labour migration programme’s fallacy came to be understood by workers. A seemingly small 
change of the government’s rules, triggered the workers’ resistance against the system. The 
migrant workers’ resistance against the temporary labour migration policy was an expression of 
protective countermovement that seeks to challenge the fictitious commodification of migrant 
labour and to re-embed migration into society. They also extended its scope of perspective 
towards the root-causes of commodification and the global context of transformations, which had 
direct impacts on individual workers’ lives. The solidarity of the anti-globalisation movement and 
the civil rights groups has grown as the core force to accelerate the migrant workers’ resistance 
against the South Korea temporary labour migration policy. 
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Chapter 9 South Korean civil society’s engagement 
: a social movement approach  
In continuation of the previous chapter, this chapter seeks to answer the third set of research 
questions as presented in Chapter 1: ‘what are migrant workers’ experiences of the scheme and 
in what way have they engaged with the policy process, especially in connection with South 
Korean social movements?’ As mentioned in the previous chapter, South Korean pro-migrant 
organisations actively engaged with migrant workers’ collective actions. They assisted migrant 
workers in organising collective actions and negotiating with the government and employers on 
the workers’ behalf. This chapter shows the pro-migrant activists had already engaged with 
protecting migrant workers, before the migrant workers began to express their grievances and 
resisted against the appalling working conditions.  
The first and second sections discuss how and why pro-migrant organisations of non-migrant 
activists engaged with the protection of migrant workers and their struggles. South Korean 
scholars studied some aspects of this topic by delineating the establishment and development of 
the pro-migrant groups (Lee, 2003c, Lee, 2006, Seol, 2005a), by analysing the characteristics of 
the organisations (Park, 2005b), by examining the emergence in the context of post-
democratisation (Kim, 2003d), or by focusing on the role of religion (Kim, 2011a). On top of the 
literature, my analysis in the first section focuses on the strategies of two major groups: faith-
based organisations and citizens’ movement groups. 
The second section examines the pro-migrant activists’ motivations in the historical and political-
economic contexts. The founding members of many pro-migrant organisations had already been 
involved in South Korean social movements for democratisation and labour rights. They diverted 
attention to emerging concerns on migrant workers’ conditions. The second-generation activists 
were more influenced by changing political-economic conditions, i.e. globalisation and 
precarisation. Then, I discuss the controversies over two particular issues among the pro-migrant 
activists: whether to maintain a universalism or to adopt a nationalist approach as a strategy; and 
whether to seek to disseminate a religious faith or to remain as a service deliverer. 
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Although the pro-migrant organisations made crucial contributions to protecting migrant 
workers and promoting migrant rights, they are organisations ‘for’ migrants, not ‘of’ migrants. 
Thus, they were often questioned about their representativeness, unequal relationship with 
migrants, paternalistic attitude toward migrants, and the objectification of migrants (e.g. Gray, 
2007, Shim, 2007). Thus, the third section examines the relationship between migrant workers 
and non-migrant activists.  
The last section begins with another dilemma of the pro-migrant organisations: whether to 
pursue a social movement approach for institutional changes and migrants’ political 
empowerment or to focus on service deliveries for migrants’ daily needs. Then, I present an 
emerging model of social movement-oriented pro-migrant activism that takes into account the 
migration process, temporary labour migration policy and social movements in the context of 
neoliberal globalisation. This group played a leading role in the revival of migrant workers’ 
collective actions in 2012. 
Emerging of pro-migrant activists and organisations 
The clergy’s services for migrant workers 
In the early 1990s, a small number of clergypersons began to engage with the migrant workers 
in their local areas. The Protestant and the Catholic churches were already located in industrial 
areas in Seoul or neighbouring cities near the workplaces of migrant workers. They had provided 
services to local workers. After the industrial areas were deserted by the local workers and filled 
by migrant workers, the clergy continued to provide the same services to the newly arrived 
migrant workers. 
They began by offering religious services. The migrant workers with religion sought to continue 
their religious practices in the destination country; so, they began to visit churches near where 
they worked or lived. Since the churches recognised the increasing number of migrant members, 
they began to provide the services in English or other languages of the migrant workers’ origin 
(Seol, 2005a). As was in the cases with other immigration countries (e.g. Cadge and Ecklund, 
2007), the religious services helped migrants maintain their ethnic and religious identities as well 
as build social networks among the migrants. 
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Soon after, the churches were requested to offer humanitarian services like medical care and 
shelter. Under the ITS, failed pseudo-temporary labour migration policy, no labour rights were 
recognised. The South Korean government and employers took no responsibility for the migrant 
workers’ welfare, despite growing needs. An immediate response from the religious groups was 
to assume the responsibility rather than to advocate systematic changes in policy. Since the 
religious groups were in a relatively favourable position to mobilise substantial resources from 
their membership or from other churches, they provided migrants with the services for free. As a 
renowned pastor, KH (RP_02), stated at my interview, the service provision was considered as a 
practice of their religious faith: ‘hospitality to strangers’ and ‘care of the disadvantaged’. 
As the needs increased, the churches set up organisations specialised in services for migrant 
workers under the auspices of the church. Several members of a Christian grassroots community, 
who had been working in Guro industrial district in Seoul since 1990, set up the Foreign Worker’s 
Refuge in 1992. The Catholic workers’ association, Young Christian Workers and Christian Workers 
Movement, had been concerned about migrant issues since 1990 and established the Foreign 
Workers Counselling Center in 1992 under the auspice of the Seoul Archdiocese. Both 
organisations took significant roles in supporting the migrant workers’ protests in 1994 and 1995 
illustrated in Chapter 8. 
It was followed by the churches in local cities. The Presbyterian Jumin Church in Seongnam was 
established 1973 for the poor local workers who had been forcefully relocated from central Seoul 
by the authoritarian government’s gentrification plan. The church began to serve migrant 
workers from 1991 (Jumin Church, n.d.) and set up the Seongnam Foreign Workers’ House and 
Chinese Diaspora’s House in 1994 (Seongnam Migrants Center, n.d.). The Anglican St. Francisco 
Church at Namyanju was established by English priests in 1964. It had served the community of 
Hansen’s disease (leprosy) patients, who had been collectively relocated by the authoritarian 
government (Goh and Lee, 2013). The community managed to settle down and rented out their 
land to furniture-makers. The employers of the furniture factories began to hire undocumented 
migrants from the late 1980s. The Church began to provide religious services to the migrants in 
1991 and established the Shalom House – Namyangju City Center for Foreigners’ Welfare in 1997 
with the sponsorship of a local government (Shalom House, n.d.).  
A growing number of migrant workers was in need of not only the humanitarian assistance but 
also labour-related legal services. The clergy were often asked to assist workers in resolving 
labour-related disputes on overdue wages or compensations for industrial accidents. Many of the 
clergypersons actively engaged with these issues on behalf of migrant workers on the basis of 
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their previous experience with local workers. South Korean sociologist, Kim (2011a, p. 1650) 
referred to them as the ‘activist clergy’. 
At the early stages, the activist clergy often relied on personal networks or other informal 
methods to redress employers’ illegal treatment of migrant workers, rather than pursued legal 
processes or systematic changes in policy. For example, Rev. Kim Hae-Seong, who was the pastor 
of Jumin Church and the director of Seongnam Migrant Workers’ House, testifies how the activist 
clergy dealt with the labour disputes in his autobiographic essay: 
He [a migrant worker] fell to death from the 16th floor at a construction site […] I went to 
the construction office and said ‘I want to talk about the fatal incident’. The construction 
manager […] slammed the door in my face. I called the CEO of the company and 
demanded a meeting […] I also met the Mayor of Seongnam city […] and the Member of 
National Assembly who sat for Seongnam electorates. […] After a few days, the 
construction manager came to me with a frightened face. […] ‘Dear Reverend, […] I 
apologise for my ignorance of you.’ After all, the company paid compensation to the 
worker’s family (Kim, n.d., pp. 22-23). 
However, the activist clergy’s strategy of mediation was not sustainable for resolving the labour 
disputes in the long run. The number of cases dramatically increased and the cases became 
significantly more complicated. Thus, they turned their attention toward systematic changes in 
policy through collective actions. Members of the Foreign Workers’ Refuge testified in an 
interview with an independent paper how their strategy had changed. 
At first, we appealed to the employers’ conscience. […] After around four months, we 
concluded […] we had to challenge this […] We generated tensions and conflicts, […] 
When we took actions like protest rallies, we could see employers and the police 
suddenly changed their attitudes. […] We realised the fundamental solution is […] to 
establish ethical environments and structural improvement. Thus, we assisted in the sit-
in protest to call for the full application of labour law (Ryu, 1994). 
While the majority of faith-based organisations limited their scope of activities to providing 
humanitarian services to individual migrant workers, the ‘activist clergy’ realised that 
humanitarian services only alleviated the individual workers’ difficulties but would not stop the 
abusive and poor working conditions. Their advocacy moved to focusing on the equal entitlement 
of labour-related standards to migrant workers, including compensation schemes for industrial 
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accidents and minimum wage standards. The ‘activist clergy’ played leading roles in the 
abolishment of the ITS and the amendment of the Act on Overseas Koreans and also made 
significant contributions to organising the nation-wide and cross-religious coalition of pro-
migrant organisations, JCMK. A South Korean scholar acknowledged them as ‘catalysers in 
promoting the status and rights of migrants in Korea’ (Kim, 2011a, p. 1664). 
Despite the acknowledgement of their contributions, the activist clergy have also been criticised 
for their ambivalent attitude toward migrants. They were often responsible for the hierarchical 
culture within organisations, paternalistic or patronising attitudes toward migrants, and religious 
pressure on non-Christian migrants. These issues will be discussed later from the perspective of 
ambivalent relationship between migrants and activists.  
Nevertheless, the activist clergy’s early activities for migrants were still not the initiator of the 
social movements of migrant workers. As discussed in Chapter 8, the social movements of migrant 
workers were triggered by the discontented migrant workers who actively expressed their 
grievances and protested. The migrant workers’ resistance made the activist clergy, who had 
been enthusiastic about addressing social injustice, realise their grievances would have to be 
linked with the efforts for institutional changes in South Korean society. The migrant workers 
inspired the activist clergy to take a lead in the social movements for institutional and legal 
improvements for migrant workers.  
Citizens organised for migrant workers’ rights 
While the faith-based organisations dominated pro-migrant groups, NGOs with no religious 
background also emerged. The first of its kind was The Association for Migrant Worker’s Human 
Rights (1992) established in Seoul by a group of social movement activists, academics and other 
professionals. It was followed by the organisations in local cities: for example, Bucheon Foreign 
Worker’s House (n.d.) in 1995, the Busan Association for Foreign Workers’ Human Rights in 1996 
(Solidarity with Migrants, 2016) and Korea Migrant Workers’ Human Rights Center in Incheon in 
2001 (Korea Migrant Human Rights Center, n.d.). As mentioned in Chapter 7, these organisations 
later changed their names after they reflected on the exclusionary connotations of some of the 
terms they had used. They replaced the ‘foreign’ with ‘migrant’ to emphasise migrancy not 
alienness; ‘migrant worker’ with ‘migrant’ to include non-working migrants; and ‘for migrant’ 
with ‘with migrant’ to emphasise solidarity not charity. 
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These organisations identified themselves as ‘citizens’ movement’ organisations (Seol, 2005a, p. 
80). The citizens’ movement had largely engaged with the social issues affecting the lives of 
citizens (see Chapter 5). Noticing the growing problems faced by migrant workers, however, they 
extended their concerns toward the issues of non-citizens. 
Like most citizens’ movement organisations, the founders of these pro-migrant organisations 
sought to generate their activism through a wide participation of citizens. For example, the 
Association for Foreign Workers’ Human Rights, in its inaugural declaration (1992), called for the 
voluntary and expanded participation of professionals and citizens: 
Until now, only several thoughtful clergypersons have individually helped [migrant 
workers] with their efforts. However, the problem is too serious and huge to be resolved 
by individual efforts […] Anyone, who believes foreign workers are the same human 
beings […] and their basic rights have to be guaranteed, may participate in this 
association. We expect the participation of not only lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, 
teachers but also clergypersons, workers, students, citizens and anyone who is 
interested. 
The citizens’ movement groups did not limit their activities to redressing individual migrant 
workers’ problems. They sought to address institutional and structural problems through 
political actions, research and policy development. For their everyday activities, they still 
responded to migrant workers’ request for consultations on labour- or immigration-related legal 
problems or medical or shelter services. However, they considered the information collected 
through the activities as the grounds for research and policy-making and ultimately for 
institutional changes. For example, the founders of the Association for Foreign Workers’ Human 
Rights (1992) proclaimed that: 
We hope to pull together to protect foreign workers’ human rights […] through various 
activities […] like legal consultations, […] investigations on the conditions, and research 
for the improvement of the system. 
The citizens’ movement group made particularly significant contributions to systematic 
investigations, agenda-setting and policy-proposals. As mentioned in Chapter 7, the JCMK (2000) 
published a report on human rights conditions of migrant workers, which made a critical 
contribution to initiating the political debates for institutional changes in labour migration 
system. The report recognises that the Busan Association for Foreign Workers’ Human Rights and 
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its director, Jeong Guesun, took the lead in the investigation, compilation and analysis of human 
rights violation cases and also the coordination of the project. The Busan Association continued 
investigations of migrant workers’ working conditions. An example is the report on ‘overseas 
investment company’s trainees’ who were employed by an overseas branch of a South Korean 
company and dispatched to its headquarter in South Korea (Migration and Women's Rights 
Network, 2002). The report exposed the exploitative working conditions of these workers, which 
had not been known to the public. The employer in South Korea was exempt from the obligation 
to protect the rights of those workers because they were formally employed by the overseas 
company. The investigations continued in collaboration with trade unions (Assocation for 
Foreign Worker's Human Rights, 2008, Solidarity with Migrants, 2009).  
In 2005, the Busan Association established an affiliated research institute, the Migration and 
Human Rights Institute (n.d.) to promote independent and professional migration research. The 
Institute made significant contributions to the pro-migrant movements by conducting research 
and proposing an alternative migration policy (e.g. Migration and Human Rights Institute, 2006, 
Soliarity Network with Migrants Japan, 2007). As KGD, Director of a citizens’ movement-oriented 
pro-migrant organisation (RP_07) acknowledged, it also facilitated the activists’ discussions 
about the movement’s strategies by organising workshops and training programmes. 
The independent professionals also made significant contributions to the research and policy-
making activities of the pro-migrant groups. For example, sociologist Seol Dong-hoon was one of 
the founding members of the Association for Foreign Workers’ Human Rights. He conducted 
surveys on the conditions of migrant workers in collaboration with pro-migrant organisations 
and also actively participated in the discussions for alternative migration policies (e.g. Seol, 1999, 
2003, Seol et al., 2002). Cultural anthropologist Kim Hyun Mee also made significant 
contributions to the social movements for marriage migrants, migrant workers and refugees by 
producing significant research findings (e.g. Kim, 2006b, 2011c, Kim, 2012a, b). She also actively 
participated in migrants’ collective actions (e.g. PO_25) and co-organised joint meetings of 
researchers, activists, lawyers and service providers, Forum on Migrant Women’s Rights (PO_42).  
MINBYUN–Lawyers’ for a Democratic Society and GONGGAM–Korea Public Interest Lawyers 
played important roles in drawing the judiciary’s attention on migrant rights. The lawyer’s groups 
had already been actively involved in advocacy for workers even before democratisation as well 
as important actors in the process of the democratisation in 1987, as mentioned in Chapter 4. As 
the rule of law has been consolidated since the series of democratic governments came into 
power, the lawyers’ involvement in the advocacy and movements for social minorities has 
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become more significant, systemised and organised. Since migrant workers were one of 
significant minority groups who were either outside or around the border line of legal protection, 
the lawyers paid particular attentions to this group. Their strategy was to translate the migrant 
workers’ claims into legal terms and bring the cases to the court. Once the workers’ claims were 
officialised and recognised by the judiciary, they became political leverage in lobbying or pressing 
the government for improving government rules in favour of migrants. 
Nevertheless, some professionals gave a reflexive assessment of their engagement with the social 
movement for migrants. For example, YJ (RP_28), a public-interest lawyer who actively advocated 
migrants’ labour rights, was concerned the domination of professionals and the legalisation of 
migrants’ claims might weaken the dynamics of social movements. She stated: 
Professional and legal approaches to migrant workers’ rights help provide immediate 
remedies to the workers. However, I am concerned that excessive professionalisation 
and legalisation may diminish the workers’ self-organised movement for their own 
rights. Lawyers have to be, at best, an assistance to their social movements, not the 
central in the movements. 
Coalition and division of pro-migrant organisations 
The migrant workers’ protests of 1995 inspired both migrant workers at workplaces and South 
Korean pro-migrant activists. While the former went on strikes at their own workplaces (see 
Chapter 8), the latter organised a nation-wide coalition of pro-migrant organisations, the JCMK. 
The pro-migrant activists of both religious and citizens’ movement backgrounds agreed on the 
imperative of a joint effort to address the root-causes of widespread human rights violations on 
migrant workers and to improve the labour migration policy. Ten pro-migrant organisations, 
including those mentioned above, took the leadership. Nepalese, Bangladeshi, Chinese and Sri 
Lankan migrant communities also took part in the coalition (Seol, 2005a). The JCMK’s primary 
aim was to abolish the ITC. It particularly contributed to drafting, proposing and lobbying for an 
alternative labour migration policy by engaging with the legislation process (see Chapter 6).  
Since the JCMK member organisations continued to provide practical services to migrant workers 
as well as actively engaged with political activities, they soon grew highly influential among both 
migrant communities and South Korean civil society groups. Four years after its establishment, 
the JCMK (1999) had 27 member organisations. The growth in membership, however, did not 
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help form a stronger coalition. According to Seol (2005a), who had closely followed up the 
development of the JCMK, it was related to the funding opportunities which the JCMK could 
deliver to its member organisations. As the government and private donors had been increasingly 
interested in sponsoring the organisations since the late 1990s, the JCMK assumed the 
responsibility for liaison between donors and member organisations and for ‘gatekeeping’ 
financial sponsorship. As co-founder of a former member organisation of the JCMK, KY (RP_23), 
testified, ‘some of the new members seemed certainly more interested in money than social 
movements’. 
Between 2000 and 2001, the coalition went through severe turbulence. Internal conflicts among 
pro-migrant activists divided the JCMK into three groups: the Migrant Rights Network (MRN), 
Equality Trade Union – Migrants’ Branch (ETU–MB) and the remaining JCMK.  
The MRN was initiated by three organisations which had been a part of the JCMK’s leadership. 
They withdrew from the JCMK in 2000, questioning undemocratic decision-making process 
within the coalition. They established Migration and Woman Network in 2001 and also organised 
the Daejeon Forum in 2003, which was later renamed the MRN. As LG (RP_03), JG (RP_04), YH 
(RP_05) and CHM (RP_14), who were current or former leaders of the MRN, all emphasised, they 
sought to reject the ‘well-reputed-leader-oriented movement’ but to uphold the ‘activist-oriented 
movement’.  
The ETU-MB was launched by former staff members of the JCMK and migrant workers who 
supported them. These staff members collectively resigned from the secretariat of the JCMK in 
2000 and established Strikers’ Headquarter for the Full Achievement of Migrants’ Labour Rights 
and the Realisation of Migration and Employment. They criticised the JCMK for failing at four major 
issues: ‘fostering migrant workers’ self-reliance’, ‘identifying the antagonistic relationship 
between capitalist and worker’, ‘establishing a united front’, and ‘solidarity with labour 
movement’ (Cho, 2001, pp. 24-26). In 2001, this organisation affiliated itself to the KCTU as the 
ETU-MB. The Equality Trade Union, to which the Migrant Branch was affiliated, was a non-
enterprise-based union, established for unionising precarious, unorganised and non-regular 
workers (Kim, 2001c). In 2005, the ETU-MB was transferred to the MTU (see Chapter 8). 
The remaining JCMK, despite the separations, continued to grow due to its increased brand 
awareness. Various organisations of diverse backgrounds, perspectives and interests joined the 
coalition. The JCMK eventually suffered continuing internal conflicts in relation to leadership 
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elections and decision-making process, according to research participants WS (RP_20) and LW 
(RP_21), who were founding members of the JCMK. 
There had been three primary sources of the division of the JCMK: objectification of migrant 
workers, undemocratic decision-making processes and a divided position on the new temporary 
labour migration policy, EPS. First, the objectification of migrant workers was a longstanding 
challenge for the pro-migrant social movements. At the early stage, the pro-migrant activists of 
the JCMK sought to encourage migrant workers’ participation and to include ethnic communities 
as member organisations (Park, 2002c, Seol, 2005a). However, the non-migrant activists soon 
dominated the policy-making process and governance of the coalition, while migrant workers 
were in a difficult position to actively engage with them. Although an apparent reason was the 
language barrier, the fundamental problem was the hierarchical relationship between pro-
migrant activist leaders and migrant workers. As Gray (2007) and Kim (2011b) criticised, some 
leaders with religious backgrounds tended to have paternalistic or even superior attitudes 
toward migrant workers. Migrant workers were often treated as clients of service provision 
rather than the claimants to labour rights. They perceived that they gradually became the object 
of pro-migrant activists’ movements not the subject of their own movements.  
As the migrant communities eventually withdrew themselves from the coalition, the JCMK had to 
change its name from Joint Committee ‘of Migrant Worker’ to ‘for Migrant Worker’ in 1998 (Lee, 
2005b). It was a symbolic gesture of acknowledgement that migrant workers were absent in the 
movement for migrant workers. After a series of internal conflicts and reflections, the coalition 
changed its name again to ‘Joint Committee with Migrant Worker’ in 2007, as a way of expressing 
their commitment to fostering solidarity with migrant workers. Nevertheless, no member 
organisation of the JCMK had yet been self-governed by migrant workers and no activist in the 
JCMK’s leadership has been of migrant background until 2012, as admitted by my research 
participants WS (RP_20) and LW (RP_21). 
Second, the undemocratic decision-making processes both at the levels of organisations and the 
coalition were the source of junior activists’ discontent. At individual member organisations, ‘top-
down leadership’ was a common practice. The leaders were often the founder of the organisation 
or senior clergypersons. They were accustomed to making decisions on their own for seemingly 
urgent matters. Many junior activists, who had a religious conviction or commitment to human 
rights, worked devotedly despite working conditions sometimes being poorer and wages lower 
than those of migrant workers. However, their leaders’ unilateral or even dogmatic decisions 
were hard to accept, as they valued democratic decision-making process within organisation. The 
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organisations commonly experienced high turnover of junior staff members, while their founders 
held the absolute leadership for a long time. My research participants, like LG (RP_03), JG (RP_04) 
and YH (RP_05), who had been involved in the movement since the mid-1990s, commonly 
recalled how serious the problem was: 
It was a vicious circle. Experienced activists couldn’t stand the unfair working 
relationship and left the organisations. Then, unexperienced new staff members filled 
the position. Again, and again. The long-standing leaders of the organisations could have 
stronger power than anyone else (RP_05). 
At the coalition level, some leaders’ attitudes toward decision-making processes and lobbying 
practices were questioned by other member organisations. The JCMK had official procedures for 
decision-making like the executive committee and general assembly meetings. The meetings 
were often dominated by male and senior leaders, while the opinions of junior activists or migrant 
activists were often ignored. The decisions made through the official processes were often 
ignored by the leaders when they represented the coalition and negotiated with the government. 
Sometimes, they had unofficial meetings and negotiations with government representatives 
without the coalition’s prior endorsement. Then, they unilaterally informed the member 
organisations about the agreement they made. My research participant, CHM (RP_14), a former 
representative of a network of pro-migrant organisations, recalls: 
He [a senior representative of the coalition] often came to executive meetings with ‘good 
news’, as he called it. He proudly said we reached an agreement with the government on 
the compensation for victims of industrial accidents. All others looked at him without 
any word. We had never entrusted him with such a secret meeting with the government 
nor such a negotiation. What we needed was not the compensation, but an official 
apology of the government. We just said to ourselves, ‘Not again’. 
Third, the positions on the introduction of the EPS was the critical issue dividing the movement. 
As discussed in Chapter 6 and 8, when the South Korean government initiated the discussion for 
the abolition of the ITS and introduction of the EPS, the JCMK initially proposed a ‘Work Permit 
System’ that allows migrant workers to freely choose their job and to have access to permanent 
residence. The leadership of the JCMK, however, envisaged the proposal would be hardly 
accepted by the government under pressure from employers. The JCMK finally turned their 
position to support the second best option, the EPS, as a measure of stopping the worse 
programme, ITS.  
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After the Bill of the Act on the EPS passed the National Assembly in 2003, the South Korean 
government introduced a voluntary return programme for undocumented workers before it 
launched intensive deportation operations. The JCMK maintained a neutral position on this 
programme: it left up to individual migrants to decide whether or not to participate in the 
programme. The MRN also accepted the EPS and the voluntary return programme, although it 
maintained the position of ‘critical support’ and launched close monitoring of the operations 
afterwards (Lee, 2005, Park, 2005, Kim, 2011).  
The ETU-MB severely criticised the pro-migrant organisations for the ‘opportunistic’ change of 
position. It argued the JCMK’s decision failed to represent the wishes of migrant workers but was 
to give up the full protection of the workers. The ETU-MB also strongly refused the voluntary 
return programme, because it gave no opportunity to long-term undocumented migrants. Instead, 
it claimed ‘a full legalisation of all undocumented migrants’ (Seol, 2005a, Lee, 2005).  
Despite the growing antagonism among the leaders, the junior members of each group continued 
to seek co-operations with each other. When the disastrous fire incident happened at Yeosu 
Detention Center in 2007, which killed ten undocumented migrant inmates, they organised a 
nation-wide temporary network with the broad participation of pro-migrant organisations, trade 
unions, socialist groups, human rights organisations and other civil society groups. Later, some 
members of the network, including my research participants KGD (RP_07), KI (RP_08), LJW 
(RP_11), JYS (RP_13) and UR (RP_32) organised a permanent network, Alliance for Migrants’ 
Equality and Human Rights. It played critical roles in mobilising the protests against the EPS in 
2012, which was illustrated in Chapter 1. 
Pro-migrant activists in the historical and the political-economic contexts 
A historical background: legacy of democratisation and industrialisation 
The historical background of the faith-based groups was a decisive factor behind their 
engagement with migrant workers. Scholars of historical approach argue the church’s proactive 
involvement in the movement for migrant workers was the legacy of its involvement in social 
movements during the period of democratic transition (Kim, 2011a, Kim, 2003d). The ‘activist 
clergy’ (Kim, 2011a, p. 1649) took lead of the church’s social participation. During the 
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authoritarian and industrialisation period, they actively supported the labour movements of local 
workers, most of whom were internal migrants. They eventually saw the empowered local 
workers establish independent unions and achieve significant political leverage. By that time, the 
activist clergy took notice of the poor conditions of newly arrived migrant workers. Their 
concerns turned to the international migrant workers who were in vulnerable conditions in 
different ways. The faith-based activists among my research participants, PC (RP_01), KH (RP_02), 
CEP (RP_06) and KY (RP_23) all had such backgrounds. 
Motivation for the pro-migrant activists came not only from the experiences of the 
democratisation movement, but also the organisational and individual experiences of migration 
during the industrialisation period. Anyang Jeon Jin Sang Social Welfare Center, formerly Workers’ 
Hall, was established in 1968 by a Belgium-based association of Catholic lay people, the 
Association Fraternelle Internationale (Inter-Culture Association) with the sponsorship of 
Austrian and German donors. The Center’s main purpose was to provide welfare services, labour 
law trainings and accommodation to young internal migrant workers. In the 1970s, it also 
provided pre-departure orientations to South Korean ‘guest workers’ who were about to go to 
Germany as miners or nursing assistants. Lee Keum Yeon, the former director of the Center, 
joined it as a young boarding worker in the early 1980s. The Center had provided free 
accommodation to young workers like her, who came from rural areas and sought jobs at the then 
industrialising city, Anyang (Anyang Jeon Jin Sang Social Welfare Center, 2003).  
When Lee became the director in 1997, the dormitories of the Center was already full of 
international migrant workers who had been thrown out of or run away from their company. The 
major beneficiaries of the Center had shifted from internal to international migrants, although its 
functions had not significantly changed (Anyang Jeon Jin Sang Social Welfare Center, 2003). Lee 
established Anyang Migrant Workers’ House. In the Center’s history book, published for its 35th 
anniversary, Lee acknowledges: 
When I was young, I learnt from my experience about the reality of exploited workers. 
The government decorated the reality with such words as ‘the country’s industrial 
mainstay’. But, I know the words meant not more than exploitation to the workers. The 
experience motivates me to engage with the people and the workers suffering from the 
structural evil of the society (Anyang Jeon Jin Sang Social Welfare Center, 2003, p. 48). 
She also opened a shelter for migrant women, WeHome. Her special concerns on ‘the 
discrimination against female migrant workers’ were rooted in her experience of internal 
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migration. This case suggests the history of internal migration is a significant element for South 
Korean activists’ engagement with the social movements for migrants. 
As was in the case with the faith-based groups, the rise of citizens’ movement groups was also 
largely ‘the legacy of democratisation movement of the earlier decade’ (Kim, 2003d, p. 248) at 
least for early-generation activists. Many founding members of the groups used to be a part of 
democratisation and labour movements of the 1980s. For example, Park Seok-un, the founding 
director of the Association for Foreign Workers’ Human Rights, had been a student movement 
activist in the 1970s. Having been a member of an underground resistance movement and 
participating in the demonstrations against the dictatorships, he was imprisoned two times and 
expelled from his university, although he was able to return later. In the 1980s, he worked as a 
labour-law consultant and provided free legal services to the local workers who had suffered 
overdue wages or unpaid compensation for industrial injuries (Yoon, 2012b, Yoon, 1999). Later, 
he expanded his scope of activities to include non-local workers. 
When the early activists encountered the exploitative working conditions of migrant workers, the 
scene was familiar to them because it overlapped with their experiences of the labour and 
democratisation movement throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. The scene was, however, 
striking because it still existed in the 1990s in South Korea. For JG (RP_04), a founding member 
of a citizens’ movement-oriented pro-migrant organisation, the scene symbolised the coexistence 
of the past of South Korean workers and the present of migrant workers. She had devoted her 20s 
and 30s to democratisation of South Korean society and emancipation of the working class. She 
had thought the society achieved a certain level of improvement. However, the reality was 
contrary to her expectation. At the workplaces, nothing changed except the nationality of the 
workers. She recalled the contradictory reality strongly motivated her to participate in the 
movement. 
I had been involved in the underground labour movement for about fifteen years […] 
One day, I happened to hear that a migrant worker was in need of help. I went to see 
him. Then, what a shocking scene. I realised all the achievement of the Korean labour 
movement was only an illusion. There were exactly the same working conditions which 
shocked me when I had first joined the labour movement in the 1980s. Nothing changed, 
except who do the jobs. I realised I had to start from the scratch again with the same 
problems at the same place but for the new people (RP_04). 
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Lived experience as an international migrant during the industrialisation period was also an 
important motive to participate in the movement. One of the volunteer staff members of Bucheon 
Foreign Workers’ House, Park Myung Ja had been one of the nurses who were sent to Germany as 
guest workers in the late 1960s (see Chapter 4). When she returned to her home in Bucheon in 
1997, she was surprised not only by the dramatic changes of landscapes but also of the 
populations, as she recalls in her interview for the organisations’ newsletter (Park, 2005a). When 
she saw an exhausted face of a migrant worker by chance, she thought she had no time to wait 
and joined the pro-migrant organisation. Her lived experience as a former migrant worker gave 
insights to her organisation that migrants are agents for social change, not merely beneficiaries 
of social welfare services, which her colleague activists had often ignored. She stated: 
I believe we have to help them to raise their self-esteem by feeling respected and treated 
equally […] Migrant workers are so desperate for jobs that they gladly take the jobs 
avoided by Koreans. They are not beneficiaries of the Korean society, but are 
complementary to the society (Park, 2005a). 
The individual experiences of pro-migrant activists in relation to the social movements or internal 
or international migration during the period of democratisation and industrialisation became 
invaluable resources for both individual activists and the organisations.  
A political-economic background: post-democratisation, globalisation and precarisation 
Unlike the founding members of pro-migrant organisations, the second-generation members who 
joined the organisations after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis had rather different backgrounds 
and perspectives. Notably, many of my research participants of this group testified they had 
personal experiences of the adverse effects of the globalisation; thus, they harboured critical 
perspectives on the global economic forces during their youth. They also grew up or were born 
after the 1987 democratisation movements, which made them consider democracy as a natural 
part of life, not as something they had to sacrifice themselves for. The second-generation pro-
migrant activists were the most affected victims of globalisation and precarisation, but the 
beneficiaries of democratisation. The early-generation activists, on the other hand, had relatively 
less firsthand experience of globalisation, but had been the victims of authoritarian regimes or 
had struggled and achieved the democratisation. 
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My research participant, KGD (RP_07), depicts the experience of a second-generation pro-migrant 
activist. He was employed as a staff member of a non-faith-based pro-migrant organisation in 
2004. He attended a university in the 1990s, when the South Korean people began to realise the 
effect of the global forces in their lives. The government vaunted ‘globalisation’ or ‘segyehwa’ as 
the panacea of the ‘Korean disease’ (see Chapter 5). It was also eager to integrate the national 
economy into the global market. The government’s proactive engagement with the free trade 
regime like the Uruguay Round of the GATT and the establishment of the WTO was broadly 
perceived to threaten the lives of the disadvantaged people like farmers and the poor. KGD’s first 
experience of South Korean social movements was to attend a student rally on streets and to 
shout ‘No to Uruguay Round Negotiations!’ After he graduated from the university, he became 
one of the victims of ‘the IMF crisis’ and understood what the IMF’s Structural Adjustment 
Programme meant to his life. Amid storms of layoffs and precarisation, a life-long stable job in a 
private sector seemed unreachable for a new entrant to the transforming labour market. When 
he learnt about the precarious conditions of migrant workers, he had a sense of solidarity as a 
colleague-victim of globalisation, rather than having a charitable mindset as a saviour of poor 
workers. His participation at a pro-migrant organisation was motivated by his critical 
perspectives on globalisation, the sense of fellowship with migrant workers, and the practical 
need for a paid-job. 
For another second-generation activist, a lived experience in an origin country was an important 
motivation. KM (RP_09) worked at a rural village in Indonesia as a volunteer member of the South 
Korean aid agency, Korea International Cooperation Agency before she joined a faith-based pro-
migrant organisation. As the government-led neoliberal ‘globalisation’ projects accelerated in the 
1990s, international volunteering emerged as a promising opportunity among the South Korean 
youth to build up their ‘competitiveness’ in the globalised labour market. The government 
actively promoted overseas experiences for the youth and also employment at international 
organisations or transnational corporations. KM was one of the youth in the neoliberalising South 
Korea. However, her life in a remote village for two years changed her life goal. She learnt both 
Bahasa Indonesia and the local language, which might have been a useful skill for a well-paid job 
but eventually became useful for helping migrants. She also had chances to observe the realities 
of those intending to migrate, returned migrants and their families in the developing country. 
This made her consider the problems of global inequality and also helped her have a thorough 
understanding of the migration process. Through her lived experience in an origin community, 
she was able to overcome ‘the receiving country bias’ (Castles, 2010, p. 1571) which still prevailed 
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both in the government and the civil society of South Korea. The lived experience in an origin 
country inspired her to commit herself to stand on the migrants’ side. 
On the other hand, the voluntary work for a pro-migrant organisation was often a method of 
career-building for the youth in preparation to enter the extremely competitive labour market. 
The deregulation and flexibilisation of the labour market in the 1990s and the 2000s generated 
extremely precarious work and intense competition for slim job opportunities, especially for the 
youth. Some of the youth even gave up entering the labour market at all and despondently called 
themselves ‘surplus population’, taking the idea from sociologist Bauman (2013). For most of the 
others, a probable employment strategy was ‘to accumulate spec.’ (Woo and Park, 2007), in other 
words to collect qualifications. Volunteer work for NGOs was a popular option for the youth’s 
qualification-collection strategy. For example, a volunteer of Solidarity with Migrants (formerly, 
Busan Association for Foreign Workers’ Human Rights) wrote in a bulletin of the organisation that 
she was one of the South Korean youth in competition. At the beginning, she had considered her 
weekly voluntary work as not more than an extracurricular activity to ‘add a few lines on her CV’ 
(Lee, 2014a). It was after several years that she realised the meaningfulness of the work. 
The experience of voluntary work for NGOs became a social capital in the time of ‘flexibilised’ 
labour system and precarious work. Since the neoliberal labour system was firmly installed in 
society, the commodification of voluntary work was considered a natural stage of life for young 
people. The earlier generation was at least able to problematise the transformation of the labour 
system and the influences of global forces, because they witnessed how the neoliberal 
‘restructuring projects’ were imposed by international financial institutes and embraced by 
national neoliberal elites. However, the new generation, born into the neoliberalised society after 
‘the IMF crisis’ spread out and naturalised the neoliberal logic of commodification and 
competition all over South Korean society, had a different perspective from the earlier 
generations. Although they perceived the effects of neoliberal globalisation by experience, the 
priority was to survive through the neoliberal era. This is not a case unique to South Korean 
society, but rather a global trend, or at least of industrialised societies: for example, Muehlebach 
(2012) describes similar cases in Italy. 
These cases show both the second-generation activists and volunteers who joined pro-migrant 
organisations after ‘the IMF crisis’ often had more transnational perspectives on migration and 
more critical perspectives on globalisation and precarisation than earlier generations. While 
earlier generations struggled to democratise the nation, the generation of post-democratisation 
struggled for survival in the extremely competitive and globalised labour market and the 
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neoliberal employment system. The difference in the lived-experiences generated differences in 
perspectives on nationalist sentiment, globalisation, universal human rights and equality. The 
differences were reflected particularly in the way they created and maintained relationship with 
migrant workers. The issue is discussed further in the next section. 
Controversies between universalist principle or nationalist strategy 
The different backgrounds of the pro-migrant activists generated controversies over the 
rationales behind the mobilisation of the movements. A distinctive issue is the dilemma between 
universalism and nationalism. As mentioned earlier, South Korean scholars, from an essentialist 
approach, argue the activism of the activist clergy is partly attributed to the universalistic 
characteristic and transnational structure of the church (Kim, 2011a, pp. 1654-1655). They argue 
that the missionary work for migrants is based on the religious teachings of Christianity, such as 
the hospitality to stranger. 
However, I take note that some influential pro-migrant activists often appealed to patriotism as 
the ground of claiming migrants’ rights. For example, Rev. Kim Hae-Seong often stated ‘respect 
for human rights is an important non-governmental diplomacy’ and ‘warm treatment makes 
[migrants] pro-Korean, but careless treatment makes them anti-Korean’ (Kim, n.d., p. 26). These 
statements reveal he perceives the protection of human rights not as a universal value but as a 
matter of national interest. He may have strategically appealed to the idea of ‘the good nation’ as 
a way of attracting supports from the public. However, this case clearly exemplifies how some of 
the activist clergy disseminated nationalist perceptions over the rights of migrants.  
This approach is problematic because it allows migrants to be entitled to rights only when it is 
compatible with the ‘national interest’ or, in other words, the interest of the citizens. It leads to a 
conclusion that when migrant rights conflict with the ‘national interest’, they may be restricted 
or withdrawn. This reminds us that when the restriction of migrants’ fundamental human rights 
are justified by the ‘national interest’, it may lead to a horrendous outcome, as seen in the US post-
September 11.  
Another influential activist even appealed to ethnocentric nationalism to mobilise the collective 
actions for Joseonjok migrants. Rev. Suh Kyung Suk’s ideological root of activism was, like that of 
many others of his generation, ethno-nationalism. When he set up the Seoul Joseonjok Church in 
1999 for missionary and advocacy works exclusively for Joseonjok migrants, he publicly urged 
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that the South Korean society should have the ‘love of compatriots’ for Joseonjok migrants (Donga 
Ilbo, 1999). During the protests for the government’s preferential treatment and against the 
deportation of Joseonjok migrants in 2003 (see Chapter 8), he argued that the reinstatement of 
their citizenship would prevent the Joseonjok diaspora from being assimilated into Chinese 
society. He publicly claimed ‘We can never sit by and watch the reality that our Joseonjok 
compatriots become Han Chinese’ (Lee, 2003a). During the protests of 2003, the primary demand 
of both migrant workers from various origin countries and South Korean social movement groups 
was that the government should grant amnesty and working visas to all undocumented workers. 
On the contrary, Rev. Suh’s position was that the government should grant South Korean 
citizenship to undocumented Joseonjok migrants.  
His ethno-nationalist approach attracted considerable attention from politicians and the media 
and eventually made a noticeable achievement as illustrated in Chapter 8 (see also Yeo and Im, 
2003). However, pro-migrant activists and migrant workers severely criticised his strategy for 
inventing an excuse for discriminating non-ethnic-Korean migrants (see Hankook Ilbo, 2003). 
Others were concerned it might cause diplomatic disputes and adversely endanger the Joseonjok 
migrants, considering the Chinese government’s prohibition of dual citizenship (see Kim, 2003c). 
These two cases show that although the universalist principle of religion might have contributed 
to motivating the activist clergy to get involved with migrants’ issues, it was not consistently 
applied to their strategies and activities. Instead, they accommodated themselves to patriotism 
and ethno-nationalism. The both ideologies have been the predominant ideologies organising the 
society throughout the modern history of South Korea, as historical-anthropologist Han (2007) 
commented. Although the mobilisation of patriotism and ethno-nationalism may have some 
short-term effects of protecting the migrants of Korean origin, they practically excluded the 
migrants of non-Korean origin. As Piao (2011), sociologist of Joseonjok-background argued these 
approaches eventually isolated Joseonjok migrants from the social movements of migrants in 
South Korea. 
Also, I argue these approaches eventually contributed to justifying the government’s propaganda 
for neoliberal restructuring. It is notable that, in the process of transformation toward a 
neoliberal society in the 1990s and the 2000s, the South Korean government actively promoted 
the patriotic and ethno-nationalist ideologies in linkage with the neoliberal political agenda. For 
example, ‘reinforcing national competitiveness’ in the global market, ‘creating new Korean 
nation’, ‘Korean nation’s potential energy to overcome the IMF crisis’, or ‘fostering the growth of 
the global corporations of Korean origin’ were the most often disseminated discourses during the 
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period, as the inaugural statements of the President represent (see JoongAng Ilbo, 1998, Pressian, 
2008).  
This ideology was reflected in the South Korean immigration policy as ‘hierarchical nationhood’ 
(Seol and Skrentny, 2009, p. 147) for ‘national interest’, which essentially gave preference to 
Joseonjok migrants in the labour market over migrants of other origins. Social movement activists 
like JYS (RP_13) criticised this policy for ‘institutionalising the discriminations on the basis of 
ethnicity, disseminating the discriminatory perceptions in the public, and eventually 
manipulating the public opinion for the economic and political interest of the advantaged class’. 
Also, other activists like CHM (RP_14) were also concerned that the social movements’ 
employment of patriotic and ethno-nationalist strategies might eventually generate xenophobic 
sentiments among the public and even in the civil society. 
Dilemmas between faith and advocacy 
According to a utilitarian approach, the church’s outreach to migrants is a survival strategy to 
expand resources and membership (see Kim, 2011a, p. 1650). Recent increases of religious 
groups’ involvement in services-provision for migrants substantiate this argument: the number 
of churches that claimed to be a ‘multicultural church’ or a church for migrants ‘explosively’ 
increased (see Table 9-1). According to an analysis of the utilitarian approach, this is related to 
the underdevelopment of South Korean churches (Kim, 2013b). After they achieved an 
impressive growth in membership and wealth from the 1960s to the 1980s, often noted as the 
‘Christian success story’ (Kim, 2002, p. 291), the South Korean churches experienced a stagnation 
in the 1990s (see Figure 9-1). The increased migrant population was an opportunity for the 
churches to make a new leap forward and to increase their membership. It was particularly 
important for the newly-established or small churches that had little chance to recruit local 
members, because the mega-churches, some of which were the world’s biggest both in 
membership and in wealth, already held a huge number of middle-class members and had 
political, economic and cultural influence (Kim, 2013b). According to an analysis of YH (RP_05), a 
former senior member of a pro-migrant organisation, the minor churches strategically turned 
their attentions toward the newly arrived migrant populations. This strategy spread throughout 
South Korean churches, making a boom of ‘multicultural missionary work’. 
The main interest of these churches was the conversion of migrants from non-Christian cultures 
to Christianity. For example, the Jubilee Mission Fellowship, which has significantly contributed to 
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the medical services for migrant workers since its establishment in 1991, is a pathfinder of the 
religious propagation-oriented groups. This organisation identifies its primary objectives as the 
‘propagation of gospel, training, formation of religious communities for Filipino, Muslim, Hindu, 
Chinese and Joseonjok’ (Jubilee Mission Fellowship, n.d.). The latecomers, mostly established in 
the 2000s, tend to be more proactive than the earlier groups. For example, a missionary 
organisation Friends of All Nations, of which Korean name means Korea Foreigner Missionary 
Association, was established in 2001 with local branches throughout the country and overseas 
missionaries. This organisation states its visions are ‘to convert migrant workers to Christianity’, 
‘to train them as missionaries’ and ‘to return them to set up churches in their home countries’ of 
non-Christian cultures like Thailand and Vietnam (Friends of All Nations, n.d.). 
 
Table 9-1 Increase of 'multicultural churches', 1995–2009 
1995 2000 2009 
40 120 560 
Source: Kim (2010b, p. 20) 
 
Figure 9-1 Christian (Protestant) population and its ratio to total population, 1950–2015 
 
Source: Chung (2014a) and Statistics Korea (2017).  
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The religious propagation-oriented organisations were often criticised for their aggressive 
missionary work. It was occasionally reported that the mission-oriented organisations demanded 
migrant workers of other religions, typically Muslims, to attend the church’s worships or to be 
baptised as a condition of receiving welfare services or subsidies (Woo, 2003). An activist 
clergyperson, Woo (2003) was concerned this ‘commercialisation’ of the church’s services for 
migrants would eventually fail in the propagation of Christianity. Non-religious groups were 
concerned they might lead to religious conflicts or even violence (Shin, 2010b). Also, it has to be 
noted that these practices involved the violation of migrants’ freedom of religion, one of 
fundamental human rights as enshrined in international human rights laws. 
Whether to give priority to either religious faith or advocacy was a dilemma of the activist clergy. 
Having social movement backgrounds, they tended to avoid imposing their religious faith on 
migrants. However, when they encountered unexpected behaviour of migrants, especially against 
their religious faith, they turned to the idea that the workers should be converted. Rev. Kim Hae-
Seong stated in an essay published in a Christian-owned newspaper: 
Once, a Bangladeshi worker came to me with a severed hand. I made the employer pay 
him 30 million Won. After he returned to his home country, I received a letter from him. 
He wrote he bought a pretty young woman. He had already had a wife and children. […] 
Another worker earned money and returned, but became a vicious employer. Others 
became alcoholic or drug-addicted with the money they received for the compensation 
of industrial accidents. Whenever I heard such news, I felt depressed because all my 
efforts failed. […] They needed to be reborn by the Gospel with the wisdom of hindsight. 
[…] With 10 million Won, we can set up a church and have services in their hometowns. 
In April 2002, the Ministry of Justice granted one-year grace period to illegal foreigners 
if they voluntarily report […] It was an opportunity given by God. We preached the 
Gospel at the site where the illegal migrants came to report to the government (Kim, n.d., 
pp. 28-29). 
This case also implies the faith-based pro-migrant organisations considered the return of 
migrants as an opportunity to accelerate the propagation of their religious faith across national 
boundaries. It affected their stance toward the government’s return policy. When the government 
announced the one-year grace period, the faith-based group hesitantly accepted it and indirectly 
promoted the return of irregular migrants. This approach contrasted with the positions of 
progressive social movement organisations, trade unions and migrant workers, who severely 
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resisted this policy and denounced it as a mere deception and justification of violent deportations 
after one year (see Chapter 8).  
Ambivalent or cooperative relationship between migrant workers and pro-
migrant activists 
Unequal and ambivalent relationship  
The relationship between pro-migrant organisations and migrant communities was not always 
as constructive. Non-migrant activists often took for granted hierarchical relationships between 
activists and migrants, especially when they were in the position of a clergyperson who looked 
after his or her migrant congregation. The hierarchical relationship between the clergy and their 
congregation is occasionally found in some South Korean churches; however, it is also common 
that senior members of congregations are more influential in a church’s decision-making than the 
pastors who they hired.  
The service provision-oriented approach and the paternalistic and charitable attitudes of the 
early leaders of both faith-based and non-religious pro-migrant organisations are often criticised 
for reinforcing the unequal relationship between migrants and pro-migrant activists. As a 
strategy of fund-raising, the early activists often projected the image of migrant workers as poor 
service-recipients. The media amplified and reinforced the unequal relationship by disseminating 
the image of a charitable and good priest kindly helping vulnerable and poor migrants. The 
paternalist and patronising perspectives on migrant workers were spread throughout the society 
as well as the government policy, as South Korean sociologist Shim (2007) pointed out.  
The unequal relations sometime generated migrant workers’ distrust of non-migrant activists, 
which led to separation from pro-migrant organisations. Migrant activist Mahbub Alam’s 
experience plainly depicts the ambivalent relationship between a faith-based organisation and 
migrant workers. He recalls his experience in an autobiographic essay: 
When we worked together with […] organisation affiliated with the church, […] we were 
not considered as the main agents of the project which is about us. When the church 
prepared this event and that, we were always expected to be attendees or audiences and 
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to fill the auditorium. However, I thought ‘I still have to be with this church and 
organisation. Otherwise, we will receive no help.’ We were too weak. […] Although we 
disagreed about many things, I did not doubt their good will. […] The ETU-MB offered 
me the Union’s representative for Namyangju city and we participated in the ETU-MB’s 
campaigns against the introduction of the EPS. But, it led to an argument with a priest of 
the S organisation. They did not understand why we wanted to participate in the rally. 
‘Why do foreigners want to go to rallies? You are not Koreans. If you go to rallies, you 
will get arrested!’ […] We were very much disappointed with these people […] I realised 
they had objectified migrant workers and considered us only as ‘someone who need 
help’ (Alam, 2010, pp. 69-71).  
The experience of the ambivalent relations eventually made migrant workers realise the 
importance of their empowerment as political entities. Alam again stated: 
I happened to read a newspaper article about the priest of the S organisation. It was 
entitled ‘The father of foreign workers, the OO priest at Maseok’. This title drove me 
mad. ‘What a father! Migrant workers are not children… We are not the objects [of their 
service] who always need to be protected. […] The help of several organisations will not 
solve our problems. We need to take actions to make migrant workers the activists.’ I 
learnt ‘our voice’ is important. We should not rely on a powerful church or a famous 
pastor or priest. We should speak about our problems with our voice (Alam, 2010, pp. 
69-71). 
Another controversial example of the relationship between faith-based pro-migrant activists and 
migrant workers is found during the struggles of Chinese migrant with Korean ethnicity 
(Joseonjok) to achieve the ‘preferential treatment’ for ‘co-ethnic’ migrants. Joseonjok’s self-
organised association was incapacitated by the government in the mid-1990s (see Chapter 8). 
Since then, church-based pro-migrant groups had dominated the advocacy movements for 
Joseonjok migrants. The performances of two churches were distinctive: the Seoul Joseonjok 
Church led by Rev. Suh Kyung Suk and the Seoul Foreign Workers and Diaspora House of Rev. Kim 
Hae-Seong. Both were at the front of proactive movements for the policy of preferential treatment 
of Joseonjok migrants (see Chapter 8). The churches effectively synthesised religious propagation 
and advocacy movements and mobilised collective actions. Undocumented Joseonjok migrants 
desperately sought to avoid deportations and extend their stay in South Korea. But, it was hard 
for them to take any collective action without an organised community. Instead, many Joseonjok 
migrants, who had communist backgrounds, individually joined the churches and converted 
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themselves to Christianity. The churches practically provided them with a platform of collective 
action and spiritually gave them a hope not to be deported by the favour of religious saviours. 
Unequal relations between the non-migrant service-provider activist clergy and the migrant 
parishioners in desperate situations inevitably generated a hierarchy. Also, the clergy’s 
paternalistic and patronising attitudes toward the migrants made the hierarchy even worse. 
There was little room for empowering and subjectivating the workers as the agents of the 
movement. A Korean scholar with the background of Joseonjok migrant Piao (2011) criticised that 
the paternalistic and patronising approaches rendered the Joseonjok migrant community 
dependent on pro-migrant organisations.  
Despite the unequal and hierarchical relations and the paternalistic and patronising attitudes of 
some pro-migrant activists, migrant workers still approached the organisations by strategic 
choice for their survival. They went to the service-providing churches and organisations, even 
though their religious beliefs conflicted with them. Mahbub Alam recalls his first encounter with 
the above-mentioned church-based organisation: 
We wanted to be with the church just because we thought they wanted to help migrants. 
But, they seemed to want us to attend their religious services, too. […] ‘Attend church 
every Sunday. After services, you can have free meal. There are gifts, so pick one up with 
you.’ They were kind. But, we felt uncomfortable with the free meals and gifts […] We 
had no other choice. […] I thought we had to do as they wanted, if we want to get help 
from them. […] Some friends blamed me for taking Muslim friends to the Christian 
church. ‘What are you doing now?’ ‘No, just calm down. Let’s just pretend to be like this 
for now. It would be helpful for handling our friends’ problems.’ (Alam, 2010, pp. 65-66) 
Empowering migrant communities 
The case of Solidarity with Migrants (SOMI) and migrants’ self-support associations in Busan 
shows how the relationship between pro-migrant organisations and migrant communities could 
develop in constructive ways. Several years after the organisation was established, non-migrant 
activists of the SOMI realised the service-provision-oriented activities had only increased migrant 
workers’ dependency on non-migrant activists, which made them concerned about potentially 
unequal power relations between the migrants and non-migrant activists. They also realised it 
had exhausted the non-migrant activists so seriously it might render the movement 
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unsustainable. Kim Gru, a non-migrant activist of the SOMI, who I met several times during my 
field research in 2012, reflects her experiences at a workshop of migrant and pro-migrant 
activists: 
The counselling for migrant workers has been considered as a 3D job. Activists could not 
continue it longer than one or two years. […] A common reason was that the activists 
were exhausted by the job. Non-migrant activists had to do everything from A to Z on 
behalf of migrant workers. The more vulnerable a migrant worker’s condition was, the 
longer was the to-do list. […] The problem is this repeats forever. […] I often asked to 
myself ‘Is this a social movement or what?’ When I did things for migrants, many of them 
bowed low to me and made me feel like being a charitable person. Whenever I faced 
such situation, it made me so angry. This was not the reason why I wanted to do this job. 
‘I want to do a social movement!’ (Kim, 2016b, pp. 29-30). 
The SOMI realised the emphasis of their activities should be turned to the empowerment of 
migrant workers. It endeavoured to assist migrants in organising their self-support communities: 
for example, it organised ten ‘leadership training programmes’ between 2001 and 2006. As a 
result, Bangladeshi, Vietnamese, Indonesian and Filipino communities were organised in 2001 
and 2002 in Busan. The associations of migrants began as self-support communities through 
which the members helped each other when someone was in difficulties. Once the leaders of the 
migrant communities were experienced, they gradually replaced the non-migrant activists by 
taking over the service-provision activities. The migrant leaders also actively participated in the 
migrants’ collective actions and mobilised their colleague migrant workers to join the protests, 
especially during the struggles against the ITS and deportations in 2002 and 2003. Later, the 
migrant leaders joined the SOMI as full-time staff members. Kim Gru declares that ‘the time of 
migrant activists is upon us’ (Kim, 2016b, p. 33) at least for the SOMI. At the workshop, she 
proudly acknowledged that the migrant activists often dominated the SOMI’s activities, which 
made her feel awkward to be an activist of non-migrant background. 
In 2008, the migrant communities formed a network between each other by the name of 
Solidarity for Equality of Migrants in Korea (SEMIK). This network had an equal partnership with 
the SOMI, not being a subordinate affiliate of the pro-migrant organisation. It actively participated 
in the alliances of migrant and pro-migrant organisations and sought to challenge the South 
Korean temporary labour migration policy. During the elections for the local government, the 
SEMIK also became involved in local politics by proposing political agendas for migrants in Busan. 
It also organised cultural events to contribute to promoting the local people’s awareness of 
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respect for diversity and multiculturalism. The SEMIK was initiated by the efforts of the SOMI’s 
pro-migrant activists, but it has transformed the SOMI from ‘for migrants’ to ‘of migrants’ 
organisation. Kim, Gru’s comment represents what the transformation was about: 
In the past, migrant activists used to perceive the SOMI as ‘a good organisation which 
gives us help’. However, […] they have built the confidence that ‘I belong to this 
organisation; this is my space; and my life is meaningful and valued here.’ Whenever we 
organised an event or an action, we realised the organisation’s dependence on migrant 
activists had grown ever (Kim, 2016b, p. 40). 
Changing languages and relationships 
As discussed earlier, the founding members and the second-generation activists of pro-migrant 
organisations had different backgrounds and perspectives, which affected their attitudes towards 
migrant workers. The differences in their attitudes were often reflected in the language that the 
activists and migrant workers used to address each other. Throughout my participant 
observations and the interviews of the activists and migrant workers, I noticed that there were 
some significant differences in address terms that they used when they referred to each other. 
Some activists used honorific terms when they referred to migrant workers, while others did not. 
Some migrant workers called their South Korean colleagues ‘comrade’, while others called them 
by their social position and honorific suffix.  
For example, my research participant, KGD (RP_07), had been mostly called ‘Mr K’ by migrant 
workers, which is not considered as an honorific form in the South Korean context. It did not 
change even after he held higher positions in his organisation. When he spoke to migrant workers, 
he often used the term ‘hyung-nim’, which is the honorific term for a big brother in Korean, or ‘Mr’ 
or ‘Ms’ for very young workers. This is compared with the practice that the activist clergy are 
mostly called as ‘moksa-nim’ or ‘shinbu-nim’, the honorific terms for pastor or priest; or the senior 
activists often called as ‘seonsaeng-nim’, which is the honorific term for teacher or elder person. 
An activist clergyperson who I met often used the term ‘chingu’, which literally means friend but 
is also used to call a younger fellow; some even used the term ‘ae’, which means child. In South 
Korean culture, the clergy is referred to with honorific term by their congregation. However, it is 
not common for them to speak to their congregation with these terms. 
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Trade unionists and pro-migrant activists seriously reflected upon the importance of address 
terms in making relationships with migrant workers. For example, at a training course for KCTU 
members, the Head of Consultation Department at Incheon Regional Council of the KCTU, 
reiterated that the use of respectful terms of address is a basic attitude required for trade 
unionists working with migrant workers: 
When you accompany migrant workers […] you would vividly experience how the South 
Korean society treats migrant workers. Typical examples are ‘address terms’ and 
‘talking down’. Employers and even some government officials often call migrant 
workers with ‘Ya [close to ‘hey’ in English but in impolite manner]’, ‘Neo [close to ‘you’ in 
English but in impolite manner]’ or by their name only [without address term]. They 
frequently talk down to migrant workers […] Even some counsellors [of pro-migrant 
organisations] too. However, we should remember migrant workers come to counsellors 
to seek a protection of their rights because they have experienced the South Korean 
society’s disrespect for them. Thus, we should never treat them like that. If we consider 
the migrant workers are our colleagues and comrades who will go together for the 
movement, we should have even more respectful attitudes toward them (Kim, 2016a, p. 
34). 
These examples show the intentional efforts of the second-generation pro-migrant activists to 
create an equal relationship with migrant workers. As sociolinguists point out, the use of address 
terms reflects not only the intimacy or solidarity between speaker and addressee, but also the 
power relations between the two. The speaker’s choice of address terms often exhibits whether 
he or she expects an equal relationship with the audience or not, although it may also function to 
mask the stratification in the relations (Fillmore, 2003). Studies also show the asymmetric use of 
address terms often indicates the inequality in power, while the mutual use of the terms is related 
with familiarity (Brown and Ford, 1961). Korean language has a particularly extensive system of 
honorifics to reflect the hierarchical relationship between speaker and addressee (Choo, 2006). 
Korean speakers have developed various ways of using the title and last or first name and also of 
combining them when they name an addressee (Park, 1997). Thus, the types and forms of address 
terms between two people are a barometer that indicates the power relationship between the 
two. 
I suggest the second-generation activists’ efforts to create an equal relationship with migrant 
workers through using non-hierarchical address terms are related to the emergence of the human 
rights movement among the citizens’ movement group during the post-democratisation period. 
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The human rights movement groups tended to put particular emphasis on creating equal 
relations between the activists and the victims as well as among the activists, as they are all equal 
human rights-holders. Some began to refuse to use any hierarchical address terms at all. The 
usage of new and equal language including address terms was an important symbolic strategy of 
the human rights movement. However, many of the earlier-generation activists were 
uncomfortable with such experimental practices that challenged their superiority in the 
hierarchy. The hierarchical formality, status, position and title were still important to many of the 
senior activists. 
Regression or progression of the migrant and pro-migrant social movements 
Collusion or antagonism to the EPS’s governance mechanisms 
After the South Korean government introduced a paternalistic ‘assistance’ policy for migrant 
workers as a governing mechanism of the EPS (see Chapter 7), many pro-migrant organisations, 
especially those that called themselves a ‘migrant support organisation’, turned their identity 
toward becoming a service deliverer.  
I argue that they exemplify the pro-migrant organisations’ incorporation into the governing 
mechanism of the temporary labour migration policy. Although the institutionalised service-
provision increased in volume due to the government’s funding, this did not mean the 
government policy changed to allow migrants to enter mainstream South Korean society or the 
labour market. The pro-migrant organisations’ implementation of the governing mechanism of 
the EPS only intensified the objectification of a migrant worker as a unit of workforce not as a 
rights-holder.  
As discussed in Chapter 7, the government required more standardised and institutionalised 
service-provisions to migrants. The government’s funding depended on the organisations’ 
performances, measured by quantified methods. The government-sponsored organisations 
became busy with processing the migrant clients’ complaints without resolving the root-causes 
of the problems. This is an example of how service provision is ‘commodified’ and how the 
migrants’ discontent with the system are treated with impediment measures.  
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The governing mechanism of the EPS relating to service provision postpones the possibility of the 
‘countermovement’. As the pro-migrant organisations became more dependent on the 
government’s resources, the government gained more controls or influence over the 
organisations. Many pro-migrant organisations became no more critical about the government 
policies or interested in addressing structural problems. The number of such organisations 
rapidly increased after the EPS was introduced. According to an estimation from the government, 
there were more than 740 governmental or non-government organisations working for migrants 
in 2016 (Ministry of the Interior and Safety, 2016). Only a handful of them remained independent 
from the government’s financial assistance and critical of the government’s migration policy. 
Those organisations that took up the role of the government’s service deliverer gradually became 
inactive in the coalitions aiming at institutional changes, like the JCMK and the MNR. Some of them 
withdrew their membership from the coalitions or the coalitions expelled others. Pro-migrant 
organisations divided into three types: those which accepted the government’s offer to function 
as a service deliverer, those which failed to be selected to work for the government, and those 
which refused the opportunity and sought to assume the role of watchdog. The first group 
organised the Council of Foreigner Support Organisations in 2008 to exchange their experiences 
and concerns. The second group organised the National Coalition for Immigrant Care in 2010, 
which aimed at supporting its member organisations to be selected as a subcontractor of the 
government programme (see Jeong, 2011). Most of the third group remained either in the JCMK 
or the MNR while some of them sought to organise an alternative network like Alliance for 
Migrants. 
This situation weakened the movement’s capability to propose a political agenda or to pursue 
political actions for migrants. As mentioned in Chapter 8, it became a major factor in the decline 
of migrant workers’ collective actions as well as the pro-migrant organisations’ involvement in 
social movements. As many of my research participants stated (RP_07, RP_14, RP_15, RP_20, 
RP_21), many organisations were ‘trapped’ by the government-outsourced service-provision 
programmes. Although many activists felt the movement was at risk, it was hard to escape from 
the ‘trap’ because their activities already relied heavily on the government-set system.  
The expansion of the service-provision approach even adversely contributed to the rising claims 
of reverse discrimination. Some socially disadvantaged people began to organise xenophobic 
groups, which the major newspaper was concerned might become a ‘Korean version of KKK’ 
(Kwak and Kim, 2012). At a rally organised by this group, which I had a chance to observe (PO_08), 
they claimed they were excluded from social protection due to the government’s excessive 
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services to migrants who took away their jobs; thus, the ‘multicultural policy’ should be 
withdrawn. They are partly influenced by the media’s stigmatisation of undocumented migrants 
as ‘potential criminals’ (Woo and Woo, 2014). South Korean scholars identified that the rising 
xenophobia arose from ‘resistance to multiculturalism, established as political correctness’, ‘fear 
of the neo-liberal system’, and ‘a distorted adherence to the West’ (Kang, 2014, p. 8). Also, I argue 
the exclusionary nationalist ideology and the paternalistic service-provisions contributed to the 
rise of the anti-migrant sentiments among the disadvantaged local people. I also argue this case 
is a retroactive example of the ‘countermovement’.  
Challenging neoliberal globalisation and precarious work 
Nevertheless, a small number of activists still seek an alternative direction. They identify 
themselves as social movement activists distinguished from service deliverers. However, the 
intensified lack of resources creates an insurmountable obstacle. The South Korean public has 
become less interested in sponsoring political actions for migrants, of which outcome is less 
visible than that of direct service provision. The newly arrived EPS workers have also become 
less interested in collective actions to claim their rights, but more satisfied with practical services 
provided by the government-sponsored organisations.  
Under these conditions, KGD states, it is a challenging task to set up a vision for his organisation 
as social movement-oriented: 
We had to decide whether we would become a service provider like others or remain as 
a ‘human rights organisation’. We do not have to provide the services any longer, 
because they are now done well by the government-sponsored organisations. With the 
government-funded resources, they can certainly do better than we do. Instead, we try 
to focus more on awareness-raising for the public or on agenda-setting for policy. Well… 
counselling work still continues. The workers who come to us are only those who have 
very complicated cases that the government-sponsored agencies couldn’t handle. Very 
tricky cases. We are now left with difficult jobs. Also, we have less money than before, so 
we have to reduce programmes, budget, and even space! Yes, doing a social movement is 
very difficult (RP_07). 
The service provision-oriented organisations gave up their roles as watchdogs of the 
government’s policy. They also failed to extend their perspectives toward addressing the 
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structural problems of society. They rarely discuss the structural changes that predominate the 
society and migration processes: the neoliberalisation of the labour market, of the mode of 
production management, and of all social relations. Individual migrant workers’ problems were 
not understood in the political economic context of neoliberal transformations. While they 
concentrated on the resolutions of individual cases, they hardly involved themselves in the 
discussions about how the South Korean employment system was transforming or about what 
were the driving forces behind the precaritisation of work. They rarely discussed or cooperated 
with the growing labour movements against the ‘non-regular’ and precarious employment or the 
resistances against neoliberal globalisations. 
In this context, it is notable that a small number of the social movement-oriented groups have 
been re-launched. The Alliance for Migrants’ Equality and Human Rights has recently taken a 
leading role among the social movement-oriented pro-migrant organisations. As mentioned 
earlier, this network was organised by diverse groups: trade unions (e.g. the MTU, the KTCU and 
the National Council of Non-regular Workers’ Union), pro-migrant organisations and their 
coalitions (e.g. Korea Migrant Rights Centre, Asia Chang and the MRN), the anti-capitalist or anti-
neoliberal globalisation movement organisations (e.g. People’s Solidarity for Social Progress 
(PSSP), All Together (later renamed to Workers’ Solidarity), National March of Students), faith-
based human rights groups (e.g. Catholic Human Rights Committee, Human Rights Committee of 
Association of Korean Buddhist Orders), lawyers (e.g. GONGAM-Public Interest Lawyers’ Group, 
MINBYUN-Lawyers for a Democratic Society) and a migrant community (KASSAMAKO). This 
group played a crucial role in coordinating the series of the migrant workers’ protests in 2012, as 
illustrated in Chapter 1. 
The Alliance for Migrants explicitly called for the abolition of the employer-driven temporary 
labour migration scheme and the introduction of the Work Permit System, which ensures the 
workers have the right to choose a job and the pathways to permanent residence. It also discussed 
the linkage between the temporary labour migration scheme, non-regular or precarious work, 
capitalist accumulation and racism. The members of the Alliance shared the perspective that the 
South Korean temporary labour migration scheme imposes ‘non-regular or precarious work’ on 
migrant workers to accelerate ‘the South Korean capitalist accumulation’ and reinforces 
‘racialisation of labour’, as articulated by social movement activist, Im (2011b). 
In 2012, I followed the series of their executive meetings and public forums for the preparation 
of protests and rallies (PO_07, PO_14-17, PO_24, PO_26-31, PO_34, PO_36 and PO_40) as a part of 
my field research. Throughout the research, I was able to observe the non-migrant activists’ 
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efforts to encourage the MTU and migrant communities to take the leadership of the movement. 
The pro-migrant activists’ role was to inform the workers of the changing government policies 
that would affect migrants’ lives, to assist them in making decisions, and to facilitate the migrant 
workers’ self-organised actions. Neither paternalistic nor patronising attitudes were found 
throughout the series of events. As my research participant JYS (RP_13), co-convenor of the 
Alliance, commented, the pro-migrant activists were devoted to empowering the migrants and 
fostering them to be the principal actors of the movement. 
I argue this new group of social movement-oriented pro-migrant activists are the core actors who 
assisted the revival of migrant workers’ collective actions in 2012. Their claims are indeed not 
much different from those of the migrant protestors in 2003 and 2004, before the EPS was 
introduced. Thus, I argue the series of protests in 2012 are a continuation of the migrant workers’ 
earlier struggles against the temporary labour migration scheme. It is significant that a member 
of the Alliance repeatedly reminded of a resonant speech of Busra Rai, a migrant activist of the 
2003 and 2004 struggles: 
The martyr Chun Tae-il made ‘the declaration of human’ by exclaiming ‘We are not 
machine’, ‘the declaration of workers’ by claiming ‘Observe the Labour Standard Law’, 
and ‘the declaration for struggles’ by leaving a will ‘Do not waste my death’. It is the time 
for us, workers, to inherit his spirit and to achieve the emancipation of workers by the 
solidarity across the borders and nations (Jung, 2012, p. 14). 
‘Transformative quality’ of migrant and pro-migrant movements 
In Chapter 2, I suggested a theoretical account that the case of South Korean social movements 
against the state’s temporary labour migration policy forms a countermovement against the 
neoliberal commodification of labour and migration. Temporary and irregular migrants are 
‘politically disenfranchised populations whose political marginality is compounded by various 
socio-economic problems’ (Castles et al., 2014, p. 296) and also a significant part of the global 
precariat (Standing, 2014a). The temporary migrant workers in South Korea are not exceptions. 
Having neither citizenship nor permanent residence status, the temporary migrant workers had 
almost no access to decision-making for South Korea’s labour migration policy which had critical 
impacts on their lives. Their frustrations and claims were conveyed or translated by pro-migrant 
activists, who had their own causes. Depending on the religious, ideological or economic 
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backgrounds, the migrant workers were treated either as beneficiaries of charity service, holders 
of human rights or comrades for transnational labour movements. 
Whether their movements had ‘transformative quality’ is an intrinsic attribute of a social 
movement as an expression of countermovement. It distinguishes the social movements from 
‘consensual movements’ that eventually contributes to reinforcing the current social systems 
(Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 23). As discussed in Chapter 2, the three perspectives are found 
in migrant resistances in relation with their transformative quality (Tyler and Marciniak, 2013): 
first, being limited to ‘integrationist politics’; second, challenging existing legal and political 
frames and seeking to gain the ‘rights of citizenship’; third, emphasising the ‘autonomy of 
migration’ and ‘migrancy’ as a ‘creative and productive form of movement’ to ‘escape’ and ‘exceed’ 
the current legal and conceptual frameworks of citizenship (Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2013, p. 
178). The social movement activists of the third approach, in practice, mobilised ‘the category of 
“worker” to defetishize the figure of the “immigrant” or “illegal”’; reconceptualised ‘migrancy as 
strategies to escape from economic abjection; and sought to build ‘political solidarities’ of 
‘precarious workers’ (Tyler and Marciniak, 2013, p. 148).  
I argue the migrant and pro-migrant activisms in South Korea, as illustrated in the previous and 
this chapter, exemplifies the three perspectives of Tyler and Marciniak (2013). During the early 
stage of the movement in the 1990s, both migrants’ resistances and pro-migrant movement of the 
‘faith-based organisations’ and ‘citizens’ movement organisations’ began as challenges to existing 
legal frames which reject migrant workers’ labour rights and basic human rights and continued 
‘to gain the “rights of citizenship” like legal aid and welfare’. The struggles on the introduction of 
the EPS in 2003 and 2004 were, however, a watershed in the movement. Since the South Korean 
government assured the minimal institutionalisation of migrant workers’ basic human rights by 
introduction of the EPS, many organisations and activists recognised it as the achievement of the 
‘rights of citizenship’.  
The movement was divided to two groups. First, most faith-based organisations rapidly, and 
many citizens’ movement organisations eventually, turned into collaboration with the 
government and acted as agents delivering the government-funded humanitarian services to 
ensure the effective implementation of the temporary labour migration scheme. They stopped or 
significantly reduced their roles as watchdogs of government policy or even as advocates for 
migrant’s rights; instead, they eventually contributed to reinforcing the temporariness and the 
‘rotation’-principle of migrant workers. According to the words of Papadopoulos and Tsianos 
(2013, p. 178), this group confined itself into the ‘integrationist politics’. However, considering 
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the exclusive nature of the employer-driven temporary labour migration scheme without any 
access to permanent residence, their service provisions are only a temporary integration 
fundamentally based on exclusionary principles. 
The second group emerged throughout the series of migrant worker’s self-initiated resistances 
throughout the 1990s. This group of migrant workers and pro-migrant activists grew to a 
significant force of the migrant movement through the struggles against the introduction of the 
EPS in 2003 and 2004. Most of the members were either undocumented migrant workers with 
expired immigration status or pro-migrant activists who had challenged the precarisation of 
work as a part of anti-neoliberal globalisation movement. They maintained the uncompromising 
stand against the employer-driven ‘Employment Permit’ temporary migration scheme but 
insisted on a work-permit which allows migrant workers to choose their jobs and have access to 
transferring to permanent residence. In the words of Tyler and Marciniak (2013, p. 148), these 
activists sought to promote the category of ‘worker’ as a way of ‘defetishizing the figure of the 
“immigrant” or “illegal”’ and also to build ‘political solidarities’ of both migrant and non-migrant 
‘precarious workers’. Since the EPS entered into force, however, this approach rapidly waned 
away. Many of the leadership were either deported during immigration raids or left the country 
with disappointment about the failure of their struggles. Most temporary migrant workers who 
newly arrived under the EPS had not yet been able to build a class consciousness as precarious 
temporary migrant workers. The pro-migrant activists who supported this group also lost their 
influences. The majority pro-migrant groups denounced them as being too radical or driving 
migrant workers into risk, which rooted in a long-standing debate among various groups of social 
movements not only in South Korea but also worldwide: ‘whether a movement will rupture the 
existing social and political narratives, practices, status and order or reproduce them’ (Bassel and 
Lloyd, 2011).  
The transformative quality of the early migrant resistances was barely retained by a small group 
of workers, mostly the MTU’s members who were organised in the aftermath of the failed 
struggles against the EPS in 2004. A small group of pro-migrant activists who were also involved 
in anti-neoliberal movements also continued to claim the employer-driven temporary labour 
migration system should be replaced by a work-permit system that allows migrant workers’ right 
to choose a job.  
Their transformative claims, which had been considered as ‘radical’ by the majority migrant 
workers and pro-migrant activists, began to gain currency only after eight years by the time when 
the temporary labour migration system began to withdraw the temporary right to work from the 
266 
first arrivals under the EPS. Newly arrived EPS workers who were designated to agricultural or 
fishery sectors also began to join the ‘Stop, EPS!’ movement, since they experienced extremely 
poor working conditions due to lack of the government’s supervision. The series of resistances of 
migrant workers and pro-migrant activists in 2012 were a sign of the revival of transformative 
quality in migrant’s resistances. Since they were also linked with the precariats’ movement 
against the neoliberal precarisations and globalisations, the resistances considerably form the 
sprouts of a protective countermovement which challenges the fictitious commodification of 
labour and migration and, eventually, re-embeds economy and migration into society. 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the third set of my research questions as presented in Chapter 1: ‘what 
are migrant workers’ experiences of the scheme and in what way have they engaged with the 
policy process, especially in connection with South Korean social movements?’ with a focus on 
engagement with South Korean civil society.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, South Korean pro-migrant organisations actively engaged 
with migrant workers’ collective actions. They assisted migrant workers in organising collective 
actions and negotiating with the government and employers on the workers’ behalf. This chapter 
showed the pro-migrant activists had already engaged with migrant workers, even before the 
migrant workers began to express their grievances and resisted against the appalling working 
conditions.  
Some pro-migrant organisations, often faith-based, tended to ignore the problem of the 
objectification of migrant workers and to consider the migrant workers as ‘those who need help’. 
This tendency corresponds to the government’s ‘paternalistic approach’ (Shim, 2007). Other 
organisations, often citizens’ movement-oriented groups and migrant communities, prioritised 
the empowerment of the workers and sought to encourage the agency of migrant workers in the 
social movements. The pro-migrant organisations had internal debates about their priority 
between the systematic change of migration policy and the provision of services to individual 
migrants. Those who sought systematic changes are considered a part of the South Korean social 
movements, while the others would be best characterised as service providers or ‘consensus 
movement’ (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, pp. 22-23).  
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Also, it was found that some pro-migrant activists intentionally mobilised patriotism or ethno-
nationalist sentiments as a strategy for improving the conditions of migrants, especially 
Joseonjoks. However, this approach was challenged by both migrants of non-Korean origin and 
non-migrant activists of globalist motivations.  
The faith-based groups tended to have two distinctive approaches: some concentrated on the 
aggressive propagation of religion, while others were more concerned about institutional 
changes for the improvement of migrant workers’ conditions. Nevertheless, most faith-based 
groups considered the religious faith as their fundamental objective. The aggressive mission-
oriented organisations are often criticised for considering migrants as the target of religious 
conversion, which is far from a multicultural and religiously tolerant attitude. The religious faith 
was the strength of this group in relation to mobilisation of collective actions. However, the 
dogmatic approach of some leaders often became a source of the breakdown of coalitions, 
weakening the movement. 
After the EPS was introduced, the movement declined. Many faith or charity-oriented groups 
turned into service deliverers of government programmes. Most of them gave up the role of 
watchdog but became dependent on the government’s funding and control. The pro-migrant 
organisations’ collusion may be a countermeasure to protect society from extreme exploitation. 
However, they eventually reinforced the governing mechanisms of the temporary labour 
migration schemes and functioned to promote the commodification of migration and labour. 
The new generation of social movement activists in South Korea, which emerged in the context of 
post-authoritarianism and neoliberal globalisation, offered new perspectives to the movements. 
The non-migrant activists joined the movement with various causes: faith, humanitarian, justice, 
anti-capitalism, solidarity with precariat. Despite various personal backgrounds, they identify the 
experience of globalisation and precarisation as important motivations for their activism. They 
considered migrant workers as the colleague-victims of global transformations; thus, they were 
motivated by a sense of solidarity rather than by the emotion of charity, unlike the earlier 
generation. Although they are limited in political influences in policy-making process, it is 
significant that they maintain the transformative quality of the early migrant resistances as well 
as of the anti-neoliberal movements to claim the employer-driven temporary labour migration 
system should be replaced by a work-permit system that allows migrant workers’ right to choose 
a job. They are recently emerging as new leaders of social movement-oriented pro-migrant 
organisations.  
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Chapter 10 Conclusion 
This project began with three questions that arose in the course of my field research in 2012, 
South Korea: ‘what had brought the migrant workers to South Korea?’; ‘why does the South 
Korean government restrict the migrant workers’ free choice of job?’ and ‘why do the migrant 
workers and pro-migrant local activists protest against the South Korean labour migration 
policy?’ A review of political economy, policy studies and social movement studies literature 
informs us that these questions involve three research areas: international migration in the 
context of global and national labour markets; the temporary labour migration scheme as a part 
of employer-driven state policy; and social movements including both migrants’ self-organised 
and non-migrants’ pro-migrant movements. Thus, the primary purpose of this thesis was to 
answer the three grounded questions in theoretical terms and analyse the inter-relations among 
the three areas in the context of neoliberal transformations of the South Korean society. 
Like many other contemporary critical social scientists, I made use of Karl Polanyi’s (2001 [1944]) 
three critical concepts: fictitious commodification that entails disembeddedness; market society as 
a political project; and the protective countermovement as a theoretical framework to analyse 
contemporary social transformations involved in international migration, temporary labour 
migration policy and migrants’ social movements. A theoretical exploration of this thesis suggests 
three theoretical perspectives should be considered for this research: first, the political economic 
background of international labour migration to South Korea has to be understood in the context 
of the transformation of the mode of production management on a global scale, which derives 
from the fictitious commodification of labour and results in disembededness of labour migration. 
Second, the rationales of the South Korean government’s introduction of the temporary labour 
migration scheme has to be understood in the context of a social transformation into market 
society as a neoliberal political project. Third, the motivations of migrant workers and their 
supporters to protest against the South Korean government’s labour migration policy have to be 
understood in the context of a countermovement to protect society from the perils of neoliberal 
social transformation on a global scale. 
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The three approaches, I adopted in this research as identified above, are grounded in syntheses 
of specific theories on international migration, temporary labour migration policy and migrants’ 
social movements.  
First, a synthesis of the segmented labour market theory (Piore, 1979, cited in Massey et al. (1998), 
Lee, 1997), the global political economy of migration (Phillips, 2011, Talani and McMahon, 2015) 
and theories of neoliberal transformations in employment practices and migration (Schierup et al., 
2014, Harvey, 2010, Castles et al., 2014) informs us the segregated labour market in a national 
context is linked with the new global division of labour based on the global value chain as well as 
the precarisation of job as a neoliberal transformation of employment system.  
The thesis research finding on this first theoretical account is that the labour market 
segmentation in South Korea was created or reinforced under the neoliberal restructuring 
process. The process is not an isolated or inevitable stage of economic development but is a part 
of the neoliberal restructuring process of industrial organisation, employment system and the 
state’s role, which has been driven by global capital in association with major political actors in 
South Korea. In Polanyi’s (2001, [1944]) term, this is the process of fictitious commodification that 
entails disembeddedness. It has also to be noted particularly in the South Korean context that the 
restructuring process has created a hierarchical outsourcing system linking transnational 
corporations based in South Korea or chaebols (South Korean conglomerates) and the small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) in South Korea. As presented in Chapter 5, the immigration data and 
labour market indexes show the neoliberal restructuring of the South Korean labour market 
coincided with an influx of migrant workers in the 1990s. The 1997 Asian financial crisis was a 
watershed in the accelerated restructuring of financial, industrial and labour systems in South 
Korea. The hierarchical subcontract system intensified the pressures on wages and working 
conditions of non-unionised workers in SMEs. The South Korean government institutionalised 
the neoliberal ‘flexibilisation’ of the labour market, which accompanied precarisation of jobs and 
the deterioration of workers’ living conditions.  
Second, the migration literature informs us of the emergence, failure and resurrection of 
temporary labour migration policies. They emerged in the post-Second World War period of 
economic expansions in Europe as a way of addressing labour shortages; however, the 
governments failed in maintaining the principle of temporary migration (Castles, 1986). The 
temporary labour migration policies re-emerged in the neoliberal era as ways of enhancing 
employer’s control over workers and reducing the cost of wages and working conditions (Castles 
et al., 2014). The resurrection of temporary labour migration policy was reinforced by such 
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discourses as ‘migration management’, ‘circular migration’ and ‘migration-development nexus’ 
(International Organization for Migration, 2008). However, as critical scholars argue, they have 
to be parts of neoliberal transformation of labour market, if we take into account of their 
characters: ‘propelling competition within precaritized and ethnically niched labour markets’, 
‘functioning as spearheads for “flexibilisation”’ as a labour market regulatory mode, ‘formalizing 
rules and regulations that belongs to a hegemonic neoliberal state’ and disciplining the 
transnational mobility of people (Schierup et al. 2014). In Polanyi’s (2001 [1944]) term, the South 
Korean temporary labour migration policy of today is part of the neoliberal project of 
disembedding migration and labour from society.  
In line with the critical assessment of resurging temporary labour migration policies, the thesis 
research findings also testify that the South Korean version, first in the name of the Industrial 
Trainee System and then of the Employment Permit System (EPS), was an essential element of 
the neoliberal labour market restructuring project. These schemes were oriented to employers’ 
demands for a non-regular and low-waged workforce. The newer policy, EPS, was introduced 
with support from the South Korean civil society and made some improvement in the wages and 
working conditions of migrant workers. However, its primary principles, like ‘complementarity’, 
‘transparency’, ‘temporary migration’ and ‘no discrimination’, have retreated to uphold the core 
principle, ‘alignment with firms’ needs’. To ensure the enforcement of the principles, the South 
Korean government relied on governing mechanisms like unfree choice of jobs, violent 
deportation, a limited entitlement to social security, a paternalistic ‘assistance’ discourse, and 
exclusionary nationalist politics. 
Third, the synthetic approach of contemporary social movement studies, taking into account of 
‘both the how and the why collective action’ (Melucci, 1989, cited in Martin, 2015, pp.94-95), 
suggests social movements are distinguished from other collective action, particularly in the 
aspect of whether they are involved in ‘conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents’ or 
remain ‘consensus movements’ (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, pp.20-23). This problem resonates 
with a long-standing question: whether a movement will reproduce the existing social relations 
or rupture them (e.g. Bassel and Lloyd, 2011). In other words, ‘transformative quality’ 
distinguishes social movements from other forms of collective actions including consensus 
movements. In the context of migrant resistances, the migrant or pro-migrant movement with 
‘transformative quality’, in practice, mobilised ‘the category of “worker” to defitishize the figure 
of the “immigrant” or “illegal”’; reconceptualised ‘migrancy as strategies to escape from economic 
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abjection; and sought to build ‘political solidarities’ of ‘precarious workers’ (Tyler and Marciniak, 
2013, p. 148).  
My ethnographic research of migrant and pro-migrant movements in South Korea informs us that 
the countermovement of migrant workers and the South Korean civil society began with the 
protests against extremely poor working conditions. The individual expressions of grievances 
developed into collective actions that challenged the governing mechanisms of temporary labour 
migration policy, especially deportation. The social movements of migrants, however, faced a 
downturn after the institutionalisation of the temporary labour migration policy, EPS. Pro-
migrant activists, both faith-based and citizens’ movement-oriented, made notable contributions 
by providing both practical services to individual migrants and political assistance to their 
collective actions. Also, they actively engaged with the institutional changes of migration policy. 
However, after the EPS was introduced, many of them turned to focusing on service provisions 
only in collusion with the government’s governing mechanisms for the EPS. While the first 
generation of activists have gradually given up the conflictual relation with the government, a 
newer generation of activists oriented to a social movement approach began to understand the 
interconnectivity among the neoliberal transformation of the global and national labour markets, 
the state’s introduction of temporary labour migration policy, the precarisation of work and the 
role of social movements of non-citizens. Ten years after the EPS was introduced, the fallacies of 
the employer-driven temporary migration programme were noticed by migrant workers. The 
series of migrant workers’ protests in 2012 indicate the revitalising resistance of regular but still 
precarious migrant workers. The migrant and pro-migrant movements begin to regain the 
‘transformative quality’. 
The resistance of migrant workers and local activists is a protective countermovement to re-
embed migration and labour into the society and to redress the fictitious commodification of 
migrant labour. The irregular migrants who were in the most precarious conditions resisted the 
introduction of temporary labour migration policy because it only ‘ex-commodificates’ them by 
deportation. Many pro-migrant organisations’ collusions with the governing mechanisms of the 
temporary labour migration policy may be considered as a measure to protect the society from 
extreme forms of exploitation. However, they also functioned to reinforce the commodification 
process of migrants’ labour. Nevertheless, the revitalising migrant workers’ protests in solidarity 
with South Korean social movement groups, especially anti-globalisation movement, indicate a 
new state of countermovement against neoliberal transformations. 
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Finally, given the topicality and centrality of the question of temporary migration worldwide, it 
would be important to note the comparative value of the results of the analysis in this thesis. 
Although Chapter 2 of this thesis briefly touched the theories and data from studies of temporary 
migration in other parts of the world, a full-fledged comparison between the South Korean case 
and other cases was beyond the scope of this thesis. The findings of this research may have 
particular implications on labour market changes and the role of social movements in similar fast-
growing Asian economies. Thus, a forward looking suggestion from my research would be to 
develop a wider comparative international research agenda on globalisation, migration and social 
movements, bearing on the holistic approach of this thesis that engaged with the historicity, 
political economic structure and transformative agency of temporary labour migration, 
neoliberal transformation and social movements. 
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Appendix I 
List of participatory observations 
No. Title of event 
Dates 
(2012) 
Place Key organiser(s) 
PO_01 [Panel discussion] 
Panel Discussion for 
International Day on the 
Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination: “The 
elimination of racial 
discrimination in Korean 
society, what can we do?” 
20 March  Seoul - Alliance for the Equality and 
Human Rights of Migrants 
- Group for the Improvement of 
Migration Policy 
PO_02 [Panel discussion] 
Panel Discussion for the 
protection of migrant’s social 
rights and the improvement of 
the status of sojourn 
24 April  Seoul - GONGGAM – Human Rights Law 
Foundation 
PO_03, 
PO_04, 
PO_05, 
PO_06 
[Inter-organisational meeting] 
NGO workshops on the CERD’s 
consideration of the report of 
South Korean government, the 
1st, the 2nd, the 3rd and the 5th 
meetings 
24 April, 
24 May, 
13 June, 
3 July 
Seoul - MINBYUN – Lawyers for a 
Democratic Society 
- GONGGAM – Human Rights Law 
Foundation 
- Korea Center for United Nations 
Human Rights Policy 
PO_07 [Rally] 
Migrant Workers’ May Day 
Rally 2012: “Workers of the 
world unite to win labor 
rights!!” 
29 April  Seoul - Korean Confederation of Trade 
Unions (KCTU) 
- Alliance for Migrants Equality and 
Human Rights 
- Joint Committee with Migrants in 
Korea (JCMK) 
PO_08 [Picketing] 
No, no to their 10 demands: bad 
employers and poor foreign 
workers?? 
 
 
 
 
29 April  Seoul - No Multiculture 
- Solidarity for the Eradication of 
Foreign Crime 
- Action Solidarity for the Correct 
View on Multiculture 
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No. Title of event 
Dates 
(2012) 
Place Key organiser(s) 
PO_09 [Cultural event] 
2012 May Day Marathon for the 
social respect of labor and 
prevention of industrial disaster 
1 May Seoul - Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
(FKTU) 
- Economic and Social Development 
Commission 
- Korea Employers Federation (KEF) 
- The Federation of Korean 
Industries (FKI) 
- The Korean Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry 
PO_10 [Rally] 
No work, No chore, No School: 
General strike for you 
1 May Seoul - Basic Income Youth Network 
- Nodeul Night School for the 
Disabled 
- Research Commune Suyunomo R 
PO_11 [Rally] 
The 122th International 
Workers’ Day Rally: Beyond the 
rage against the world of 1%; 
Let’s go toward the general 
strike!; Abolish non-regular job! 
Stop layoff! 
1 May Seoul - Korea Confederation of Trade 
Union (KCTU) 
PO_12 [Inter-organisational meeting] 
Preparatory meeting for the 
report on migrant children’s 
rights to childcare 
23 May Gyeonggi - Asia Chang 
- Kosian’s House 
PO_13 [Panel discussion] 
2012 Woldam Project for 
Sharing Culture with Refugees: 
the first meeting, the life story of 
an Ugandan refugee 
24 May Seoul - NANCEN – Center for Refugee’s 
Rights 
PO_14, 
PO_15, 
PO_16 
[Inter-organisational meeting] 
Executive committee of Alliance 
for the Equality and Human 
Rights of Migrants, the 8th, 9th 
and 10th meetings 
7 June, 
26 June, 
17 July 
Seoul - Alliance for the Equality and 
Human Rights of Migrants 
PO_17 [Rally] 
Rally to Urge the Cease of Brutal 
Intensive Crackdowns of 
Undocumented Migrant 
Workers 
14 June Seoul - Alliance for the Equality and 
Human Rights of Migrants 
- Joint Committee with Migrants in 
Korea (JCMK) 
PO_18 [Panel discussion] 
2012 Refugee Day Forum: The 
transition toward the challenge 
of refugee settlement after the 
legislation of Refugee Act 
19 June Seoul - NANCEN – Center for Refugee’s 
Rights 
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No. Title of event 
Dates 
(2012) 
Place Key organiser(s) 
PO_19 [Public hearing] 
Public Hearing for the 
Introduction of Permanent 
Residence Status-Prepositive 
Principle 
20 June Seoul - Ministry of Justice 
PO_20 [Internal meeting] 
Labour Migration Team of 
MINBYUN-Lawyers for a 
Democratic Society, Monthly 
Meetings, the 20th meetings 
23 Aug. Seoul - Labour Migration Team of 
MINBYUN-Lawyers for a 
Democratic Society 
PO_21 [Inter-organisational meeting] 
Preparatory meeting for the 
whitepaper on migrant workers 
in agricultural sector 
28 June Gyeonggi - Migrant Rights Network 
PO_22 [Panel discussion] 
Migrant Rights Network Policy 
Workshop: the reality of 
migrant’s rights of sojourn and 
the plan for its improvement 
10 July Daejeon - Migrant Rights Network 
PO_23 [Internal meeting] 
Migrant Rights Network 
Steering Committee, the 4th 
meeting 
11 July Daejoen - Migrant Rights Network 
PO_24 [Inter-organisational meeting] 
Emergency Planning 
Committee for the Withdrawal 
of Ministry of Employment and 
Labor’s Rule imposing the 
Slavery Labor of Migrant 
Workers, National Meeting on 
the Deprivation of Right to 
Select Workplace 
18 July Seoul - Ad-hoc Committee for the 
Withdrawal of Ministry of 
Employment and Labor’s Rule 
imposing the Slavery Labor of 
Migrant Workers 
PO_25 [Rally] 
Rally to commemorate the 
migrant women killed by 
domestic violence: “Migrant 
women’s rights not to be killed” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 July  Seoul - Eulim –Migrant Women and Multi-
cultural Family’s Center 
- Korea Center for Migrant Women’s 
Human Rights 
- Forum on Migrant Women’s Rights 
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No. Title of event 
Dates 
(2012) 
Place Key organiser(s) 
PO_26 [Rally] 
National Rally against Ministry 
of Employment and Labor: 
Deprivation of Right to Select 
Workplace! Imposition of 
Slavery Labor of Migrant 
Workers! 
18 July Gyeonggi - Korea Confederation of Trade 
Union (KCTU) 
- Alliance for the Equality and 
Human Rights of Migrants 
- Migrant Rights Network 
- Gyeonggi Joint Committee on 
Migrant Workers 
- Busan Gyeongnam Joint Committee 
for Migrant Rights 
- Daegu Gyeongbuk Solidary Council 
on Migrant Worker’s Human Rights 
and Labor Rights 
- Incheon Solidary for Migrant 
Movement 
PO_27, 
PO_28, 
PO_29, 
PO_30 
[Forum] 
Solidary Conference of Migrant 
Communities, the 1st, 2nd,, 3rd 
and 4th meetings 
12 Aug..,  
26 Aug., 
9 Sept., 
21 Oct. 
Seoul - Ad-hoc Committee for the 
Withdrawal of Ministry of 
Employment and Labor’s Rule 
imposing the Slavery Labor of 
Migrant Workers 
PO_31 [Rally] 
Migrant Worker’s Day of 
Struggle: Abolish the EPS! 
Guarantee the Job Change! 
Achieve Basic Labor Rights! 
19 Aug. Seoul - Ad-hoc Committee for the 
Withdrawal of Ministry of 
Employment and Labor’s Rule 
imposing the Slavery Labor of 
Migrant Workers 
PO_32 [Forum] 
Labor Movement Forum 
19 Aug. Seoul - People’s Solidary for Social 
Progress 
PO_33 [Cultural event] 
Making Fuss with Cort Col-tec 
Guitar Making Workers: Film 
Screening at Strike Site  
30 Aug. Incheon - Col-tec Worker’s Union 
- Incheon Human Rights Film 
Festival 
PO_34 [Panel discussion] 
National Assembly Discussion 
on the Migrant Worker’s Right 
to Change Workplace 
31 Aug. Seoul - Member of National Assembly, Eun 
Soo Mi 
- Emergency Planning Committee 
for the Withdrawal of Ministry of 
Employment and Labor’s Rule 
imposing the Slavery Labor of 
Migrant Workers 
PO_35 [Campaign] 
Campaign for Migrant Workers 
in Noksan Industrial Complex 
 
 
 
 
5 Sept. Busan - Search for Hope for Noksan 
Workers 
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No. Title of event 
Dates 
(2012) 
Place Key organiser(s) 
PO_36 [Rally] 
Migrant Worker's Day of 
Struggle: Listen to Migrant 
Worker's Voices! Ministry of 
Employment and Labor, 
Withdraw the Rule on 
Workplace change! Abolish the 
EPS! Win the Fundamental 
Labor Right! Guarantee the 
Right to Freely Change 
Workplace!  
23 Sept. Seoul - Ad-hoc Committee for the 
Withdrawal of Ministry of 
Employment and Labor’s Rule 
imposing the Slavery Labor of 
Migrant Workers 
PO_37 [Press conference] 
Press Conference to Urge the 
Abolition of the EPS and the 
Implementation of UN 
Convention on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination 
12 Oct. Seoul - Joint Committee with Migrants in 
Korea (JCMK) 
PO_38 [Inter-organisational meeting] 
Labour migration team meeting 
of Joint Committee with 
Migrants in Korea (JCMK) 
12 Oct. Seoul - Joint Committee with Migrants in 
Korea (JCMK) 
PO_39 [Cultural event] 
The 7th Migrant Film Festival at 
Ansan 
20 Oct. Gyeonggi - Migrant Film Festival 
- Earthian’s Station 
PO_40 [Rally] 
Migrant Workers Are Not 
Slaves! - Migrant Worker’s 
Speak Out: Testimony on the 
New EPS Rule of Job Change 
and the Announcement of 
Signature Campaign 
28 Oct. Seoul - Ad-hoc Committee for the 
Withdrawal of Ministry of 
Employment and Labor’s Rule 
imposing the Slavery Labor of 
Migrant Workers 
PO_41 [Migrant communities] 
Meeting with the Philippines 
Embassy in Seoul on the 
protection of Filipinos in Korea 
6 Nov. Seoul - The Philippines Embassy in Seoul 
- KASAMMAKO 
- Migrant Trade Union 
PO_42 [Internal meeting] 
Forum on migrant women’s 
rights, monthly meeting 
 
 
19 May Seoul - Forum on Migrant Women’s 
Rights 
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List of research participants 
No. Pseudonym Age10 Gender Occupation & role11 
Country of 
origin 
Dates 
(2012) 
Place of 
interview 
RP_01 PC 50s Male - Director of a migrant 
advocacy NGO 
- Fmr. representative 
of an NGO coalition 
- Pastor 
Korea 23 Oct. Gyeonggi 
RP_02 KH 50s Male - Director of a migrant 
advocacy NGO 
- Fmr. representative 
of an NGO coalition 
- Pastor 
Korea 24 Nov. Seoul 
RP_03 LG 50s Female - Fmr. director of a 
migrant advocacy 
NGO 
- Senior member of a 
development NGO 
- Fmr. representative 
of an NGO coalition 
- Member of an 
international 
religious group 
Korea 9 Nov. Seoul 
RP_04 JG 50s Female - Director of a migrant 
advocacy NGO 
- Fmr. representative 
of an NGO coalition 
Korea 14 Nov. Busan 
RP_05 YH 40s Female - Former director of a 
migrant advocacy 
NGO 
- Former 
representative of an 
NGO coalition 
Korea 11 Jun. Seoul 
RP_06 CEP 60s Male - Fmr. director of a 
migrant advocacy 
NGO 
- Fmr. representative 
of an NGO coalition 
- CEO of a social 
enterprise 
- Pastor 
Korea 19 July  Seoul 
                                                             
10 The ages of research participants are as at the time of interview. 
11 The occupations and roles of research participants are as at the time of interview. 
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No. Pseudonym Age Gender Occupation & role 
Country of 
origin 
Dates 
(2012) 
Place of 
interview 
RP_07 KGD 30s Male - Director of a migrant 
advocacy NGO 
- Representative of an 
NGO coalition 
Korea 7 Nov.,  
2 May, 
22 Oct. 
 
Incheon 
RP_08 KI 40s Male - Director of a migrant 
advocacy NGO 
- Film producer 
Korea 23 Nov, 
13 Sep., 
17 Oct. 
Gyeonggi 
RP_09 KM 40s Female - Staff member of a 
migrant advocacy 
NGO 
Korea 12 Jun.  Gyeonggi 
RP_10 LYA 40s Female - Director of a migrant 
advocacy NGO 
- Representative of an 
NGO coalition 
Korea 12 Jun.  Gyeonggi 
RP_11 LJW 30s Female - Activist of a political 
movement 
organisation 
- Representative of an 
NGO coalition 
Korea 14 Jun.  Seoul 
RP_12 LY 40s Male - Director of a migrant 
advocacy NGO 
- Fmr. representative 
of an NGO coalition 
- Pastor 
Korea 15, 21 
Jun.  
Gyeonggi 
RP_13 JYS 30s Male - Activist of a political 
movement 
organization 
- Representative of an 
NGO coalition 
Korea 29 Jun. Seoul 
RP_14 CHM 40s Male - Fmr. director of a 
migrant advocacy 
NGO 
- Fmr. representative 
of an NGO coalition 
- Staff member of a 
human rights NGO 
Korea 13, 15 
Aug.  
Seoul 
RP_15 LJS 40s Male - Director of a migrant 
advocacy NGO 
- Pastor 
Korea 21 Aug.  Seoul 
RP_16 AT 30s Female - Staff member of a 
migrant advocacy 
NGO 
Vietnam 24 Aug.  Busan 
320 
No. Pseudonym Age Gender Occupation & role 
Country of 
origin 
Dates 
(2012) 
Place of 
interview 
RP_17 TT 30s Male - Staff member of a 
migrant advocacy 
NGO 
Myanmar 4 Sep.  Busan 
RP_18 KGR 30s Female - Staff member of a 
migrant advocacy 
NGO 
Korea 5 Sep.  Busan 
RP_19 BH 20s Male - Staff member of a 
migrant advocacy 
NGO 
- Postgraduate student 
Japan 17 Oct.  Gyeonggi 
RP_20 WS 40s Male - Director of a migrant 
advocacy NGO 
- Pastor 
- Fmr. representative 
of an NGO coalition 
Korea 12 Oct.  Seoul 
RP_21 LW 30s Male - Director of a migrant 
advocacy NGO 
Korea 12 Oct.  Seoul 
RP_22 LI 40s Male - Staff member of a 
migrant advocacy 
NGO 
 
 
Korea 12 Oct.  Seoul 
RP_23 KY 50s Female - Director of a 
childcare center for 
migrant children 
Korea 16 Oct.  Gyeonggi 
RP_24 JH 40s Female - Staff member of a 
migrant advocacy 
NGO 
- Postgraduate student 
Korea 21 Oct.  Gyeonggi 
RP_25 LT 30s Male - Director of a human 
rights NGO 
Korea 6 Jun.  Seoul 
RP_26 BJ 30s Female - Staff member of a 
human rights NGO 
- Fmr. activist of a 
political movement 
organisation 
Korea 15 Jun.  Seoul 
RP_27 PR 50s Male - Director of a human 
rights NGO 
Korea 17 Aug.  Seoul 
RP_28 JY 30s Male - Staff member of a 
human rights NGO 
Korea 17 Aug.  Seoul 
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No. Pseudonym Age Gender Occupation & role 
Country of 
origin 
Dates 
(2012) 
Place of 
interview 
RP_29 KR 30s Female - Activist of a political 
movement 
organisation 
- Representative of an 
NGO coalition 
Korea 30 Aug.  Incheon 
RP_30 MK 30s Trans-
gender 
- Former trade union 
leader 
Philippines 30 Nov.  Manila 
RP_31 PS 50s Male - Staff member of a 
trade union 
Korea 1 May  Seoul 
RP_32 UR 40s Male - Trade union leader Nepal 12 Jun.  
 
Seoul 
RP_33 TS 20s Female - Member of a trade 
union 
- Factory worker 
Cambodia 9 Sep.  Seoul 
RP_34 JM 40s Male - Staff member of a 
human rights NGO 
Labour Attorney 
Korea 23 Aug. Seoul 
RP_35 YJ 30s Female - Attorney-at-law Korea 23 Aug.  Seoul 
RP_36 CES 40s Female - Labour Attorney Korea 23 Aug.  Seoul 
RP_37 CHJ 40s Female - Staff member of an 
international 
organisation 
Korea 5 Jun. Seoul 
RP_38 HS 40s Male - Government 
employee 
Korea 1 Aug. Seoul 
RP_39 LJH 40s Female - Representative of an 
international 
organization 
Korea 31 Aug. Seoul 
RP_40 JH 40s Male - Government 
employee 
Korea 18 Sep.  Gyeonggi 
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Appendix II 
Semi-structured interview schedule 1 
ID: A - 
Social Transformation and International Migration in South Korea 
: A Human Rights Movement Perspective 
 
Interview Schedule for of In-depth Interview 
(Questionnaire A) 
[To be Asked to Senior Social Movement Activists] 
 
Informed Consent 
 
Thank you for participating in the interview. This interview is a part of a PhD research project 
titled “Social Transformation and International Migration in South Korea: A Human Rights 
Movement Perspective”. This research is conducted under the supervision of Professor Stephen 
Castles and based at Department of Sociology and Social Policy, The University of Sydney. This 
study seeks to examine how South Korean human rights movement has responded to the social 
consequences of the neo-liberal economic restructurings before and after 1997 East Asian 
Financial Crisis with particular focus on the area of international migration. 
The results of this interview will be used strictly for my academic purpose including my thesis, 
academic publications and presentations at academic conferences. 
Since this study employs the biographical narrative method, the identity of interviewees will be 
inevitably publicized. Participation in this interview is completely voluntary and you can choose not to 
answer any question or withdraw yourself from this interview at any time. After all the sessions of 
interviews, you will be requested to review the transcript of your interviews. If you wish any part of the 
transcript should remain confidential, the part will be erased and unused for any purpose. 
May I begin with the interview now? 
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SECTION A: BIO DATA 
 
A.1. Name   ………………………………………………………………… 
A.2. Age   ………………………………………………………………… 
A.3. Gender   ………………………………………………………………… 
A.4. Ethnicity (or nationality)………………………………………………………………… 
A.5. Current affiliation(s) and position(s) 
Affiliation 1 ………………………………………………………………… 
Position 1 ………………………………………………………... 
Affiliation 2 ………………………………………………………………… 
Position 2 ………………………………………………………..  
A.6. Contact information(s) 
 (Phone)  …………………………………………………………………… 
 (Email)  …………………………………………………………………… 
A.7. When did you first engage yourself into social activities? 
 (1) 1970s (Go to SECTION B)  (2) 1980s (Go to SECTION C) 
 (3) 1990s (Go to SECTION D)  (4) 2000s (Go to SECTION E) 
 
SECTION B: HISTORY OF ACTIVISM in 1970s 
 
B.1. ~ B.10. Questions on personal experiences 
B.1. What kind of social activities were you involved in 1970s? 
B.2. What organisation were you involved in then? Please list the names of organisations, groups or 
networks, which you were involved in. 
B.3. Please also list the positions you held in each organisation. 
B.4. What were the motives of your involvement in the activities? Was there any momentum or 
special event which brought you into social movement? 
B.5. What were the main causes of your activities in this period? 
B.6. What were the main goals for these activities and how did you achieve them or did not? 
B.7. How did your activities develop for this period? 
B.8. How did the organisations develop for this period? 
B.9. How did such involvement in the social activities change your lifestyle and ideas? 
B.10. How did your experiences in this period influence your activities and thoughts of the present 
time? 
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B.11. ~ B.20. Questions on social context 
B.11. What were the main political, legal, social and economic issues which you were mostly 
concerned about during this period? Why do you think they were so important? 
B.12. How did different groups of social actors such as government, media and business respond to 
the issues?  
B.13. How did other groups of social movement respond to such issues? 
B.14. How did you respond to such issues with your social activities and how were they different 
from others?  
B.15. Where do you think your activities and yourself are located in the spectrums of political ideas, 
economic classes, closeness to government, cultural diversities, etc.?  
B.16. How do you think such events influenced the daily lives of general people during this period? 
What were the challenges which they had to face? 
B.17. How did you communicate or interact with the public in the society during this period? Did you 
find it successful? 
B.18. Was there any perceived global force which influenced the political, economic, legal and social 
conditions of Korea during this period? 
B.19. If so, how did this force influence the lives of people in Korea? 
B.20. If so, how did different groups of Korean society such government, media, business and social 
movement, respond to this force in various manners? 
 
B.21. ~ B.30. Questions on perceptions on social transformation and international migration 
B.21. How did Korean society change during this period, in particular relations with political, legal, 
economic and social conditions? What were the major changes compared to the previous decade 
(1960s)? 
B.22. What were the major sources of such social changes? 
B.23. Was there any specific historic event or watershed which brought about significant social 
changes during this period? If so, what were the main causes of this event? 
B.24. How do you think different groups of Korean society (e.g. government, media, business and 
social movement) responded to the historic event in different manners? Was there any specific 
event, which may symbolise the different approaches of each group? If so, what was it? 
B.25. What did such social transformation mean in your life and your social activities? 
B.26. Were international migration and ethnic or cultural diversity social concerns during this period? 
If so, what were the major issues? 
B.27. How do you think different groups of Korean society (e.g. government, media, business and 
social movement) responded to the issues of international migration and ethnic or cultural 
diversity during this period? Was there any specific event, which may symbolise the different 
approaches of each group? If so, what was it? 
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B.28. What were your understandings of the issues of international migration and ethnic or cultural 
diversity during this period? 
B.29. How did you respond to the issues of international migration and ethnic or cultural diversity 
with your social activities? 
B.30. How did you understand the relation between social transformation and international migration 
during this period, if you try to evaluate them from the perspective of the present time? 
 
SECTION C: HISTORY OF ACTIVISM in 1980s 
 
C.1. ~ C.30. Same as questions B.1. ~ B.30. of SECTION B, except the period to be changed to 
1980s. 
 
SECTION D: HISTORY OF ACTIVISM in 1990s 
 
D.1. ~ D.30. Same as questions B.1. ~ B.30. of SECTION B, except the period to be changed to 
1990s. 
 
SECTION E: HISTORY OF ACTIVISM in 2000s 
 
E.1. ~ E.30. Same as questions B.1. ~ B.30. of SECTION B, except the period to be changed to 
2000s. 
 
SECTION F: VIEWS ON SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS 
 
F.1. How do you define social transformation? 
F.2. What does social transformation mean in Korean society? 
F.3. How, do you think, Korean society has been transformed over the last three decades? What 
makes you think so? 
F.4. What have been the main sources of such transformations? 
F.5. How has Korean society responded to such transformations in general? 
F.6. How did such social transformations influence your life and social activities? 
F.7. How have people been influenced by such social transformations? How have people influenced 
the process of social transformations? 
F.8. How do you define globalisation? 
F.9. How do you evaluate the influence of globalisation in the transformation of Korean society? 
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F.10. How have people have responded to the globalisation in Korea? How have you responded to 
globalisation? 
 
SECTION G: VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 
 
G.1. Do you think there were significant changes in international migration to Korea for the last 
decade? If so, why and how did it happen? 
G.2. How did the increased international migration influence Korean society for the last decade? 
G.3. How did Korean society in general or different groups of Korean society contribute to the 
increase of international migration? 
G.4. What was the influence of the increased international migration on your life and your social 
activities? 
G.5. How has Korean society responded to such changes in general? How have different groups of 
society such as government, media, business and civil society responded to the social changes? 
G.6. If their responses are different, what made such difference? 
G.7. How do you evaluate the validity and effects of the different approaches taken by different 
social groups?  
G.8. Which social group does each approach represent or benefit?  What are the political 
backgrounds of each approach? 
G.9. How do you evaluate the depth and width of understandings of Korean society about various 
aspects of international migration such as the cause of migration, the perspectives of origin 
societies, etc.? 
G.10. How do you evaluate your activities on international migration in this regards? 
 
SECTION H: VIEWS ON SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
 
H.1. How do you define social movement? How is it different from other similar concepts such as 
civil society, non-governmental organisations, etc. 
H.2. Can you categorise different types of social activities which you can find in Korea for the last 
three decades, in particular focus on those groups working on international migration? If so, 
how? What are the differences among those categories? 
H.3. What is the relationship of each category with other actors of the society such as government, 
media and business? 
H.4. What were the contributions of each social activity to the political, legal, economic and social 
dimensions of Korean society for the last three decades? 
H.5. What are the differences among the positions held by different groups of those social activities 
toward the transformations of Korean society? What are their contributions to the 
transformations? 
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H.6. What are the differences among the positions held by different groups of those social activities 
toward the globalisation? What are their activities like on this issue? 
H.7. What are the differences among the positions held by different groups of those social activities 
toward the idea of human rights? What are their activities like on this issue? 
H.8. Which category do you think your social activities belong to among the above mentioned? 
H.9. How do you evaluate the contribution of the group which you belong to or your own 
organisation to the political, legal, economic and social dimensions of Korean society for the 
last three decades? 
H.10. What do you think the role of social movement in Korean society in general? 
 
SECTION I: VIEWS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
I.1. How do you define human rights? 
I.2. Where does your definition of human rights come from? How were your ideas on human rights 
formed? 
I.3. What are the significances of the ideas of human rights in social movement? 
I.4. What do you think the significance of the idea of universality is in relation with the concept of 
human rights? 
I.5. Do you think the claim of universal human rights may have different significance than other 
types of rights-claim? If so, how? 
I.6. What are the implications of universal human rights in your social activities in particular 
relation with your activities on international migration? 
I.7. How do you think human rights are understood in Korean society? What do you think about 
such discourse of human rights? Are they different from the discourses of international 
community? 
I.8. What are the differences, in the understandings of human rights among different types of 
organisations working on migrants? Why are they different? 
I.9. What is your position about the idea of universal human rights? How has it been developed for 
the last three decades? 
I.10. How has the ideas of human rights influenced your social activities, in particular the 
relationship with your activities on international migration? 
 
Thank you for your time.  
If you have any question, comment or suggestion, please do not hesitate to share with me. 
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Semi-structured interview schedule 2 
 
ID: B - 
Social Transformation and International Migration in South Korea 
: A Human Rights Movement Perspective 
 
Interview Schedule for General Interview 
(Questionnaire B) 
[To be Asked to Junior Social Movement Activists and Others] 
 
Informed Consent 
 
Thank you for participating in the interview. This interview is a part of a PhD research project titled 
“Social Transformation and International Migration in South Korea: A Human Rights Movement 
Perspective”. This research is conducted under the supervision of Professor Stephen Castles and based 
in Department of Sociology and Social Policy, at The University of Sydney. This study seeks to examine 
how South Korean human rights movement has responded to the social consequences of the neo-liberal 
economic restructurings before and after 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis with particular focus on the 
area of international migration. 
The results of this interview will be used for the academic purpose including my thesis, academic 
publications and presentations at academic conference.  
Whatever information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and will not be shown to any other 
person. Participation in this interview is completely voluntary and you can choose not to answer any 
question or withdraw yourself from this interview at any time. After all the sessions of interviews, if 
you wish you may review the transcript of your interviews.  
May I begin with the interview now? 
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SECTION A: BIO DATA 
 
A.1. Name   ………………………………………………………………… 
A.2. Age   ………………………………………………………………… 
A.3. Gender   ………………………………………………………………… 
A.4. Ethnicity (or nationality)………………………………………………………………… 
A.5. Current affiliation(s) and position(s) 
Affiliation 1 ………………………………………………………………… 
Position 1 ………………………………………………………... 
  Affiliation 2 ………………………………………………………………… 
Position 2 ………………………………………………………...  
A.6. Contact information(s) 
 (Phone)  …………………………………………………………………… 
 (Email)  …………………………………………………………………… 
 
SECTION B: CURRENT ACTIVISM 
 
B.1. ~ B.3. Questions on current activities 
B.1. What kind of social activities are you currently involved in? 
B.2. What are the main goals of your activities? 
B.3. What are the main goals for these activities and how do you achieve them? 
 
B.4. ~ B.12. Questions on social context 
B.4. What are the main political, legal, social and economic issues which you are mostly concerned 
about at present? Why do you think they are so important? 
B.5. How do different groups of social actors such as government, media, business respond to the 
issues in different manner?  
B.6. How do other groups of social movement respond to such issues? 
B.7. How do you respond to such issues with your social activities and how were they different from 
others?  
B.8. Where do you think your activities and yourself are located in the spectrums of political ideas, 
economic classes, closeness to government, cultural diversities, etc.?  
B.9. How do you communicate or interact with the public? 
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B.10. Is there any perceived global force, which influences the political, economic, legal and social 
conditions of Korea? 
B.11. If so, how does this force influence the lives of people in Korea? 
B.12. If so, how do different groups of Korean society such government, media, business and social 
movement, respond to this force in various manners? 
 
SECTION C: VIEWS ON SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS 
 
C.1. ~ C.10. Same as questions F.1. ~ F.10. of SECTION F of Questionnaire A. 
 
SECTION D: VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 
 
D.1. ~ D.10. Same as questions G.1. ~ G.10. of SECTION G of Questionnaire A. 
 
SECTION E: VIEWS ON SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
 
E.1. ~ E.10. Same as questions H.1. ~ H.10. of SECTION H of Questionnaire A. 
 
SECTION F: VIEWS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
F.1. ~ F.10. Same as questions I.1. ~ I.10. of SECTION I of Questionnaire A. 
 
Thank you for your time. 
If you have any question, comment or suggestion, please do not hesitate to share with me. 
 
 
 
 
 
